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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
A) Surveying the landscape – The problem of monopoly 
Arguably, the monopoly phenomenon displays the entangled 
interaction between law and economics more than any other 
issues of antitrust-competition law. At first blush, monopoly can 
be described as a plausible occurrence of the firm’s lifecycle, to 
which legal effects are unavoidably reconnected; a market is 
monopolized when one firm is the sole supplier of a good or of a 
service. With that affirmed, what are the consequences in the 
realm of law of a market shifting towards monopoly? 
The negative incidents of monopoly that ipso facto substantiate 
antitrust intervention are similar in every legal system based on 
rule of law: the monopolist will raise the price for the product, 
being the sole supplier; the absence of competition will thwart 
technological innovation; last but not least, the monopolist will 
subtract “shares” of welfare from the aggregate welfare of the 
market to the detriment of consumers.  
Yet, the justification for antitrust intervention generates some 
confusion if one ponders on the postulation that firms are profit 
maximizers and will inevitably tend to subtract market shares 
from their competitors, thereby causing an overall reduction of 
competition. Parallel to that, another element of confusion is the 
rethinking of the monopoly phenomenon in light of both network 
effects and economies of scale that consumers can benefit from. If 
network effects characterize a market, one product moves towards 
dominance because the convenience of it increases in accordance 
with the increase of the number of people using them. The firm 
would extract a lower price, or a “network” utility in accordance 
with the increase of the purchases of the good or service, on the 
one hand, and with the increase of the demand for these, on the 
other hand (economies of scale). 
The laws of monopoly, in other terms, are to account of three 
conflicting forces: first, every capitalist market structure accepts 
the idea that a firm tends to eliminate competition in order to 
increase its efficiency; second, the attainment of monopoly justifies 
antitrust intervention in virtually every legal systems, on a more 
or less conservative basis: the traditional incidents of monopoly 
are almost universally perceived as evil; third, if the market is 
characterized by network effects and economies of scale, the 
attainment of a monopolistic position will not be inherently and 
aprioristically detrimental to purchasers.  
It follows that antitrust intervention is always called to strike a 
balance between the interest of consumers in having a competitive 
price, the interest of competitors in having an open market, and
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the interest of those efficient firms in competing aggressively and 
driving less efficient firms off competition. 
Here lies the conceptual difficulty of disciplining monopoly, 
which is also inherently entrenched into one of the traditional 
open questions of capitalist economies: how can a legal order 
mediate between the need to incentivize private enterprise and the 
need to protect the market structure and consumers? Or, with 
respect to antitrust, at what point does a legal order need antitrust 
laws to discipline the unilateral practices of the firm?  
It will be seen that case law has usually been oscillating in this 
subject matter, and has expanded and contracted its intervention, 
failing to identify monopolization standards unambiguously, 
unlike economic science. Both American and European 
jurisprudence have resorted to economic notions, where legal 
arguments proved unsuitable to elucidate all the determinants of 
this domain. 
From a legal perspective, monopoly is a nuanced phenomenon, 
whose peculiarities are neither entirely encompassed in the 
shaping of statutory rules, nor in the judge-made law. Professor 
Sacco describes the difficulties of the law-making process based 
on incomplete information by using the figure of speech 
“synecdoque”, which conveys the idea that law is a complex 
evolutionary order and decision-makers only account for a small 
part of it, when they develop rules of universal application1. 
Likewise, with regard to the monopoly phenomenon, the 
cognizance of its complexity is only partly conveyed in its 
regulation.  
Moreover, the difficulties of determining the monopoly contours 
stem from the fact that several factors impact on it, from both an 
economic and a legal standpoint. Monopoly is first of all a market 
occurrence, whereby it is subject to the laws of demand and 
supply; monopoly is an antitrust concern, subject to both 
lawmakers’ and courts’ intervention; monopoly is also a political 
concern, subject to majoritarian or minoritarian biases typical of 
every political process. A meaningful depiction of this 
phenomenon cannot abstract from considering these three 
processes, their different impact, and their interaction. Therefore, 
the analysis of the monopoly phenomenon should never overlook 
at the three institutions that affect it, namely the market, the role 
of both courts and lawmakers, and the government action. 
In the realm of law, the discipline of monopoly is first of all a 
regulatory framework against those market failures that 
undermine the efficiency of the overall market structure; second, 
monopoly laws are a tool available to courts to police the 
                                                
1 P.G. Monateri and R. Sacco, Legal Formants, in P. Newman, (ed.), The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of conomics and the Law, Vol. 2 London: MacMillan, (1998), p. 
531 
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contrasting interest of parties; third, monopoly laws are the 
product of all the interests and the values that are represented in 
the political process, which, by definition, is free in its ends.      
 
B) Demarcating the scope – Comparative, legal and economic 
analysis 
The first pillar on which the present essay stands is the 
comparative analysis. What it seeks to compare is how two legal 
systems deal with the liability of a firm for monopolizing a market. 
Accordingly, the main question of the dissertation is: how do the 
selected legal systems react when a firm that uses its market 
power to monopolize the market in which it operates?  
The legal systems selected are the United States, and its discipline 
of monopoly pursuant to § 2 of the Sherman Act, and the 
European Union, and its discipline of the abuse of dominant 
position pursuant to article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union.  
Preliminarily, it is to be affirmed that the choice of analyzing the 
two systems is not coincidental, as their peculiarities will permit to 
treat these as models symbolizing the two most typically 
recognized legal families of comparative science, the Common 
Law family, as regards the United States, and the Civil Law family, 
as regards the European Union. In that respect, good comparative 
law should not only assert the differences and similarities between 
legal systems, but should also be able to trace concrete models 
within the legal rules analyzed. Indeed, the mere juxtaposition of 
rules would be an incomplete endeavor2. 
In both Common and Civil law, liberal thinking found a way into 
the law of abusive unilateral conduct of the firm, especially with 
respect to the individual right of the entrepreneur to determine its 
own future by freely made decisions and to determine its own 
success based on his market performance. As it will be seen, 
however, some great differences exist mainly between the 
common law and the civil law understanding of the limits of the 
firm’s freedom to exercise its market power, which find their 
justification in the different policy concerns characterizing the 
models at stake.  
The Common law tradition puts more emphasis on parties 
protecting their own interests and takes party inequalities lesser 
into account. It is therefore more individualistic and more 
concerned with the promotion of efficiency and the enhancement 
of the nation’s wealth. In this light, it is peculiar of the Common 
law tradition the adherence of the American law of 
monopolization to economic principles, first and foremost the 
                                                
2 R. Sacco, One Hundred Years of Comparative Law, 75 Tulane Law Review 1159 
(2000) 
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concept of efficiency, and the refusal of dogmatic and moral 
notions, such as the concern for fairness in transactions.  
The Civil law tradition, on the other hand, is more dogmatic and 
has infused the law of abusive dominance with moral elements in 
which it finds its rethorical justification, such as a general concern 
for the fairness of transaction and for the promotion of a social 
market economy. Further, it will be seen how deeply the concern 
for the fostering of the Internal Market affects the molding of the 
European discipline, producing significant divergences compared 
to the American law of monopolization.  
From a comparative standpoint, notwithstanding the lack of a 
structural and literal equivalent to the American notion of 
monopolization in the European discipline, it will prove fruitful to 
look at the selected legal systems as to find functionally equivalent 
objects, rather than structural ones. Thus, the research will have a 
functional, problem-solving attitude, whose departing point will 
be the situation in which a firm has abused its high market power 
to drive one or more competitors off the market. In that respect, 
the disciplines of monopolization and of abuse of dominant 
positions are juxtaposable in terms of functional equivalence, since 
neither sanctions the static attainment of monopoly, but the 
dynamic abuse of the monopolistic position with a view to 
dampening competition on a market, to the detriment of both 
competitors and consumers. 
Consequently, to quote Professor Rodolfo Sacco, “to see the law as 
a whole one must find a suitable place for the laws, definitions, 
reason, principle and so on”3 and being able to map them in a 
proper and clear way. The functional equivalence will lead to an 
understanding of law not based on the mere analysis of the legal 
rules, but based on the description of the movements of law. The 
purpose of the comparison will not be “to identify the ‘better rule’, 
but solely to highlight the itineraries law follows overtime and in 
different legal cultures and environments without forcing a 
specific one”4. 
Unfolding the legal formants that shape the laws of 
monopolization and of abusive dominance can best convey the 
itineraries that the two legal models follow5; it will be argued that 
the legislative formant plays a marginal role in both models, since 
both § 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 102 TFEU are broad 
invitations to courts to elaborate a law of unilateral abusive 
practices. Parallel to that, the judicial formant plays a pivotal role 
                                                
3 R. Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 Am. J. 
Comp. Law 1, 27 (1991) 
4 G. Comandè, Legal Comparison and Measures: It is Logic to Go Beyond Numerical 
Comparative Law, forthcoming, p. 3 
5 R. Sacco, Legal Formants: A dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 1, (1991) 
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in both models, to the extent that the role of judge-made law is 
significantly more prominent than the statutory law one, in a 
manner that is more familiar to the Common law tradition. Last 
but not least, the impact of the doctrinal formant is particularly 
evident with regard to the role of economic analysis of law in the 
definition of legal standard.  
It will be seen, for instance, that the American shaping of the law 
of predation is mostly based on the cost-based school that 
Harvard Professors Areeda and Turner have developed, which 
has also had significant resonance in the European Union. 
Similarly, the influence of the Chicago School of law and 
economics and of the Harvard School, both in the US and the EU, 
and of the Freiburg Ordoliberal School, in the EU only, signifies 
how manifestly the legal question at stake is affected by 
scholarship. In accordance with the different degree of impact of 
the three formants, this essay will focus more on the judicial and 
scholarly notions of monopolization and of abusive dominance, 
and less on the statutory laws, owing to the scarcity of legislative 
sources. 
The second pillar of the essay is the inclusion of some 
straightforward economic analysis of law in the description of the 
models. When it comes to both monopoly and abusive dominance, 
the synecdoque implied in the complexity of the facts that both 
statutory and judge-made law intend to regulate, and that 
scholarship intends to survey, in all likelihood will not be resolved 
by this dissertation; at any rate, a larger picture of the 
phenomenon will be captured by conjoining the legal comparative 
analysis with the inputs of economic analysis of law. Throughout 
the essay, the description of the legal disciplines of monopoly will 
be accompanied by inquiries into the economic thinking of the 
offense of monopolization and of abuse of dominant position, 
mainly by referring to the Chicago School of law and economics, 
the Harvard structure-conduct-performance School, and the 
Freiburg ordoliberal School. 
Economic analysis of both monopolization and abusive 
dominance will have a positive slant, not a normative, nor 
functional one6. Positive economic analysis of law departs from 
the claim that efficiency shapes the legal rules and institutions, 
and wealth maximization is the sole policy for the development of 
law. Thus, efficient rules are those that maximize the society’s 
aggregate wealth, on the account of the notion of allocative 
efficiency: a rule is efficient when no one can be made better off 
without making anyone worse off. Positive analysis lends itself to 
                                                
6 For a more detailed description of the three approaches of economic analysis 
of law, see F. Parisi & B. Luppi, Quantitative Methods in Comparative Law, 
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-20 (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2049907  
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evaluate the efficacy of judicial outcomes with regard to parties 
and to provide comparable data.   
Normative analysis identifies and selects policy goals through 
economic analysis and provides a prescriptive statement as to 
what the law should be. The normative school postulates that 
market failures require legal intervention and that economic 
analysis is the best method for identifying market failures and 
selecting a law to remedy the resulting harms.  The three most 
common goals of policymakers and economists are wealth, utility, 
and happiness.   
The functional approach looks at individuals’ revealed 
preferences as the fundamental criterion as how society chooses 
legal remedies. When rational individuals have a choice between 
two legal remedies, they will choose the one they can extract the 
most benefit from. Functionalists are less inclined in measuring 
the aggregate wealth of society, but attempt to identify and create 
legal rules based on individual choice, given that the choice is 
marketable, meaning that the legal order will not impede 
transactions and the preference revelation.  
Within the confines of the present essay, the economic analysis of 
law will be positive, i.e. it will only proffer an empiric-quantitative 
framework to employ in the description of the phenomenon, in 
addition to the legal argument. The fact that the two models 
choose different solutions for the same legal questions indicates 
that there is no single better rule. Hence, the inputs of economics 
applied to comparative analysis can provide better insight of the 
effects of alternative legal rules. In other terms, the comparative 
analysis will borrow the conceptual apparatus and empirical 
methods of economics with a view to gaining a better knowledge 
of the legal question at stake, without attempting to either 
prescribe what goals law should achieve, or to make the 
normative claim that individuals’ choices should be incorporated 
into the legal regulation of the phenomenon.  
In light with the claim that the scope of the comparison is not the 
identification of the better rule but the expansion of the 
knowledge of the institutions compared, the employment of some 
basic principles of law and economics, such as the study of the law 
of demand, the economic description of monopoly and 
dominance, and the concept of allocative efficiency as regards the 
profit maximization of the firm, will not seek to weigh the efficacy 
of the two legal disciplines or of the courts outcomes, but will be 
simply represent a framework to expand knowledge. In a Kelsian 
perspective, the economic analysis of monopolization and abusive 
dominance will simply better describe what the law is (sein) and 
not what the law should be (sollen)7. 
                                                
7 H. Kelsen, Lineamenti di Dottrina Pura del Diritto, Torino, (2000) 
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In conclusion, economic analysis will serve to sharpen and refine 
the analytic tools of legal reasoning, on the one hand, and to put 
the comparative analysis in a quantitative context, which will 
enrich its overall epistemological purpose, on the other hand8. The 
descriptive part will be supplemented by some basic empirical-
quantitative schemes of economics that should be read as the 
completion of the critical analysis of the economic, social and 
cultural contexts of the models under investigation9. 
 
C) Structuring the work 
The main analytical question above referred will be answered 
through four sub-questions: how do the selected systems narrow 
the relevant market for the purposes of the two disciplines? What 
is the relevant threshold of market shares that the firm is to hold 
to contravene the two provisions? What are the main types of 
abusive unilateral conducts? How do the selected systems deal 
with discriminatory abuses, in general, and with price 
discrimination, in particular? 
The essay is divided into three parts, a descriptive part, a 
comparative and explanatory part, and a conclusion. The first part 
is divided into two chapters, which respectively analyze the law 
and economics of monopolization in the US, as under § 2 of the 
Sherman Act, and of the abuse of dominant position in the EU, as 
under article 102 TFEU. Both models will be scrutinized with 
respect to the normative origins of their statutory law, the relevant 
market for the reach of the law, the role of market shares and the 
interaction with the firm’s conduct, the analysis of anticompetitive 
conduct in general, and the narrowing of the most recurrent forms 
of abusive behavior, in particular. With regard to the types of 
abuse, particular emphasis will have the discipline of predation, 
which stands as the archetypal anticompetitive practice of the firm 
with monopoly power, the hypothesis of monopoly refusal-to-
deal and the impact of the so-called “essential facilities doctrine” 
on both models, the treatment of the so-called exploitative abuses, 
which characterize the European model but are not regulated in 
the US, and the regulation of discriminatory pricing abuses, which 
are encompassed in the European law of abusive dominance, 
while are recollected in the American discipline of price 
discrimination, which does not require e finding of monopoly for 
its application, pursuant to § 2(a) of the Robinson Patman Act.  
                                                
8 U. Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 
Press, (1996) 
9 The analysis of law in its social, economic, and cultural context has been 
described as critical comparative law. See E. Oru ̈cu ̈, Critical Comparative Law: 
Considering Paradoxes for Legal Systems in Transition, 4.1 Electronic Journal Of 
Comparative Law, (June 2000), available at  http://www.ejcl.org/41/art41-
1.html  
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Again, with respect to discriminatory price abuses, the functional 
approach will characterize the analysis, namely functionally 
equivalent provisions will be compared, rather than normatively 
homologous ones. Furthermore, it will be underscored that § 2 of 
the Sherman Act sanctions the attempt to monopolize in the same 
way as the actual monopolization, unlike article 102 TFEU, which 
only prohibits the actual abuse of dominant position, not also the 
attempt. 
In the second part, a comparison between the two models will be 
drawn, together with a tentative economic, sociological and 
political explanation of why the same phenomenon is treated in a 
substantially different manner. As far as the comparison is 
concerned, attention will be paid to the elements of major 
divergence between the two models, in particular to the treatment 
of exploitation by the monopolist firm, the treatment of predation, 
and the treatment of the monopoly refusal-to-deal. Furthermore, 
an attempt will be made to recollect the two disciplines under the 
main doctrinal and judicial analytical tests, in order to better 
identify standards in the treatment of unilateral exclusionary 
abuses. 
As far as the explanation is concerned, from a rethorical and 
epistemological standpoint, it will be argued how the two models 
position themselves in the continuum between individualism and 
altruism, in accordance with the seminal taxonomy that Professor 
Duncan Kennedy elaborated with respect to substantive issues of 
private law. According to Kennedy, two opposite rethorical 
formal modes inform the adjudication of substantive issues of 
private law, ranging from an “individualistic” attitude, which 
favors self-reliance, namely the conviction that someone is entitled 
to enjoy the benefits of his effort without having to sacrifice them 
to the interest of others, as opposed to an “altruistic” attitude, 
which favors solidarity, even when this is exposed to the 
possibility of non-reciprocity, and enjoins individuals “to make 
sacrifices, to share, and to be merciful”10. The continuum theory 
will be applied to the main question of this essay, and it will be 
affirmed that the American model tends to have an individualistic 
attitude, namely to seek to freeze into the legal system the whole 
structure of laissez faire, whereas the European model is oriented 
towards altruism, preferring the application of standards of 
reasonable understanding, such as the preponderance of standard 
such as “competition on the merits”, or “special responsibility” of 
the firm not to distort the market openness, to which the 
enforcement of article 102 TFUE is informed. 
                                                
10 D. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1685, 1717 (1976).  
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Parallel to the analysis of the two rethorical modes, an inquiry into 
the main policy concerns of the American and European systems 
will follow; it will be argued that the American discipline of 
monopoly is merely concerned with the protection of consumer 
welfare, namely the aggregate nation’s wealth, whereas the 
European law of abusive dominance is characterized by both 
fairness and market integration concerns. In particular, the 
fostering of the Internal Market is one of the tenets of the acquis 
communautaire and a general policy principle of the EU treaties, 
which significantly weighs on the European discipline of 
competition; in that respect, the treatment of abusive dominance is 
not sheltered by its impact. 
A second possible explanation for the different approaches to 
monopoly is economic and will rest on the dichotomy between 
consumerist and ordoliberal policies, the former characterizing the 
US approach, and the latter characterizing the EU approach. In 
particular, the law of monopolization tends to protect the 
efficiency of the market, whereas the law of abusive dominance 
tends to protect the openness of it.  
The last possible sociological explanation for the different 
attitudes of the two models will be found in two different models 
of capitalism, the “Anglo-American” model, concerning the US, 
and the “Rhine” model, concerning the EU, according to the 
definition coined by Albert Michel in his 1991 book “Capitalism 
versus Capitalism”11. The “Anglo-American” model is based on 
laissaz faire capitalism, i.e. on the idea that free market is the most 
powerful driver of development, and that the government should 
abstain from regulating the economy. The Rhine model envisages 
the triumph of a social market economy, entailing minimum 
regulation of the market in a way to strike a balance between the 
rights of private capital and the long-term social needs of the 
economy. 
In line with the claim that the monopoly phenomenon is 
multifaceted and characterized by legal, market and political 
stances, the epilogue of the essay will consist of an evaluation of 
the impact of the adjudicative (or judicial) process, the market 
process, and the political process, in an attempt to re-collect the 
two legal models into a general framework for legal analysis, 
which has been elaborated by Professor Neil Komesar in his 
seminal book “Imperfect Alternatives”12, known as “comparative 
institutional analysis”. In particular, an attempt will be made to 
make an institutional choice on which of the processes –or 
                                                
11 M. Albert, Capitalism versus capitalism, London, Whurr, Business Economics, 
1993. In 1991, the book was firstly published in French, Capitalisme contre 
capitalisme, Paris, Editions du Seuil. 
12 N.K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives – Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, 
and Public Policy, University of Chicago Press, (1994) 
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institutions, as Komesar defines them- can best pursue the social 
policy goals embedded in turn in the American law of 
monopolization and the European law of abusive dominance. 
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METHODOLOGICAL PREMISES 
 
 
 
A first basic premise to the present research is that it regards a 
traditional topic of antitrust law, or competition law –the terms 
are substantially synonymous- that is monopoly13. The present 
work aims to compare models, rather than institutions; more 
specifically, it aims to compare the two most influential models 
disciplining the opaque phenomenon of monopoly, namely the 
American and the European one. With regard to the US model, the 
concept of monopoly or monopolization will be analyzed, 
whereas with regard to the EU system and the concept of “abuse 
of dominant position” will be investigated.  
The terms monopoly and monopolization must be used 
judiciously, since monopoly refers to a status already reached by a 
firm in an industry, whereas monopolization implies the positive 
action of jacking up a market through exercising power over 
price14. The analysis will show that the selected models do not 
censor the mere status of monopoly, but the conduct seeking to 
attain monopoly, with regard to the US model, and the abuse of 
the monopolistic position, with regard to both models.  
However, if the reader were to consider the present work as a 
mere –yet useful- comparative endeavor, he would fail from 
grasping the central idea underlying it. In fact, a second 
epigrammatic methodological premise to the work would be that 
it positions itself in the field of Comparative Law and Economics. 
Having that said, the reader might still wonder: what can exactly 
be defined as Comparative Law and Economics?  
In order to answer this question it is fruitful to borrow some 
words from the work of a prominent scholar, who has recognized 
an operative interaction between the two disciplines. “It seems 
likely that the two disciplines may benefit from each other. 
Specifically, comparative law may gain theoretical perspective by 
using the kind of functional analysis employed in economic 
analysis of law…moreover, in the moment in which a strong case 
is made for the rebirth of ‘legal process-style’ comparison of 
alternative legal institutions, it seems that comparative law may 
offer to economic analysis a reservoir of institutional alternatives 
                                                
13 See for a classic introduction R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 2001. Judge Posner maintains this major theoretical 
subdivision of American Federal Antitrust Law along his whole work. 
14 This definition of monopolization is incomplete; however, it suffices to stress 
that the main object of the research will be the analysis of an economic 
phenomenon that has different treatments in accordance with two different 
ways of perceiving antitrust/competition. 
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not merely theoretical but actually tested by legal history”15.  
Comparative Law may achieve more sophisticated 
accomplishments by combining the study of legal categories and 
doctrines with some tools of economics -such as the concept of 
efficiency- in an attempt to provide the essay with more 
empirical/quantitative evidence. Moreover, whereas law is 
generally confined within national boundaries, economics 
presents models and claims that have a universal foundation, and 
that can overcome the sovereignty constraints of legislation. An 
economic assumption, which claims universal validity and from 
which the entire work will be animated, is that firms are profit 
maximizers: therefore, the reach of a dominant position is more 
than a bad case of distortion of competition, but is a very plausible 
phenomenon characterizing the firm’s lifecycle. Economics will 
help to have a more unbiased understanding of such phenomenon 
and unravel the policy undertones of the legislator’s intervention.  
The undoubted advantage that the comparative approach can 
offer to the analysis is a better insight of the legal models at issue, 
which will be analyzed by understanding and measuring their 
relative analogies and differences 16 , in search of functional 
equivalents rather than merely juxtapose the legal rules. Unlike 
Law and Economics, the comparative method will not reduce 
legal knowledge to mere logic rules (efficiency), but will account 
for the different paths that law follows in times and in different 
legal cultures, without striving to categorize better rules17. 
The other inherent values of a comparative research are the gain 
of mutual international understanding of the selected topic, and 
the engendering of a critical attitude towards each legal model18.  
Conversely, the input that Comparative Law can give to Law and 
Economics is a cure for the insularity from which this discipline 
has suffered, having been mostly confined within the American 
scholarship –with a certain degree of acceptance by the US Courts. 
The marginalization of this branch of learning has been 
predominantly caused by the legal parochialism of the legal 
scholars and law professors of the other jurisdictions, who have 
insulated their legal systems from any outer scholarly legal ideas, 
in order for them to seek additional rents within their frame of 
                                                
15 U. Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 
Press, (1996), preface 
16 R.B. Schlesinger, H. Baade, M. Damaska, P. Herzog, Comparative Law: Cases, 
Text, Materials, The Foundation Press, Mineola (NY), 5th ed., (1988), p. 39; R. 
Sacco, Legal Formants: A dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 
1, 1991 
17 G. Comandè, Legal Comparison and Measures: It is Logic to Go Beyond Numerical 
Comparative Law, p. 4, forthcoming 
18 K. Zweigert, H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1998, p. 13 et seq. 
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reference19. The Comparative method can force the exchange of 
ideas and foster the erosion of certain biases against the economic 
analysis of law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
                                                
19 The degree of acceptance of Law and Economics in the US Courts is not 
impressive –but nevertheless significant-, while this field is virtually ignored by 
Courts elsewhere. Some authors explain the legal parochialism by equating it 
with protectionism in trade: the main players in the legal debate outside the US 
have sheltered their jurisdictions from foreign legal doctrines, in order to 
continue holding a predominant stake. N. Garoupa, The Law and Economics of 
Legal Parochialism, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1517, 1527 (2011) 
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1. Introduction – The birth of American antitrust law and the 
first discipline of monopoly   
Monopolies in the U.S. are not illegal per se. They become illegal 
when firms use their monopoly power to gain price or other 
advantages to the detriment of their competitors. The first 
Congress intervention disciplining the monopoly phenomenon is 
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the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 189020. At the time the act was 
passed, the Anglo-American institution of trust was used as a 
device to agglomerate market shares in the hand of a single group 
or firm, in order to gain monopoly rents from the market itself. 
More precisely, a group of companies would form a trust to fix 
prices low enough to drive rivals off competition; normally, once a 
trust achieved a monopoly over the market, it would raise prices 
to recoup its losses. 
Prior to analyzing the concept of monopoly in depth, it is 
significant to ponder on the year 1890, which saw the origins of 
both antitrust law and of modern economic science. The passage 
of the Sherman Act and the publication of Alfred Marshall’s 
Principles of Economics both praised for government intervention in 
regulating business as a counterpart to the traditional idea that 
market could self-correct its shortcomings and act as self-
regulator21. The Sherman Act strived to be an tool for public 
intervention against the abuses of power deriving from the highly 
concentrated dimension of industrial capitalism, which 
characterized the U.S. economy at the time the Act was enacted.  
By contrast to that, Marshall’s Principles introduced a benign 
vision of business, based on the axiom that laws of price bring 
supply and demand into balance, like a “stone hanging by a 
string” moved by “the force of gravity”, within a universe of 
economic forces in equipoise22. According to the economist, the 
market would harmonize freedom of contract to yield the best for 
the most in the end.  
The Sherman Act responded to the fear of the small businesses 
and labor forces that the rapid industrialization of American 
economy would immobilize capitals into big corporations, which 
would be able to control both markets and prices. In his 1888 State 
of the Union Message, President Grover Cleveland disapproved of 
the growth of trusts, monopolies and corporations, because they 
went from being “the carefully restrained creatures of the law and 
the servants of the people” to being “the people’s masters”23. In 
the wake of such depiction of the US economy, the Sherman Act 
was passed two years later, establishing a federal forum for both 
public and private enforcement of antitrust law. 
 
1.1 The Standard Oil case  
                                                
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 1 et seq. 
21 F.R. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact 
of Law and Economics ,72 Geo. L. J. 1512 (1972) 
22 A. Marshall, Principles of Economics (8th edition), p. 323-346 (1920) 
23 T.D. Morgan, The Impact of Antitrust Law on the Legal Profession, 67 Fordham 
Law Review 415 417 (1998), E.W. Kintner ed., 1 Legislative History of the Federal 
Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes, 1978, p. 58 
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The new piece of legislation was firstly applied to dismantle the 
Standard Oil Trust, a concentration that was deemed as a menace 
to the Republican institutions themselves. 
The Standard Oil Trust was an arrangement whereby the 
stockholders of the properties of the Standard Oil Company, a 
concentration that by 1880 had gained control of virtually the 
whole oil marketing facilities in the U.S., transferred their shares 
to a board of nine trustees who controlled the property and 
managed the agglomerate. In exchange, the stockholders received 
certificates granting them a certain share of the turnover of the 
jointly managed companies.  
Owing to his control of the board of trustees, John D. Rockefeller 
attained monopoly power in the oil market, aiming at both 
horizontal and vertical integration, i.e. the control of all the oil 
refineries of the country, on the one hand, and the power over 
other stages of production and distribution, on the other hand. He 
was able to control the price for oil, to create economies of scale 
from the control of almost all the refined oil in the U.S., and to 
push the railroad companies and other suppliers to charge him a 
lower price for transportation24.  
Shortly, the Standard Oil model become paradigmatic in the 
American industrial organization, and trusts were established in 
several industries25. The monopolization of economy became a 
major topic for public opinion, in particular for those who had 
their small businesses cancelled by the predatory tactics of the 
trusts. Finally, the vehement public opposition to the trusts led to 
the passage of the Sherman Act, the first measure enacted by the 
U.S. Congress to prohibit this industrial-relationship model.  
Although several states had previously enacted similar laws, they 
were limited to intrastate commerce. Conversely, the Sherman 
Antitrust Act was based on the constitutional power of Congress 
to regulate interstate commerce relying on the Commerce Clause26.  
When in 1892 the Ohio Supreme Court declared the Standard Oil 
Trust to be an illegal monopoly and ordered its dissolution, the 
                                                
24 Literature on the Standard Oil case is virtually boundless. A detailed and 
informative reconstruction of the rise of the Standard Oil trust can be found in 
B. Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly: The Standard Oil Cases, 1890–1911. 
New York: Greenwood Press, (1979) 
25  A. D. Chandler & H. Daems, (eds), Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative 
Perspectives on the Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise, Cambridge MA: 
Harvard, (1980) 
26 The Commerce Clause refers to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. 
Constitution, which gives Congress the power “to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes”. The 
individual components of the provisions are often referred to as 1) the Foreign 
Commerce Clause, 2) the Interstate Commerce Clause and 3) the Indian 
Commerce Clause.  L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law p. 306, Foundation 
Press 3rd ed. (2000) 
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decision had little effect because the trustees managed to retain 
their positions on the boards of the component companies by 
reincorporating the trust in New Jersey, as a holding company 
under the name of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. In fact, 
looking for tax revenue, New Jersey was the first state to adopt a 
law allowing a parent company to own the stock of other 
corporations in their own right. 
By 1906, Standard Oil had become a monopoly, controlling over 
80 percent of oil production in the United States. Despite the 
existence of sufficient evidence describing the unfair practices 
through which Standard Oil would restrict competition, the U.S. 
Government was reluctant to act. The mounting public repulse for 
the increased costs and the shrunk levels of services encouraged 
President Theodore Roosevelt -and his successor President 
William Howard Taft- to commence both an investigation of 
Standard Oil’s practices and a lawsuit, on the account of the 
alleged restriction of the interstate commerce perpetrated by the 
company. Standard Oil controverted the allegations, arguing that 
the individual companies controlled by the parent company were 
competitive on their market, and uninhibited in their scope from 
the overarching trust.  
The decision was issued in St. Louis Federal Circuit Court on 
November 20, 1909. Justice Walter Henry Sanborn ruled that 
Standard Oil trust had acted with a view to restricting interstate 
commerce, by using its control over the individual companies to 
both hinder competition and monopolize the oil industry.  
Standard Oil appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Chief Justice Edward D. White, delivered the Court’s unanimous 
opinion in favor of the United States, upholding the lower court’s 
decision27. Judge White found that the vagueness of the Antitrust 
Act inevitably called for the introduction of a standard to be used 
in outlawing specific monopolies. This standard was called the 
“rule of reason”28. 
The rule stated that restriction of competition “does not 
necessarily constitute or imply an illegal restraint of trade or 
attempt to monopolize”29. The prohibition of all restraints of trade 
per se would be contrary to the congressional intent30. In order to 
state whether an arrangement constitutes an unlawful restraint of 
trade, the scrutiny is to be concentrated on the scope of the 
arrangement, the power of the parties and the effect of their acts. 
                                                
27 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55 L. 
Ed. 619 (1911) 
28 See infra, para. 6.1 
29 M.J. Sklar, The Corporate reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The 
Market, the Law, and Politics, p.147, Cambridge University Press (1988) 
30 E. Gellehorn & W.E. Kovacic, Antitrust Law and Economics in a nutshell, 4th ed., 
West Publishing Co., St. Paul (Minnesota), p.174, (1994) 
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If, for instance, the company can justify a restraint of trade as a 
necessary part of a business transaction, and both the participating 
companies and the general public consider such restraint 
reasonable, then it will not be considered illegal.  
It would be up to the courts to decide based on the single case. 
Justice White added that even though some behaviors were 
considered inherently unreasonable –such as the predatory tactics-
31  the ban of all restraints of trade would hamper the U.S. 
economy, since the restraint of trade was a key element of most 
business combinations 32 . All things considered, this approach 
underlined the behavioral element of the parties, but also 
acknowledged that some conducts are intrinsically unreasonable33. 
As a result, by means of a ruling that has been described as 
“remarkable for its cloudy prolixity”34, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ordered that Standard Oil Trust must be dissolved under the 
Sherman Antitrust Act and broken into 34 independent 
companies; its market share of refining declined from 80% in 1910 
to a market share for the divested parts of Standard Oil of 40% in 
1940. 
 
1.2 The new wake of Antitrust Law – The Microsoft case 
                                                
31 The analysis of predation can be found infra at para. 9.2  
32 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 67 L. 
Ed. 619 (1911) 
33  Justice John Marshall Harlan agreed with Justice White’s decision, but 
dissented on part of the rule of reason. Harlan, believing the rule would be 
difficult to apply in future cases, asserted that all restraints of trade were illegal 
under the Sherman Act. He wrote, “I have a strong conviction that it will throw 
the business of the country into confusion and invite widely-extended and 
harassing litigation, the injurious effects of which will be felt for many years to 
come. When Congress prohibited every contract, combination, or monopoly, in 
restraint of commerce, it prescribed a simple, definite rule that all could 
understand, and which could be easily applied by everyone wishing to obey the 
law, and not to conduct their business in violation of law. But now, it is to be 
feared, we are to have, in cases without number, the constantly recurring 
inquiry — difficult to solve by proof — whether the particular contract, 
combination, or trust involved in each case is or is not an ‘unreasonable’ or 
‘undue’ restraint of trade. Congress, in effect, said that there should be no 
restraint of trade, in any form, and this court solemnly adjudged many years 
ago that Congress meant what it thus said in clear and explicit words, and that 
it could not add to the words of the act. But those who condemn the action of 
Congress are now, in effect, informed that the courts will allow such restraint of 
interstate commerce as are shown not to be unreasonable or undue”. Standard 
Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619 
(1911) 
34 P.E. Areeda, L. Kaplow, A.S. Edlin, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Texts and 
Cases, Aspen Publishers (6th ed. 2004), 148 
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The most famous modern monopolization case and arguably the 
most analytically demanding legal question in antitrust history is 
the Microsoft case35.  
Of the various claims, the Justice Department contented that 
Microsoft had realized an illegal tying arrangement with its 
marketing of Windows 98 OS. In fact, a 1995 consent decree that 
was aimed at fostering competition in the software industry 
prevented Microsoft from licensing its software under tying 
conditions36. The government sought to inhibit Microsoft from 
using its dominance in personal computer operating systems – by 
that time Windows detained more than 80 percent of PC market- 
to control the Internet browser market.  
Microsoft countered that the integration of Internet Explorer into 
Windows was in line with its history of enhancing its operating 
system. The Department of Justice argued that Microsoft saw the 
Internet as a threat and sought to eliminate their Internet 
competition by freely distributing their browser, integrating it into 
their popular operating system. A great deal of this antitrust 
lawsuit was devoted to Internet Competition. More specifically, 
with the bundling of Microsoft OS and Microsoft Internet Explorer, 
Microsoft attempted to exclude their largest internet competitor, 
Netscape Communications, which was offering an internet 
browser not for free.  
The Justice Department alleged that Microsoft had violated §1 and 
2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by:  
1. Unlawful exclusive dealing arrangements in violation of § 1, by 
obliging PC hardware manufacturers to agree to license, 
preinstall, and distribute Internet Explorer on every Windows PC 
                                                
35 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). A. Chin, 
Decoding Microsoft: A First Principle Approach, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev., 6 (2005). 
For a detailed description of the case, see infra, para. 7.5 
36  In 1994, the Justice Department filed suit alleging that Microsoft has 
unlawfully maintained a monopoly and unreasonably restrained trade in the 
market for IBM-compatible personal computer operating systems. The 
department filed a proposed consent decree embodying the terms of the 
settlement agreement, which provided at section IV(E)(i): “Microsoft shall not 
enter into any License Agreement in which the terms of that agreement are 
expressly or impliedly conditioned upon: (i) the licensing of any other Covered 
Product, Operating System Software product or other product (provided, 
however, that this provision in and of itself shall not be construed to prohibit 
Microsoft from developing integrated products)”. United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1998) In amicus briefs filed with the Court of 
Appeals, some anonymous companies had argued that Microsoft could exploit 
a loophole in the language of the provision. In fact, Microsoft would be able to 
avoid this prohibition simply by “integrating” the “other product” into a next-
generation operating system. The Court of Appeals dismissed this concern by 
offering some assurance as to how it expected to interpret the provision in the 
future: “We perceive no interpretation of the decree’s definition of covered 
products which would allow such a result.” 
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such manufacturers shipped, as a condition of obtaining licenses 
for the Windows 95 operating system. 
2. Unlawful tying of IE to Windows 95 and Windows 98, the 
successor of Windows 95, in violation of § 1; 
3. Unlawful maintenance of a monopoly in the PC operating system 
market in violation of § 2, by requiring PC hardware 
manufacturers to agree as a condition of acquiring a license to the 
Windows operating system to adopt the uniform “boot-up” 
sequence and “desktop” screen specified by Microsoft; and  
4. Unlawful attempted monopolization of the Internet browser 
market in violation of § 2, through the distribution of Internet 
Explorer for free, by virtue of a bundle of it with the Windows 
OS37. 
In June 1999, the District Court issued separate findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, holding Microsoft liable for tying under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act. In June 2001 however, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the legal question of Microsoft’s tying liability 
by striking a balance between the anticompetitive consequences 
and the pro-competitive justifications of Microsoft’s conduct 
under the rule of reason.   
The Court of Appeals entirely upheld the District Court’s findings 
of fact, but reversed the conclusions of law regarding the alleged 
violation of § 1, ruling that the government had failed to establish 
“a precise definition of browsers” and “a careful definition of the 
tied good market” at trial and would be precluded from doing so 
on remand38. Based on these hindrances, the government decided 
to drop the tying claim in September 2001.  Consequently, the 
claim was never finally adjudicated.  
With regard to the claim of violation of § 2, the Court of Appeals 
ruled that the Microsoft had used its monopoly to quash nascent 
and potentially competitive technologies. Moreover, the fact that 
in the internet industry rapid technological advance and 
continuous shifts in paradigms take place contributed to sustain 
that the other browsers were a potential threat for the defendant’s 
monopoly in the operating system market.  
In conclusion, the Court considered Microsoft’s monopoly 
leveraging as relevant in re ipsa to the exclusion of other 
competitors from the market, and as a way of protecting its –
legally acquired- monopoly rents by means of anticompetitive 
practices. The naked quashing of a new technology in a rapidly 
evolving market sufficed to integrate violation of § 2. 
 
1.3 The intriguing parallels between Standard Oil and Microsoft 
Reference to these two famous cases right at the outset of the 
                                                
37 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d Introduction 48 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
38 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 95 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
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present analysis is not unintentional, since they are emblematic of 
the attitude of American Courts towards the drive of a single 
individual to dominate some crucial sectors of the industry, and 
towards the drift towards maintaining such dominance through 
practices incompatible with the competitive process. In both cases, 
the possession of monopoly in a strategic industry allowed the 
defendants to control and shape the development of a 
groundbreaking technology. 
In the 124-year history of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the sole 
antitrust policy the judicial process has enforced consistently is the 
safeguard of the competitive process as the basic standard under 
which private and economic activity must be governed. An author 
has highlighted the existence of “intriguing parallels” between 
Microsoft and the Standard Oil case, since the two companies gave 
rise to antitrust challenges for their quest to dominate a new 
fundamental technology39.  
Standard Oil and Microsoft attained and consolidated monopoly 
in their respective industries by resorting to means that have been 
found at odds with the Sherman Act, with claims of tying, price 
discrimination, rising rivals’ costs and strategic conduct; these 
particular claims, as it will be displayed through the course of the 
chapter, represent the most controversial examples of 
anticompetitive conduct under § 2, which have often been based 
on highly hypothetical assumptions of the Courts, rather than on 
economic accuracy. 
Moreover, both cases reflect the key policy choice of Courts that 
the treatment of monopoly power not be left to the market forces, 
but be either regulated by government or effectively 
circumscribed by an antitrust remedy, when the dominance of a 
crucial industry based on the consolidation of entry barriers to 
new innovation thwarts the future development of the industry 
itself. 
 
1.4 The incidents of monopoly 
From an economic point of view, three are the goals of every 
antitrust action, which are also embedded in both the Standard Oil 
and Microsoft Courts’ reasoning: 1) the preservation of efficiency 
of the market, 2) the safeguarding of economic progress and 3) the 
fostering of technological innovation. These are the prima facie 
instances that are symbolic of the “economic sense” that all 
antitrust cases must make40.  
In both cases, the Court has seen an even more severe public 
injury in the delay or denial of new innovations being brought to 
                                                
39 J.J. Flynn, Standard Oil and Microsoft: intriguing parallels or limping analogies?, 46 
Antitrust Bull, 2001, p. 645  
40 United States v. Syufy Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659 (1990) Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1356 (1986) 
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the market, where restraints of trade or monopoly power 
undermine the competitive process determining technological 
change and open market access for the new innovation41. 
Beyond the above correspondences between the policy choices 
underlying the two rulings, there appears to be a surprising 
continuity between the outcomes and what was the perception of 
the evils of monopoly in the British Common Law in 1602: 
“There are three inseparable incidents to every monopoly: 1) that 
the price will be raised. 2) The second incident to a monopoly is, 
that the monopoly granted, the commodity is not so good and 
merchantable as it was before. 3) It tends to the impoverishment of 
diverse artificers and others who before by their labor had 
maintained themselves and their families…A society in which a 
few men are the employers and the great body are merely the 
employees or servants is not the most desirable in a republic; and 
it should be as much the policy of the laws to multiply the 
numbers engaged in independent pursuits or in the profits of 
production as to cheapen the price to consumers”42. 
In turn, the economic disadvantages of higher prices, the 
weakening of technological innovation and the detriment to the 
overall welfare of consumers were and are the threats that judicial 
review has traditionally identified in a monopolized market.  
All things considered, the mission of antitrust law is to classify the 
varieties of profit-maximizing behaviors in accordance with their 
relationship with consumer welfare. There are three possible 
relationships, which correspond to three different “ways of 
making money”43 and judicial attitudes. A firm might increase its 
profits 1) by achieving new technological, managerial or 
productive efficiency, which is beneficial to consumers, 2) by 
gaining monopoly power through output restriction, which is 
detrimental to consumers, or 3) by some other device unrelated to 
technological, productive or allocative efficiency, which is 
indifferent to consumers44. Once the inference of the firm on 
consumer behavior is identified, antitrust will sanction those 
behaviors whose effect is output restricting45. 
Certainly, there are some “grey areas”, in which Courts oscillate 
between intervening and leaving the market structure untouched, 
such as when the firm achieves monopoly by integrating the 
                                                
41 J. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Economic Progress and 
Technological Innovation, 62 N.Y.U.L. Rev., 1020-1027 (1987) 
42 W.C. Noyes, A Treatise on the Law of Intercorporate Relations, Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1902, p. 468-quoting a British case Darcy v. Allein, Coke 
Part 11, 86b (1602), (Noy 173) 
43 Compare R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, Basic 
Books, Inc. Publishers, New York, p. 122 (1993) 
44 On the traditional understanding of the concept of efficiency in economic 
analysis of law, see infra the economic thinking of market power, para. 4.3 
45 On the anticompetitive conduct through output restriction, see infra, para. 4.2  
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
34 
 
market through technological progress. Technological progress 
can be seen as an inseparable component of consumer welfare; 
however, progress sometimes implies the sacrifice of other 
resources, such as the openness of the market and exclusion of 
rivals. Therefore, the judicial weighing of whether or not the 
exclusion brought about by a firm’s technological advancement is 
improper cannot but be highly conjectural and dependent on 
different considerations than allocative efficiency and consumer 
welfare.   
 
2. The offense of monopolization and the difference between 
monopoly and the act of monopolizing 
“The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the 
value of competition” 46. One of the policy considerations that have 
traditionally characterized the US legal discourse has been the 
alarm for monopoly, and in general for the distortive effects of the 
concentration of economic power in the hands of a few47.  
As said above, the basic federal antitrust law is the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. By then, many industries were already concentrated 
into what the Congress deemed too few hands; this piece of 
legislation was passed in an attempt to prevent practices that 
create undue monopolies or restraints of trade or commerce, and 
to guarantee free competition in business and commercial 
transactions 48. More specifically, from this moment onwards the 
Congress began to ascertain the inherent favorable effects of 
having a free and competitive market; thus, it developed a public 
policy as regards monopoly and proscribed restrictive practices as 
a form of public injury49.  
                                                
46 In the Sherman [Act] … ‘Congress was dealing with competition, which it 
sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent.’ Emphasis added. 
Staley Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 135 F.2d 453, 455, cited 
and quoted in Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U.S. 231, 249, 
71 S.Ct. 240, 249, 95 L.Ed. 239; Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 
F.2d 356, 369 (9th Cir. 1955) 
47 U. S. v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274, 86 S. Ct. 1478, 1480, 16 L. Ed. 2d 
555 (1966). 
48 “The purpose of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is to prevent undue restraints of 
interstate commerce, to maintain its appropriate freedom in the public interest, 
to afford protection from the subversive or coercive influences of monopolistic 
endeavor”. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359, 53 S. Ct. 471, 
474, 77 L. Ed. 825 (1933) overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube 
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 104 S. Ct. 2731, 81 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1984) 
49 “The end sought [by the Sherman Act’s prohibition against unreasonable 
restraints of trade] was the prevention of restraints to free competition in 
business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise 
prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of 
goods and services [emphasis added], all of which had come to be regarded as a 
special form of public injury”. Glen Holly Entm't, Inc. v. Tektronix Inc., 343 F.3d 
1000, 1009-10 opinion amended on denial of reh'g sub nom. Glen Holly Entm't, 
Inc. v. Tektronix, Inc., 352 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 2003). On the development of the 
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From a consumer-welfarist perspective, the underlying scope of 
the Sherman Act was the promotion of commercial competition 
through the ban of certain anticompetitive practices50 and the 
safeguard of the competitive process that brings the benefits of 
lower prices, better products, and more efficient production 
methods51.  
The main provision regulating the action of monopolizing a 
market is § 2 of the Sherman Act, which reads as follows: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, 
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other 
person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment not 
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the 
direction of the court52. 
 
The actus reus embedded in the provision at stake is the offense to 
monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire to 
monopolize any part of the nation’s interstate or foreign 
commerce. Violations are punished as felonies, subject to fines of 
up to $100 million for corporations and $1 million for individuals, 
possible imprisonment of as much as 10 years, or both fines and 
imprisonment53. 
Not only does § 2 of apply to concerted misconduct by two or 
more persons or entities, but also to unilateral conduct involving 
only a single actor54. Therefore, cases brought under § 2 have 
fallen into four broad categories: 
                                                                                                                                                            
concept of public policy as regards monopoly see J.E. Schefter, Historical Policy 
of the United States Toward Monopoly, 43 NDL Rev 17 (1966); C. Wilcox, Public 
Policies Toward Business, Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 4th Ed., (1971). 
50  “Anticompetitive ... refers not to actions that merely injure individual 
competitors, but rather to actions that harm the competitive process” Clamp-All 
Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 486 (1st Cir. 1988); Columbia 
River People's Util. Dist. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 217 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 
2000);  
51 Central aim of the antitrust laws is to protect consumers against certain 
abusive business practices-especially price-fixing and monopoly. Seacoast 
Motors of Salisbury, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 
2001); 7 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law, 1978, 1502; Clamp-All Corp. v. 
Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 486 (1st Cir. 1988) 
52 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 as amended by the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement 
and Reform Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 668) 
53 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 
54 Section 2 has, thus, played a pivotal role in antitrust actions where concerted 
action between multiple parties was either not present or difficult to prove. W 
Holmes and M. Mangiaracina, Antitrust Law Handbook, Thomson Reuters, 2011, 
§ 3:2 
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(1) Actual monopolization, in which a firm acquires or 
retains actual monopoly power through competitively 
unreasonable practices. 
(2) Attempted monopolization, in which a firm not yet in 
possession of actual monopoly power engages in competitively 
unreasonable practices that create a dangerous probability of 
monopoly power being achieved. 
(3) Joint monopolization, in which two or more parties 
conspire to jointly retain or acquire monopoly power, where 
actual monopoly power is achieved. 
(4) Conspiracies to monopolize, in which parties not yet in 
possession of monopoly power conspire to seize monopoly 
control of a market, but where monopoly power has not yet 
actually been reached. 
Within the confines of the present analysis, only the first two 
categories will be examined, on the grounds of the fact that joint 
monopolization and conspiracies to monopolize are conducts that 
border the offense proscribed under § 1 of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibits contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of 
trade55. The overarching scope of the present study is a survey of 
the unilateral conducts of the firm that are relevant to antitrust 
law and regard the establishment of an anticompetitive price. 
Even though the provision at stake does not define the term 
monopoly, its meaning can be inferred by the common law, 
provided that the act of “monopolizing” presupposes the 
possession of market control power in a relevant market, by 
means of which it is possible to exclude actual or potential 
competitors from any part of trade or commerce.  
Yet, the mere possession of market power cannot be equated with 
the act of monopolizing, since § 2 refers to a conduct –
monopolization- rather than a status –monopoly- and “it is 
directed against activities rather than results” 56. Moreover, the 
relevant conduct must be integrated by the intent to exercise such 
dominance. The test of illegality is to ascertain both the existence 
of market power and the intent to exercise it57. 
                                                
55  U.S. Code › Title 15 › Chapter 1 › § 1 15 U.S.C. 
56 It is a consolidated opinion that “… ‘monopoly in the concrete’ is not 
prohibited under the section [2]” United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & 
Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 214 (D. Del. 1953) aff'd sub nom. U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 76 S. Ct. 994, 100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956) 
57 Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S. Ct. 12, 92 L. Ed. 20 (1947) 
abrogated by Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 126 S. Ct. 
1281, 164 L. Ed. 2d 26 (2006); Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 
663 (8th Cir. 1957), in which the Court held that “monopolization means the 
possession of monopoly power by a party or parties through which power it is 
possible to exclude actual or potential competitors from any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several states, provided that he or they have the intent or 
purpose to exercise that power”; United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 245 F. 
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More specifically, monopoly does not fall within the reach of the 
Act when it has been “thrust upon it”58, that is when it is not 
acquired as a goal in itself, but it is “the incidental result of a 
constructive competitive effort”59. It follows that a monopoly is 
lawful when it stems from the normal growth of an industry, from 
natural advantages60, from technological innovation, from the 
business acumen or the superior skill of the entrepreneur, from 
the limited amount of the demand that is satisfied only by one 
provider, from a sudden change in tastes of the consumers, from a 
patent61, from ownership of land62. In other terms, there appears to 
be a distinction between unlawful achievement of a monopoly and 
lawful passivity63. 
Even when a monopoly is lawfully acquired –i.e. by means of a 
patent-, it becomes illegal when it is maintained through 
anticompetitive conduct that causes economic injury64. A properly 
vested monopolist can adopt different practices in order to 
increase or misuse his monopolistic power, by using his dominant 
position in one market to gain anticompetitive leverage in 
another65, by using predatory or discriminatory means, by using 
                                                                                                                                                            
Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1965) aff'd, 362 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1966); Heath v. Aspen 
Skiing Corp., 325 F. Supp. 223 (D. Colo. 1971) 
58 In the case law, particularly under the structuralist approach to § 2, there is a 
clear-cut distinction between the achievement of monopoly, on the one hand, 
and monopoly that has been ‘thrust upon it’, on the other hand, to which the 
Sherman Act does not apply. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 
416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945). Note, The Thrust-Upon Defense: An Affirmative Defense or 
Judicial Balm, 72 W. Va. L. Rev. 260 (1970) 
59 The classical expression of constructive effort may be found in the Homeric 
words: “Be ever best and o'ertop other men”(The Iliad, VI, 208, XI, 784). This is 
the advice given by two fathers to their sons who were leaving for war and is 
the unsurpassable exposition of the ideal in an age of sportsmanlike fighting. 
Rudolf Callmann, What is Unfair Competition?, 28 Geo. L. J. 601 1939-1940. In 
McIlhenny Co. v. Bulliard, 265 F. 705 (W.D. La. 1920), the Court said the 
product of a manufacturer “should stand on its own merits, and gain its way to 
popular favor by its own inherent quality”. 
60 It is the hypotheses of natural monopoly, and of the “essential facility” 
doctrine and. See infra Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 
S. Ct. 2847 (1985) J. Cirace, An Economic Analysis of Antitrust Law's Natural 
Monopoly Cases, 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 677, 728 (1986) 
61 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See infra. 
62 Souza v. Estate of Bishop, 821 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1987). Bishop Estate’s 
monopoly power was lawfully acquired as a consequence of historic accident.  
63 R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books, Inc. 
Publishers, New York, p. 166 (1993) 
64  Patent holder’s modification of its patented biopsy gun to prevent 
competitors’ non-infringing, flangeless needles from being used in patent 
holder’s guns constituted antitrust violation, based on evidence that patent 
holder enjoyed monopoly power in market for replacement needles and 
maintained its monopoly position by exclusionary conduct. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. 
M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
65 Cases of unlawful leveraging on a lawfully acquired monopoly are numerous, 
and the outcomes are oscillating. In United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 68 S. 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
38 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Ct. 941, 92 L. Ed. 1236 (1948) disapproved of by Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 104 S. Ct. 2731, 81 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1984) it 
was held that monopoly leveraging may be proved by showing that the 
monopolist achieved only a “competitive advantage” in the target market. In 
Great W. Directories, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 63 F.3d 1378 (5th Cir. 1995) 
opinion withdrawn and superseded in part, 74 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 1996) violation 
of Section 2 was found in an action brought by independent yellow pages 
telephone directory publishers against a parent holding company of telephone 
local exchange carrier (LEC) contending company orchestrated affiliation-wide 
effort, by means of charging unreasonable rates for directory information, in 
order to extend monopoly of yellow pages market and to eliminate competition. 
In Cost Mgmt. Services, Inc. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937 (9th 
Cir. 1996) an unregulated natural gas seller brought actions for attempted 
monopolization under the Sherman Antitrust Act against natural gas local 
distribution company (LDC), alleging that company engaged in monopoly 
leveraging, using its monopoly over gas delivery facilities in unlawful attempt 
to monopolize gas sales market. The Court maintained that plaintiff must prove 
specific intent to control prices, destroy competition, predatory or 
anticompetitive conduct to accomplish monopolization, dangerous probability 
of success, and causal antitrust injury. Concerning the exploitation of a patent, 
in Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 
1997) the Court adopted a presumption that a patent’s holder refusal to sell or 
license patented work or copyright is a valid business justification, when it is 
aimed at excluding others from its protected work, notwithstanding any 
immediate harm to consumers; conversely, exclusionary conduct supporting 
claim of unlawful monopoly can include monopolist’s unilateral refusal to 
license patent or copyright, when evidence shows that such rebuttal is a pretext 
to conceal anti-competitive activities. In re Indep. Serv. Organizations Antitrust 
Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000), The Federal Circuit held that a patent 
holder who refuses to license or sell a patented item in any product market 
does not violate antitrust laws without evidence of illegal tying, fraud in the 
patent procurement process or sham litigation. See also S. B. McCullen, The 
Federal Circuit and Ninth Circuit Face-Off: Does a Patent Holder Violate the Sherman 
Act by Unilaterally Excluding Others from a Patented Invention in More Than One 
Relevant Market?, 74 Temp. L. Rev. 469, 470 (2001). The author argues that case 
law does not support inquiries into the subjective motivation of a patent holder 
who refuses to license or sell a patented item. In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) the Court affirmed that the use of 
monopoly power attained in one market to gain an anticompetitive advantage 
in another is a violation of Section 2, even if there has not been an attempt to 
monopolize the second market. It is the use of economic power that creates the 
liability. But… a large firm does not violate Section 2 simply by reaping the 
competitive rewards attributable to its efficient size, nor does an integrated 
business offend the Sherman Act whenever one of its departments benefits 
from association with a division possessing a monopoly in its own market. 
Conversely, In Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th 
Cir. 1991), the 9th Circuit held that plaintiff cannot establish violation of 
Sherman Act without proving that defendant used its monopoly power in one 
market to obtain or attempt to obtain monopoly in downstream or leveraged 
market, and, thus, firm cannot violate Section 2 merely by obtaining 
competitive advantage in second market, absent attempt to monopolize 
leveraged market. In Gen. Cigar Holdings, Inc. v. Altadis, S.A., 205 F. Supp. 2d 
1335, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2002) aff'd sub nom. Gen. Cigar Holdings v. Altadis, S.A., 
54 F. App'x 492 (11th Cir. 2002) it was held that liability pursuant to Section 2 
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any other means that would be “honestly industrial” under other 
circumstances, but that foster the maintenance or the increase of a 
monopolistic regime in market66. In the event a monopoly is 
actively perpetuated, the exception that it is “thrust upon it” does 
not apply. Moreover, in the event a monopolist uses its lawfully 
acquired monopoly rents to leverage in another market, inference 
of the unlawfulness of the conduct is more easily attainable than 
the inference of monopolization through exclusionary practices. 
On the account of the above affirmed, the most recognized 
defenses against a prima facie violation of § 2 are the “innocently 
acquired” and “natural” monopoly ones. Where the monopoly 
power was innocently acquired, namely as the result of superior 
skill of natural advantage,  § 2 is not infringed. 
When it comes to the identification of positive standards, in over 
123 years of litigation thereupon, federal Courts have failed to set 
consistent standards of interpretation of the offense of 
monopolization. Some commentators have referred to the 
confusion surrounding the interpretation of this provision as 
follows: 
“There is a genuine dilemma here. We urge everyone to try his 
damnedest to get to the top of the heap, but we do not genuinely 
want anyone to actually make it. Consequently, when someone 
does make it we find the courts speaking out of both sides of their 
mouths”67. 
 
2.1 The three waves of enforcement of American 
monopolization law 
The oscillation of American jurisprudence reflects the role that 
antitrust law has in turn assumed in industrial relationships. 
Accordingly, in the case law three distinct phases can be 
ascertained, each characterized by a different attitude in inflicting 
legal sanctions pursuant to Section 268.  
                                                                                                                                                            
can be generally assessed when there is a threat of monopoly in a target market, 
not merely a “competitive advantage.” 
66 In United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)  
67  M.M. Blecher & C.S. Woodhead, Bigness and Badness: A Review of the 
Requirement of ‘Deliberateness’ in Monopolization, 10 Sw. U. L. Rev. 121, 125 
(1978). This dilemma also echoes in the opinion that Justice Learned Hand 
rendered in the famous Alcoa Case. After stating in that case that [A] single 
producer may be the survivor out of a group of active competitors, merely by 
virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry. . . [T]he Act does not mean to 
condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster”. 
“The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned 
upon when he wins”. Contrary to these premises, Hand found Alcoa liable of 
monopolization by simply excluding competitors by virtue of the corporation’s 
expansion. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d 
Cir. 1945). 
68 Thomas A. Piraino Jr., Identifying monopolists’ illegal conduct under the Sherman 
Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 809 
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The first phase is characterized by the assumption that the mere 
possession of a monopoly was per se not sufficient for bringing an 
action of monopolization, but the defendant should have engaged 
in predatory practices69. In the arguably most famous case on 
monopolization –the Standard Oil case- the act of unifying the 
power and control over the oil industry which resulted from 
combining the capital stock of various corporation trading in oil 
and its products in the hands of a holding company was held as a 
conduct seeking a perpetual control of the movement of these 
commodities the detriment of competitors, therefore as an 
improper attempt to monopolize such part of trade or commerce70. 
The Supreme Court found violation of § 2 insofar as it deemed 
that such an agreement establishing a trust in the oil industry was, 
by rule of reason71, a restraint of trade.  
As regards the substance of violation, the Court adopted the 
“abuse standard” of monopolization, under which a dominant 
firm can be found guilty of violating § 2 if it engages in conduct 
that would violate § 1 if engaged in by a combination of firms. 
Furthermore, the standard requires a finding of specific intent to 
monopolize, which can be reasonably inferred from a conduct that 
cannot be unjustifiable on the basis of legitimate competitive 
goals, but can only be debunked as an effort to destroy 
competition.  
The landmark Alcoa case 72  is illustrative of the second 
“structuralist” phase, in which § 2 was policed in a rather strict 
way, encompassing even non-predatory practices: by the 1940’s 
the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) had become a 
corporation which controlled over 90% of aluminum market 
thanks to technological innovation secured by a patent. 
Aluminum was a relatively new material that could only be 
                                                
69 In N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 24 S. Ct. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679 (1904) 
the Supreme Court held that [T]he idea of monopoly involves something more 
than a mere acquisition of the whole, or of the major part, of a commodity or of 
shares of stock. It involves the idea of exclusion of other supply, as well as 
inclusion of what is actually acquired. 
70 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55 L. 
Ed. 619 (1911) 
71 On the rule of reason criterion, see infra para. 6.1. Elsewhere, the Supreme 
Court found that the constitution of a holding company “organized by 
competing manufacturers of iron and steel, and which is greater in size and 
productive power than any of its competitors, and equal or nearly equal to 
them all, will not be dissolved under the Sherman Anti-Trust …where a 
monopoly was not thereby achieved, and it was not able to fix prices, and there 
was genuine, direct, and vigorous competition reflected in prices and 
production, and its attempts to persuade competitors, by means of pools, 
associations, trade meetings, etc., had been abandoned as futile prior to the 
institution of the suit”. The approach of the Court shows that United States v. 
U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 40 S. Ct. 293, 64 L. Ed. 343 (1920) 
72 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945)  
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
41 
 
produced thanks to a complex and innovative process. Alcoa 
reached its market dominance by enjoying the positive effects of 
economies of scale in aluminum manufacturing and by keeping 
profit margins low.  
Notwithstanding it abstained from any predatory conduct, Alcoa 
could not escape charge of monopoly on ground that it did not 
seek, but could not avoid control of market73. In his notorious 
opinion, Judge Hand found Alcoa liable just for engaging in 
vigorous competition, merely by meeting the growing demand for 
aluminum with its superior market capacity74. It was held that a 
manufacturer who expands his capacity before others enter the 
field is liable even when he does not attempt to exclude 
competitors deliberately, on the account of the fact that there is no 
more effective exclusion of competition than the expansion of 
facilities due to the so-called “first-mover advantage”75, the better 
organization, the longer experience and the more efficient trade 
connection than every newcomer.  
In sum, regardless of whether or not a firm with a dominant 
position has rigged prices by means of predation, it can be held 
liable of monopolization when it drives competitors off the market 
with the rent that it has obtained over the market itself.  
Filings of antitrust suits against high-technology manufacturers 
characterize the third phase, which starts with the IBM case in 
1969, when Courts acknowledged defendants’ argument that the 
creation of a monopoly in their industry would promote economic 
efficiency. Courts began to identify the “economic rationale”76 
behind the Sherman Act; however, the economic justification 
supporting the existence of monopolies in the high-tech industry 
did not overcome the unequivocal policy underlying the 
enactment of this statute, that is the “Congress’ desire to promote 
                                                
73 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co. of New Jersey, 247 U.S. 32, 38 S. Ct. 
473, 62 L. Ed. 968 (1918) 
74 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424-426 (2d Cir. 1945) In 
line with the Alcoa case, in U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) the Court reaffirmed “Evidence that a firm holding 90% of a 
market that had a substantial entry barriers drastically slashed its prices in 
response to the competition of a new entrant, for the purpose and with the 
effect of eliminating that entrant, was sufficient to show monopolization under 
the Sherman Act”. See also Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., 
194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952), in which it was stated that “Abuses of price fixing 
and price leadership have been traditional criteria of illegality under the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, but there are other indicia of monopoly power, of 
which exclusion of competitors from the market is one, that are condemned by 
the act, regardless of whether or not position of dominance has been exploited 
to rig prices”. 
75 For a definition of “first-mover advantage” see Chapter II, para. 7.2 
76 In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 994 (N.D. 
Cal. 1979) aff'd sub nom. Transamerica Computer Co., Inc. v. Int'l Bus. 
Machines Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983) 
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competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned 
businesses” 77 . Therefore, Courts did not fully appraise the 
justification of a monopoly in the software industry, by virtue of 
the welfare maximization that a reduction in the output price 
would cause. 
 
3. Monopoly power in a relevant market 
 
3.1 The notion of market power and its relationship with the 
relevant market 
In a perfectly competitive market, no one firm is able to affect 
prices by restricting output; conversely, the resource allocation of 
an economy might be severely altered if industries were 
monopolized. A monopolist firm may raise the price or reduce the 
supply of its product and, along with that, the distribution of 
resources within its sector to the detriment of consumers.  
Market power is the ability of a firm to raise prices profitably by 
restricting output 78 , and is the most ostensible symptom of 
monopoly. More specifically, a firm holding a significant degree of 
market power cannot but be a monopolist firm. 
The measurement of market power, or monopoly power (the 
terms can be used interchangeably) helps recognize changes in 
market structures that are regarded as unfavorable. Appraising 
market power presents several difficulties, in that it entails the 
identification of non-quantitative and complex-to-weigh factors. 
In fact, commentators assert that this tool to understand changes 
in market structures is to be seen as a “competitive thermometer”, 
a scale of presumptive indices through which the impact of the 
forces of monopoly can be evaluated79. 
When a US Court challenges the conduct of a monopolist firm, it 
will begin by asking whether the latter has market power. Market 
power is a basic concept in antitrust law and in the analysis of 
monopolization in particular, since it is by virtue of such 
command over the market that the monopolist can impose its 
choices on both competitors and customers. The Sherman Act 
never mentions the term “market power”; nevertheless, 
economists were using the concept of monopoly power long 
before American Courts started understanding the economic 
implications of monopoly80. 
                                                
77 Ibidem. 
78 P.E. Scherer & H. Hoverkamp, Antitrust Law – An Analysis of Antitrust 
Principles and Their Application, Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, New York, 
p.109 (2007) 
79 J.P. Miller, Measures of Monopoly Power and Concentration: Their Economic 
Significance, in Business Concentration and Price Policy, Princeton, p.119 (1955) 
80 D.F. Turner & C. Kaysen, Antitrust Policy: an Economic and Legal Analysis, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 76-78 (1959). According to W.K. 
Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm 
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The most recurrent authority on the definition of market power is 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., in which the Supreme Court 
affirmed that the offense of monopoly entails two elements:  
“(1) The possession of monopoly power in the relevant market 
and  
(2) The willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident”81.  
In his famous dissenting opinion in Grinnell, Justice Fortas has 
contended the lacking of an account of the relevant market on the 
basis of the economic facts of the industry concerned. He has 
censured the “Procustean” approach of the Court82, in that the 
market has been tailored precisely to fit the defendant’s business.  
It is manifest that the delineation of the market is a subtle issue, 
which can be manipulated and used as the tool to convey various 
policy reasons in the Sherman Act. In fact, the plaintiff and the 
defendant will have different interest in identifying the market: on 
the one hand, the former will seek to prove a smaller market, 
whereas the latter will aim at proving the existence of a bigger 
market, in order to show a lesser adverse impact of his anti-
competitive conduct on the trade or commerce83. 
In order to understand the meaning of “market power”, it is 
useful to preliminarily focus on the concept of market in a non-
technical way. “Market” can be prima facie used to label the 
general conditions under which sellers and buyers exchange 
goods. Within such structure, monopoly is often and in an 
empirical way identified with a specific market share, that is 100% 
or a segment close to it. As a consequence, market power should 
empirically correspond to the market share that the monopolist 
benefits from.  
                                                                                                                                                            
Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 1 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1 31 (2007) has 
affirmed that the book by Turner and Kaysen is the most influential law and 
economics synthesis of their time. The authors advocated for a no-fault 
provision to address the monopolist’s conduct. At a doctrinal level, this is the 
most forceful endorsement for the structuralist approach of Courts following 
Alcoa.   
81 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 1704, 16 L. 
Ed. 2d 778 (1966), The Grinnell case will be analyzed in more detail with regard 
to the role of market power, see infra note n. 80 et seq., and with regard to the per 
se rule, see note n. 186 
82 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 587, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 1712, 16 L. 
Ed. 2d 778 (1966). See infra. Procrustes is a mythological character who lodged 
travelers, but forced them to fit his standard-size beds by stretching them or 
cutting them down to size, as required. L. Altman & M. Pollack, 1 Callmann on 
Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, 4th ed., § 4.31, The Market 
Power – The relevant market., Thomson Reuters, New York (2012) 
83 EW Kintner, An antitrust primer: A guide to antitrust and trade regulation laws for 
businessmen, MacMillan, New York, p.91 (1964) 
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In antitrust litigations concerning monopolization, an orthodox 
way of proceeding would involve the definition of a relevant 
market, the identification of the defendant’s market share and, 
finally, the assessment of whether such share amounts to 
monopoly power under the Act 84 . Contrariwise, Courts have 
focused less on the measurement of monopoly power and more 
on the uses and abuses of such dominance. Some commentators 
have criticized this approach for its lack of effectiveness in 
combatting persistent monopolies not attributable to superior 
performance, and have stirred debate on the opportunity of 
establishing a “no-fault” provision85.  Vigorous 
Whilst market power measurement is normally passed over 
lightly, the product and the geographic market are first defined in 
monopolization cases. Once these boundaries are narrowed down, 
the defendant’s sales are compared with those of competitors. 
Other evidence of the defendant’s profits, or of the ability of new 
competitors to enter the market, or of price discrimination can be 
used to reinforce of refute the inference of the defendant’s ability 
to raise prices and reduce output86. 
In the famous Kodak case, the Court has defined “market power” 
as the “power to prices or to exclude competition” 87 . This 
definition is vague and raises an exegetical problem: in a perfectly 
competitive market, every firm holds a control over its power to 
prices; consequently, every firm has a quantum market power, 
hence every firm is to be considered as a potential monopolist. 
Evidently, not every firm is wholly capable of influencing prices 
by reducing outputs on the market. Therefore, the first issue for 
monopolization is to define what degree of market power would 
imply the exercise of a control over the firm’s behavior. As it has 
been argued above, the Sherman Act does not mention market 
power or gives guidance for measuring it or determining what is 
the minimal aggregation that represents a monopoly.  
When it comes to economic theory of monopoly, the concept of 
market power is closely intertwined to the laws of demand; 
market power is the ability to raise prices (or to restrict output) 
above competitive level for a sustained period of time without 
                                                
84 W.M. Landes &  R.A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 
937, (1981) 
85 The above-mentioned debate did not bring to the enactment of any measure. 
P. Areeda & D.F Turner, Antitrust Law: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles and 
their Application, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, p. 614, 1978. E. Kovacic, Failed 
Expectations: the troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for 
Deconcentration, 74 Iowa L.Rev., 1105, 1136, 1989. 
86 W.M. Landes &  R.A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 939. 
 87 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992), 
quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 
(1956), and United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). With regard 
to the latter case, see infra, note n. 148 et seq. 
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incurring in losses of sales that would outweigh the benefits of the 
higher price 88 . The “power over price” is the fundamental 
postulation of the economic concept of monopoly, and it is 
reflected in the economics’ assumption that the demand curve is 
downward sloped, whereby market price is inverse to quantity. 
The monopolist seller who controls the supply of a product can 
raise the price for it by restricting the amount supplied. The more 
steeply sloped the demand curve is, the greater the market power 
of the monopolist will be89. 
 
3.2 The notion of relevant market and the twofold dimension of 
the relevant market 
The notion of market power risks to degrade into a theoretic 
conjecture if the market within which the firm exercises its power 
is not narrowed down. The concept of “relevant market” to the 
scopes of § 2 entails setting the boundaries that identify groups of 
sellers or goods, over which monopoly power is exercised.  That 
requires the identification of a domain in which sellers and buyers 
operate to establish price and output of specific groups of goods; 
such domain has a twofold dimension including the product lines, 
on the one hand, and the geographic area, on the other hand.  
To put it better, the “product market” includes the group of 
products with which the monopolizing firm’s product or service 
effectively competes, whereas the “geographic market” entails the 
physical area within which the effects of the monopolizing 
conduct are felt. Most of the case law regarding the offense of 
monopolization is concerned with the analysis of market power in 
the aforesaid twofold dimension90. 
In order to recognize relevant markets, antitrust doctrines tend to 
determine links in the chain of available fringe alternatives, with a 
view to selecting the possible alternative goods available to buyers, 
and the transactions that are sufficiently interrelated and that can 
                                                
88 J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1992, 
p. 284; P.E. Areeda, L. Kaplow, A.S. Edlin, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Texts and 
Cases, Aspen Publishers (6th ed. 2004) p. 556; D.W. Carlton & J.M. Perloff, 
Modern Industrial Organization 3d ed. 1999 Reading, MA: Addison Wesley 
Longman Inc., p. 92; D.E. Waldman & E.J. Jensen, Industrial Organization: Theory 
and Practice, Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice Hall, 2d ed. 2000 pp. 40, 437, 953. 
E.T. Sullivan, Antitrust and its economic implications, 5th ed., LexisNexis 
Publisher, Newark (NJ), p.23 (2008)  
89 R. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2001, 
p.9. For a more in-depth analysis of the economic notion of market power, see 
infra,  
90 T.G. Krattenmaker et al., Airlie House Conference on the Antitrust Alternative: 
Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 251-52 
(1987) 
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be affected by the dominance of a firm91. Thus outlined, the 
grouping is often difficult to execute. 
 
3.2.1 The relevant product market 
The relevant product market is the one in which all of the 
substitutes of the seller’s product are available to buyers. If the 
characterization of a product market were too narrow, it would 
not encompass genuine substitutes; conversely, if it were too wide, 
it would overestimate the defendant’s ability to affect price and 
output. In the famous Cellophane case, the Supreme Court has 
availed itself of a “reasonable interchangeability criterion”92: the 
control over a relevant part of the commerce or trade of a product 
is determined by reference to the availability of alternative 
commodities for buyers, or, to put it in economic terms, reference 
should be made to the cross-elasticity between the demand for the 
alternative commodities93.  
More specifically, the economic account of the reasonable 
interchangeability of two products does not include the extent to 
which they are substantially and objectively fungible or have the 
same price, but is based on an economic notion, namely the degree 
to which the change of price/output of a product of an industry a 
firm is alleged to monopolize is likely to affect the change of 
price/output of the alternative commodity. If the variation in 
price/output of the product affects the alternative commodity, 
they can be considered as part of the same commerce or trade for 
the scope of § 2. If there is substantial interaction (high cross 
elasticity) between the two products, they will be included in the 
same market94; contrariwise, if there is little interaction between 
                                                
91 R. Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 
Colum L. Rev. 1805-1810, (1990) 
92 U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395, 76 S. Ct. 994, 999, 
100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956) 
93 In U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380, 76 S. Ct. 994, 999, 
100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956), the Supreme Court had to determine whether there was 
competition between cellophane and other wrapping materials and it borrowed 
the notion of cross-elasticity from the realm of economics to evaluate the part of 
trade or commerce the defendant was suspected to have monopolized. 
94 Compare Se. Missouri Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 
2011), in which the Court affirmed that “the outer boundaries of a product 
market can be determined by the reasonable interchangeability, or cross-
elasticity of demand, between the product itself and possible substitutes for 
it”…“Evidence that consumers will substitute one product for another in 
response to a slight decrease in price, strongly indicates those products compete 
in the same product market”; AD/SAT, Div. of Skylight, Inc. v. Associated 
Press, 181 F.3d 216, 227 (2d Cir. 1999) “In economists’ terms, two products or 
services are reasonably interchangeable where there is sufficient cross-elasticity 
of demand. Cross-elasticity of demand exists if consumers would respond to a 
slight increase in the price of one product by switching to another product. Cf. 
Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571, 86 S.Ct. 1698. Also relevant to the delineation of a 
relevant product market is cross-elasticity of supply, which depends on the 
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the two products, they will not bi included in the same market, 
even though they are objectively fungible. 
The Cellophane case is particularly illustrative of how the analysis 
of product market is carried out, on the one hand, and of how the 
judicial criteria are applied in concrete, on the other hand; the 
Court had to establish the product market in which du Pont was 
charged to possess a high degree of market power. The 
Government alleged that du Pont’s control over almost 75% of the 
production of cellophane sold in the United States was sufficient 
proof of monopoly power, since the other flexible wrapping 
materials were not competitive enough to break the defendant’s 
control over market price. Conversely, du Pont objected that there 
was no cellophane’s product market disconnected from other 
market alternative that buyers could use in lieu of the former, 
such as pliofilm, saran wrap, aluminum foil etc. With the inclusion 
of these alternative options for buyers in the product market at 
issue, du Pont’s market share would fell to 17%95, well below the 
monopoly threshold established in other cases96. 
The Government (plaintiff) claimed to narrow down the 
cellophane product market in a way to only include the products 
that were largely fungible, and would sell within the same price 
range97. The Supreme Court rejected this hypothesis, countering 
that under such a narrow definition of product market, the 
producers of many patented products should be subjected to the 
monopoly scrutiny98. Instead, it advocated for appraising the 
cross-elasticity of demand in the trade99, in order to determine 
“whether commodities are reasonably interchangeable by 
consumers for the same purposes for which they are produced”100. 
                                                                                                                                                            
extent to which producers of one product would be willing to shift their 
resources to producing another product in response to an increase in the price 
of the other product. Where there is cross-elasticity of supply, a would-be 
monopolist's attempt to charge supra-competitive prices will be thwarted by 
the existence of firms willing to shift resources to producing the product, 
thereby increasing supply and driving prices back to competitive levels”; In 
Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 436-38 (3d Cir. 
1997) it was held “products in a relevant market [are] characterized by a cross-
elasticity of demand, in other words, the rise in the price of a good within a 
relevant product market would tend to create a greater demand for other like 
goods in that market”;  
95 U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 405, 76 S. Ct. 994, 999, 
100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956) 
96 See following chapter, concerning market share. 
97 U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393-395, 76 S. Ct. 994, 
999, 100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956) 
98 U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 381, 76 S. Ct. 994, 999, 
100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956) 
99 U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394, 76 S. Ct. 994, 999, 
100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956) 
100 U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395, 76 S. Ct. 994, 999, 
100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956) 
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The reasonable interchangeability test calls for considering three 
elements: qualities, use and price. 
As regards the first element, the Court argued that cellophane did 
not have intrinsic qualities that other materials used in the food 
industry were lacking of, such as transparency, low permeability 
to gases and low moisture permeability. Therefore, the inclusion 
of other wrapping products with these features in the cellophane’s 
product market was not deemed unreasonable101. 
With regard to the use test, the Court affirmed that it entails the 
appraisal of whether the products have a “considerable degree of 
functional interchangeability”102, whether buyers can shift back 
and forth from cellophane to other flexible wrappings. This test 
did not encompass the analysis of some of the advantages that 
cellophane had compared to the alternative materials. 
With reference to the price, the Court examined price movements, 
and responsiveness of the sales of one product to prices changes of 
the other. It maintained “if a slight decrease in the price of 
cellophane causes a considerable number of customers of other 
flexible wrappings to switch to cellophane, it would be an 
indication that a high-cross elasticity of demand exists between 
them; that the products compete in the same market”103. Thus, the 
test includes a consideration of costs, in a way to exclude the 
substitutes of cellophane where, at prices producing a high cross-
elasticity, the alleged monopolist has a substantial cost advantage. 
The substitutes are a check of the power of the alleged monopolist. 
To put it better, when focusing on cross-elasticity the Court 
considered direct competition from other products. Some scholars 
have stressed that the elasticity analysis was flawed, since buyer-
price responsiveness to changes in cellophane prices suggested 
that other flexible products are close substitutes only if 
competitive prices were in fact being charged for cellophane104. 
Percentage share of a market based on a definition the market 
itself does not in itself indicate the extent of monopoly power.  
                                                
101 U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404-405 Appendix A, 76 
S. Ct. 994, 999, 100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956). The Court passed on singling out every 
flexible wrapping material that was fungible with cellophane. Some 
commentators have objected that the Supreme Court has included in this 
product market aluminum foil, even though it is opaque and cannot be used for 
packaging fresh produce. See E. Gellehorn & W.E. Kovacic, Antitrust Law and 
Economics in a nutshell, 4th ed., West Publishing Co., St. Paul (Minnesota), p.101, 
(1994) 
102 U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 399, 76 S. Ct. 994, 999, 
100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956) 
103 U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400, 76 S. Ct. 994, 999, 
100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956). The Court held that other wrapping materials competed 
with cellophane; the findings of the case showed that some customers shifted 
their purchases in response to price changes. 
104 D.F. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane case, 70 Harv. L. Rev., 281, 308 
(1956) 
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Criticism should be addressed to the misleading aspects of the 
traditional approach of Courts, implying a first narrowing of the 
market and a successive decision of whether a firm has 
monopolized it. Percentage share of a market based on a 
particular definition of the market does not in itself indicate the 
extent of monopoly power. If the question of the extent of the 
power is to be answered in the process of deciding what the 
market is, market definition becomes redundant.  
If, for example, du Pont had been the sole producer of cellophane 
and had had a substantial preference-cost advantage over 
competing materials in all significant uses, that would have been 
shown by substantially higher profits. That alone would tend to 
show monopoly power. By merely leaning on the cross-elasticity 
of the demand, the inquiry would fail to combat those 
monopolies, which do not present power over price, because -
consciously or unconsciously- the monopolist has not maintained 
margins of advantage that his product would have made available 
to him.  
In the case at stake, the cross-elasticity test nothing said about the 
actual monopoly power of du Pont: in fact, if the defendant was 
charging a monopoly price for cellophane, the high cross-elasticity 
would have only meant that it could not have raised its prices any 
further without a sales loss. This is what as been defined as the 
“Cellophane fallacy”105, insofar as the Supreme Court erred in 
considering that a finding of high demand cross elasticity might 
mean that the defendant has already exercised monopoly power 
by raising price to the “tipping point”, after which there would be 
no profit maximization, since purchasers would respond by 
buying close substitutes.  
The Court determined the size of the relevant market, as defined 
by the number and availability of substitute products, with 
reference to a supra-competitive (monopoly) price rather than the 
lower competitive price. Distinctive substitutes showing a high 
cross-elasticity of demand at prices that have actually been 
charged are to be included in the market even though produced at 
a substantial margin of disadvantage. As a result, the Court held 
that the defendant had no market power when in fact it had 
substantial market power. 
                                                
105 G. C. Schaerr, The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice Department's Guidelines for 
Horizontal Mergers, 94 Yale L.J. 670, 677 (1985); L. Kaplow, The Accuracy of 
Traditional Market Power Analysis and a Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95 Harv. L. 
Rev., 1817, 1832-35 (1982) The author has affirmed that analysis of substitution 
possibilities with reference to prevailing market conditions… “presents a 
subtle, but most important, analytic trap”; D.I. Baker & W. Blumenthal, The 
1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 311, 325-26 (1983). Aside 
from this analytic trap, the cross-elasticity criterion can be used to establish 
whether two products are close substitutes only when both are sold at 
competitive price.  
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In United States vs. Grinnell Corp., the Government charged 
Grinnell with monopolization of the supply of accredited central 
station protective services (CSPS). Accredited CSPS included the 
installation of a central alarm system “[I]ncluding such services as 
automatic burglar alarms, automatic fire alarms, sprinkler 
supervisory service”106. Grinnell owned 87% of the market of 
accredited central station protective services and, even though the 
central station could provide burglary protection or fire protection 
separately, the Supreme Court considered these submarkets as 
irrelevant entities for antitrust purposes107, hence it identified one 
single market of all central services, leveraging on the fact that the 
relevant market was actually the central service protection of 
property108.  
The Court purported to follow the Cellophane approach, 
considering the relevant market as the one affected by the cross-
elasticity of demand of reasonably interchangeable products, but –
in doing so- it did not test price responsiveness of substitutes. 
Moreover, it argued that, under the standards of Cellophane, in 
order to compete effectively a seller had to offer central services; 
consequently, no reasonably interchangeable systems were 
found109.  
Another important case concerning the definition of a product 
market is Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp110. Plaintiff charged IBM with 
monopolization “in the manufacture, distribution, sale, and 
leasing of plug compatible peripheral products which are attached 
to IBM central processing units” 111 . Telex had entered the 
peripheral hardware market for IBM computers by copying the 
defendant’s equipment and by charging a lower price than the 
defendant for a significant amount of time prior to pressing 
charges112.  
The defendant reacted by reducing its prices on peripheral 
products and by introducing slight design changes; as a result, no 
sooner did Telex begin losing customers, than it sued IBM for 
                                                
106 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 16 L. Ed. 2d 778 
(1966) 
107 Ibidem United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 16 L. Ed. 
2d 778 (1966) 
108 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 572, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 16 L. Ed. 2d 778 
(1966). The installation of accredited CSPS would substantially lower the 
insurance premiums on houses. This is another factor the Supreme Court 
considered to identify a separate CSPS market, independent on the single alarm 
systems that it encompassed. 
109 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 574, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 16 L. Ed. 2d 778 
(1966) 
110 Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) 
disapproved of by Memorex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 555 F.2d 1379 
(9th Cir. 1977) 
111 Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894-898 (10th Cir. 1975) 
112 Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1975) 
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monopolizing the above-mentioned market. The core matter of the 
case was the identification of the product market, in particular 
whether it should be restrained to the peripheral devices that were 
“plug compatible” 113  with IBM’s central processing units, or 
whether it should encompass all peripheral devices not 
necessarily “plug compatible” with IBM central units.  
The District Court held that the relevant market was the one of the 
peripheral that could be plugged into IBM machines, since the 
original market itself had been shaped by IBM’s own products, 
being the latter the only manufacturer of peripheral products that 
were plug compatible with its own system; therefore, the finding 
of individual submarkets for each particular type of peripheral 
product gave IBM an original 100% command over the commerce 
equipment compatible with its own mainframes114. This monopoly 
was slowly eroded by the entry into the plug-compatible market 
with IBM CPUs of other manufacturers, including the plaintiff.  
The Tenth Circuit reversed the conclusions of the district court, 
challenging the narrow construction of the peripherals market. It 
expanded the defined market to all peripherals 115. The court 
applied the Cellophane cross-elasticity test, by taking into account 
the responsiveness of sales of one product to price changes of the 
other, but objected that “finding of actual fungibility is not 
necessary to a conclusion that products have potential 
substitutability” 116 . In the case at bar, reasonable 
interchangeability between peripheral products plug compatible 
with IBM CPUs and those compatible with non-IBM systems was 
proven, for these products, although non fungible, were 
                                                
113 Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1975). The 
Court affirmed that “[T]he term ‘plug compatible peripheral device’ is the 
specific class of equipment that enters into this case. What is meant is that a 
producer of a complete electronic processing unit manufactures, as noted, the 
central processing unit and peripheral components, which are geared to use on 
that central processing unit. Many manufacturers produce peripheral 
components primarily for attachment to central processing units of a particular 
manufacturer and so, therefore, the plug compatible peripheral device refers to 
a component which is functionally equivalent to the manufacturer's peripheral 
device and can be readily plugged into that central processing unit. 
Undoubtedly it is the wide use of the IBM central processing unit that caused 
Telex and others to market peripheral devices which were plug compatible 
with the IBM unit and which could replace IBM peripheral devices which had 
been made for the IBM central system”. 
114 Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 899-900 (10th Cir. 1975) 
115 Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1975). The 
Court assessed the power of IBM by examining “IBM’s annual share of new 
installations among IBM plug-compatible units as well as among all hardware 
units” See E. Gellehorn & W.E. Kovacic, Antitrust Law and Economics in a 
nutshell, 4th ed., West Publishing Co., St. Paul (Minnesota), p.105, (1994) 
116 Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 917-918 (10th Cir. 1975) 
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interchangeable with minimal financial outlay, so cross-elasticity 
existed within the meaning of du Pont117. 
 
3.2.2 The relevant geographic market 
After having surveyed the judicial faceting of the product market, 
it is essential to focus on the other aspect of monopoly power, 
namely the geographic determination of such dominance. Scholars 
normally define the geographic market as the entire nation where 
products are distributed nationally and costs do not vary 
significantly118. One of the economics’ account of the geographic 
market holds that it is not necessarily related to a place, but rather 
to buyers and sellers who are “in such free intercourse with one 
another that prices of the same goods tend to equality easily and 
quickly”119.  
In the case law, it has been argued that the relevant geographic is 
an economic reality, not a political one; thus, it is to be identified 
in terms of the distances that the defendant and its competitors are 
willing to travel to service their customers, regardless of the 
boundaries of a state120.  
When it comes to delineating the geographic market, a general 
rule calls for considering it as the area in which the firm and its 
competitors sell their product and in which their customers buy 
without a ready access to an outside source of supply121. This 
principle has been expanded by Courts, which tend to delineate 
the relevant geographic area as the one where market would be 
diverted if a relevant increase in price for the primary product or 
service at stake took place, in a way to include it when calculating 
the defendant’s market share122. However, applications of this 
                                                
117 Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 1975) 
118 K.G. Elzinga, Defining Geographic Market Boundaries, 26 Antitrust Bull. 739 
(1981), W.G. Lavey, A Close Analysis of Buyers and Antitrust Markets, 61 Wash. 
U.L.Q. 752 (1983), W.G. Lavey, Commentary: Focus of Antitrust Markets, 62 Wash 
U.L.Q. 671 (1985), G.J. Werden, Use and Misuse of Shipments Data in Defining 
Geographic Markets, 26 Antitrust Bull. 719 (1981) 
119 A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, Book V, London: Macmillan, p.324, 
(1978). 
120 Discon Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 86 F. Supp. 2d 154, 162 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) 
121 Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125 
(D. Mass. 1960). See also the case note Restraint of Trade - in General - Unfair 
Competition in Natural Monopoly Situation Is Sherman Act Violation; Newspaper 
Stock Acquisition by Neighboring Monopoly Publishers Not Clayton Act Violation. - 
Union Leader Corp., 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1632, 1633 (1960) 
122 In Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261 amended, 890 
F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989) the relevant market was confined “to western world 
production on the basis of an accepted economic benchmark for identifying 
substitute goods within a given market; under that benchmark, sales of a 
“substitute” rise significantly in response to a non-temporary increase of 5% or 
more in prices of the primary product”. 
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criterion still remain casuistic, in particular where the treatment of 
foreign imports into the US is concerned123. 
The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of the geographic 
market in the above-mentioned Grinnell case, ruling that a 
national market existed in accredited CSPS, even if competition 
for the sale of fire and burglary alarm was realistically limited to 
metropolitan areas. The Court relied on the national planning and 
price plan of the defendant –and on its relations with other 
businesses on a national basis- to identify a national geographic 
market124, even though there was no other accredited competitor 
in 92 of 115 in which Grinnell operated. Grinnell, as the two of the 
dissenters have put it, might have had 92 separate monopolies, 
but it would have been difficult to attach to each of the separate 
markets the exclusionary practices the defendant was charged 
with. By identifying a nationwide market, the Court provided no 
incentive to create localized competition125. In the case at bar, 
however, evidence was in favor of identifying a local geographic 
market, such as the fact that the accredited CSPS could be 
furnished only locally, the business was carried out locally, and 
the defendant was found to have violated the Sherman Act only in 
certain areas of the country126. 
When a discriminating incumbent monopolist controls the market, 
the sales made at the same price only partially identify the actual 
geographic market; in fact, transportation costs are another factor 
influencing the scope of a geographic market. Transportation costs 
have the effect of linking those areas where a certain product is 
exchanged at the same price, and where that product can be 
transported if price differential exceeds shipping costs127. At any 
rate, there is no consensus among scholars as regards how to 
gauge transportation costs in the delineation of the geographic 
market. Some argue that if transportation costs are high, they will 
also have the effect of sheltering local producers from suffering 
losses in sale in the event they would raise prices128. This way, 
transportation costs will define a geographic market by excluding 
the entry into the market itself of either external competitors or of 
external fringe products, and therefore by giving the firm a power 
                                                
123 G.A. Hay, J.C. Hilke & P.B. Nelson, Geographic Market Definition in an 
International Context, 64 Chicago-Kent L. Rev., 711 (1988) 
124 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 575, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 16 L. Ed. 2d 778 
(1966) 
125 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 589, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 16 L. Ed. 2d 778 
(1966) 
126 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 590, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 16 L. Ed. 2d 778 
(1966) 
127 T.F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits, 
18 Antitrust Bull., 50 (1973) 
128 E.T. Sullivan, Antitrust and its economic implications, 5th ed., LexisNexis 
Publisher, Newark (NJ), p.28 (2008) 
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over the market that can be evaluated accordingly.  
Some other have adopted a “diversion” approach which 
individuates the relevant spatial framework by resorting to the 
cross-elasticity of demand criterion, without regard to the impact 
of transportation costs: they claim that Courts should tend to 
evaluate the extent to what buyers will increase purchases from 
more distant suppliers in the event the defendant will raise the 
price for his output. If cross elasticity is high, the relevant 
geographic market will encompass the areas in which the other 
suppliers operate129.  
Moreover, the diversion criterion can also be used “[T]o show that 
the supply response of the competitive fringe (here consisting of 
the distant sellers that have some sales in the local market in 
question) is an increasing function of the ratio of the distant 
sellers’ sales in their other markets to their sales in the local 
market. The higher that ratio, the higher their supply response 
will be, because it is easier for distant sellers to divert a small 
fraction of their output to the local market should price rise there 
than it would be to divert a large fraction of their output to the 
local market. The simplest way to take account of the relationship 
between the distant sellers’ sales in other markets and their supply 
response in the local market is to include those sales in the 
relevant market--in other words, to include in the local market the 
entire output of any seller who has some local sales”130.  
With regard to transportation costs, the authors of the 
aforementioned quote argue that in the event an external seller 
and the whole of his sales were to be included in the relevant 
geographic market, the market power of the local seller can be 
measured without any account of the transportation costs and of 
the other distance-related costs that the sellers operating in 
another state or country would suffer. The reason is that the local 
seller has an interest in setting prices for his product below the 
cost of external –or foreign- producers, in order to keep the latter 
out of the market131. This tendency to lower prices would make up 
for higher transportation costs, therefore expanding the relevant 
geographic area to include in the analysis, and making proof of 
monopolization more improbable. 
A price lower than the actual cost that the external producer has to 
bear in order to divert the product in the primary market will 
make entry unprofitable. Therefore, the authors maintain that 
                                                
129 P. Areeda & D.F Turner, Antitrust Law, volume 2, p. 533, (1978), K.G. Elzinga 
&  T.F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits, 
18 Antitrust Bull., 45 (1973), W.M. Landes &  R.A. Posner, Market Power in 
Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 963, (1981). 
130 W.M. Landes &  R.A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. 
Rev. 964, (1981) 
131 Ibidem 
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what matters is not the existence of barriers to entry –such as 
transportation costs- but the appraisal of whether an external 
product has overcome these logistic barriers and entered the 
domestic market, in a way to expand the geographic frame of 
reference and to erode the market dominance of the local 
producer.  
The size of the total output of the external producer relative to the 
size of the local market will show his ability to overcome both 
barriers to entry and extra costs of production. The relation is 
evident by including the distant seller’s output in the local 
market132. 
The above analysis allows consideration of foreign trades in the 
relevant geographic market, since it proves valid with regard to 
both external and foreign sellers. The inclusion of outputs of 
foreign sellers in the relevant market for American antitrust 
purposes will serve to scale down some domestic monopolies133. 
Leaving aside transportation costs, the qualifications required to 
include in the relevant market outputs of distant sellers are the 
consistent presence on the market for several years, on the one 
hand, and the “identification of a group of consumers large 
enough to be entitled to the protection of the antitrust laws, and 
identification of the sellers who can readily supply this group of 
consumers, which may not be a group located within easy reach of 
foreign suppliers”, on the other hand134. 
 
3.3 Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
joint Guidelines 
In 1992 the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission issued joint Guidelines concerning how federal 
antitrust officials analyze the competitive effect of horizontal 
mergers135. The Guidelines provide directions on how to define the 
relevant market in Section 1.1. Market definition is relevant not 
only for the purpose of applying Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
but also for cases under the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.  
With regard to the product market definition, Section 1.11 defines 
                                                
132 Ibidem, p. 965 
133 L.C. Thurow, The Zero Sum Society, New York: Basic Books, p. 146 (1980) 
134 W.M. Landes &  R.A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. 
Rev. 967, (1981) 
135 M.E. Guerin-Calvert, The 1992 Agency Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the 
Department of Justice’s approach to bank merger analysis, 37 Antitrust Bull. 667, 
(1992), D.T. Scheffman, Symposium on New 1992 Merger Guidelines, 38 Antitrust 
Bull., 473 (1973), P.T Denis, Advances of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 
the Analysis of Competitive Effects, 38 Antitrust Bull., 479 (1993). G.J. Werden, 
Market Delineation under the Merger Guidelines: A Tenth Anniversary Retrospective 
Symposium on New 1992 Merger Guidelines, 38 Antitrust Bull., 571 (1993), M.B. 
Coate, Entry under the Merger Guidelines 1982-1992 Symposium on New 1992 
Merger Guidelines, 38 Antitrust  Bull., 557 (1993). 
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the relevant market as a “product or a group of products such that 
a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that was the only present 
and future seller (‘monopolist’) likely would impose at least a 
‘small but significant and non-transitory’ increase in price” (SSNIP 
)136. Even if the Guidelines do not use the term antitrust market, 
they refer to it rather than to the understanding of market in 
economics137.  
The threshold for significance of market power is expressed in 
terms of the extent of the price increase that the presumed 
monopolist will be likely to impose, and it is usually deemed 
relevant when it is at least of 5% and lasts for at least one year138. 
This criterion is purely economic: in fact, on the one hand, the 
guidelines link market power to the capacity of price adjustment, 
but on the other, hand they do not contemplate the conditions that 
brought to the price adjustment139.  
The process begins with the identification of a product produced 
or sold by the hypothetical monopolist and with the question: 
what would happen if a hypothetical monopolist of that product 
imposed at least a SSNIP, but the terms of sale of all other 
products remained constant? If, in response to the price increase, a 
large enough number of buyers switch to another product and 
render such an increase no longer profitable, the substitute 
product will be included in the relevant market, as the next-best 
substitute for the defendant’s product. 
The price increase question is then asked again for a hypothetical 
monopolist controlling the expanded product group. In 
performing successive iterations of the price increase test, the 
hypothetical monopolist will be assumed to pursue maximum 
profits in deciding whether to raise the prices of any or all of the 
additional products under its control. This process will continue 
until a group of products is identified such that a hypothetical 
monopolist over that group of products would profitably impose 
at least a SSNIP. Generally, the relevant product market is 
                                                
136  1992 Merger Guidelines § 1.0 et seq. available at the website 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.shtm  
137  Many economists argue that the economic market is unrelated to the 
antitrust market. D.T. Scheffman & P.T. Spiller, Geographic Market Definition 
under the U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 30 J.L. & Econ. 123, 127-28 
(1987), and Spiller & C.J. Huang, On the Extent of the Market: Wholesale Gasoline 
in the Northeastern United States, 35  J. Indus. Econ. 131, 132-33 (1986). Others 
argue against this distinction. J.A. Ordover & D.M. Wall, Understanding 
Econometric Methods of Market Definition, 3 Antitrust, 20-23 (1989)W.F. Shughart 
II, The organization of Industry, 2nd ed. Houston TX, Dame Publications, p.148 
(1990);. 
138 1992 Merger Guidelines § 1.11. Under the 1992 Guidelines, the price increase 
is not uniform, and the 5% threshold is applied to the product of one of the 
merging firms around which the market is delineated. 
139 J.F. Rill, Merger Enforcement at the Department of Justice, 59 Antitrust L.J. 45, 49-
50 (1990) 
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considered to be the smallest group of products that satisfies this 
test. 
In sum, the relevant product market pursuant to the Guidelines is 
identified as follows: a) singling out the defendant’s product; b) 
identifying the products that the customers of the firm view as 
good substitutes if these have a prevailing price c) evaluate 
whether circumstances suggest  “coordinated interaction” 140 
between the two categories. In order to estimate the shift of 
customers to substitute products in the event of a SSNIP of the 
principal product, the government will use various factors: 
1. Evidence that buyers have shifted or have considered shifting 
purchases between products in response to relative changes in 
price or other competitive variables; 
2. Evidence that sellers base business decisions on the prospect of 
buyer substitutions between products in response to relative 
changes in price or other competitive variables; 
3. The influence of downstream competition faced by buyers in their 
output markets 
4. The timing and costs of switching products141. 
The relevant product market is identified when switches no longer 
occur. In case law, Courts have occasionally availed themselves of 
the SSNIPP tool as “a valid diagnostic tool” for both horizontal 
merger hypotheses and monopolization practices142. It has been 
said that “determining the relevant market can involve a 
complicated economic analysis, including concepts like cross-
elasticity of demand, and ‘small but significant non-transitory 
increase in price’ (‘SSNIP’) analysis. … Cross-elasticity of demand 
measures the percentage change in quantity that consumers will 
demand of one product in response to a percentage change in the 
price of another. … When demand for the commodity of one 
producer shows no relation to the price for the commodity of 
another producer, it supports the claim that the two commodities 
are not in the same relevant market. … Similarly, a SSNIP analysis 
asks whether a monopolist in the proposed market could 
                                                
140  The expression “coordinated interaction” is repeatedly used in the 
Guidelines. When it comes to the relevant product market, the need to test an 
interaction between the two sets of product, aside from the SSNIP criterion 
conveys an attempt to avoid the afore-mentioned Cellophane fallacy. 
141 1992 Merger Guidelines § 1.11 
142 In Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. Nat'l Ass'n of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 
588 F.3d 908, 917 (6th Cir. 2009) the Court has held that the SSNIPP test 
“measures whether increasing a product’s price-usually by five percent-results 
in a substantial number of consumers purchasing an alternative product. The 
use of this technique has been recognized in antitrust case law, see F.T.C. v. 
Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1038 (D.C.Cir.2008) (recognizing the SSNIP 
test as a valid diagnostic tool), and the district court found that the parties in 
this case agreed that it is “an accepted means of analyzing the 
interchangeability of a product and its substitutes”. 
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profitably impose a small but significant and non-transitory price 
increase. … If a significant number of customers would respond to 
a SSNIP by purchasing substitute products, the SSNIP would not 
be profitable for the hypothetical monopolist. … If a monopolist 
could not profitably impose a SSNIP, the market definition should 
be expanded to include those substitute products that constrain 
the monopolist’s pricing”143. 
With regard to geographic market, guideline n. 1.21 affirms that it 
entails the region within which the firm selling the relevant 
product can profitably impose a small but significant and non-
transitory increase in price, holding constant the terms of sale for 
all products produced elsewhere. 
The analysis departs from locating the firm under investigation, 
together with the locations of the other suppliers from which 
consumers will be induced to buy by a SSNIP for the main 
product144; the same question is asked: what would happen if the 
hypothetical monopolist imposed a SSNIP for the main product, 
but the terms of the sale at all other locations remained constant? 
If the increase results unprofitable for the monopolist, then the 
location from which production is next best substitute for the 
monopolist’s product will be added. 
When assessing the likelihood that buyers will switch to other 
suppliers, the Government will consider the four above factors. 
Nevertheless, the Government can isolate a narrower market in 
the event that, on the one hand, the firm under investigation will 
raise prices and, on the other hand, buyers will be refrained from 
defeating the price increase by switching to a more distant 
seller145. 
Guidelines outlay some tools to delineate the relevant market 
diachronically, since they require the ascertainment of a price 
increase and an assessment of the substitutability that the price 
adjustment is likely to cause, in terms of both switching to a 
different product and buying in a different geographic area; 
moreover, the fact that the 5% SSNIP is not an fixed benchmark, 
but any change in price that is seen as made at “prevailing prices” 
can be held relevant show that the Guidelines ultimately leave 
room for the Government to evaluate circumstances of the 
concrete case at issue. 
Finally, the extent to which a firm possesses market power over a 
                                                
143 Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News America Marketing FSI, 546 F.3d 991 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (California antitrust law).  
“acknowledging the agency guidelines test for defining a relevant market as 
“recognized in antitrust case law” and generally describing the test as 
“measur[ing] whether increasing a product’s price —usually by five percent—
results in a substantial number of consumers purchasing an alternative 
product” 
144 http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.shtm  
145 http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.shtm  
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product in a geographic area is determined by the conduct of the 
firm and by the concurrence of three factors constraining the 
market: demand substitutability, supply substitutability and entry 
in the market146. Demand substitutability indicates the extent to 
which an attempted exercise of market power in the market under 
investigation would bring consumers to switch to another market. 
Supply substitutability and entry both refer to the extent to which 
an attempted exercise of market power in the market would 
induce other suppliers not currently selling in the candidate 
market to begin operating in it. The distinction between the two 
factors (at least under the Guidelines) is that entry entails 
significant new investment in production or distribution, whereas 
supply substitution does not147. 
 
4. Proving market power 
 
4.1 The economic definition of market power 
In order to understand antitrust law, it is important to understand 
the meaning of “competition”, on the one hand, and of “market 
power”, on the other hand in economic terms, namely in terms of 
how the price system affects the distribution of income and the 
rationing of scarce resources in a market economy. The tools of 
economic analysis can be a formidable tool in understanding both 
court decisions and antitrust policies. 
Competition on part of the producers allows consumers to bid for 
goods and services, matching their desires with society’s 
opportunity/costs. The economic foundation of antitrust action is 
the belief that competition induces firms to satisfy consumer 
needs at the lowest price while using the fewest resources. 
Antitrust, in other terms, is about the effects of business behavior 
on consumers, and the relationship of the firm’s conduct with the 
consumers’ well being. Consumer welfare can be expressed by 
resorting to basic economic theory, particularly on the concept of 
efficiency. 
The traditional economics understanding of efficiency is inherent 
in the process that compels business to respond to consumers. 
                                                
146 It is noteworthy to keep in mind that the guidelines refer to horizontal 
mergers; however, the above said holds true for monopoly power as well. G.J. 
Werden, Market Delineation under the Merger Guidelines: a Tenth Anniversary 
Retrospective Symposium on New 1992 Merger Guidelines, 38 Antitrust Bull. 520 
(1993) 
147  The analysis of competitive constraints is marginal in the Guidelines; 
conversely, it plays a fundamental role in the definition of the relevant product 
market in the EU context, according to the Commission Notice on the definition of 
relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, published on the 
Official Journal, OJ C 372, 09.12.1997, 5. The Commission itself defines the 
relevant market in terms of both demand-side and supply-side substitutability. 
See infra Chapter II, paras. 2.1.1 and 2.2 
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Consumer welfare is maximized when resources are allocated in a 
way to satisfy consumers’ needs to the fullest. This process may be 
viewed under two perspectives, as allocative efficiency, on the one 
hand, and as productive efficiency, on the other hand148.  
Allocative efficiency implies the optimal assignment of the 
available resources among the various lines of industry, and 
occurs when there is an optimal distribution of goods and 
services, taking into account consumer’s preferences. On the 
demand curve, allocative efficiency is reached at a rate of output 
at which price equals marginal cost of production, since at that 
point the price that consumers are willing to pay is equivalent to 
the marginal utility o that they extract from that output level; if 
the firm produces one more unit of output, the marginal cost will 
be greater than the marginal revenue and the extra unit is sold at 
loss; if it produces one less marginal cost will be less than 
marginal revenue and the firm will lose business149.  
Productive efficiency implies the coordination of the means of 
production of each industry in a way that produces the greatest 
result.  
Allocative and productive efficiency are the two elements of 
consumer welfare. The goal of antitrust is to maximize allocative 
efficiency without impairing productive efficiency150. 
Allocative and productive efficiency are to be taken into account 
also to evaluate whether a particular monopoly is beneficial or 
detrimental to consumers. The monopolist is able to restrict 
output and in way to create a misallocation of resources. The evil 
of monopoly is the misallocation of resources that brings along 
both higher prices and smaller rates of production. 
 
4.2 The economic thinking of the act of monopolizing – the 
output restriction rule 
A monopolist is a seller that can change the price (p) of his 
product by changing the quantity (q) placed on the market; by 
reducing the quantity, he will raise the price above the 
competitive level, namely the price that established by market 
forces in a competitive market.  
It has been seen that a company can be a single seller of a product 
and yet not a “monopolist” according to the Sherman Act 
provisions, because of the lack of entry barriers in that market.  
                                                
148 R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books, Inc. 
Publishers, New York, p. 91 (1993), quoting F.H. Knight, The Economic 
Organization, University of Chicago Press, p. 9 (1933) 
149 Ex multis, A. Sullivan and S.M. Sheffrin , Economics: Principles in action. Upper 
Saddle River, New Jersey, p. 111 (2003); E. Silberberg & W. Suen, The Structure 
of Economics, A Mathematical Analysis, 3rd ed. McGraw-Hill, p. 181 (2001) 
150 For the purposes of this essay, when the word efficiency alone is used, 
allocative efficiency is meant. 
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Conversely, a company may not control 100% of market share and, 
nevertheless, align with the market power requirements that 
define a “monopolist”, because of the lack of solid enough 
competitors on the market.  
The classic definition of “market power” is power to set the price 
for a product, which will be accepted by the other smaller 
operators in the market, also known as the competitive fringe. A 
firm has market power because its rivals do not have sufficient 
strength to increase or decrease output and influence the market. 
The market power is exercised over the remaining demand that is 
left unsatisfied by the competitive fringe151. 
The measurement of the monopolist’s market power can be 
measured against the “perfect competition” benchmark, a 
theoretical hypothesis, where there are many suppliers each with 
the same market power, homogeneous products, full information, 
no transaction costs, and –in static economic terms- when price 
equals average cost, namely the cost of production of an extra unit 
of product. 
In reality, all firms have a degree of market power, and are 
capable of raising their price above the perfect competition level. 
Market power becomes of concern for antitrust law when firms 
can exercise it for a sustained period of time in order to bring price 
above competitive level, and exclude one or more rivals that do 
not have the same degree of power to influence the price/output. 
Another analytical flaw with regard to the analysis of market 
shares stems from law and economics: if market power were 
accounted as the ability to set prices above the marginal cost, that 
cost that would prevail in a perfectly competitive market, market 
power could be inferred in most markets, with the result that 
antitrust law could not feasibly address every deviation from 
perfect competition; it follows that courts have never equated the 
economic definition of market power with the antitrust notion of 
monopoly power underlying the interpretation of § 2. While most 
judges have recognized that “substantial” market power is 
involved in the statutory concept of monopolization, they have 
not succeeded in indicating how much power is substantial152.  
The classic economic model of monopoly implies that there be a 
sole producer in a well-defined market153; however, this model can 
be applied with a satisfying degree of approximation to firms that 
are simply dominant. The dominant firm model suggests that a 
                                                
151 GJ Stigler, The Dominant Firm and the Inverted Price Umbrella, 8 Journal of Law 
and Economics 167 (1965) 
152 P. Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future, 
75 Cal. L. Rev. 959, 960 (1987) 
153 L. Cabral, Economia Industriale, Carocci Ed., Rome, p. 91 (2002) 
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firm may have the power to control prices even though there are 
other firms competing in the relevant market154.  
Parallel to the concept of market power, the economic notion of 
monopoly is “power over price”, and derives from the classic 
assumption that price is inverse to quantity155. If the monopolist 
reduces his output below the competitive level, the market price 
will rise. His total costs will be lower, since he will be producing 
less, but his revenue will be higher, since he will charge a higher 
price.  
The hypothesis that the monopolist’s cost will be lower since he 
will produce fewer units implies that his total costs vary 
proportionately with his output; if the reduction in output does 
not affect the price on the market, the market conditions will be 
invariant to the firm’s decision on how much to produce at a 
given cost. In such event, demand can be said to be inelastic, 
because an increase in the price will bring about a proportionately 
smaller decrease in the quantity demanded. 
The concept of price elasticity of demand (PED) summarizes the 
relationship between price and quantity demanded, and illustrates 
the revenue changes (price per quantity) or, in general terms, the 
proportional change in one variable brought about by a 
proportional change in another156.  
                                                
154  On the equivalence between the monopolistic and the dominant firm 
economic models, compare chapter II, para. 5 et seq. 
155 R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th ed., Aspen Publishers, New York, p. 
282, (2007), R.A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revised, 2 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics 
& Pub. Pol'y 90 (1985-1987), E.K. Browning, A Neglected Welfare Cost of Monopoly 
– and most Other Product Market Distortions, 66 J. Pub. Econ. 130 (1997) 
156 R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th ed., Aspen Publishers, New York, p. 
279, (2007) 
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The notion of elasticity relevant to the present analysis is the 
elasticity of demand with respect to price, namely the 
proportional effect on the quantity demanded of a proportional 
change in price157. In less scientific terms, demand is considered 
elastic if a small change in price causes a large change in quantity 
demanded. Inelastic demand is a situation in which the quantity 
demanded is unresponsive to price changes. 
The elasticity of demand is normally expressed in minus value, 
because the negative sign indicates that P and Q are inversely 
related, which is the normal assumption for price/demand 
relationships: if a 1% price increase causes a demand fall by 2%, 
the elasticity of demand will be – 2. If a 1% price increase causes a 
demand fall by 1% the elasticity will be – 1, thus the total revenue 
will remain unchanged and the demand will be inelastic158.  
The relationship price/demand can be less than one, which means 
PED is inelastic; greater than one, which is elastic; zero (0), which 
is perfectly inelastic (demand curve vertical); infinite (∞), which is 
perfectly elastic (demand curve horizontal).  
 
                                                
157 Ibidem 
158 In order to grasp the inelasticity of demand, consider the following example. 
Suppose that at price 4 the quantity sold is 5, whereas if price were raised up to 
5 the quantity sold would decrease to 4. In both cases the total revenue of the 
firm is 20; therefore the demand is said to be inelastic. 
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159 
 
There are three extreme cases of PED: 1) Perfectly elastic, where 
only one price can be charged; 2) perfectly inelastic, where only 
one quantity will be purchased; 3) Unit elasticity, where all the 
possible price and quantity combinations are of the same value. 
The resultant curve is called a rectangular hyperbola.  
 
                                                
159  
http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Competitive_markets/Price_elasticity_of_
demand.html  
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160 
The main problem in expressing the degree of monopoly power 
by means of an economic index is the extent of variables that are 
to be taken into account, in particular the elasticity of the demand 
curve, rates of profit, degree of product substitution, marginal 
costs and related conditions of supply. 
More specifically, this power is expressed by saying that the 
monopolist is confronted with a downward-sloped demand curve 
for his product, or with an elasticity of the demand that is less 
than infinity (non horizontal).  
 
                                                
160  
http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Competitive_markets/Price_elasticity_of_
demand.html  
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161 
The above figure shows three curves. The first is the demand 
curve (D) and shows the relationship between change in output 
and change in price, the second is the average cost/marginal cost 
curve, the third one is the marginal revenue curve and shows the 
relationship between change in total revenue and change output 
sold. For the sake of clarity, marginal costs are assumed constant 
and identical. 
In a perfect competition model, the marginal revenue curve would 
be assumed to be horizontal; however, in a monopoly, the curve is 
normally assumed to be downward sloped, always below price 
and to never intersect the demand curve. In other terms, the 
marginal revenue of the monopolist is always declining, and the 
more output the monopolist places on the market, the less his 
marginal revenue will amount to. Hence, one tenet of the 
monopoly model is that the output is artificially smaller than in 
the competitive market; that equals to asserting -in economic 
terms- that the core peculiarity of a monopolist is his power over 
price. 
Marginal revenue is the contribution to the industry’s total 
revenue made by selling one more unit of output. Because of the 
negative slope of the demand, any increase in output is associated 
with a decline in price, and marginal revenue will be positive 
                                                
161  
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/single_firm/docs/222104.htm  
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(above the axis) or negative (below the axis) based on whether the 
change in output is proportionately smaller or greater than the 
change in price. The monopolist will increase his price (or reduce 
his output – the one implies the other) as long as a price increase 
would cause a proportionally greater reduction in the quantity 
demanded.  
Another important assumption is that the monopolist is interested 
in maximizing profits, not revenues; thus, he might raise the price 
beyond the level at which demand turns elastic and his total 
revenues begin to shrink, and “so will stop raising his price only 
when any further increase would reduce his total revenues by 
more than the reduction in total cost resulting from the small 
quantity produced. He will raise his price until marginal revenue, 
the effect on his total revenues of price change, equals marginal 
cost”162.  
The area YXZ in the above diagram is the so-called deadweight 
loss, representing what is lost by not using the enough resources 
to increase the output to the efficient point –where price equals 
marginal cost-.  
The above model assumes that average cost is constant, and 
equals to marginal cost (AC = MC). Under perfect competition, 
equilibrium price and output is at Pc and Qc. If the market is 
controlled by a single firm, the equilibrium for the firm is where 
MC = MR, at Pm and Qm. Under perfect competition, the area 
representing economic welfare encompasses the triangle formed 
by the MC curve, the demand curve and the $ axis, but under 
monopoly the area of welfare is deprived of the area Y, Z, X, 
which is traditionally defined “deadweight loss” and indicates the 
welfare loss that an artificial monopoly price will impose on 
society.  
An increase in price above competitive level has two negative 
effects on consumers welfare: first of all it causes a transfer of 
wealth from consumers to firms, since the former purchase the 
good or the service at a higher price than in a competitive market; 
second, they destroy rents by forcing some consumers with 
“shallower pockets” to exit the market.  
In economic terms, the deadweight loss is the loss incurred in the 
non-fulfillment of the condition of “optimality”, in which price 
equals marginal cost163. The deadweight loss is a conversion of 
                                                
162 R. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p.12 
(2001) 
163 The point at which the demand curve intersects the marginal cost/average 
cost curve represents the “Pareto optimality”. In theoretical welfare economics 
“Pareto optimality” is a measure for efficiency. It was named after Vilfredo 
Pareto, an Italian economist who contributed to develop the field of 
microeconomics, and in particular the study of individuals’ choice. An 
allocation is Pareto-optimal when it is not possible to make at least one person 
better off without making anyone else worse off. “Better” and “worse” express 
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social costs into monopoly profits, a transfer from consumers to 
the monopolist seller; it is not simply the cost that consumers are 
to bear due to a reduction in output. That justifies the hostility of 
economics towards monopoly.  
 
According to the vast majority of industrial-organization scholars, 
the deadweight loss does not encompass the Pm, Y, Z, Pc (L) area, 
because it corresponds to the increase in profits associated to the 
above competitive price. It represents a mere transfer of rents from 
consumers to the firm that is irrelevant to the scopes of antitrust 
law. Some authors, however, indicate that the social loss brought 
about by a monopoly is quite small in relation to the total revenue 
of the industry at the monopoly price. They hold that the costs of 
monopoly should not only be represented by the area Y, Z, X (D), 
but the area Pm, Y, Z, Pc (L) should also be recognized as 
relevant164. Therefore, the call for an efficient antitrust policy is 
more significant. 
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purely subjective preferences, which can be exemplified in a “utility function”, 
or ordinal numerical index of preference satisfaction. L. Amoroso, Vilfredo 
Pareto, 6 Econometrica, no. 1, (1938) 
164 R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p.17 
(2001). Elsewhere, the author has affirmed that the social costs of monopoly 
should account the total revenue of the industry at the monopoly price, under 
two assumptions: the first is that becoming a monopolist is a competitive 
activity; hence, the expected profit from obtaining a monopoly is zero. Firms 
seeking a monopoly expend resources until the last dollar spent increases the 
expected value of having a monopoly by one dollar. The second assumption is 
that the costs of becoming a monopolist are constant, so that the sum of the 
opportunity cost of becoming a monopolist is equal to the expected value of the 
monopoly. Therefore, the total social costs are to encompass the total revenue of 
the industry and the difference in costs brought about by the output reduction. 
See R.A. Posner, Social Costs in Monopoly and Regulation, 83 Journal of Political 
Economy, n. 4, 811 (1975) 
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Since D = 12 (!P!Q)  and L = !P(QC "!Q) , the relative sizes of D 
and L are given by DL =
!Q
2(QC "!Q)
, assuming that the demand 
curve is linear.  
This ratio can also be expressed in terms of elasticity of demand 
for the product at stake at the competitive price (Ed = elasticity of 
demand) and the percentage increase in price brought about by 
monopolization (p): DL =
P
2(1
!
! p)
.  
C, the total social cost of monopoly, is equal to 
D+ L = pRc !
1
2 ("P"Q) = Rc (p!
1
2 !p
2 ) , where Rc stands for total 
sales revenue at the competitive price. This cost is higher, the less 
elastic the demand for the product at that output. For instance, at 
Ed = 1, a 1% increase in price above the competitive level will 
yield a total social cost of monopoly equal to 0,995% of the total 
revenues of the industry at the competitive level. At Ed = ½ the 
percentage rises to 0,9975%. Posner warns that these formulas are 
accurate only for small changes in the price level. For larger 
changes Ed -the measurement of elasticity at a point- can no 
longer be used. And monopolization can result in large price 
increases.  
As stated above, the economic concept of market power is the 
ability to set price above marginal costs. Under the perfect 
competition assumption, price equals marginal cost; therefore, 
when the firm does not face perfect competition, it will be likely to 
have some degree of market power and it will be likely to fix the 
output (q) which will sell at a price (P(q)), or to fix a price (p) and 
let the buyer decide how much he will buy at that quantity (D(p)). 
In order to produce the quantity (q) the monopolist will bear a 
cost (c). Since price and quantity are in function on the demand 
curve, it is irrelevant whether the monopolist will act on the 
output or on the price.  
In order to maximize profits, the monopolist will choose to sell the 
quantity: 
!(q) = R(q)"C(q) = p(q)q"C(q)  
The profit maximization condition occurs when marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost, at which point it has been seen that the 
misallocation of resources will cause the greatest loss in terms of 
consumer welfare: 
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Furthermore, marginal revenue is expressed by the formula:  
MR = dp(q)dq q+ p(q)
MR < p
dp(q)
dq < 0
MR = dp(q)dq q+ p(q) = p(q)[
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In a monopoly MR is always less than p, since dp(q)dq < 0
165
. 
 
4.1 Economic Thinking of market power – the Lerner index and the 
Bain index 
The law and economics account of market power suffers from an 
analytical flaw: if market power is the ability to set prices above 
the marginal cost, that cost that would prevail in a perfectly 
competitive market, market power could be inferred in most 
markets, with the result that antitrust law could not feasibly 
address every deviation from perfect competition; that probably 
explains the reason why courts have never equated the economic 
definition of market power with the antitrust notion of monopoly 
power underlying the interpretation of § 2. While most judges 
have recognized that “substantial” market power is involved in 
the statutory concept of monopolization, they have not succeeded 
in indicating how much power is substantial166. 
The above is not to deny the analytical attempts that have been 
made to measure market power quantitatively, in search of a 
                                                
165 L. Cabral, Economia Industriale, Carocci Ed., Rome, p. 101 (2002) 
166 P. Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future, 
75 Cal. L. Rev. 959, 960 (1987) 
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relevant economic threshold that could also be used in antitrust 
litigation. 1934 professor Abba Lerner published an article in the 
Review of Economic Studies in which he developed a 
mathematical formula to measure the monopolist’s market power. 
This formula is nowadays known as Lerner Index, which is 
expressed mathematically by the equation:  
L = (P !C)P  
L stands for Lerner Index, P is the profit maximizing price and C is 
the marginal cost at the profit maximizing output167. Lerner holds 
that a monopolist is a firm facing a downward sloping and elastic 
demand curve. The slope of a demand curve defines monopoly; 
the index measures the degree of monopoly, which is identified by 
the difference between the firm’s price and its marginal cost at the 
profit-maximization rate of output. It expresses proportional 
deviation of price at the firm’s profit maximizing output from the 
firm’s marginal cost at that output168.  
The assumption is that the price charged under competitive 
conditions is equal to marginal cost; therefore, the formula 
measures the difference between the firm’s profit maximizing 
price and the competitive price divided by the profit-maximizing 
price. The higher the index is, the greater market power of the 
firm is. In pure and perfect competition price equals marginal cost, 
and the index is equal to zero. If the output is costless and 
marginal costs equals to zero, the index is 1 and shows the ability 
to fix a price for a free good169.  
Lerner was the first scholar who maintained that the social loss 
from monopoly consists of the divergence between price and 
marginal cost rather than price and average cost170.  
Moreover, not only does the formula express market power, but 
also shows the relationship between the firm’s market power and 
the elasticity of the demand that the firm itself faces. It is manifest 
that the ability of the firm to charge prices above competitive level 
depends on the elasticity of demand. Thus, the Lerner Index is 
                                                
167 E.T. Sullivan, Antitrust and its economic implications, 5th ed., LexisNexis 
Publisher, Newark (NJ), p. 24 (2008), A. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the 
Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 Rev. Econ. Stud. 157 (1934), W.M. Landes &  
R.A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 937, (1981). The 
Lerner Index is grounded on the assumption that firms are profit maximizers. 
168 F.M Scherer & D. Ross, Industrial market structure and Economic Performance, 
2nd ed., Rand-McNally Inc., Chicago p.56 (1980) 
169 In high technological markets (e.g. software markets), marginal costs are 
close to zero, since the cost for the production of one more unit of a product 
does not rise above average. The Lerner index shows that in this case the 
producer has a greater market power, being free to fix the price or establishing 
the output at the point of maximum revenue, without incurring in extra costs. 
170 A. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 
Rev. Econ. Stud. 168 (1934) 
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equal to the reciprocal of the elasticity of the demand curve of the 
firm171: 
L = (P !C)P = 1/Ed (elasticity of demand) 
A lower elasticity implies a higher index and a greater market 
power, whereas a higher elasticity implies a lower index and a 
lesser market power. A bigger divergence between P and C meant 
a bigger monopoly power. The degree of monopoly power varies 
directly and only in accordance with the demand elasticity of the 
product sold by the monopolist.  
The starting point of the Lerner construct is what he defined “the 
social optimum” which is reached in perfect competition and 
stands as the welfare-benchmark in the study of economics of 
welfare172. This condition is met when the demand curve for the 
product of the monopolist coincides with his average cost curve. 
Whether this equilibrium is feasible is irrelevant, since Lerner 
index measures the divergence from this optimal point.   
Since marginal cost is an assumed construct –the effect on total 
cost of a small change in output- it is difficult to determine in 
practice what is the actual market power of the firm. Furthermore, 
the Lerner Index does not reveal whether the level of marginal 
cost is the result of superior efficiency or, in contrast, is the 
reflection of anachronistic methods of production in plants of 
uneconomic size and purchasing practices that exploit suppliers173. 
In fact, “new economy” industries have marginal costs close to 
zero, but high research, development and innovation costs Aside 
from the rather outmoded methodology, the Lerner Index has 
received numerous applications in the course of time, in particular 
to ascertain the change in the degree of monopoly in certain 
industries174, and in general to identify the degree of monopoly of 
the whole American economy175. 
 
Another traditional index to measure market power is the Bain 
Index, elaborated by Professor Bain, who used the divergence 
between price and average cost to measure monopoly, rather than 
the difference in the Lerner Index between price and marginal 
                                                
171 Landes &  R.A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 
(1981) 
172 A. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 
Rev. Econ. Stud. 168 (1934) 
173 E.M. Singer, Antitrust Economics: Selected Legal Cases and Economic Models, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, p. 66 (1968) 
174 J.T. Dunlop, Price Flexibility and the Degree of Monopoly, 53 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 522, (1939) 
175 M. Kalecki, The Determinants of the Distribution of the National Income, 6 
Econometrica 97, (1938) 
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cost176. The author argues that it is possible to view the divergence 
between price and average cost as evidence, on a probability basis, 
of the divergence between price and marginal cost. He affirms: 
“Although excessive profits (a price-average discrepancy) are not 
a sure indication of monopoly, they are if persistent, a probable 
indication”177.  
 Holding that average costs and marginal costs are neither constant 
nor identical, the graph shows that the firm has a demand curve D 
and an average cost curve ACI, in which case the discrepancy 
between average costs and price is represented by the segment AE 
and the discrepancy between marginal costs and price by the 
segment AB. In accordance with the Bain Index assumption, the 
existence of AE (discrepancy average costs-price) is evidence of 
the existence of AB (discrepancy marginal costs-price). 
Where the average cost curve is ACI, the area PAED represents the 
profits made by the firm at output Q; this rate of profit is the 
measure of monopoly, and is defined as “the rate at which, when 
used in discounting the future rents of the enterprise, equates their 
                                                
176 J.S. Bain, The Profit Rate as a Measure of Monopoly Power, 55 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 271 (1941)  
177 J.S. Bain, The Profit Rate as a Measure of Monopoly Power, 55 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 271 (1941) ibidem 
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capital value to the cost of those assets which would be held by 
the firm if it produced its present output in competitive 
equilibrium. If this rate is greater than the rate of interest (or 
“normal rate of return”), the difference may be defined as a rate of 
excess profit”178. 
Bain calculates the excess profit rate as follows: 
R = total annual sales revenue; 
C = currently incurred costs for materials, wages and salaries; 
D = past incurred costs allocable to the above current venue, 
depreciation charge for the plants and machinery bought in the 
previous years, and amortization expenses for stock and materials 
bought in prior years but used in the current year; 
V = owners’ investments; 
i = current interest rate for capital funds requiring the same degree 
of risk. 
Economic excess profit = R – C – D – i.V, that is excess profits are 
equal to total revenue, less current costs, depreciation and 
amortization, and imputed interest on owners’ investment. 
Accounting profit  = R – C – D, since it does not deduct the 
imputed interest on owners’ investment. 
If accounting profit equals the imputed interest on owners’ 
investment (R – C – D = i.V), no economic excess profit will be 
generated and the price will equal average costs. 
The main criticism towards the Bain Index is that there can be a 
divergence between price and marginal cost that does not imply a 
divergence between price and average costs. The above graph 
describes such a scenario by means of the curve ACII, which at 
output Q is tangent to the demand curve D, and shows that the 
firm will gain no excess profits, even though it may possess 
monopoly power in the “Lernerian” sense, as the inverse of the 
elasticity of the demand curve179.  
Other criticism to an index based on profits is that it does not 
explain whether the profits are the result of monopolistic 
practices, or of superior efficiency, resulting from different factors 
of production, better techniques of manufacturing, or expertise in 
management. In fact, economic rents from specialized resources or 
factors of production, which give rise to profits, should be 
capitalized into the average cost curve for the firm180. 
 
                                                
178 J.S. Bain, The Profit Rate as a Measure of Monopoly Power, 55 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 276 (1941) 
179 E.M. Singer, Antitrust Economics: Selected Legal Cases and Economic Models, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, p. 68 (1968) 
180 M. Friedmann, Comment of C.A. Smith’s article Survey of the Empirical 
Evidence of Economies of Scale, in Business Concentration and Price Policy, 
Princeton University Press, p.235 (1955) 
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In conclusion, rather than its actual application, the importance of 
the Lerner index comes from the fact that it provides the 
conceptual tool for the decoding market power, namely the 
directly proportional relationship between the power of the 
monopolist and the elasticity of demand. The shortcoming of the 
Lernerian approach is that the lack of marginal cost data often 
makes the formula impracticable.  
That in practice often leads to the employment of the Bain index, 
based on the empirical assessment of the firm’s profit rates. 
Moreover, the attractiveness of the Bain model rests on the fact 
that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between monopoly 
power and market performance.  
All things considered, both measurements are indicators of the 
market performance, which can complement the legal argument in 
monopolization claims. 
 
5. Measuring market power – the role of market shares and the 
interaction with the firm’s conduct 
Once the relevant market is determined, the tool to assess the 
dominance of the purported monopolist firm is the computing of 
its market shares; at any rate, market share is only a starting point 
to prove the monopoly power of a firm181. Notwithstanding the 
traditional account in American antitrust law is that a mere high 
market share is something to be avoided, the standard view on the 
role of market share has been re-discussed in particular in the 
wake of United States v. Microsoft Corp182, in light of both network 
effects and economies of scale that monopolies in high 
technological markets are likely to bring about.  
When network effects characterize a market, one product moves 
towards dominance because “the utility that a user derives from 
consumption of the good increases with the number of other 
agents consuming the good”183. Therefore, high market shares in 
certain sectors ought not to be evaluated as inherently detrimental 
to competition, since the convenience of some products increases 
                                                
181 Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: single firm conduct under 
section 2 of the Sherman Act, Gude- Report, September 2008, 2008 WL 4606679 
(D.O.J.), 2, available at www.justice.gov  
182 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The issue of 
the efficiency of the relevant conduct of the monopolist, namely of network 
externalities and economies of scale will be analyzed infra. 
183 M.L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 
75 am. Econ. Rev. 424, 424 (1985). To put it better “[a]n individual consumer's 
demand to use (and hence her benefit from) the telephone network ... increases 
with the number of other users on the network whom she can call or from 
whom she can receive calls.” 
H.A. Shelanski & J.G. Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 u. Chi. 
L. RevV. 1, 8 (2001), United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) 
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in accordance with the increase of the number of people using 
them. As a scholar has rightly pointed out, network effects make 
competition to be “for the field rather than within the field”184.   
As stated above, finding of a dominant market share is a 
prerequisite for any inquiry into a firm’s monopolizing conduct, 
albeit courts have not asserted a fixed threshold amounting to 
monopoly power185. Market shares are usually calculated by virtue 
of a two-prong process: first, the defendant’s historical output in 
production units or sales is measured, and second the output is 
divided by the total amount of production or sales in the 
demarcated area186. Production units and sales are similar, even 
though sales typically match a firm’s output over a period of time. 
In fact, in the lifecycle of the firm it may happen that either orders 
exceed production, or production exceeds sales. In the first 
hypothesis, orders will inevitably overstate the defendant’s 
position when they remain unattended. Conversely, if production 
exceeds orders, large stocks will be set aside as unused capacity 
and will threaten to flood the market in the long, bringing harmful 
consequences to an entrant. Having that stated, sales provide the 
better measure for the defendant’s output. 
Another way of measuring the “competitive significance”187 of a 
firm is through its productive capacity, in both terms of unused 
capacity and capacity to meet market’s demand compatibly with 
its resource constraints. As regards the unused capacity, the 
defendant can reduce output in order to raise prices, but this 
ability can be hindered by the excess capacity of rivals that can 
soon generate saleable output. Therefore, a dominant firm’s 
capacity can be also defined as the current output on the market, 
plus the competitors’ capacity to meet the remaining demand that 
has been left unsatisfied by the defendant’s attempt to profit by 
reducing output.  
As regards the firm’s resource constraints, in an expanding market 
the current production of a firm overstates its significance if the 
firm’s is not promptly capable of expanding its capacity in 
accordance with the market demand188. All things considered, a 
                                                
184 H. Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. L. & Econ. 55, 57 & n.7 (1968) 
185 American Bar Association (ABA), Section of Antitrust Law, Market Power 
Handbook: Competition Law and Economic Foundations, ABA Publishing, Chicago, 
p. 19-20 (2005), E. Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. 
Rev. 343 
186 P.E. Areeda & H. Hoverkamp, Antitrust Law – An Analysis of Antitrust 
Principles and Their Application, Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, New York, 
§2 p. 273-274 (2007) 
187 Ibidem, p. 276 
188 In case law, the above hypothesis is defined as “failing firm” defense. It is the 
extreme case of a dominant firm with large production but depleted reserves, 
and competitors with small production but larger reserves. Compare F.T.C. v. 
Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 125 (D.D.C. 2004) case dismissed, 04-5291, 
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caveat for using market capacity would be that it requires data that 
are not always available or easy to process. 
One of the most renowned cases regarding the measurement of 
market shares of a firm is the afore-discussed Alcoa case, in which 
the core issue was the estimation of Alcoa’s share in the virgin 
ingot market. The relevant market was initially narrowed down to 
the ingot market consumed in the U.S. 189 , disregarding 
“secondary” ingot market -metal recovered from scrap, imported 
ingot, virgin ingot that Alcoa consumed in its own fabrication 
plants. This included the entire virgin ingot produced and sold in 
market. Under this market delineation, Alcoa was the sole 
producer of primary aluminum in the United States, and could 
not but be regarded as a monopolist, also on the grounds of a 
patent monopoly granted to the latter that lasted from 1899 to 
1909190. Yet, some concurring elements rendered the analysis more 
fragmented, namely the inclusion in the market of “secondary” 
aluminum. Under this market delineation, Alcoa’s market share 
would oscillate between 33% and 90%191. In particular, if Alcoa’s 
sales were divided by the sum of “primary-virgin”, “scrap” and 
“import” aluminum, its market share would amount to 33%; 
contrariwise, if the “captive”–ingot that Alcoa produced and 
consumed in its own fabrication plants- were to be added to the 
defendant’s sales and then the figure were to be divided by the 
sum of “primary”, “scrap” and “import” aluminum, the 
defendant’s market share would increase to 64%, Finally, if the 
sum of “captive” ingot and sales were to be divided by the sum of 
primary and import, Alcoa’s market share would amount to 90%. 
In his famous opinion, Justice Hand affirmed that Alcoa’s market 
share was 90%, therefore he bound the virgin ingot market to the 
“captive” one192. He encompassed the “captive” production in the 
totaling of market shares, based on the remark that “all ingot- 
with trifling exceptions- is used to fabricate intermediate or end, 
products; and therefore all intermediate, or end, products which 
‘Alcoa’ fabricates and sell, pro tanto reduce the demand for ingot 
                                                                                                                                                            
2004 WL 2066879 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2004) in which the Court affirmed, 
“current production…may not be a stable predictor of future competitiveness, 
or a producer’s ability to deliver in the future in the form of sales or contracts”. 
Current production rates overstate the market presence of a firm that only has 
limited reserves remaining at present production rates, and cannot support the 
growing demand for its product in the long run. 
189 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945).  
190 As a matter of interest, Alcoa had a patent for the production of the virgin 
ingot in the U.S., since the inventor of the process through which aluminum can 
be isolated, and can become commercially practicable by the elimination of the 
oxygen, had assigned the patent to the defendant itself. Therefore, Alcoa’s 
monopoly was allegedly “honestly industrial” F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945). 
191 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) 
192 E.M. Singer, Antitrust Economics: Selected Legal Cases and Economic Models, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, p.44 (1968) 
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itself”193. Likewise, he excluded the secondary ingot from the 
computing of the total market product, even if scrap aluminum 
was a substitute for virgin ingot and had the same price as the 
latter. He leaned on the argument that the production of scrap 
aluminum over the course of years would have depended on the 
virgin aluminum that Alcoa had produced in the first place. 
Therefore, Alcoa “had its share in determining how much to 
produce”194 and could estimate the impact of its production on the 
secondary cycles of the metal at issue195. 
Finally, Hand found that the only competition Alcoa was facing 
was from the imported virgin ingot, which in fact was included in 
the relevant product market. In doing so, he acknowledged the 
concept of cross-elasticity of demand and the likelihood that 
foreign producers would enter the market in the event Alcoa 
would raise its prices196. Nevertheless, he gauged that the elasticity 
was low due to tariff barriers, transportation costs, and a 
historically documented low import volume. At any rate, the 
inclusion of import aluminum cut Alcoa’s market by 10%, down 
to 90%. With that affirmed, Hand uncompromisingly purported 
“that percentage [90%] is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is 
                                                
193 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). In 
stating so, Judge Hand followed the line of reasoning purported in the Standard 
Oil case: “as substantial power over the crude product was the inevitable result 
of the absolute control which existed over the refined product, the 
monopolization of the one carried with it the power to control the other”. 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 77, 31 S.Ct. 502, 523, 55 L.Ed. 619, 
34 L.R.A., N.S., 834, Ann.Cas. 1912D, 734. Likewise, in Alcoa the defendant’s 
control over the ingot supply made it indifferent whether it was consumed in 
its own plants or sold to other producers. See contra E. Gellehorn & W.E. 
Kovacic, Antitrust Law and Economics in a nutshell, 4th ed., West Publishing Co., 
St. Paul (Minnesota), p.115, (1994). The authors argue in favor of the irrelevance 
of the “captive” production with the following example “[I]n measuring a coal’s 
company’s market power, it probably would be inappropriate to include all the 
production of coal mines owned by automobile or steel company whose entire 
output is consumed by them. Output from these mines may reduce total 
demand for coal, but this production is often unavailable to the market unless 
the auto and steel makers also have a sales force and the other capabilities 
needed to sell coal. To include all their production would understate the 
defendant’s coal company’s power”.  
194 E. Gellehorn & W.E. Kovacic, Antitrust Law and Economics in a nutshell, 4th ed., 
West Publishing Co., St. Paul (Minnesota), p.115, (1994) 
195 Posner suggests that the complete exclusion of the scrap aluminum market 
may have resulted in a too narrow market. The narrowness of the market might 
have led Justice Hand to require significantly high shares to characterize 
Alcoa’s enterprise as a monopoly. W.M. Landes &  R.A. Posner, Market Power in 
Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 978-979, (1981) 
196 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1945) 
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doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; 
and certainly thirty-three per cent is not”197.  
Hand demonstrated that a 90% market share obtained without 
predation or merger is monopoly pursuant to § 2 of the Sherman 
Act, based on the distinction between a lawfully acquired 
monopoly and the act of monopolization, which is necessarily 
illegal198. Despite acknowledging that a firm can passively achieve 
the status of monopoly by virtue of its “superior skill, foresight or 
industry”199, and that Alcoa maintained its market position by 
superior efficiency, Justice Hand reasoned that Alcoa had 
nonetheless contravened § 2, because combining “90% of the 
producers of ingot would have been to ‘monopolize’ the ingot 
market”. For that matter, Hand admits that the “so far as concerns 
the public interest it makes no difference whether an existing 
competition is put an end to, or whether prospective competition 
is prevented”200. 
Three are the arguments that he used to support his analysis, of 
which the first two refer to the defendant’s conduct, whereas the 
third implies a political consideration:  
1) Price-fixing among competitors is illegal for it: Alcoa maintained 
its monopoly by obtaining promises from some electrical utilities 
not to supply power to any other aluminum manufacturer, 
whereby competitors would face higher prices for electricity as 
they would bid for the remaining input (naked exclusionary 
right)201;  
2) Alcoa barred other competitors from entering the aluminum 
market by repeatedly expanding its capacity, through excess 
accumulation of scarce inputs of bauxite necessary to produce 
aluminum, before demand for aluminum increased 
(overbuying)202;  
3) The Sherman Act was passed to promote economic goals, as well 
as also social and moral ones. Courts would not be capable of 
                                                
197 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). 
Justice Hand found Alcoa liable of monopolization for solely having an 
honestly industrial monopoly See supra, note 35. 
198 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). See 
also R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books, Inc. 
Publishers, New York, p.166-168 (1978). The author stresses the inconsistency of 
Justice Hand’s line of reasoning, in that he ultimately equates gaining and 
maintaining a monopoly. 
199 It is the “Monopoly thrust upon it” defense. See supra the Alcoa case, para. 2. 
As for the difference between unlawful achievement of monopoly and lawful 
passivity -monopoly thrust upon it-, Hand gives three examples in view of the 
achievement-passivity distinction: 1) natural monopoly because of economies of 
scale, 2) changes in taste or cost that drive all but one seller, 3) single producers 
who survives by virtue of its superior skill, foresight, industry; 
200 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) 
201 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 422 (2d Cir. 1945) 
202 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945) 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
80 
 
constantly scrutinizing whether a producer -“having command of 
the domestic market”- was able to make a “fair” profit by virtue 
the highest possible ingenuity, the adoption of every possible 
economy, or the anticipation of technological advancement. 
Owing to this structural limitation, the Congress has chosen not to 
“condone good trusts and condemn bad ones”, but to forbid all. In 
doing so, the Congress possibly preferred a system of small 
producers rather than big concentrations, regardless of economic 
motives alone203.  
As antitrust scholars have rightly highlighted, although the 
Supreme Court asserted the first two arguments that merely 
reflected the defendant’s internal efficiencies, the case was merely 
adjudicated on the basis of a political and social concerns204. 
Consequently, there appears to be a benchmark, between 60% and 
90% market share, in which any conduct of the firm might be 
                                                
203 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) 
204 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430-431 (2d Cir. 1945); 
on the point see T.G. Krattenmaker & S.G. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209, 236 (1986). The 
authors advocate for a test to assess violation of § 2 based on the raising of 
rivals’ cost. In particular, they illustrate this basic paradigm with four types of 
behavior that could raise rivals’ costs: (1) “a bottleneck”; (2) the “cartel 
ringmaster”; (3) the “Frankenstein Monster”; and (4) “real foreclosure”. The 
bottleneck is the “most obvious method by which foreclosure of supply can 
raise rivals’ costs is the purchaser’s obtaining exclusionary rights from all (or a 
sufficient number of) the lowest-cost suppliers, where those suppliers 
determine the input’s market price”. The main application is the “essential 
facilities doctrine” (see infra).  
The “cartel ringmaster” is a vertical restraint that facilitates cartel-like price 
coordination and enriches suppliers while raising the costs of the purchaser’s 
competitors. An example is the so-called “price squeeze”, when a firm 
purchasing a vertical restraint may, as part of the agreement, induce a number 
of its suppliers to deal with the purchaser’s rivals only on terms 
disadvantageous to those rivals.   
The “Frankenstein Monster” is a method through which “the purchaser of an 
exclusionary rights contract creates and turns loose upon its rivals an industry 
structure likely to generate a price increase”. An example is when a 
manufacturer signs exclusive dealing contracts with all but one retailer. If entry 
barriers characterize the market, the one remaining retailer can monopolize 
trade with the manufacturer’s rivals. That manufacturer is the Frankenstein 
Monster. 
Real foreclosure “can raise rivals’ costs when the purchaser acquires an 
exclusionary right over a representative portion of the supply, withholding that 
portion from rivals and thereby driving up the market price for the remainder 
of the input still available to rivals”. In Alcoa, Justice Hand reasoned that the 
defendant had acquired naked exclusionary rights over the supply of electricity 
in order to raise prices for the remaining inputs to the detriment of its rivals. 
Moreover, the defendant had overbought excessive amounts of bauxite before 
demand for aluminum increased. That left potential entrants facing the 
prospect to raise the prices for the remaining inputs by bidding higher on them. 
Krattenmaker and Salop argue that these practices are an example of real 
foreclosure by raising rivals’ cost. 
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alleged illegal as such, by reasons of public interest. The only non-
economic argument that Hand brought to sustain his claim 
against the defendant was that the latter’s monopoly was 
perpetuated between 1909 and 1912 through unlawful practices205. 
However, the weight of the internal evidence of this allegation 
does not offset the populist rationale underlying the decision to 
quash Alcoa’s market share as illegal. The struggle to individuate 
unfair practices yields to a no-fault monopolization theory and, 
when it comes to attacking on persistent monopolistic corporate 
size in itself, political and social decentralization concerns prevail 
over economic efficiency206. 
Alcoa’s reading is still a matter of dispute: the firm’s size was 
found to contravene § 2 since it discouraged entry of other 
competitors, and whereas an illegal intent to monopolize did not 
apply in the decision, the display of monopoly power created a 
presumption of illegality, being at odds with the no-fault 
structural test put forward in Justice Hand’s analysis. 
After Alcoa, the Supreme Court embraced Justice Hand’s 
reasoning in American Tobacco Co. v. United States 207 , for the 
analysis of single firm behavior rested on the Alcoa definition of 
monopolization as monopoly power -subsequent to a consistent 
market share- plus exclusionary conduct; where “exclusionary” is 
not limited to unlawful maneuvers actuated to limit competition, 
but can encompass any practice that has exclusionary 
consequences. With regard to the market share, the Court stressed 
that the defendant had a monopoly “amounting to over two-
thirds of the entire domestic field of cigarettes, and to over 80% of 
the field of comparable cigarettes”208, which was rendered more 
effective by the reduced opposition of small competitors. Such a 
market share, accompanied by some acts –exchange of words- that 
gave effect to an unlawful conspiracy, was the relevant element 
the Court deemed necessary to decide against the petitioner. 
Thus, a monopoly, although lawfully acquired, could contravene § 
2, since the statute condemns the result to be achieved rather than 
the means used to acquire a monopolistic position209. In all, what is 
                                                
205 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 423 (2d Cir. 1945) 
206 R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books, Inc. 
Publishers, New York, p.168 (1978), J.E. Lopatka & P.E. Godek, Another Look at 
ALCOA: Raising Rivals' Costs Does Not Improve the View, 35 J.L. Econ. 311 (1992). 
207 Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S. Ct. 1125, 90 L. Ed. 1575 
(1946) 
208 Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797, 66 S. Ct. 1125, 1133, 90 L. 
Ed. 1575 (1946) 
209 Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809, 66 S. Ct. 1125, 1139, 90 L. 
Ed. 1575 (1946). See similarly Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488, 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2093, 119 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1992), in which 
the Court stressed “Our § 2 monopolization doctrines are…directed to discrete 
situations in which a defendant’s possession of substantial market power, 
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required is a general intent to establish and maintain the 
monopoly, “for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what 
he is doing”, which can be presumed by the conduct itself210.  
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery, the United Shoe’s 
monopoly on the industry of machineries used in shoemaking 
processes fell under the Government investigation; the 
defendant’s monopoly had been obtained from the acquisition of 
over 50 shoe machinery producers holding complementary 
patents. United Shoes was then the sole company in the US 
offering a complete line of shoe machines and had a share of 
approximately from 75 to 95% of the shoe machinery market; 
despite this large share, the defendant faced competition from a 
group of competitors, which offered competitive fringe machines 
for all the steps in the shoe manufacturing process 211 . The 
defendant’s dominance essentially leaned on its research, 
development, and on the actual supplying a large number of 
dependable machines and services; according to the facts of the 
case, shoe machinery costs only represented 2% of the wholesale 
price of a shoe212.  
In that respect, United Shoe could not have allegedly monopolized 
the shoe manufacturing industry. Nevertheless, the Court found 
that the defendant had established its monopoly position in the 
machinery supply through the policy of not selling its machineries 
to shoe producers, but of merely leasing them. The practice was 
regarded as exclusionary because it gave United Shoe effective 
control over the shoe machinery commerce in violation of the 
Sherman Act.  
In its reasoning, the Court defined the shoe machinery sector as a 
service industry rather than a manufacturing one, on the ground 
that through the restrictive lease the manufacturer would benefit 
from a range of supplier services provided by the lessor, but 
would also find himself bound to the lessor along the entire 
course of shoe manufacturing. By means of practices that do not 
                                                                                                                                                            
combined with his exclusionary or anticompetitive behavior, threatens to defeat 
or forestall the corrective forces of competition and thereby sustain or extend 
the defendant’s agglomeration of power... Where a defendant maintains 
substantial market power, his activities are examined through a special lens: 
behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws -or that 
might even be viewed as pro-competitive- can take on exclusionary 
connotations when practiced by a monopolist”. On the point, compare P. 
Areeda & D.F Turner, Antitrust Law: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their 
Application, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, §813, p. 300-02 (1978)  
210 United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 347 U.S. 521, 74 S. Ct. 699, 98 L. 
Ed. 910 (1954) 
211  S.E. Masten & E.A. Snyder, United States versus United Shoe Machinery 
Corporation: On the Merits, 36 J.L. Econ. 41 (1941). The author argues in favor of 
the role of the leasing agreement as a solution to the-durable-goods-monopoly 
problem. 
212 Ibidem 
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contravene antitrust provisions per se –the defendant’s leasing 
policy and the supplying of assistance services-, in conjunction 
with its vast market power, United Shoe was found to have 
violated § 2. Ultimately, United Shoe reaffirmed the Alcoa principle 
that deliberate restrictive practices, yet not illegal, though apt to 
perpetuate a large market share were enough to satisfy the § 2 
conduct requirement, regardless of proof of an actual abuse. 
Post United Shoe approaches in policing § 2 with a view to both the 
relevant behavior and market share were more stringent, 
requiring not just an “improper conduct, but at a pernicious 
market structure in which concentration of power saps salubrious 
influence of competition”213. Berkey reasserted the need to prove 
the abuse of market power, in that the defendant had consolidated 
its market share “by reaping the competitive rewards attributable 
to its efficient size”214. In the case at bar, the plaintiff alleged that 
Kodak had restricted competition by introducing a new film 
format that was only compatible with new pocket-size Kodak 
cameras, therefore leveraging on its monopoly in the film 
industry, in order to drive Berkey off competition in amateur 
camera and photo-finishing equipment. In particular, Kodak had 
allegedly violated § 2 of the Sherman Act by not disclosing the 
new format in which it was manufacturing the film, thus, enabling 
rivals to prepare similar designs in order to stay on the amateur 
camera market once the new film would be introduced. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided against the 
plaintiff’s claim and countered that Kodak’s ability to introduce 
both the new film and the new camera without pre-disclosure was 
a function not of its monopoly power, but of its superior business 
skill, innovation, and integration. Thus, the defendant’s refusal to 
disclose the product innovation did not constitute willful 
maintenance of monopoly power in violation of the Sherman 
Act215. Moreover, it argued that a pre-disclosure duty would 
enable rivals to free ride on the dominant firm’s research and 
development and, therefore, would hamper incentive to 
innovate216. Then, from the last passage it results that the interface 
between market share and the incentives for the development of 
new products is determined in favor of the latter. In fact, “the 
process of innovation is clearly tolerated by the antitrust laws”217. 
                                                
213 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979) 
214 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) 
215 C.E. Bagley & G. Clarkson, Adverse Possession for Intellectual Property: Adapting 
an Ancient Concept to Resolve Conflicts Between Antitrust and Intellectual Property 
Laws in the Information Age, 16 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 327, 337 (2003) 
216 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979) 
217 Ibidem Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 
1979), quoting United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 
(D. Mass. 1953) aff'd, 347 U.S. 521, 74 S. Ct. 699, 98 L. Ed. 910 (1954) 
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Likewise, great market shares are legitimate inasmuch as they 
stem from the entrepreneurial endeavor to innovate and integrate.  
The ability of a monopolist to market an innovation without pre-
disclosure does not depend on its market power. Any firm, 
regardless of its market share, may introduce a new product 
without prior notice to competitors, although it may have to 
disclose details to non-rival firms in its supply and distribution 
chain. The ability not to pre-disclose is based on the capacity to 
manufacture enough of the complement to satisfy the initial 
demand, not on monopoly power218. From a consumer-welfare 
perspective, to the extent consumers can reap the fullest possible 
benefits from technological change, normal incentives to innovate 
must be preserved, even for monopolists219.  
In sum, Berkey shows that high market shares fall outside the 
reach of the Sherman Act when they are qualified by technological 
and integration reasons. Even if the market is restricted to fewer 
options, an innovation is accepted so long as consumers can still 
choose between existing products and the new one; hence, a 
monopoly vested by high market shares is lawful when shares are 
a consequence of the innovation and integration process that the 
firm is likely to put in practice, unless some decisions have been 
biased through the use of monopoly power220.  
                                                
218 Case comment, Antitrust Scrutiny of Monopolists’ Innovations: Berkey Photo, Inc. 
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 93 Harv. L. Rev. 408, 415 (1979), Copyright (c) 1979 by the 
Harvard Law Review Association. 
219 A similar policy is followed as to patents. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 
F.Supp. 983, 997-98 (D.Conn. 1978), remanded on other grounds, No. 79-8018 (2d 
Cir. May 10, 1979). P. Areeda & D.F. Turner, Antitrust Law: an Analysis of 
Antitrust Principles and their Application, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, §706, p. 
127-33 (1978); F.M. Scherer & D. Ross, Industrial market structure and Economic 
Performance, 2nd ed., Rand-McNally Inc., Chicago p. 380-84 (1980); Turner, supra 
note 
220 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979); 
drawing the line between the ability to leverage on innovation or on monopoly 
power is not easy. In that respect, some tying agreements can offer an example 
of abuse of monopoly position. A tying agreement violates the Sherman Act 
whenever the party imposing the tie has sufficient economic power with 
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the 
market for the tied product and a not-insubstantial amount of interstate 
commerce is affected. Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 
F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976). Another example of distortion is the “physical tie-in” 
between products, which occur when “[A] dominant or economically powerful 
manufacturer of a primary product introduces a newly designed product for 
which the manufacturer and its competitors make parts or accessories, and the 
competing secondary parts are physically incompatible with the new primary 
product. Because the manufacturer makes the only compatible secondary 
products, it achieves a temporary monopoly in the secondary market”. D.W. 
Jordan, Physical Tie-ins as Antitrust Violations, 1975 U. Ill. L.F. 73 p.224. The 
above scenario was scrutinized in Bell & Howell Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
Civil No. 73-35 (N.D. Ill., July 8, 1974) in which the plaintiff contented that 
Kodak had violated § 2 of the Sherman Act by using its monopoly in the film 
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As regards the relationship between market share and market 
power, in the measurement of market power Courts seldom 
consider market share independently, since direct evidence of 
monopoly power from the mere share is only rarely available. 
Monopoly can be proved circumstantially by examining market 
structures in conjunction with other factors, such as, the size and 
stability of the market shares, profitability and, in particular entry 
conditions221. Since market share “is just a way of estimating 
market power, which is the ultimate consideration” the absence of 
barriers is relevant even though “the defendant has a large market 
share”222. When a firm controlled nearly 100% of an industry 
characterized by easy entry, Courts have declined to infer 
monopoly power, since either actual or potential entry of rivals is 
likely to keep prices on a competitive level. Elsewhere, 70% 
market share in conjunction with numerous barriers to entry the 
US market has been deemed sufficient to integrate 
monopolization of the industry pursuant to § 2223.  
Likewise, in Spirit Airlines v. Northwest Airlines the Court has gone 
further and affirmed that where monopoly power is ordinarily 
inferred by the possession of a predominant share, and “2/3 is 
generally considered to be a predominant share”, in markets with 
high entry barriers a share between 78 and 89% shows the 
requisite of monopoly, and any predatory conduct may be likely 
to bring prices above competitive level224.  
The share of significant market may vary with other factors, but it 
is held relevant when it is well above 50%225; Courts have thus 
                                                                                                                                                            
market to strengthen its position in the camera market. Prior to introducing the 
new film, Kodak had developed new cameras compatible, in a way to 
immediately render the cameras manufactured by its competitors obsolete. The 
defendant can overcome the charge of illegal tie-in by proving that the tying 
and the tied products are so functionally interrelated that they constitute one 
single product. See D.W. Jordan, ibidem, p. 228.  
221 Los Angeles Land Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 6 F.3d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1993). 
See also Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1250, 2002-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
73607 (11th Cir. 2002) “Because … evidence is only rarely available, courts more 
typically examine market structure in search of circumstantial evidence of 
monopoly power…. Absent other pertinent factors, a share significantly larger 
than 55% has been required to establish prima facie market power. Other 
germane factors include the size and strength of competing firms, freedom of 
entry, pricing trends and practices in the industry, ability of consumers to 
substitute comparable goods, and consumer demand”. 
222 Ball Memorial Hosp. Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Inc., 784 F.2 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 
1986) 
223 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 451 (4th 
Cir. 2011) 
224 Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 936 (6th Cir. 2005) 
225  Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969) 
“[S]omething more than 50% of the market is a prerequisite to a finding of 
monopoly”; Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 375 F. Supp. 1, 68 (N.D. Cal. 1974) 
market share of 42% “does not approach” monopolization; Pacific Eng. & Prod. 
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purported that irrespective of the entry barrier “a market share at 
or less than 50% is inadequate as a matter of law to constitute 
monopoly power”226. It goes without saying that the 50%-market-
share threshold below which Court do not assert §2 violations is a 
rule of thumb applied with due exceptions227.  
When it comes to defining the term entry barrier, scholars divide 
between two models: on the one hand, an entry barrier is 
considered as any market condition that enables an incumbent 
firm to charge monopoly price without attracting new entry228, 
whereas on the other hand it consists of “a cost of producing (at 
come or every rate of output) which must be borne by firms which 
seek to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the 
industry”229. On the account of the first definition, the investment 
necessary to enter the market is not considered as an entry barrier, 
since it is assumed that the new entrant will bear the same costs 
that the incumbent firms had previously borne. The notion of 
entry barrier is drafted in terms of divergence between the 
difficulty for a new entrant to enter a market and the ease of the 
incumbent firm to charge a monopolist price. On the account of 
                                                                                                                                                            
Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 1974 Trade Cas. 75,054, at 96,740 (D. Utah 1974) (51% 
of market does not constitute monopoly); Scholarship affirms that amongst 
other elements, market share is the primary factor in measuring market power. 
The percentage of share that supports the inference of monopoly is not a figure 
capable of precise definition, but it is well above 50%, American Bar 
Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law developments, New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Columbia University Press, p.47 (1997) 
226 Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1250 (11th Cir. 2002). In United Air Lines, 
Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1989) the 2nd Circuit held that 
less than 31% of national market share does not suffice for asserting antitrust 
violations. In Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC Int'l Inc., 679 F.2d 516, 529 (5th 
Cir. 1982) the 5th Circuit affirmed “market shares in the range of 16 to 25 
percent… are insufficient-at least absent other compelling structural evidence-
as a matter of law to support monopolization”.  
227 In Energex Lighting Indus., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Lighting Corp., 656 F. 
Supp. 914, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) the Court found violation of §2 where 
defendants had only 25% of market share; however, that was sufficient to assert 
monopoly power, provided that defendants had failed to meet their burden of 
demonstrating that there was no factual support for the plaintiff’s allegation. 
228 J.S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition: their Character and Consequences in 
Manufacturing Industries, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p.3 (1962). The 
author considers economies of scale as barriers to entry, since in a market 
characterized by economies of scale the existing firm tends to have lower costs 
at a high output rate than the new firm. 
229 G.J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry, University of Chicago Press, p. 67 
(1983). The author argues that economies of scale and demand conditions of the 
firm –as well as of the industry- are the only factors governing the firm size. His 
definition of barrier as a higher entry cost overrides economies of scale, because 
the incumbent dominant firm is confronted with the same problem, namely the 
achievement of a lower cost through higher output. The incumbent firm is to 
bear higher entry costs, such as the losses arising out of selling below 
competitive price, in order to obtain higher market shares.   
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the second definition, investment costs are an entry barrier 
depending on the characteristics of each market. Entering a high-
tech market implies significantly higher costs than entering a fruit 
distribution market. Therefore, the more burdensome the 
requirements for a firm to enter a market are, the higher the entry 
barriers. 
In the wake of United States v. Microsoft Corp230, the role of market 
shares has been analyzed in light of both network effects and 
economies of scale that monopolies in high technological markets 
are likely to produce. As it has been noticed above, in highly 
technological markets competition is rather for the field, than 
within the field231. It is therefore not inherently detrimental to 
consumers that a firm achieves a high market share, since the 
former would extract a lower price, or a “network” utility in 
accordance with the increase of the number of people using them, 
on the one hand, and with the increase of the demand for these, on 
the other hand.  
The original understanding of antitrust action that the unilateral 
practices of monopolistic businesses inevitably erode consumer 
welfare, has given way to the idea that in certain markets the size 
of the firm can actually be beneficial to consumers. 
 
In conclusion, even if Alcoa’s formula for identifying relevant 
market shares is still valid in modern antitrust litigation232, the role 
of market shares per se little adds to the antitrust scrutiny of the 
unilateral practices of a firm with a significant market power. Case 
law shows that the quantitative projection of monopoly power on 
a given market has constantly been read in conjunction with other 
elements, such as the market definition, or the political concern for 
small businesses that, following Alcoa, brought to the naked 
quashing of every monopoly as quantitatively identified, or in 
conjunction with the conduct element of § 2, following the post-
structural interpretation of the provision, or in conjunction with 
the ability of the firm to innovate, with the entry barriers 
characterizing the market, or with the network effects or the 
economies of scale produced by a concentration of shares. 
 
6. “Purposeful” and “anticompetitive” conduct requirement – 
Prohibited market behavior 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that both the act and the 
attempt of monopolizing are a crime, without defining what 
monopoly is, or specifying whether the mere attainment of 
                                                
230 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
231 See supra, para. 5, note n. 162 
232 “Percentage [90%] is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether 
sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three per cent 
is not” United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) 
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monopoly absent any offense is unlawful. This vagueness has 
brought Courts to police § 2 in accordance with different waves, in 
turn requiring an impropriety in achieving the monopoly position, 
or requiring a sole act of monopolizing. As seen above, in order to 
untangle the issue of monopoly Courts have focused on market 
definition rather than on a critical degree beyond which a market 
share in an industry contravenes § 2. 
The formula found in the case law with regard to monopoly –
power to control prices- has no meaning if price does not refer to 
the divergence from the competitive price (price of a good in a 
perfectly competitive market). It has been seen, however, that 
Courts tend to avoid an economic definition of price and rely on a 
rule of thumb, specifically the scrutiny whether under concrete 
circumstances the defendant has power to exclude competition 
with its presence on the market. 
Monopoly power alone is not unlawful pursuant to § 2 unless 
some additional act is ascertained. More specifically, the alleged 
monopolist must obtain or maintain a monopolistic position by 
means of “deliberate and purposeful” acts, namely acts showing 
that the firm with market power purposefully and intentionally 
acquired, maintained, or exercised that power233.  
Conversely, defendant can exculpate himself by showing that 
monopoly power was 1) attained “by superior skill, foresight, or 
industry”, or 2) “thrust upon”, because of a thin market or the 
enjoyment of economies of scale234.  
A first consideration can be made by reflecting on the Alcoa 
formula: even though there is no violation of § 2 unless it is 
proved that that the monopolist deliberately exercised its market 
power, specific intent to monopolize is not required. Law of 
monopolization may be contravened without a specific intent to 
build monopoly, if or monopoly results as consequence of 
defendant’s conduct; furthermore specific intent in common-law 
sense is necessary only where the conduct fall short of results 
condemned by the antitrust laws235, such as in the attempted 
monopolization hypothesis236. 
                                                
233 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) 
234 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 1704, 16 L. 
Ed. 2d 778 (1966).  Endorsing Justice Hand’s opinion. The Grinnell formula is 
reported for the sake of clarity: “[T]he offense of monopoly . . . has two 
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) 
the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from 
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident”. See infra, para. 6.2.1, the analysis of the Grinnell 
case with regard to the per se approach of Courts. 
235 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 68 S. Ct. 941, 92 L. Ed. 1236 (1948) 
disapproved of by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 
752, 104 S. Ct. 2731, 81 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1984). 
236 See infra para. 10, Attempted monopolization. 
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The second paramount element of the monopolization test is 
whether the conduct is anticompetitive; whilst a judicial notion of 
anticompetitive act has not yet been elaborated, the Supreme 
Court has followed the Areeda and Turner definition of exclusion 
and established that “exclusionary” conduct “comprehends at the 
most behavior that not only (1) tends to impair the opportunities 
of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the 
merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way”237.  
In 2007, Areeda and Hovenkamp reformulated the test, and held 
that exclusionary conduct entails acts that: (1) are reasonably 
capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by 
impairing the opportunities of rivals; and (2) that either (2a) do 
not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are unnecessary for the 
particular consumer benefits claimed for them, or (2c) produce 
harms disproportionate to any resulting benefits238. 
 
6.1 Standard Oil and the Rule of reason 
The foundational exegesis of § 2 was set in the seminal cases 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States239 and United States v. 
American Tobacco Co.240; Standard Oil controlled almost 80% of the 
US business of shipping, refining and selling petroleum and its 
products. Amongst all the business practices put in practice by the 
monopolist, some were found to restrain the interstate commerce 
in petroleum and its products: rebates, preferences, and other 
                                                
237 See infra, para. n. 6.3 
238 Courts have been reluctant to censor conducts of the dominant firm merely 
on the grounds of the firm’s dominance, conducts that were nevertheless 
available to its smaller rivals and that, absent monopoly power, would have 
been deemed lawful. Nevertheless, in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605, 105 S. Ct. 2847, 2859, 86 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1985), the 
court borrowed the Areeda-Turner formula to infer violation of § 2 in the 
defendant’s conduct, who refused to venture business with a competitor. P. 
Areeda & D.F Turner, Antitrust Law: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their 
Application, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, vol. 3 § 651 p. 78 (1978). As for the 
new formulation of the test, compare P.E. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Law – An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, Wolters Kluwer 
Law and Business, New York, § 3 p. 96 (2007). As regards the Aspen case, see 
note n. 211. 
239 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62, 31 S. Ct. 502, 
516, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911) 
240 United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S. Ct. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663 
(1911). The two cases were delivered in the within a short distance of time were 
both decided on the ground of the rule-of-reason doctrine. In American Tobacco 
the Supreme Court stated “The standard of reason which had theretofore been 
applied at the common law and in the United States in dealing with subjects of 
the character embraced by the prohibitions of Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, §§ 1, 2, 26 
Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note, against combinations in restraint of 
interstate or foreign trade or commerce, or monopolization or attempts to 
monopolize any part thereof, was intended to be the measure used for the 
purpose of determining whether, in a given case, a particular act had or had not 
brought about the wrong against which the statute provided”. 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
90 
 
discriminatory practices in favor of the combination by railroad 
companies; restraint and monopolization by control of pipe lines, 
and unfair practices against competing pipe lines; contracts with 
competitors in restraint of trade; unfair methods of competition, 
such as local price cutting at the points where necessary to 
suppress competition; espionage of the business of competitors, 
the operation of bogus independent companies, and payment of 
rebates on oil, with the like intent; the division of the United States 
into districts, and the limiting the operations of the various 
subsidiary corporations as to such districts so that competition in 
the sale of petroleum products between such corporations had 
been entirely eliminated and destroyed241.  
At issue in the case was not whether the monopolist had a 
relevant market power or whether he had attained that power 
through the afore-mentioned practices, but whether those 
practices could be defined anticompetitive242.  
The Supreme Court outlined the renowned “rule of reason” and 
stated that §2 is a complement of §1 of the Sherman Act, whose 
primary scope is the prohibition of monopolization. Such ban is to 
be read in conjunction with § 1, which prohibits unreasonable 
restraints of trade brought about by concerted actions. More 
specifically, a dominant firm can be found guilty of violating § 2 if 
it engages in conduct that would violate § 1 if engaged in by a 
combination of firms. Furthermore, the rule of reason requires a 
finding of specific intent to monopolize, which can be reasonably 
inferred from a conduct that cannot be unjustifiable on the basis of 
legitimate competitive goals, but can only be debunked as an 
effort to destroy competition. In other words, § 2 only seeks to 
prohibit the undue restraints of trade and the improper exercise of 
the right to contract, conducive to monopoly243. 
Thus, when investigating the single firm conduct, criteria must 
reflect the policy these restrictions were enacted to serve, namely 
the prevention of any kind of undue restraint of trade or 
commerce, and the protection of freedom of contract as the most 
efficient mean for the prevention of monopoly. Freedom of 
contract is the core of freedom from undue restraint on the right to 
contract 244 . Having that affirmed, the Sherman Act does not 
                                                
241 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 42-43, 31 S. Ct. 
502, 509, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911) 
242 “[T]he steps taken to protect that dominance involved the suppression of 
independent providers of new technology, followed by the assumption of 
control over the technologies”. M.J. Bauer, The Metamorphosis of Antitrust 
Law: From Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S. to U.S. v. Microsoft 
Corporation, 5 Duq. Bus. L.J. 81, 97 (2003) 
243 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62, 31 S. Ct. 502, 
517, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911) 
244 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62, 31 S. Ct. 502, 
516, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911) 
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condemn all business practices leading to a concentration of 
market power in the hands of a firm, but only those that 
unreasonably restrain trade, and that would violate §1 if adopted 
by two or more firms jointly.  
Whether a particular restraint of trade is unlawful is to be assessed 
with the employment of the same reason that courts have 
traditionally employed in interpreting the common law of 
restraints of trade245, with a view to deciding solely against those 
curtailments of competition that -under the circumstances of the 
case- have the purposeful and unduly tendency to monopoly or to 
generate its consequences246.  
These evil consequences are the power to restrict output, the 
power to fix prices and the danger to deteriorate quality of the 
monopolized product 247 . Therefore, under Standard Oil, the 
Sherman Act serves as an externality regulation and can be used 
to abridge freedom of contract only when the latter produces 
monopoly and harms consumers and society248.  
Competition is protected in a quantitative way: under the rule of 
reason Courts would ensure the appropriate amount of 
competition –and contractual liberty- that protects society from 
practices resulting in monopoly. Under this assumption, 
restraining practices can be classified as either pro-competitive or 
anti-competitive, and the defendant can be granted grounds to 
prove that his restraint might have “potentially redeeming value” 
or “pro-competitive justification”249. 
The analysis has thus far regarded the rule of reason as one of the 
canons of antitrust analysis. This standard of reasonableness is a 
vacuum that Courts theoretically fill with meaning by recourse to 
the common law of trade restraints in force at the time Congress 
passed the Sherman Act. However, Courts have never translated 
the principle in static precedents, but have applied price theories 
                                                
245 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 31 S. Ct. 502, 
516, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911) 
246 Compare United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83 (6th 
Cir. 1898) aff'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211, 20 S. Ct. 96, 44 L. Ed. 136 (1899) 
“where the sole object of both parties in making the contract as expressed 
therein is merely to restrain competition, and enhance or maintain prices, it 
would seem that there was nothing to justify or excuse the restraint, that it 
would necessarily have a tendency to monopoly, and therefore would be void”. 
247 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57 and 61, 31 S. 
Ct. 502, 516, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911).  
248 Compare A.J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 
2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 77, 88 (2003): the author argues that the reading of the 
Sherman Act as an externality regulation is consistent with the then-dominant 
approach to political economy, approach that was embraced by the Courts in 
the interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendment. 
249 Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 73 L. Ed. 
2d 48 (1982) 
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to assess whether a certain restraint was reasonable, scrutinizing 
the economic consequences of the firm’s conduct250. In other terms, 
restraint of trade has been interpreted not as a list of forbidden 
practices, but with a view to the economic conditions surrounding 
an arrangement.  
 
6.2 Alcoa and Griffith the birth of the per se approach 
The decision in the Standard Oil was not delivered unanimously, 
since Justice Harlan dissented in part from the majority opinion. 
Harlan held that the arguments sustaining the rule of reason 
interpretation of § 1 and § 2 -as a corollary of the former- had been 
rejected by the Supreme Court fifteen years earlier in the Trans 
Missouri Freight Association case 251 . The concept of a per se 
approach, as the antithesis of the rule of reason interpretation is 
developed in one of the passages of the case:  
“The arguments which have been addressed to us against the 
inclusion of all contracts in restrain of trade, as provided for by the 
language of the act, have been based upon the alleged 
presumption of that Congress, notwithstanding the language of 
the act, could not have intended to embrace all contracts, but only 
such contracts as were in unreasonable restraint of trade. Under 
these circumstances we are, therefore, asked to hold that the Act of 
the Congress excepts contracts which are not in unreasonable 
restraint of trade, and which only keep rates up to a reasonable 
price, notwithstanding the language of the act makes such 
exception. In other words, we are asked to read into the act by 
way of judicial legislation an exception that is not placed there by 
the law-making branch of the government, and this is done upon 
the theory that the impolicy of such legislation is so clear that it 
cannot be supposed Congress intended the natural import of the 
language it used. This we cannot and ought not to do”252. 
Harlan maintained that a decision as to the reasonableness of the 
contract necessitated a judgment as to the reasonableness of the 
levels of price resulting from the contract. This type of inquiry 
                                                
250 A.J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
77, 90 (2003). Compare Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 
79 S. Ct. 705, 3 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1959), in which the Supreme Court stated 
“[S]ection one of the Sherman Act prohibits those classes of contracts or acts 
which the common law had deemed to be undue restraints of trade, and those 
which new times and economic conditions would make unreasonable, and 
section two of the Act makes prohibitions thereof more complete and perfect by 
embracing all attempts to reach the end prohibited by the first section, that is, 
restraints of trade by any attempt to monopolize, or monopolization thereof, 
and the effect of both sections is to adopt the common-law proscription of all 
contracts or acts which have a monopolistic tendency and which interfere with 
the natural flow of an appreciable amount of interstate commerce”. 
251 United States v. Trans Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290 (1896) 
252 United States v. Trans Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 340 (1896) 
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would open floodgates of evidence and create considerable 
uncertainty as to the import of the Sherman Act and the legality of 
business conduct. Courts would not be allowed to set a standard 
to judge a reasonable price, since there would be to many 
parameters to evaluate in such assessment. Following this line of 
argument, the per se approach was elaborated with regard to the 
interpretation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, in response to the 
inefficiency of the rule of reason253. The inquiry of anticompetitive 
conduct proved vague and arbitrary, because of the lack of 
unanimity as to whether it was solely grounded on economic 
ends, or whether political and social considerations were at 
stake254. In addition to that, there was no consensus as to the 
values underlying the application of this standard, in particular 
whether the sole consideration ought to be consumer welfare, or 
whether the law should acknowledge competition considerations. 
The simultaneous use of conflicting values rendered the 
reasonableness approach insufficient for the purposes of the 
Sherman Act255.   
As a consequence, a shift from an inquiry of the firm’s intent to an 
inquiry of firm’s business expansion has characterized the 
subsequent developments of §2 jurisprudence. Whereas in 
Standard Oil the Court affirmed that the statute omits “any direct 
prohibition against monopoly in the concrete” 256 , thus only 
monopoly as a consequence of a specific intent to restraint trade is 
forbidden, in Alcoa the defendant was condemned since it had 
merely expanded output, without any assessment of the pro-
competitive effects of its presence on the market.  
Likewise, United States v. Griffith indicated that antitrust laws may 
be contravened without a specific intent to restrain trade or to 
build monopoly, if restraint of trade or monopoly results as 
consequence of defendant’s conduct, and specific intent in 
common-law sense is necessary only where the conduct fall short 
of results condemned by the antitrust laws257.  
One could consider the per se rule as an exception to the rule of 
reason, or as an entirely separate approach to antitrust analysis; 
                                                
253 T.A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to 
Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 685, 691 (1991) 
254 R.H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division II, 75 Yale L.J. 373, 376 (1965) 
255 R.H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division II, 75 Yale L.J. 373, 376 (1965) 
256 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62, 31 S. Ct. 502, 
516, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911) 
257 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 68 S. Ct. 941, 92 L. Ed. 1236 (1948) 
disapproved of by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 
752, 104 S. Ct. 2731, 81 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1984). See infra, attempted 
monopolization. 
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instead, this rule is consistent with the first criterion, being an 
abbreviated version of the rule of reason258.  
In fact, Courts determine that particular restraints are unlawful per 
se on the account of the experience acquired under the rule of 
reason, namely on the account that under the rule of reason 
certain arrangements will always create market power and will 
always unduly curtail competition 259 . Hence, even after the 
development of a per se jurisprudence, many commentators agree 
that the rule of reason should be the departing point of any 
antitrust analysis260. 
 
6.2.1 Grinnell – a landmark application of the per se rule 
A landmark application of the per se rule is United States v. Grinnell 
Corp., in which the Supreme Court stated the prevailing formula 
that monopoly entails two elements, market power in conjunction 
with willful acquisition or maintenance of it261. 
A remark on the Grinnell formula is that it is difficult to 
distinguish a willful acquisition of a monopoly from the intent of a 
firm to expand business or improve its product or service, given 
the fundamental postulation that firms are profit maximizers.  
Therefore, while firms often acquire or maintain monopoly by 
virtue of superior product, business acumen or historic accident, 
these occurrences may not exclude the concurring willful 
maintenance of monopoly power, because a monopoly “thrust 
upon it” is hardly sustainable without the help of an active 
conduct262.  
Nonetheless, the Grinnell Court does not give guidance as to how 
to define “business acumen” or “superior product”, and these 
notions lend themselves to become mouthpieces for the Court to 
proscribe a conduct as unlawful according to the circumstances, or 
to a particular “policy” reason263.  
                                                
258 T.A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to 
Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 685, 692 (1991) 
259 Per se treatment is appropriate “once experience with a particular kind of 
restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason 
will condemn it.” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10, 118 S. Ct. 275, 279, 139 L. 
Ed. 2d 199 (1997). 
260 L.A. Sullivan & W.S. Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook 
192-194 St. Paul (Minnesota) (2000). 7 Philip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law §1501 
(1986); 
261 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 1704, 16 L. 
Ed. 2d 778 (1966). The Grinnell formula is reported for the sake of clarity: “The 
offense of monopoly . . . has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly 
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of 
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident”. 
262 E. Elhauge, Defining better monopolization standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253, 261 
(2003) 
263 Compare the Berkey case (supra, note n.147 et seq.), in which Kodak Co., the 
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Moreover, as an eminent scholar has held, if a conduct enhances 
the economic performance of the firm engaging in it will be 
perfectly lawful; conversely, if a conduct impedes competitors’ 
ability to compete is by no means unlawful. Monopolization can 
be identified through the following test: if the dominant firm has 
improved its own efficiency in order to make a better or cheaper 
product, it should be free to sell that product at any above-cost 
price it wants, even though that may shrink rival market share to a 
size that leaves rivals less efficient. If the dominant firm has 
succeeded in furthering monopoly power by impairing rival 
efficiency, its conduct should be deemed unlawful264. At any rate, 
within this spectrum it is problematic to assess a course of conduct 
that on the one hand increases the firm’s efficiency, but on the 
other hand decreases those of the rivals265. 
 
6.3 The difficulties of establishing monopolization standards – 
the Areeda-Turner formula 
Per se rule remains a vague concept among practitioners and even 
among some judges, who mainly fail to separate out two different 
components of the rule itself: whether and when (1) exculpatory 
claims are to be considered and (2) power must be proved in order 
to condemn a business practice.  
As a scholar has rightly indicated, in practice the per se rule has 
been interpreted as the absence of a justification or a defense for 
the restraint of trade, regardless of the proof of monopoly power. 
                                                                                                                                                            
defendant, was charged with monopolization for having introduced a new film 
format that was only compatible with new pocket-size Kodak cameras, 
therefore leveraging on its monopoly in the film industry, in order to drive 
Berkey off competition in amateur camera and photo-finishing equipment. The 
introduction of the new film format could be interpreted in either way, as 
“business acumen” or as a malicious act of monopolizing the amateur camera 
industry. To the same extent, if the incumbent firm lowers prices in order to 
discourage new entries in the market but manages to keep prices above costs, 
that conduct can be considered as either the result of business acumen or as a 
willful maintenance of monopoly power.  See, E. Elhauge Why Above-Cost Price 
Cuts To Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory—and the Implications for Defining 
Costs and Market Power, 112 Yale L. Jour., 681 (2003) 
264 E. Elhauge, Defining better monopolization standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253, 263 
(2003) 
265  E. Elhauge Why Above-Cost Price Cuts To Drive Out Entrants Are Not 
Predatory—and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 Yale L. 
Jour., 681 (2003). The difference between performance competition and 
impediment competition resembles the Ordoliberal doctrine of the difference 
between “performance competition” (Leistungswettbewerb) – making products 
more attractive for consumers, by improving their characteristics or lowering 
their price- and “impediment competition” (Behinderungswettbewerb) – 
inhibiting the rivals’ capacity to perform. This doctrine has influenced EU 
Competition law, in particular with regard to the idea of “performance-based 
competition”, to which the EU Courts approach is informed. See Chapter II, 
para. 5.1 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
96 
 
More specifically, the analytical process in finding a conduct 
unlawful per se is the same, and implies the consideration and 
rejection of a ground of exculpation based on a standard of 
reasonableness, namely on the rule of reason, on the one hand, 
and the application of this standard to the whole class of conduct. 
The validity of defenses or exculpations for the conduct and the 
proof of power place themselves on different standpoints, because 
the inquiry into power is much more costly and time consuming 
that the assessment of the defendant’s defenses. Therefore, once a 
type a conduct has been defined as anticompetitive per se, absent 
an exculpation or defense, the court will decline to analyze the 
standard of reasonableness of that course of conduct, based on the 
proof of monopoly power266. In all, the rule of reason would 
degrade into an evaluation of the validity of the defendant’s 
defenses, and into a standardization of this process. 
The shortcomings of the per se rule above referred might explain 
why the attitude of Courts towards allegedly monopolizing acts, 
which are lawful absent proof of monopoly power, is oscillating.  
In search of better monopolization standards, Courts have gauged 
firm’s conducts in conjunction with the element of substantial 
market power, and have borrowed the famous formulation by 
professors Areeda and Turner (relevant conduct must be 
“anticompetitive or exclusionary”), where exclusionary 
“comprehends at the most behavior that not only (1) tends to 
impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not 
further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily 
restrictive way”267. Clause 1 of the formula sets down an objective 
parameter, since conduct is to be substantially capable of creating 
or prolonging monopoly, while clause 2 implies that 
                                                
266 P. Areeda, The Changing Contours of the Per Se Rule, 54 Antitrust L.J. 27, 27-28 
(1985) 
267 Courts have been reluctant to censor conducts of the dominant firm merely 
on the grounds of the firm’s dominance, conducts that were nevertheless 
available to its smaller rivals and that, absent monopoly power, would have 
been deemed lawful. Nevertheless, in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605, 105 S. Ct. 2847, 2859, 86 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1985), the 
court borrowed the Areeda-Turner formula to infer violation of § 2 in the 
defendant’s conduct, who refused to venture business with a competitor. P. 
Areeda & D.F Turner, Antitrust Law: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their 
Application, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, vol. 3 § 651 p. 78 (1978). A new 
formulation of the formula can be found in P.E. Areeda & H. Hoverkamp, 
Antitrust Law – An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, Wolters 
Kluwer Law and Business, New York, § 3 p. 96 (2007). In the 2007 book the 
authors define monopolistic conduct as acts that: (1) are reasonably capable of 
creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by impairing the 
opportunities of rivals; and (2) that either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, 
or (2b) are unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits claimed for them, 
or (2c) produce harms disproportionate to any resulting benefits. As regards the 
Aspen case, see infra, para. 7.3. 
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anticompetitive exclusion a) shows no consumer benefit, b) shows 
that alternative and less exclusive practices are likely to bring 
about the same consumer benefit, in a way that the exclusion is 
unnecessary, c) shows ample lack of balance between the gains 
and the evils of exclusion268. 
Both the rule of reason and the per se approach are essential 
elements in the interpretation of current monopolization laws; 
moreover, they both reflect “the never-ending conflict between the 
desire for certainty and the desire for flexibility that is as old as the 
process of the law itself”269. The per se doctrine offers greater 
elements of certainty but sacrifices the flexibility typical of the rule 
of reason. Whereas the rule of reason operates through a process 
of inclusion and exclusion of case in a spectrum on the basis of a 
case-by-case evaluation, the per se approach operates by 
converting single fact categories into fixed rules of law270. 
 
6.4 Lawful practices  
Courts have been reluctant to censor lawful conducts of the 
dominant firm that were available to its smaller rival, merely on 
the grounds of the firm’s dominance. The most significant 
outcomes adhesive to this line of argument is the afore-mentioned 
Berkey case, in which the Court allowed the defendant not to 
disclose a product innovation to the plaintiff271 and, thus, reap the 
advantages of the disclosure when market conditions were more 
profitable for it.  
Elsewhere, the dominant firm has been allowed to introduce a 
design change that improved the product for the benefit of 
consumers, but impaired competitors’ complementary products or 
services; the court refused to weight the anticompetitive effects 
brought by the innovation, but rested on the advantageous effects 
for consumers of the design improvements272.  
A manufacturer was not found to have monopolized a market by 
refusing to sell or license patented or copyrighted intellectual 
property to its competitors, in the absence of fraud on the Patent 
                                                
268 A balance between gains and harms of exclusionary conduct is extremely 
difficult to strike. An example of that is the sacrifice of short-run benefits that 
are redistributed to consumers in order to gain a monopolist position in an 
industry in the long run; more specifically, it is the case of monopoly-predatory 
pricing of a firm which is meant to recoup the losses stemming from below-cost 
sales incurred in the attempt to reach a dominant position.  E. Elhauge, Defining 
Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 343 
269 C. Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National 
Antitrust Policy, 50 Mich. L. Rev., 1149 (1952) 
270 C. Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National 
Antitrust Policy, 50 Mich. L. Rev., 1152 (1952) 
271 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). 
Compare note n. 147 et seq. 
272 Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group LP, 592 F.3d 
991, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) 
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and Trademark Office, even though such refusal had 
anticompetitive effects; conversely, the refusal was considered by 
the Court as the exertion of the defendant’s statutory rights273. 
A predatory price-cutting –above cost pricing, yet below market 
level- was not considered unlawful to the extent the predator had 
no reasonable prospect of recouping his investment prices 
through later supra-competitive profits; such interference in price 
competition falls outside of the scope of American antitrust laws 
in general, and of the Sherman Act in particular274; the reason is 
self-explanatory, in that American antitrust goal is not the 
protection of firms from price cuts, but the protection of consumer 
welfare in an perspective of market efficiency. 
 
7. The most significant outcomes  
In search of better monopolization standards, the following 
section will concisely describe the most significant outcomes of 
both the Supreme Court and the Circuit Courts that have shed 
light on the contours and the scopes of § 2. 
 
7.1 Trinko  
Similarly, in Verizon v. Trinko the refusal to provide assistance, 
parts or other support to competitors was not seen as a violation 
of § 2275. Under the Telecommunication Act of 1996 the claimant 
(the incumbent local exchange carrier – LEC) was under a duty to 
share its telephone network with its competitors; the duty 
consisted of offering, to any requesting telecommunications 
carrier for the provision of a telecommunications service, 
nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled 
basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and 
conditions that are just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory276.  
The Supreme Court argued that the presence of a substantial 
degree of regulation in that industry did not imply that the 
Sherman Act could be an independent source of liability: failure to 
meet the duty pursuant to the Telecommunication Act did not 
state any further claim under the Sherman Act. The Court 
                                                
273 In re Indep. Serv. Organizations Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). The Court did not even question the anticompetitive effects of the 
defendant’s conduct, but asserted the lack of opportunity to inquire into the 
subjective motivations for exerting his statutory rights.  
274 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993). In particular, the Court held 
“To hold that the antitrust laws protect competitors from the loss of profits due 
to such price competition would, in effect, render illegal any decision by a firm 
to cut prices in order to increase market share. The antitrust laws require no 
such perverse result.” 
275 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 410, 124 S. Ct. 872, 880, 157 L. Ed. 2d 823 (2004).  
276 47 U.S.C. § 251(3) 
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reasoned that the 1996 act did not alter antitrust law standards or 
created new claims, and that Verizon did not violate preexisting 
antitrust standards. The justices declined to add a new claim by 
making an exception to the proposition that there is no duty to aid 
competitors277.  
This proposition is grounded on one pre-existing standard of § 2 
expressed in U.S. v. Colgate & Co., in that “in the absence of any 
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly (the intent test), the 
[Sherman] Act does not restrict the long-recognized right of trader 
or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to 
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom 
he will deal”278, with the exception to this rule set down in the 
Aspen case279, according to which under certain circumstances, a 
monopolist’s refusal to cooperate with rivals can constitute 
exclusionary conduct and violate § 2. 
Elsewhere, the Court has held that a valid business justification 
exists for a conduct that is allegedly predatory or anticompetitive, 
that conduct cannot support inference of a § 2 violation280; in 
particular, the Court did not uphold the plaintiff’s claim that the 
defendant had monopolized a market of computer-based testing 
services, by acquiring a third party’s existing network of testing 
centers upon learning that the plaintiff was about to partner with 
the network as part of its own efforts to enter the market. The 
defendant managed to prove that such acquisition would expand 
its business and give it access to more customer, and that it was 
not characterized by a mere intent of eliminating competition281.  
 
7.2 Noerr and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 
In the renowned Noerr case, a group of 24 major railroad 
companies was charged with conspiring to restrain trade through 
a joint publicity campaign directed to influence governmental 
action with a view to impeding the ability of long-distance 
trucking companies to compete with them282. The Supreme Court 
held that while an “anticompetitive purpose” underlay the 
defendants’ behavior, joint action to induce legislation was held to 
be of sufficient societal importance to warrant immunity from the 
                                                
277 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 411, 124 S. Ct. 872, 881, 157 L. Ed. 2d 823 (2004) The Court refused to 
extend the essential facility doctrine beyond the facts of the controversial Aspen 
case. Compare note n. 190 
278 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307, 39 S. Ct. 465, 468, 63 L. Ed. 
992 (1919).  
279 See infra, note n. 211 
280 ACT, Inc. v. Sylvan Learning Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 657, 670 (8th Cir. 2002) 
281 ACT, Inc. v. Sylvan Learning Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 657, 670 (8th Cir. 2002) 
282 E. R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136, 
81 S. Ct. 523, 529, 5 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1961) 
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antitrust laws283. As a matter of fact, the divergence between such 
conduct, on the one hand, and an actual monopolization or 
attempt to monopolizing, on the other hand, rests on the fact that 
an action of pressure expresses a mere aspiration to make wishes 
known to the government. Treating the faculty of associations to 
influence the passage of laws as relevant conduct for the purposes 
of the Sherman Act would substantially impair the government 
action on behalf of people and, ultimately, the whole concept of 
representation284. 
Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine285, antitrust laws do not 
apply to individual or group actions pursuing to influence 
legislative, executive, administrative or judicial decision-making, 
provided that the action is pursued in bona fide and is not a mere 
sham to cover an attempt to interfere with a competitor’s business 
capacity286. 
 
7.2 Mercatus Group v. Lake Forest 
Another exemption from inference of § 2 violation with regards to 
conducts with anticompetitive effects was found when the 
defendant promotes its own product or service over those of 
competitors, even with misrepresentations287. A hospital did not 
engage in anti-competitive conduct that would support claims of 
actual or attempted monopolization, where it had successfully 
employed various tactics to dissuade two physician practice 
groups from relocating to a new physician practice center, 
including offering the groups incentives to not relocate, falsely 
implying that the center was in violation of federal anti-kickback 
regulations.  
                                                
283 E. R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139, 
81 S. Ct. 523, 530, 5 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1961) 
284 E. R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139, 
81 S. Ct. 523, 530, 5 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1961) 
285 Four years after the Noerr case a similar reasoning was applied in United 
Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S. Ct. 1585, 14 L. Ed. 
2d 626 (1965), in which the Supreme Court extended antitrust immunity to an 
allegedly conspiratorial action between a union and a group of large mining 
companies directed towards inducing the Secretary of Labor to set minimum 
wages at a level adverse for employees of small mining companies. In 
particular, Small coal mine operators could not collect damages under Sherman 
Act for any injuries which they suffered from action of Secretary of Labor in 
acceding to behest of large operators and coal miners' union and establishing 
under Walsh-Healey Act a minimum wage for employees of contractors selling 
coal to Tennessee Valley Authority for purpose of making it difficult for small 
operators to compete in TVA term contract market, since secretary was a public 
official who was not claimed to be a conspirator, and jury, on request, should 
have been instructed to exclude these damages. 
286 W. Holmes and M. Mangiaracina, Antitrust Law Handbook, Thomson Reuters, 
2011 § 8:8. 
287 Mercatus Group, LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 841 (7th Cir. 2011) 
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The Court affirmed that the hospital “did not leverage its market 
power to make the physicians offers on supra-competitive terms 
impossible for any competitor to match. The Hospital simply 
offered the physicians many of the same incentives the new center 
offered to induce them to relocate their practices in the first place. 
Nor is there any evidence that the Hospital resorted to unfair or 
coercive tactics, such as threats to revoke the physicians’ Hospital 
staff privileges if they relocated to the new physician center”288. In 
addition, the alleged violation of anti-kickback regulation was 
found to have had, “at best, a minimal anticompetitive effect”289.  
All these situations reflect an intellectual endeavor to evaluate the 
merits of some acts that claimants argue to have an 
anticompetitive effect. It results that Courts tend to admit some 
practices that -although exclusionary- have a slightly rational 
business justification, and to repeal those conducts that have no 
intent other than driving existing competitors off competition, on 
the one hand, and obtaining monopoly power by raising prices 
and reducing output, on the other hand. Conversely, conducts 
that would be legal if employed by firms without monopoly 
power, but have the purpose of suppressing competition -rather 
than a valid business justification- have been found in contrast 
with § 2. 
 
7.3 Aspen and the monopoly refusal to deal 
The tendency to infer § 2 violations from conducts that would be 
legal in a competitive setting is evident in the controversial 
Aspen290 case, which has set down the standard “monopoly refusal 
to deal” theory. The Supreme Court identified an anticompetitive 
practice in the unjustified refusal of a monopolist to venture 
together with a competitor in a pooled multi-mountain ski-lift 
service that the two had developed jointly, where the refusal 
lacked any legitimate business justification291.  
Of the four major sky resorts that formed the entire ski area in 
Aspen, three belonged to the defendant, and only one to the 
plaintiff. The Supreme Court agreed that a firm is not obligated to 
participate in a joint marketing program with a competitor; 
nevertheless, the defendant’s decision not to cooperate amounted 
to liability under the circumstance that such refusal gave rise to 
monopoly in the downhill skiing market; at issue in the case was 
the characterization of the monopolist’s conduct can be 
characterized as exclusionary, anti-competitive, or predatory.  
                                                
288 Mercatus Group, LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 855 (7th Cir. 2011) 
289 Ibidem Mercatus Group, LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 855 (7th Cir. 
2011) 
290 See supra, note n.190 
291 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605, 105 S. 
Ct. 2847, 2859, 86 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1985) 
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The monopolist did not merely reject an offer to participate in a 
cooperative venture, but instead elected to make an important 
change in the pattern of distribution, that is the termination of the 
“all-Aspen ticket” without a rational business justification, other 
than the attempt to drive the plaintiff off competition292. The 
Supreme Court determined that the defendant’s conduct was 
characterized as anti-competitive on a threefold perspective: with 
regard to customers, skiers had developed a strong demand for 
the All-Aspen Ticket, which had originated in a market persisting 
for several years, and which customers had become accustomed to 
consider as one. With regard to the claimant, after this change in 
the pattern of distribution it had faced a significant decline of its 
business. Thirdly, with regard to the defendant itself evidence 
could not support the claim that its conduct was justified by a 
normal business rationale, but suggested a willingness to forsake 
short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end. 
In all, the Aspen Court recognized the monopoly refusal-to-deal 
when affirmed “the high value that we have placed on the right to 
refuse to deal with other firms does not mean that the right is 
unqualified”293; however, the refusal-to-deal theory was accepted 
as an exception, given that the virtue of forced sharing is 
uncertain. 
 
7.4 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. and the 
contours of the anticompetitive tying  
Another controversial and analytically demanding case in which 
the Supreme Court attempted to articulate some guiding 
principles to distinguish monopolizing conducts from lawful 
competition is Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.294 
The petitioner adopted policies to restrict the availability of 
replacement parts -manufactured by itself- for its equipment to 
the respondent, independent service organizations (ISO), after the 
                                                
292 Originally, each competitor offered its own daily and half-day ski-passes, as 
well as a six day All-Aspen ski pass, a carnet containing six tickets, each 
redeemable at any resort of the area, at a significantly discounted price. No 
sooner did the defendant acquire three resorts of the area, than it issued a 
multi-resort ticket covering only its ski resorts. In 1978, the defendant 
threatened to discontinue sales of the All-Aspen ticket unless the plaintiff 
accepted a fixed percentage of the ticket revenue rather than an amount based 
on the fluctuating survey system and the historical average usage of each resort. 
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 585, 105 S. Ct. 
2847, 2848, 86 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1985) 
293 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601, 105 S. 
Ct. 2847, 86 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1985). For a more in-depth analysis of the monopoly 
“refusal-to-deal” and of the “essential facility” doctrine, see infra, note n. 276 
294 The case is also relevant as regards the offense of monopoly leveraging. See 
supra, para 2, note n. 46. And infra, para. 9, note n. 302. Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 112 S. Ct. 2072, 119 L. Ed. 2d 265 
(1992) 
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latter began servicing the equipment.  
Amongst other violations Kodak was charged with monopolizing 
and attempt to monopolize the sale of parts and services for 
copying and micrographic equipment, since only Kodak 
manufactured key parts needed to repair its equipment295. At the 
time, Kodak held an alleged share of 80 to 95% of the service 
market for repairing its own equipment and virtually 100% of the 
market of parts compatible with its equipment296. The termination 
of competitors’ continued access to these parts drove the 
independent services organizations off the Kodak service market.  
The Supreme Court accepted ISOs’ claim that, through tying the 
sale of parts and services for its cameras to the use of its service, 
Kodak had monopolized the market for its own parts and services. 
Furthermore, the Court found sufficient evidence of 
monopolization of this market in the fact that, after restricting 
supply of its replacement parts to ISO, Kodak had engaged in 
price increases and extracted monopoly rents from its 
consumers297.  
Price discrimination against the claimants was in itself not 
sufficient to prove monopoly power. The Court maintained that 
possession of a dominant share in a market with no available 
substitutes sufficed to infer monopoly power within the meaning 
of Grinnell298. In fact, the price increase over the competitive level 
operated by Kodak constituted possession monopoly power on 
the account of the lack of readily available substitutes in the 
market of services and parts, which forced purchasers to buy at a 
price that they would have not agreed on in a competitive 
market299.  
In reflecting on the Court’s reasoning, an eminent scholar has 
argued that the economic sophistication for antitrust has stopped 
with this outcome. The Court accepted that Kodak had no power 
in the market in which it sold its equipment, but assumed that 
Kodak would use its monopoly in the parts and services to raise 
prices without harming the sale of its equipment. It is arguable 
                                                
295 Ibidem 
296 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 452, 112 S. 
Ct. 2072, 2076, 119 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1992) 
297 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 467, 112 S. 
Ct. 2072, 2076, 119 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1992) 
298 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 499, 112 S. 
Ct. 2072, 2099, 119 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1992). The Court applied the Grinnell test 
(monopoly power in conjunction with willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
power) see above note n.186 
299 The Supreme Court was barred from applying the Cellophane case test (cross-
elasticity of demand – see note n. 55 et seq), since there were no alternative 
substitutes on the market. This market configuration upheld the claim that 
Kodak’s restrictive policy was not a consequence of a business strategy, but an 
attempt to jack up the market by reaping monopolist rents from it.  
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whether Kodak was able to extract monopoly profits on parts or 
services; nevertheless, the Court held that economic theory was 
not adequate to overcome allegations of fact of the contrary, and 
that the raise of the price for parts and services was inevitably 
above competitive level, merely by virtue of the absence of readily 
available substitutes. The author counters that it is impossible to 
raise the price for parts or services without raising the price for 
Kodak’s machines. Thus, the decision would make no economic 
sense and would constitute an unsatisfactory development of 
antitrust law300. 
As for the second element of “willingness of dominance” set down 
in Grinnell, the Court reckoned on the existence of valid business 
justifications for Kodak’s restrictive policies. The petitioner 
purported the following reasons for its acts: (1) Maintaining 
product quality: “to promote inter-brand equipment competition 
by allowing Kodak to stress the quality of its service”; (2) 
achieving inventory efficiencies: “to improve asset management 
by reducing Kodak’s inventory costs”; and (3) Avoiding free ride: 
“to prevent ISOs from free-riding on Kodak’s capital investment 
in equipment, parts and service”301.  
The Supreme Court found none of these business justifications 
persuasive: the commitment to quality service leaned on the 
assumption that customers were unable to distinguish what 
breakdowns were due to bad equipment and what were due to 
bad products. But this justification was found inconsistent with 
Kodak self-service policy.  
As for the second reason, the control of inventory costs, the Court 
affirmed that “the inventory of parts needed to repair Kodak 
machines turns only on breakdown rates, and those rates should 
be the same whether Kodak or ISO’s perform the repair”302.  
With regard to the third justification, the Court affirmed that 
Kodak’s understanding of ISO’s free riding was inaccurate, in that 
it argued that ISO was free riding the repair market since it failed 
to enter the equipment and parts market. Conversely, the Court 
affirmed that one of the evils proscribed by the antitrust laws is 
                                                
300 R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books, Inc. 
Publishers, New York, p. 433 (1993) By accepting ISOs’ claim that, through 
tying the sale of parts and services for its cameras to the use of its service, 
Kodak had monopolized the market for its own parts and services, the Court 
assumed that the defendant had monopoly power over this market without any 
particular economic justification for the affirmation.  
301 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483, 112 S. 
Ct. 2072, 2091, 119 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1992). The first and the third justifications 
(quality maintenance and avoidance of free riding) brought about by Kodak are 
two of the major arguments justifying the existence of a monopoly.  
302 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 484-85, 
112 S. Ct. 2072, 2091, 119 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1992) 
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the creation of entry barriers to potential competitors by requiring 
them to enter two markets simultaneously303.  
 
7.5 Microsoft and the interface between monopolization and the 
thwarting of a new technology 
In US v. Microsoft304 the firm’s alleged anticompetitive conduct was 
characterized by the attempt to use its lawfully acquired Windows 
operating system (OS) monopoly to leverage its position into the 
Internet browser and other software markets305. More specifically, 
                                                
303 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 485, 112 S. 
Ct. 2072, 2092, 119 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1992) 
304 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Microsoft 
case is one of the most articulated litigations of the 124-year history of the 
Sherman Act. Several violations were alleged, regarding both § 1 and § 2 of the 
Act. In sum, the case regards both a tying arrangement and leveraging a 
monopoly position in one market into another market. Often, the grounds 
claims of violations of § 1 and § 2 were based are intertwined; more specifically, 
inference of violation of § 2 by Microsoft was amongst other things based on a 
tying arrangement of the browser part and the non-browser part in the 
Windows operating system. This tying arrangement was also the objective 
element of violation of § 1 in the case at issue, and a standard conduct in 
restraint of trade in general; the case agreed that it is unlawful to maintain 
monopoly by a restraint of trade violating § 1; however, within the confines of 
the present work, the tying arrangement will be only analyzed with regard to 
the charge of monopolization pursuant to § 2 pressed by the US Government. 
For a more detailed description of the facts of the case, see supra, para. 1, 
Introduction. 
305  S.C. Salop, R.C. Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal 
Standards, and Microsoft, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 617, 623 (1999) The authors’ 
manifest criticism towards the assumption that Microsoft –or any other 
monopolist- would have an incentive to leverage its monopoly power in the 
desktop operating systems market into a second market and increase the harm 
to consumers. They argue, in fact, that according to an economic result that was 
developed by Chicago School economists and legal commentators, a 
monopolist generally has no such incentive. The “single monopoly profit” 
theory says that in a single chain of production a monopolist can extract all of 
the monopoly profits available in the first market without vertically integrating 
(either explicitly or by contract) the non-dominated market. Because there is no 
anticompetitive incentive for leverage, it is argued, a monopolist’s decision to 
integrate into a second market must be motivated by pro-competitive 
rationales. These rationales would involve either producing a superior product, 
reducing costs, facilitating entry, or increasing price competition. These 
efficiencies often may involve elimination of free riding of some type. Thus, it is 
argued, the antitrust laws should not attack vertical integration.  
A firm with both market power and the ability to charge prices above cost 
would not increase its overcharge by tying or other forms of vertical 
integration, but by operating a sort of price discrimination, which permitted to 
extract more profits, but also to increase output (and decrease price). To the 
contrary, in the case of successive or complementary firms with market power, 
combining two products or process stages into a single firm would actually 
create efficiency, by increasing output and reducing price through the 
eliminations of double marginalization. 
Post-Chicago economic analysis has suggested that there are a number of 
limiting assumptions required for this single monopoly profit theory to apply 
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the Court investigated three conducts of Microsoft that were 
allegedly anticompetitive:  
1) Microsoft had used various anticompetitive product design 
tactics to monopolize the market for Intel-compatible PC 
operating systems, integrating Windows OS with its Internet 
browser (IE - Internet Explorer) first contractually and then 
technologically -by excluding it from the “Add/Remove” 
program utility of the OS. This change reduced the usage share of 
rival browsers not by making Microsoft’s own browser more 
attractive to consumers but, rather, by discouraging PC Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) from distributing rival 
products306.  
                                                                                                                                                            
(See L. Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power through Leverage, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 
515 (1985; M.H. Riordan & S.C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago 
Approach, 63 Antitrust L.J. 513 (1995)). When these assumptions are relaxed, the 
theory’s strong result and the public policy implications no longer hold. There 
are a number of common market situations in which integration into a second 
market may raise anticompetitive concerns. These include a) markets in which 
the first monopoly is regulated, b) markets that are characterized by economies 
of scale and scope and in which the inputs are not used in fixed proportions, 
and c) markets with multiple types of buyers. In such markets, it is possible for 
a monopolist to profitably extend its power into a second market and harm 
consumers. 
A monopolist may also utilize vertical integration or exclusives to raise barriers 
to competition that can preserve or enhance its monopoly power in the first 
product. This scenario is relevant to the type of allegations made against 
Microsoft. The single monopoly profit theory is premised on the firm having 
monopoly power in the first product. However, sometimes the initial monopoly 
would face a challenge and possible dissipation by new entry or expansion by 
fringe competitors. In this situation, the monopolist may attempt an 
exclusionary strategy in order to deter or destroy that emerging competition. 
Stated differently, the monopoly power might be reduced or disappear, but for 
the exclusionary conduct. Under these circumstances, the single monopoly 
profit theory, and its strong policy implications about the efficiency of 
integration, clearly would not apply. 
In this preserving monopoly theory, it is alleged that the exclusionary conduct 
is used to impede the efforts of firms that might reduce the monopolist’s power 
and thereby cause it to reduce its prices, increase innovation or perhaps lose out 
to a superior rival (See T.G. Krattenmaker et al., Airlie House Conference on the 
Antitrust Alternative: Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. 
L.J. 241, 251-52 (1987). This approach has important implications for gauging 
the firm’s monopoly power. The existence of constraints that prevent the firm 
from raising its price above the current level would not contradict the theory or 
render the theory inapplicable. The theory focuses instead on the role of the 
exclusionary conduct in eliminating competition that otherwise would force the 
firm to reduce its prices below the current level. Deterring such price decreases 
is an exercise of market power that harms consumers. In the case of innovation, 
maintaining a lower level of innovation also harms consumers. Nor would the 
existence of attempts to compete against the monopolist contradict the theory. 
The monopoly power is maintained by the anticompetitive exclusionary 
conduct. 
306 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
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2) Secondly, the technological design of Windows had sometimes 
the effect to override the user’s choice of a browser other than IE 
as default browser for certain applications; moreover, consumers 
were discouraged from using other Internet browsers than IE, 
since the latter was free.  
3) Finally, the commingling of browsing and non-browsing codes 
deterred original equipment manufacturers from pre-installing 
rival browsers, since the delete of the browser files would hamper 
the OS functionality. 
The D.C. Circuit noted that, by bundling technologically IE to 
Windows, Microsoft both prevented OEMs from pre-installing 
other browsers and deterred consumers from using them. “[I]n 
particular, having the IE software code as an irremovable part of 
Windows meant that pre-installing a second browser would 
“increase an OEM’s product testing costs,” because an OEM must 
test and train its support staff to answer calls related to every 
software product preinstalled on the machine; moreover, pre-
installing a browser in addition to IE would to many OEMs be “a 
questionable use of the scarce and valuable space on a PC’s hard 
drive”307. 
The Court investigated all of the three allegedly anticompetitive 
practices: since Microsoft had failed to provide a business 
justification for two of the three (exclusion of IE from the add-
remove utility, commingling browser and non-browser parts), the 
Court maintained the plaintiff’s allegation that these technical 
features made it virtually impossible to separate the browsing 
parts from the non-browsing parts of the operative system308. As a 
result, the tying violated § 2, in particular because Microsoft has 
passed from contractual arrangements to technical commingling 
features to render the two parts undividable309. 
As for the third practice (override of browsers other that IE for 
certain applications) the Court found that Microsoft justification 
that this feature limited conflict when the user was attempting to 
use certain sub-features that existed only on IE was plausible; 
since the plaintiff did not rebut this claim, the practice was found 
not to be unlawful. 
As regards the causation element, Microsoft countered that no link 
had been established between the above exclusionary practices 
and the maintenance of Windows monopoly, which had 
originated from both the plaintiff’s superior product and its 
business acumen. The Court stressed that in the case at bar 
causation could be merely inferred from the “reasonable” 
appearance that the ascertained anticompetitive conducts were 
                                                
307 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
308 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
309 Ibidem.  
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capable of making a significant contribution to the maintenance of 
monopoly power310.  
In particular, the Court affirmed “to require that § 2 liability turn 
on a plaintiff’s ability or inability to reconstruct the hypothetical 
marketplace absent a defendant’s anticompetitive conduct would 
only encourage monopolists to take more and earlier 
anticompetitive action. We may infer causation when exclusionary 
conduct is aimed at producers of nascent competitive technologies 
as well as when it is aimed at producers of established substitutes. 
Admittedly, in the former case there is added uncertainty, 
inasmuch as nascent threats are merely potential substitutes. But 
the underlying proof problem is the same - neither plaintiffs nor 
the court can confidently reconstruct a product’s hypothetical 
technological development in a world absent the defendant’s 
exclusionary conduct. To some degree, the defendant is made to 
suffer the uncertain consequences of its own undesirable 
conduct”311.  
Therefore, what mattered in the case was not whether the other 
Internet browsers would have had a deeper impact on the market 
absent Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct, but the fact that the 
Microsoft used its monopoly to quash nascent and potentially 
competitive technologies. Moreover, the fact that in the industry at 
stake rapid technological advance and continuous shifts in 
paradigms take place contributes to sustain that the other 
browsers were a potential threat for the defendant’s monopoly in 
the operating system market.  
With regard to the evaluation of the anticompetitive conduct, the 
Court articulated a balancing test based on the absence of 
sufficient evidence of anticompetitive effects (inefficiencies) or of 
business justifications (efficiencies). First “to be condemned as 
exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must have an “anticompetitive 
effect” That is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby 
harm consumers. In contrast, harm to one or more competitors 
will not suffice”312. 
Second, “the plaintiff, on whom the burden of proof of course 
rests, must demonstrate that the monopolist’s conduct indeed has 
the requisite anticompetitive effect”313. 
Third, “if a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case 
under § 2 by demonstrating anticompetitive effect, then the 
                                                
310 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In order to 
assess the relevance of conduct Court availed itself of the standard of 
“reasonble appearance” of maintenance of monopoly outlined by P.E. Areeda & 
H. Hoverkamp, Antitrust Law – An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their 
Application, Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, New York, vol. 3 § 650 p. 89 et 
seq (2007). Previous edition, at  § 651 p. 78 
311 Ibidem, vol. 3 § 650 p. 89 et seq (2007). Previous edition, at  § 651 p. 78 
312 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
313 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
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monopolist may proffer a ‘procompetitive justification’ for its 
conduct”314. 
Fourth, “if the monopolist’s procompetitive justification stands 
unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the 
procompetitive benefit. In cases arising under § 1 of the Sherman 
Act, the courts routinely apply a similar balancing approach 
under the rubric of the ‘rule of reason’”315. 
The Court considered Microsoft’s technological bundling as in re 
ipsa material to the exclusion of other competitors from the 
market, and as a way of protecting its –legally acquired- 
monopoly rents by means of anticompetitive practices. The naked 
quashing of a new technology in a rapidly evolving market 
sufficed to integrate violation of § 2, absent a real balance of the 
anticompetitive harm and the procompetitive benefit.  
As a scholar has rightly pointed out, the D.C. Circuit condemned 
Microsoft bundling as exclusionary conduct “not because its 
anticompetitive effect outweighed its technological benefit, but 
because it turned out not to have any technological benefit at all”. 
Likewise, the Court disregarded the claim that a superior product 
has sometimes exclusionary effects, “because a social welfare 
calculus was ‘not feasible in any predictable or useful way’ since 
placing a value on any technological benefit is beyond the ability 
of antitrust courts, and weighing any such technological value 
against the anticompetitive harm would involve trading off 
‘incommensurable factors’”316. 
 
8. Monopolization in a nutshell 
At the conclusion of the description of the proscribed conducts, it 
is worth epitomizing the elements of monopolization according to 
judicial enforcement of § 2. A caveat applies to the following 
scheme, the fact that these indicators cannot always account for 
the imperfections of the market, or always reflect the rigor of 
economic analysis of law. In fact, it has been seen that 
monopolization claims can often lead to unpredictable results. 
Having that affirmed, when it comes to defining monopolization 
pursuant to § 2: 
1) Something more than the mere existence of monopoly power is 
required317, generally some exclusionary practices; 
                                                
314 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
315 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
316 E. Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 318 
(2003) 
317 The modern interpretation of monopolization has overcome the structuralist 
approach of Alcoa. 
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2) Monopoly achieved or maintained by means that are not honestly 
industrial violates § 2, even though it is difficult to define these 
categories without a certain degree of approximation; 
3)  The monopoly “solely” attributable to economies of scale, natural 
advantages, patents or legal license, superior skill, or accident is 
lawful; however, even in such occurrences the monopolist may 
engage in unlawful exclusionary practices to maintain its 
monopoly rents; furthermore, once a firm has achieved a 
monopolist position, a smaller degree of causative relationship 
between exclusionary practices and monopoly power might 
suffice to infer violation of § 2 (in particular in the hypothesis of 
monopoly leveraging)318. 
4) The typical defense monopolists have tried to deploy is that their 
monopoly power is attributable to the recognized exceptions 
(above, n.3). 
    
9. Examples of Anticompetitive Conduct 
Unlike the European law of abusive dominance, which is 
characterized by a more in-depth inquiry into single types of 
anticompetitive conducts, American Courts have not translated § 
2 of the Sherman Act into a list of specific prohibited behaviors, 
partly owing to the difficulty of identifying classed of conduct 
unlawful per se319, partly because of the preference for a rule of 
thumb, on the one hand, and the general restrictive interpretation 
of the provision, based on the strive to avoid false positives, on the 
other hand320. Nonetheless, and in general terms, monopolization 
litigation has focused on six general types of anticompetitive 
conducts321:  
1) Exclusionary conduct impairing competition,  
2) Predatory pricing,  
3) Refusal to deal,  
4) Monopoly leveraging322,  
                                                
318 Compare Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 
1979). The distinction between an abusive leverage on a lawfully acquired 
monopoly and a lawful attempt of a firm to expand its business capacity into 
another market is not always readily achievable courts. It has been seen supra 
that Courts tend to rely on a rule of thumb in the ascertainment of the causation 
in claims of monopoly leverage; however, in general terms, the existence of 
monopoly in a market sustains surreptitiously the claim of monopolization of 
the target market more incisively than the proof of the impairment of 
competition in the market at stake. See supra, para. 2, note n. 46, and infra, note 
n. 303, a brief excursion into monopoly leveraging.  
319 See supra, para. 6.3 
320  On the risk of awarding false positives in the American law of 
monopolization, see infra, chapter III, para 12 et seq., and the different policy 
considerations between the two models. 
321 E. Gellehorn & W.E. Kovacic, Antitrust Law and Economics in a nutshell, 4th ed., 
West Publishing Co., St. Paul (Minnesota), p. 99, (1994) 
322 The treatment of monopoly leveraging is closely intertwined with the offense 
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5) Accumulation of patents323,  
                                                                                                                                                            
of monopolization as under § 2. For a detailed excursus of the treatment of 
monopoly leveraging see supra, para. 2, note n. 46 in particular. Over the last 
decade, U.S. antitrust jurisprudence has seen the expansion and contraction of 
this aspect of the monopoly leveraging doctrine. A laxer interpretation of the 
abuse characterized the Berkey Photo decision, in which it was held that “a firm 
violates Section 2 by using its monopoly in one or more markets to gain a 
competitive advantage in another, albeit without an attempt to monopolize the 
second market”. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 263 (2d 
Cir. 1979). Thus, it appears that the structural elements of monopoly leveraging 
are two: the maintenance of a monopoly position in one market, on the one 
hand, a causative link between the monopoly position and the consolidation of 
monopoly power, or, at the very least, a dangerous probability of acquiring 
monopoly power in a target market, on the other hand. The gaining of 
monopoly power in the target market would be unlawful irrespective of the 
actual lessening of competition caused by the exercise of monopoly power 
itself.  
However, in the Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 
256 (2d Cir. 2001) decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the 
offense of monopoly leveraging more strictly: “In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., we stated it would also be a violation of § 2 to use monopoly power 
in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another, even without an 
attempt to monopolize the second market. Since Berkey Photo, we have 
questioned this proposition.... In Spectrum Sports, the Supreme Court stated that 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act “makes the conduct of a single firm unlawful only when 
it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so”. Therefore, the 
requirement of actual proof of monopolization of the target market goes 
beyond “gain[ing] a competitive advantage” as set out in Berkey Photo. 
Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan Et Vir, Dba Sorboturf Enterprises, 506 U.S. 447 
(1993), 113 S.Ct. 884, 122 L.Ed.2d 247 
323 The antitrust implications of accumulation of patents show the interface 
between two separate systems of law, intellectual property law and antitrust 
law, which both widely aim at promoting innovation and economic growth. 
S.D. Anderman (ed.), The Interface between Intellectual Property Rights and 
Competition Policy, Cambridge, (2009), introduction.  The mere accumulation of 
patents is not in itself illegal. Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine 
Research 339 U.S. 827 (1950). However, the unilateral acquisition of patents 
from third parties is subject to the antitrust scrutiny pursuant to § 2 of the 
Sherman Act, in particular to the rule of reason. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. 
v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947). More specifically, acquisitions of 
patents raise the question of monopolization when they are part of a scheme to 
attain monopoly or to attempt to monopolize a market. In that respect, in United 
States v. General Electric Co., 82 F.Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949) Court found the 
defendant had unlawfully attempted to monopolize by following the policy of 
acquiring every patent right in the market in order to exclude market 
participants, with the result that the latter are dissuaded from conducting 
research and development on the product. In Kobe v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 
F.2d 416 (10th Cir.) (1952), the Tenth Circuit held that the accumulation of 
patents without an apparent need by a firm with monopoly power, together 
with other intimidating tactics to force competitors to exit the market, will 
amount to monopolization. It follows that, despite the mere accumulation of 
patents is not in itself an offense, it will be censored under § 2 when such 
practice is pretentious and can thwart the development and evolution of a 
technology. 
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6) Product innovation and thwarting the development of a 
technology324.  
It has been seen above that modern §2 jurisprudence is 
permissive, affording dominant firms broad discretion to develop 
its own strategy concerning pricing, product development and 
promotion325. Courts have not expanded the Grinnell formula that 
the offense of monopoly consists of “possession of monopoly 
power in the relevant market” and “the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen or historical accident”, but have rather narrowed the list 
of anticompetitive behaviors relevant for the application of § 2.  
Within the confines of the present analysis, only pricing abuses 
will be analyzed more in detail. The reason superseding the choice 
to focus on these types of abuse is twofold: first and foremost, not 
only are they relevant to the firm –irrespective of its dominance-, 
but they are also the affect consumers; second, pricing abuses 
convey, more than any other unlawful unilateral behavior, the 
fundamental policy struggle of competition authorities to mediate 
between the risk of discouraging legitimate price competition, and 
the threat to leave unlawful price competition to go unpunished. 
Economics has shown how consumer welfare will grow when 
price discrimination leads to a lower price and, consequently, to a 
redistribution of that wealth, which the firm with market power 
will not subtract to market forces in the form of deadweight loss. 
Aside from that, the treatment of price discrimination shows two 
different approaches of the models under investigation: while the 
American price discrimination is part of a different piece of 
legislation, the Robison-Patman Act, not requiring prior finding of 
monopoly to be applied, the European law of price discrimination 
is recollected in the discipline of abusive dominance, as under 
article 102(c). 
                                                
324 In line with the rationale underlying the treatment of accumulation of 
patents, the thwarting of the development of a new technology justifies 
antitrust intervention pursuant to § 2. That is the case in which a firm forces one 
or more competitors to exit the market by using “dirty tricks” to impede the 
development of one or more nascent technologies. The emblematic case of 
monopolization through thwarting a new technology is United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See supra, para. 7.5. Once again, this 
type of offense shows the interrelation between antitrust law and intellectual 
property law, on the one hand, and the modern attitude towards 
monopolization, which is justified inasmuch as it impedes technological 
advance, on the other hand. 
325 J.D. Hurwitz & W.E. Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging 
Trends, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 63 (1982); W.J. Liebeler, Whiter Predatory Pricing? From 
Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1052 (1986)  
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The treatment of monopoly refusal to deal deserves greater focus 
due to the fact that it is one of the critical areas of divergence 
between the American and European model.  
Finally, the other types of exclusionary conduct, such as 
monopoly leveraging, the accumulation of patents and the 
thwarting of the development of a technology, have been 
scrutinized above as part of the relevant anticompetitive conduct, 
because they display salient features of the interpretation of § 2 in 
general. 
 
9.1 Exclusionary conduct impairing competition 
The judicial understanding of the exclusionary nature of a practice 
may vary. In other words, Courts apply the rule of thumb when 
ascertaining whether a conduct impairs competition. Examples of 
exclusionary conducts may be found in Alcoa326 and in United Shoe 
Machinery327: in the former the Court found it sufficient that the 
defendant exponentially increased its production by virtue of a 
patent, before competitors could enter the field; in the latter, the 
Court found that the “lease only” policy of 10 years minimum and 
the connected assistance policy were exclusionary because it kept 
competitors from effectively operating in the shoe manufacturing 
market.  
Contrary to these two renowned outcomes, the Court has affirmed 
that the expansion of a business into new geographic markets is 
not anticompetitive, since there are no damages stemming from an 
increased competition in a certain area328. In fact, in order to 
support a monopolization claim, injury must be brought by an 
anticompetitive or predatory conduct, not by mere competition, 
and at any rate a conduct can be regarded as exclusionary when it 
                                                
326 See supra the detailed description of the case, para 2.1 
327 See supra, para. 1.4 and 7.5 
328 Pacific Express Inc. v. United Airlines, 959 F.2 814 (9th Cir. 1992). Pacific 
Express was an airline carrier, concentrating on the route between Los Angeles 
and San Francisco. After sustaining losses in this market, Pacific Express 
restructured its business to serve routes connecting western cities with San 
Francisco and Los Angeles. After restructuring its business, the plaintiff entered 
into negotiations with United Airlines in order for the latter to provide it with 
passengers from the western region of the US so that United could concentrate 
on its longer routes. These negotiations did not prove profitable and were 
shortly terminated. No sooner did Pacific Express begin showing a profit on its 
new operations, than United announced that it would expand its service to 
cities in the western region of the US, which were previously served solely by 
Pacific Express. United also increased its service on routes where it had 
previously competed with Pacific Express. By early 1984, Pacific Express was 
unable to continue business operations. Pacific Express sought protection under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on February 4, 1984. 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
114 
 
seeks to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency329. The 
boundary between exclusion and increased competition on the 
one hand, and between expansion into a new market and 
monopoly leveraging, however, remains dim and arduous to 
grasp. 
 
9.2 Predatory pricing 
Broadly speaking, every conduct of the monopolist that 
specifically aims at driving current competitors off competition is 
defined as predatory 330 . Predatory pricing is one particular 
example of predation, which takes place when the monopolist 
temporarily set prices below its competitors’ –and its own- costs in 
order to render competition unsustainable for rivals with 
“shallower pockets” and cause them to leave the market. Once 
rivals are driven off the market, the monopolist would normally 
raise prices above competitive levels seeking to reap the benefits 
of its predation. 
Unlike price cuttings aimed at increasing or maintaining market 
share, predatory pricing seeks to cause the exit of rivals from the 
market, or to ensure that potential rivals would be deterred from 
entering or competing aggressively, for fear of being pushed out 
of the market by strategic, below cost price. 
Antitrust jurisprudence has not offered a solid theoretic 
underpinning to distinguish an unlawful predatory pricing from a 
lawful price reduction resulting from the a change in market 
conditions 331 , owing to a structural lack of a limit to price 
competition in antitrust legislation332.  
However, it is apparent that an excessively low price can bring 
harmful effects to the market: a firm that artificially fixes the price 
for its product below its rivals does not seek to gain more rents 
from the market by virtue of an honestly industrial policy, but 
looks to exclude its rivals through a predatory scheme. That is 
why the practice of predatory pricing falls within the scope of § 2 
of the Sherman Act, being either monopolization or attempt to 
monopolize333.  
                                                
329 Pacific Express Inc. v. United Airlines, 959 F.2 814 (9th Cir. 1992) citing Aspen 
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605, 105 S.Ct. 2847, 
2859, 86 L.Ed.2d 467 (1985). See supra note n. 213 et seq. 
330 L. Cabral, Economia Industriale, Carocci Ed., Rome, p. 328 (2002) 
331 E. Gellehorn & W.E. Kovacic, Antitrust Law and Economics in a nutshell, 4th ed., 
West Publishing Co., St. Paul (Minnesota), p.101, (1994) 
332 P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975).  
333 The Clayton Antitrust Act (1914), as modified by the Robinson-Patman Act  
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970) –or “Anti-Price Discrimination Act” (1936)- prohibits 
predation on the account of the ban of discriminatory prices, which seek to 
fetter competition and to monopolize the market. It is unlawful [to] “sell … at 
unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
115 
 
In line with the reluctance of the Congress to set a threshold under 
which a price can be considered predatory, Courts have never 
outlined a predatory price per se; however, it has provided 
essential guidelines to ascertain violation of § 2 by means of a 
predatory scheme. In particular, the plaintiff is to prove:  
1) The specific intent of the opponent to control the price for a 
product in a market, or to dampen competition on that market; 
2) A predatory/anticompetitive course of conduct of the 
defendant aiming at pursuing the above intent; 
3) A dangerous probability of success;  
4) Damage to competition334.   
Economic analysis of law defines the predatory price as a price 
below marginal cost. Since marginal costs cannot be measured in 
practice, average variable costs can be accounted as a proxy for 
marginal cost. 
 
The Supreme Court seems to adhere to the above principle, in that 
it has maintained that predatory pricing is to be pondered in 
economic terms: the plaintiff has to prove that the defendant has 
set price below cost; the defendant is to have a dangerous 
probability of recouping the losses incurred during the below-cost 
sale335.  In that respect, the Supreme Court distanced itself from 
prior case law on predation, in which on the basis of the 
Robinson-Patman Act predation was inferred from proof of price 
discrimination plus exclusionary intent336.  
In Brooke Group case, the Court rethought of price discrimination 
in light of its proximity with the predation standards as under § 2 
of the Sherman Act. After stating that the Robinson-Patman Act is 
a tool to proscribe a conduct that would be lawful under the 
Sherman Act, it stated: “the essence of the claim under either 
statute is the same: a business rival has priced its products in an 
unfair manner with an object to eliminate or retard competition 
and thereby gain and exercise control over prices in the relevant 
market”337. Therefore, absent the discriminatory intent, the core 
substance of predation is yet a price cut below an appropriate 
measurement of cost with a view to foreclosing competition. 
                                                                                                                                                            
competitor”. For a further inquiry of antidiscrimination law in the US, compare 
infra, para. 11; Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 
F.2d 234 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929).  
334 California Computer Prod., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); 
Williams Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 
(9th Cir. 1981) 
335 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) 
336 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 702 (1967). Compare infra, 
the analysis on the Robinson-Patman Act. 
337 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) 
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However, the dangerous probability of recouping is essential to 
assess liability in predation because, absents the recoupment and 
the consequent transfer of the losses from the firm to the 
consumers, a below-cost price reduction would actually be 
favorable to purchasers and cause an increase in consumer welfare 
aggregate, since the aggregate price for a product that consumers 
are willing to pay would decrease. In other terms, if competition 
in a market is strong enough that the predatory conduct of a firm, 
however much detrimental to its rival(s), is not compensated by 
the recoupment of the losses incurred due to the predatory phase, 
there will be no inference of violation of § 2.  
With respect to scholarship, studies on predation can be 
recollected into four broad categories resembling the four main 
policies underlying antitrust law and, more generally, four 
different accounts of the role of the legislative and judicial 
formants in the regulation of market and services. 
The first and most influential doctrine is based on the analysis of 
costs (cost-based school) and has been drafted by the prominent 
Harvard scholars Areeda and Turner, according to whom the only 
relevant price to affirm violation of § 2 is the price set below 
marginal cost for the short run, which can be recouped in the long 
run by raising prices at a monopolistic level338.  
This formula is based on neoclassical price theory, which holds 
that both in a perfect competition and in a monopoly scenario a 
firm cannot maximize its profits in the short run by pricing below 
its marginal costs. Therefore, a price below marginal costs is 
exclusionary since it will drive competitors off the market, even if 
these are equally efficient as the firm engaging in predation.  
Only the price below marginal cost is presumptively predatory, 
whereas the price reduction that remains above marginal cost is 
not, since this latter situation will only be detrimental to less 
efficient firm, which will be driven off the market in the long run, 
                                                
338 P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 716-718 (1975). With regard to predation, 
the Spirit Airlines case is emblematic. Spirit Airlines was a small air carrier 
operating the Detroit-Philadelphia line at a cost of 49 $ per ticket; the fare of 
Northwestern Airlines –its competitors- for the same route was 170 $. When 
Northwestern lowered its tariff to the same level as Spirit, it increased its traffic 
by 30% and forced Spirit to exit the market. After attaining monopoly on the 
route, Northwestern raised the price to a higher level than its pre-predation 
tariff and, moreover, it reduced the traffic on the route. Spirit brought a suit 
against Northwestern alleging violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act; 
Northwestern countered that its total revenue was higher than its average total 
costs and that the price reduction was not predatory but exclusively beneficial 
to consumers. The Supreme Court found violation of § 2, in that the defendant’s 
strategy was aimed at excluding Spirit from the market, on the grounds of the 
fact that Northwestern had recouped its losses in the post-predation phase. 
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005).  
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but will cause a wealth redistribution and an increase of consumer 
wealth339.  
However, since marginal costs cannot be measured in practice, 
Areeda and Turner propose to use average variable costs (AVG) 
as a proxy for marginal cost, calculated by dividing the overall 
costs of the firm (minus fixed costs) and the number of units 
produced340. A price below average variable cost is presumptively 
predatory and cannot be deemed promotional341: 
In sum, the two scholars conclude: 
1. A price equal or above average total cost is not predatory even it 
does not allow profit maximization in the short run; 
2. A price equal or above short-run marginal cost (SRMC) or above 
average variable cost (AVC) is not predatory even if it does not 
allow profit maximization in the short run; 
3. A price equal or above anticipated average variable cost is 
presumptively lawful; 
4. A price below anticipated average variable cost is presumptively 
unlawful342. 
 
The second theory is the so-called “structural filter school”, which 
applies the cost-based criterion only when market conditions 
indicate that the price established by the monopolist is likely to 
lessen competition. The “filter” to the application of the marginal 
cost as the limit below which a price reduction is considered 
predatory is the existence of barriers to entry in the market: if the 
market is open to the entry of other competitors, it is unlikely that 
the monopolist will be able to recoup the losses occurred during 
the predation phase343. 
 
                                                
339 Criticism to the marginal-cost criterion have been expressed by L. Cabral, 
Economia Industriale, Carocci Ed., Rome, p. 338 (2002), who has argued, for 
example, that a firm might charge a price lower than its marginal costs in the 
short term, only with a view to a faster movement on his learning curve, thus 
without an anticompetitive intent.  
340 The total cost (TC) is the sum of fixed costs (FC) and average costs (VC). 
Average costs (AC) is expressed by the relationship between fixed costs and 
output (q). Since TC/q = FC/q + VC/q, then AC = AFC + AVC, and AVC = AC 
– AFC. 
341 P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 730 (1975). Parallel to that, Courts have 
deemed the charging of a price lower than the firm’s average variable cost as 
presumptively predatory. California Computer Products v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2nd 
727 (9th Cir. 1979). 
342 P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 732-35 (1975). 
343 P.L. Joskow & A.K. Klevorich, A Framework for Analizying Predatory Pricing 
Policy, 89 Yale L.J. 213 (1979); K.G. Elzinga & A. Mills, Testing for Predation: is 
Recoupment Feasible?, 34 Antitrust Bull. 869 (1989) 
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The third theory was elaborated by the “no rule” school, which 
holds that predation is such an unlikely occurrence that should be 
irrelevant to antitrust law. The resistance of the predated firm, the 
possibilities for other firms to enter the market, together with the 
expansion of other existing firms will end up defusing the 
predatory strategies of the firm seeking to monopolize. An 
antitrust intervention would lead to a price freeze, which would in 
turn deprive consumers of the benefits of price competition344. 
The fourth and last doctrine is was elaborated by the renowned 
“game theoretic school”, which has outlined the issue of predatory 
pricing in strategic terms, rejecting the marginal-cost analysis as 
the threshold for assessing predation, in light of the static nature 
of the Areeda-Turner model345. In fact, the analsys of predation in 
terms of restriction from an output/price level (qp) to a lower 
level (q1p1) on the demand curve (Δ) does not account of those 
contingent strategies of the firm, aiming at discouraging the entry 
of new rivals346. 
Prior to the entry of the new firm, the monopolist will fix the price 
at the level at which the marginal revenue equals the marginal 
cost of the last unit produced. Both the output and the price are 
influenced by the entry of new firms, which will act on the market 
assuming that the incumbent monopolist firm will behave in the 
most anticompetitive manner to their detriment. In particular, 
entrant firms will expect that the monopolist will reduce price 
without increasing its output. 
On the other hand, entrant firms will seek to satisfy the remainder 
of demand, namely the one left unsatisfied by the monopolist. 
The main difference of the game-theoretic approach compared to 
the other static-economic doctrines is that it is relational and 
behavioral: the static change in marginal cost is analyzed together 
with the strategy of the monopolist, aimed at discouraging the 
entry of new firms, which will give rise to lawful and unlawful 
behaviors. 
The static-economic assumption of the Areeda-Turner formula is 
that efficiency is achieved when price equals marginal cost, since 
net welfare is maximized where marginal social benefits equal 
marginal social costs. Every shift below marginal cost would 
render the system inefficient, because it would inevitably drive 
                                                
344 F.H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U.Chi. L. Rev., 
263 (1981)  
345 Criticism to the game theoretic approach can be found in G. Stigler, The 
Organization of Industry, University of Chicago Press, 21 (1968), according to 
whom the firm’s decision of entering a market, or of exiting it, depends upon 
the dominant firm’s behavior or, in other terms, on the remainder of demand 
that can be satisfied after a price reduction of the dominant firm.  
346 R. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2001, 
184-196. The author focuses on the relevance of the monopolist’s predatory 
intent in predation claims. 
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competitors off the market and, in the long run, it would enable 
the dominat firm to raise prices to the detriment of consumer 
welfare347. The Areeda-Turner model, however, does not account 
of the difference among an ongoing price reduction, a temporary 
reduction imposed by the market conditions and a strategic 
reduction aimed at discouraging rivals’ entry. 
Advocates of the game theoretic method affirm the legitimacy of a 
strategic and temporary predatory price cut, provided that it only 
seeks to deter the entry of new firms, or that it is a mere signal to 
the predated firm to either exit the market or to restrict its 
output348. In particular, price-cost tests overlook a strategic price 
cut, whose aim is merely warning prospective entrants that entry 
is unattractive. Consequently, rules on predation should weigh 
the likelihood of new entrants to enter the market. In light of that, 
three rules would apply: 
1) Output restriction rule - Q ≤ Q: where Q is the output placed on 
the market by the dominant firm prior to the entry of new firms 
and Q is the post-entry output level.  After the entry of the new 
firm, the dominant firm is barred from increasing its output (by 
lowering the price) to a higher level than the pre-entry one, 
because the economic disadvantage that the new entrant would 
suffer from would prevent the latter from accruing experience and 
viability on the market349. Therefore, this rule substantially allows 
the dominant firm to operate at Q = Q, upon condition that the 
resulting price exceed average variable costs when output is held 
unchanged. 
2) Marginal Cost Rule - P ≥ SRMC, where P is the price and SRMC is 
the short run marginal cost, by virtue of which the dominant firm 
can lawfully expand its output to respond to an entry, to the 
extent that the price is not lower than the short run marginal cost, 
at which level it would be predatory350. 
3) Average Cost Rule - P ≥ SRAC, where P is the short run average 
cost, by virtue of which a price cut of the dominant firm would be 
lawful as long as it does not go below short run average cost351. 
                                                
347 P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 711 (1975) 
348 O.E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 
284 (1977) 
349 O.E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 
296 (1977). The extent of the ban should span between 12 and 18 months, 
because such is the proper time length to allow the entrant firm to carry out its 
own market evaluations and find its own market dimension.  
350 O.E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 
296 (1977). The author recalls the marginal cost threshold as the limit below 
which the firm cannot lower its price, but assumes that marginal costs are 
variable.  
351 O.E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 
296 (1977) 
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In particular, four situations can be observed: 
A. Short run: if the dominant firm reduces or maintain the output 
unchanged despite the likelihood of new entries, its conduct will 
not be deemed predatory, provided that its price is higher than 
average variable cost. 
B. Long run: price established to recoup the expenses sustained over 
a production cycle –being either for the modernization of the plant 
or for whichever emerging cost- is not considered as predatory. 
This hypothesis is a corollary of the first one and tolerates an 
output increase upon condition that the price lets the firm recoup 
the costs sustained. 
C. Short run: the dominant firm that increases its output by reducing 
price to deter new prospective entrants is deemed to engage in a 
predatory conduct, even though the market price is higher than its 
average variable cost; 
D. Long run: price is deemed predatory if the firm’s turnover does 
not cover the expenses sustained in the long run. 
 
 
352 
 
                                                
352 Source O.E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 
Yale L.J. 300 (1977) 
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The above analysis affirmed can be explained by referring to the 
scheme. The curve D is the industry demand curve and the curve 
LRAC is the long run average cost curve, which shows the 
relationship between average cost and quantity of output over the 
long run, in which the firm for instance can vary its plant size. The 
curve D’ is the residual demand curve, which is open to 
prospective entrants and shows the amount of demand remaining 
when the dominant firm leaves its output unchanged. The curve 
SRMC shows the short run marginal cost. The curve SRAC shows 
the short run average cost. 
1) Sub Q ≤ Q: Considering Q0 as the dominant firm’s pre entry level 
of output, the firm may not supply more than Q0 in the post-entry 
period (12-18 months): because the dominant firm will choose 
investment such that the prospective will profit zero on the 
residual demand curve, the dominant firm will stop at Q0, so that 
D’ is tangent and never exceeds in value the LRAC curve. T is the 
point at which the prospective entrant earns zero profits. If the 
dominant firm chose to supply a lower output than Q0 in the pre-
entry period, the D’ curve would be shifted to the right –since 
more demand would be left unsatisfied-, and the prospective 
entrant could earn positive profits under the output restriction 
rule. If the monopolist chose to place Q0 at P0, the entrant could 
only hope to break even at T. Any entry at below or above T will 
not be able to cover costs, because the residual demand lies below 
LRAC at all points other than T. 
2) Sub P ≥ SRMC: under this rule the monopolist is permitted to 
respond to an entry by increasing its output so long as the price 
remains above short run marginal cost. In the pre-entry period, 
the monopolist will choose the output that maximizes his profits; 
thus, he will fix price at Q2P2, where the marginal revenue equals 
the short run marginal cost. In response to an entry, the 
monopolist will react by increasing the output until the curve 
reaches the output Q0, where the entrant’s PT will at least allow 
him not to break even on its demand curve D’ (PTQ0 is the point on 
the SRMC curve at which the monopolist can fix its price and the 
entrant will not suffer a loss because its average costs will equal its 
price T). 
3) Sub P ≥ SRAC: under this rule, similarly the optimum price for the 
dominant firm is the one at which the short run marginal cost 
curve passes through the point PTQ0, where the prospective 
entrant will break even. Optimum output is inevitably smaller 
than QM. Accordingly, the output at which the dominant firm’s 
short run marginal cost is equal to the industry marginal revenue 
will be less than Q2. Pre-entry price will thus exceed P2. 
 
Despite the lack of a clear standard for predation, one aspect 
recurring in all the above explanations of predation is the sacrifice 
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of today’s profits for tomorrow’s gains. Once the competitor(s) is 
eliminated, the dominant firm will recoup the losses incurred 
throughout the price-cut phase by raising prices at monopoly level 
to make good those losses353.  
Without the possibility of recouping, the business strategy of the 
firm is not profit maximizing but, conversely, is beneficial to 
consumers, because the predator will inflict losses onto himself 
only354. There is no consensus, however, as to the factors that 
should be taken into account to verify the possibility of 
recoupment. Scholarship essentially suggests two tests to 
distinguish predatory discounts from pro-competitive strategies: 
1) The structural recoupment test seeks to infer the possibility of 
recoupment from the structural factors of the market, such as high 
barriers to entry, the excess capacity of the dominant firm, its 
market position vis-à-vis the competitor, and the increase of 
market shares during the predation phase355. 
2) The strict recoupment test seeks to infer predation from an 
economic quantification of losses and estimated post-predation 
gains. Only if this information is available, and economic calculus 
shows that the predator can recoup all the money lost during 
predation, should then he be held liable for the price-cutting 
strategy356. Post predation gains can be quantified in the form of 
prices established after the market has been jacked up. 
 
Modern doctrine has led courts to reformulate standards for 
dominant firms pricing strategies according to three trends.  
First and foremost, the majority of the Courts accepted the tenets 
of the cost-based school, which has explained predation in terms 
of below-cost pricing and dangerous probability of recoupment of 
the losses occurred during the below-cost phase357. The Areeda-
Turner doctrine firstly appeared in their seminal article of 1975358, 
and has exerted a significant appeal on Courts ever since, 
inducing them to create a presumption that pricing below average 
variable cost is unlawful and to require the defendant to justify 
such pricing –by proving that the below-cost pricing was 
                                                
353 Compare H. Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and 
its Practice, 3rd ed., St. Paul, (2005), p. 350. The author analytically divides 
predation schemes in two phases: the predation period in which the predator 
incurs losses, and the post-predation period, in which the predator recovers its 
losses by monopoly prices. 
354 K.G. Elzinga & D.E. Mills, Testing for Predation: is Recoupment Feasible, 34 
Antitrust Bulletin 874, (1989)  
355 P.L. Joskow & A.K. Klevorick, A framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing 
Policy, 89 Yale Law Journal 245 et seq, (1979) 
356 K.G. Elzinga & D.E. Mills, Testing for Predation: is Recoupment Feasible, 34 
Antitrust Bulletin 874, (1989) 
357 V. supra, para. 9.2, the cost-based school 
358 V. supra, para. 9.2, the cost-based school 
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promotional. Areeda and Turner firstly addressed the uncertainty 
surrounding predation claims based on the lack of a cost-based 
test, together with and the risks of creating false positives by 
sanctioning a pro-competitive conduct as anticompetitive.   
Furthermore, Courts have ignored other factors whereby 
predation can be inferred, and have applied a rebuttable 
presumption of legality for prices at or above average variable 
cost and a categorical presumption of legality for prices above 
average total cost. The assessment of the lawfulness of a price at or 
above average variable cost, but below average total cost depends 
on the evaluation of whether the existence of entry barriers would 
permit the dominant firm to charge monopoly prices once the 
plaintiff is driven off competition359. 
The second trend has been to focus on the structural prerequisites 
for successful predation. In the renowned Matsushita case, the 
Supreme Court has defined predation not only in light of the 
price/cost relationship, but also in light of other factors such as 
the profitability of predation for the defendant360. The plaintiffs, 
two American manufacturers of electrical appliances, contested 
that the defendants, a group of 21 Japanese producers or sellers of 
televisions sets, had conspired for over 20 years to charge 
predatorily low prices on the U.S. market for their products361, 
with a view to eliminating American firms. Furthermore, the 
defendants had allegedly used monopoly profits earned in Japan 
to subsidize below-cost pricing in the U.S.  
Notwithstanding the allegations contained evidence of the 
predatory conspiracy to the detriment of the defendants, the Court 
concluded that predation could not be directly proved since a 
“predatory pricing conspiracies are by nature speculative”, on the 
account that “they require the conspirators to sustain substantial 
losses in order to recover uncertain gains”362. 
 According to the Court two aspects of the allegations were highly 
unlikely: on the one hand, the predatory conspiracy had allegedly 
begun twenty years prior to the litigation, which implied that the 
Japanese cartel had stayed in place for over twenty years; on the 
other hand, predatory pricing schemes are “rarely tried and even 
more rarely successful”, and a false positive in adjudicating a 
predatory claim would result in an injury to the core interest 
                                                
359 W.L. Liebeler, Whiter Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 
61 Notre Dame L.Rev., 1055 (1986). Compare P. Areeda & D.F Turner, Antitrust 
Law: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Application, Little, Brown and Co., 
Boston, vol. 3 § 711 p. 151 (1978). 
360 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).  
361 In the plaintiff’s allegations, the relevant market encompassed the whole 
industry of electronic appliances for comsumers; the Court narrowed down the 
relevant market to the market for TV of the United States.  
362 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 89 L.Ed.2d 588 (1986). The 
Court’s reasoning echoes the no-rule school. See supra,  
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protected by the Sherman Act, namely competition363.  
In the absence of a perfect test to distinguish between a predatory 
price and a significantly low price –yet vigorously competitive-, 
legal standards should take into account the fact that predatory 
schemes are generally unlikely to occur, and the occurrence that a 
lawful price can erroneously be judged as predatory364. 
Furthermore, the Court argued that albeit the defendants had 
raised prices at monopoly level once the plaintiffs had exited the 
market, the economic loss of the predators had been so consistent 
that post-predation price raise would allow the recoupment. The 
monopolistic pricing, together with the absence of entry barriers, 
was an incentive for new entries, because “without barriers to 
entry it would presumably be impossible to maintain supra-
competitive prices for an extended time”365 as monopoly pricing 
may breed quick entry by new competitors eager to share in the 
excess profits. For these reasons the Supreme Court adjudicated 
the case in favor of the defendants.  
Through Matsushita, the Supreme Court has underscored the 
principle that absent direct evidence of a predatory intent, plaintiff 
is to prove that not only was the defendant’s price below a certain 
cost relevant for the market at stake, but also that the defendant 
had a reasonable expectation to recoup the predation losses and to 
“harvest some additional gain” 366 , on top of the dangerous 
probability of monopolizing the market. Conversely, when there 
is no direct evidence “of a plausible motive to engage in predatory 
pricing”, plaintiff is to prove equally plausible explanations, along 
the lines that the defendant’s conduct would not merely generate 
losses without corresponding gains367. 
Aside from the above affirmed, the Court has also argued that in 
predation cases the issue must make economic sense, and can be 
explained by means of formal economic models368. In that respect, 
                                                
363 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 89 L.Ed.2d 601 (1986) 
364  Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 89 L.Ed.2d 589 (1986) 
“predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried and even more rarely successful”. 
Compara K. N. Hylton & M.J. Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-
Theoretic Approach, 69 Antitrust L.J. 469 (2001) 
365 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 89 L.Ed.2d 604 (1986). In this 
passage, the Court appears to invoke the structural filter tenet that a predatory 
scheme is to be evaluated together with the ease of entry in the market. See 
supra. 
366 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 89 L.Ed.2d 602 (1986). The 
Courts continues “Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly will 
materialize, and that it can be sustained for a significant period of time, ‘[t]he 
predator must make a substantial investment with no assurance that it will pay 
off’”. F.H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies,, 48 U.Chi.L.Rev. 
263, 268 (1981). 
367 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 89 L.Ed.2d 609-611 (1986) 
368  Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 89 L.Ed.2d 597 (1986) 
Compare the Areeda-Turner criterion, supra. 
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predation must be economically profitable for the defendant; thus, 
the Court must evaluate the profits generated by the latter, which 
would account of costs, units sold and prices at which the product 
is sold. Such assessments are arduous to carry out and are likely to 
be based on some static postulates on both costs and demand that 
vary in accordance with the economic model taken as a reference. 
Conversely, “If the claim is one that simply makes no economic 
sense - respondents must come forward with more persuasive 
evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be 
necessary”369. All things considered, the Court does not indicate a 
criterion for the assessment of the predatory cost, nor does it 
indicate the economic model to adopt in the evaluation of the 
predatory nature of the price, nor does it provide any guidelines 
as to evaluate the possibility of recoupment of the predation 
losses. In spite of that, as someone has argued, Matshushita 
represents the rise of economic rigor in antitrust370. 
 
The third judicial trend on predation is manifest in Brooke Group371, 
which is the leading case on modern predation. The action was 
brought by a generic producer of cigarettes against a producer 
active in both markets for generic and branded cigarettes. The 
plaintiff complained that the defendant Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp had engaged in below-cost predation for 12-18 
months, entailing pricing below average variable cost, not with 
the intent of driving the former off the market, but to lead it to 
subdue its sale generic cigarettes, therefore reducing the gap 
between generic and branded cigarettes. The market structure in 
the case at bar was oligopolistic, and the defendant’s market share 
                                                
369 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 89 L.Ed.2d 597 (1986) 
370 R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books, Inc. 
Publishers, New York, p. 433 (1993). At the same time, aside from the predation 
hypothesis, the author argues that, in the realm of anticompetitive tying 
arrangements claims, the economic sophistication for antitrust has probably 
stopped with the 1992 Kodak decision, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 112 S. Ct. 2072, 119 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1992). By accepting 
the plaintiff ISOs’ claim that through tying the sale of parts and services for its 
cameras to the use of its service, Kodak had monopolized the market for its 
own parts and services, the Court assumed that the defendant had monopoly 
power over this market. At the same time, the Court accepted that Kodak had 
no power in the market in which it sold its machines, but assumed that thanks 
to its monopoly in the parts and services, Kodak could raise the price for these 
without harming the sale of its equipment.  Even if Kodak did not attempt to 
gain monopoly profits on parts and services, the Court held that economic 
theory was not adequate to overcome allegations of fact of the contrary, and 
that the raise of the price for parts and services was inevitably above 
competitive level. The author counters that it is impossible to raise the price for 
parts and services without raising the price for Kodak’s machines. Thus, the 
decision would make no economic sense. 
371 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) 
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was only over 10%. 
The Supreme Court held that predatory claims are to be judged by 
means of the same two-element test as all the other claims brought 
under §2 of the Sherman Act. In particular, in order to hold a firm 
liable for charging low prices, the plaintiff is to prove that: 
1) the defendant charged a price “below an appropriate measure of 
its rival’s costs”372. 
2) the defendant had a “dangerous probability” of recouping its 
investment in below cost pricing373. 
With regard to the measure of cost, albeit in an obiter dictum, the 
Supreme Court has affirmed that prices above the appropriate 
measure of average variable costs are considered legal per se374.   
With regard to the probability of recoupment, determining the 
degree of likelihood of recoupment in the post-predation phase 
implies the ascertainment of the ability of the predator to set supra-
competitive post-predation prices to recover the losses sustained 
during predation, “including the time value of the money invested 
in it”375. The recoupment threshold is constructed in a strict and 
stringent way, in order to avoid false overcompensation of 
plaintiffs, who resort to antitrust law to chill competition on the 
market. In all, predation occurs when evidence sufficiently shows 
that the predator is able to raise prices to monopoly level to make 
up for the predation losses. 
More specifically, the recoupment test is structured in a two-
pronged manner:  
1) First, “below cost pricing must be capable of producing the 
intended effects on the firm’s rivals, whether driving them from 
the market or causing them to raise prices to supra-competitive 
levels”376;  
2) Second, it must be shown that “the predatory scheme alleged 
would cause a raise in price above a competitive level that would 
be sufficient to compensate for the amounts expended on the 
predations, including the time value of the money invested in 
it”377. This evaluation will rely on “an estimate of the cost of the 
alleged predation and the close analysis of both the scheme 
alleged by the plaintiff and the structure and conditions of the 
                                                
372 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) 
373 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) 
374 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) 
375 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) 
376 Ibidem 
377 Ibidem 
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relevant market”378.  
If either element of the recoupment cannot be demonstrated, the 
claim will fail. Other factors, such as new entry, the ability to 
expand capacity and whether the market is diffuse will determine 
the extent to what recoupment is possible379 . Ultimately, the 
essence of recoupment is proving that the structure and the 
conditions of the relevant market would enable the alleged 
predator to engage in “sustained supra-competitive pricing” once 
the predated firm is driven off the market380. 
The ability to recoup losses is proof of the achieved monopoly 
power of the dominant firm over an industry. If the firm cannot 
recoup the losses of below-cost pricing the predation scheme will 
only result in a temporary price reduction of the product at issue, 
which would enhance consumer welfare and benefit society.  
Further and most importantly, the Court justifies the addition of 
the recoupment requirement on the basis that the Congress has 
passed antitrust laws “to protect competition, not competitors”381. 
Thus, the mere fact that a predatory scheme will inflict losses to 
the predated firm does not signify violation of § 2; without the 
ability to recoup there is no harm to competition, therefore there is 
no violation of antitrust law.  
The issue raised in Brooke Group is whether the expectation of 
recoupment suffices to infer proof of predation, or whether actual 
proof of recoupment is needed. It appears that defendant shows 
that predation “was likely to have succeeded” –aside from an actual 
proof of success. Therefore, evidence of the probable success of 
predation would flow in re ipsa into the proof of the occurred 
predation, since the very fact that defendants had lowered their 
price to chill competition on the market would convey for it the 
probability of success of such illegitimate conduct. 
The procedural peculiarity of the case is that the Supreme Court 
has allowed judges to dismiss predation claims as a matter of law 
for lack of the likelihood of recoupment. The Supreme Court has 
strengthened the power of court to review and assess the complex 
economic evidence presented on the recoupment issue against the 
market realities, and to dismiss the claim if they do not find 
evidence sufficient to establish the high recoupment threshold. In 
the wake of this outcome, most predation claims are nowadays 
dismissed as a matter of law382.  
                                                
378 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) 
379 Ibidem 
380 Ibidem 
381 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993), quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)) (emphasis in original). 
382 R.W. Intern, Corp v. Welch Food, Inc., 13 F.3d 478 (1st Cir. 1994); Rebel Oil Co. 
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995); AD/SAT, Div. of Skylight, 
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Moreover, in Brooke Group the Matsushita rule was applied in the 
hypothesis in which there is no proof of a concrete predation 
scheme. In fact, the Supreme Court held “when the realities of the 
market and the record facts indicate that it has occurred and was 
likely to have succeeded, theory will not stand in the way of 
liability”, that is when market reality shows that predation took 
place with a probability of success, namely the recoupment of the 
losses suffered, the “economic sense” test will not impede the 
finding of liability383.  
Another element that the Court has underscored in terms of 
evidence of the probability of success of the predatory scheme is 
the capability of the defendants to raise prices above competitive 
level. Ultimately, the “economic sense” recalled in Matsushita is a 
tool to define predatory standards, but recesses when 
documentary evidence of the likelihood of recoupment is 
provided. 
 
9.2.1 Legal and economic thinking of predation – the above-the-
cost pricing and recoupment requirements  
Assessing whether pricing above average variable cost can be 
tantamount to predation is a matter of dispute among legal and 
economic antitrust scholars. On the one hand, leading scholars 
agree that all pricing above average variable cost should be 
presumed lawful, based on the assumption that firms that are 
equally or more efficient than the monopolist are able to compete 
against above average variable cost, and that there is no net 
welfare loss if less efficient firms are driven off competition.  
According to Posner, a “seller may want to destroy a competitor, 
but if the only method used is underselling him by virtue of 
having lower costs, there is no rational antitrust objection to the 
seller’s conduct”384. Areeda and Turner, analogously, maintain 
that “the low price at or above average costs is competition on the 
merits and exclude only less efficient rivals”385. 
On the other hand, some economists affirm that even an above 
average cost pricing policy can be anticompetitive, where the 
                                                                                                                                                            
Inc. v Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216 (2d Cir. 1999); Stearns Airport Equipment 
Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 58 (5th Cir. 1999); Taylor Pub Co. v Jostens, Inc., 216 
F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1116 (10th Cir. 
2003) 
383 “When the realities of the market and the record facts indicate that it has 
occurred and was likely to have succeeded, theory will not stand in the way of 
liability”. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 
209, 229, 113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) 
384 R. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2001, 
p.188 
385 P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 706 (1975) 
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monopolist prices above its own costs, but below those of the rival 
that he seeks to exclude386. Particularly in the U.S. air transport 
sector, in response to new entry, the monopolist carrier lowered 
prices by adding capacity, yet remaining above cost, and 
increased prices back to monopoly (pre-entry) levels when the 
entrant had been eliminated. Therefore, the monopolist’s costs 
may not provide a sound guidance as to investigate the predatory 
nature of certain courses of action of the monopolist: 
Above cost predation is possible if rivals have higher costs than 
the incumbent monopoly (where predatory pricing means low 
prices that hurt consumers by limiting competition). After all, a 
firm rarely achieves a monopoly without one or more advantages. 
Any such firm probably has gone down the cost learning curve 
and produces more efficiently than a newcomer. The industry 
may enjoy increasing returns to scale or scope. The firm may 
simply have a first-mover advantage and be able to hide behind 
entry barriers from start-up costs. It may have figured out how to 
make a superior quality product, enjoy demand-side network 
externalities, or simply have a familiar and trustworthy brand…. 
Some advantage or combination of advantages gives the firm 
monopoly power in the first place. The very advantages that give 
a firm monopoly power can allow it to drive out rivals without 
pricing below cost387. 
In quantitative terms, it is also possible to explain how above-cost 
pricing might lead to undesirable exclusion. George Hay posits 
the following simple example388. A new entrant has costs (MCe) 
that are below the price (Pm) charged by the dominant company 
but greater that the dominant firm’s costs (MCm). Upon entry, the 
dominant firm lowers its price to Pc, the entrant’s break-even point. 
Under the Areeda and Turner model, the dominant company can 
still lower its price further below Pc as long as it does not go below 
its own costs. The entrant is therefore making a loss and exits the 
market only for the price to return to the pre-entry monopoly level 
Pm. 
                                                
386 A.S. Edlin, Stopping Above Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 Yale L.J. 941 (2002) 
387 A.S. Edlin, Stopping Above Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 Yale L.J. 963 (2002) 
388 G.A. Hay, A Confused Lawyer’s Guide to the Predatory Pricing Literature, in 
Journal of Reprints for Antitrust Law and Economics, Vol. XVIII, n. 2, p. 155-203 
(1988) 
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 Edlin purports the idea that the dominant firm should be 
prevented from responding with substantial price cuts or product 
enhancements until the entrant becomes “viable”389. 
 
With regard to the element of recoupment, the debate as to 
whether it shall be part of the law of predation was initiated by 
Areeda and Turner, who argued that predation has no sense 
unless the predator can recoup the losses in the post-predation 
phase390.  
Chicago scholars adhered to this line of thought and further 
argued that predation is never or hardly successful, since 
competition often shrinks the chances of the predator to reap the 
benefits of his predation strategy. Thus, many Chicagoans argued 
in favor of applying the strict recoupment test391, or to expunge the 
offense of predation from antitrust law392. 
                                                
389 A.S. Edlin, Stopping Above Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 Yale L.J. 941 (2002) 
390 P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 698 (1975) 
391 See supra, Elzinga & A. Mills, Testing for Predation: is Recoupment Feasible?, 34 
Antitrust Bull. 869 (1989), R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with 
Itself, Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, New York, p.145 (1993) 
392 F.H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U.Chi. L. Rev., 
337 (1981) 
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This skeptical view influenced the Supreme Court393, which has 
traditionally dreaded the risk of creating false positives394, due to 
nature of the enforcement system -based on private plaintiffs- and 
the possibility of awarding treble damages. Determining whether 
recoupment is likely to occur requires proving strictly that the 
predator will be able to raise prices to recover the losses, 
“including the time value of the money invested in it”395. In fact, if 
the standards for predation liability were too low, “antitrust suits 
would become a tool for keeping prices high”396. 
9.3 Refusal to deal 
In antitrust legislation -and generally in Common Law- there is no 
general provision requiring that a company deal with its 
competitors. However, under certain circumstances there are 
some exceptions to the principle of freedom of business for a firm 
with market power397.  
Many cases have regarded the issue of the obligation of a 
monopolist to consent its competitor to access its products or 
services398; however, case law has not set forth a general standard 
to define the monopolist’s obligation to do business with a 
competitor, to the extent that a court has designated the issue of 
“refusal to deal” as among “the most unsettled and vexatious in 
the antitrust field”399.  
One of the first cases reproaching the refusal to deal under § 2 is 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co.400: the plaintiff 
had sought to integrate forward into the distribution of 
photographic supplies by refusing to sell at wholesale to the 
defendant, which had previously refused to be bought by Kodak. 
The Supreme Court inferred violation of § 2 from Kodak’s refusal 
to deal, since the refusal “was in pursuance of a purpose to 
monopolize”401. Kodak –as the Court found- did not decline to do 
business with Southern Photo based on innocent motives, but 
based on the intent to perpetuate a monopoly. The “intent test”402 
was applied to ascertain whether the refusal helped the 
                                                
393 See supra, Matshushita 
394 In other terms, the judicial prohibition of legitimate competition. 
395 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) 
396 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993). Opinion of Justice Kennedy. 
397  See Guidelines of the Federal Trade Commission, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/refusal_to_deal.shtm In United States v. 
Colgate and Co. 
398 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985). 
See supra, para. 7.3. 
399 Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1979) 
400 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) 
401 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 375 (1927) 
402 The “intent test” was firstly used in United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 
300, 307, 39 S. Ct. 465, 468, 63 L. Ed. 992 (1919). See supra, para. 7.1
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monopolist maintain its monopoly, or allowed the monopolist to 
use its monopoly in one market to attempt to monopolize another 
market.   
Refusals to deal have not been analyzed with a view to 
determining the degree of market power of the monopolist, but 
with a view to establishing whether the firm has utilized its 
market power, by means of refusing to deal with a competitor, to 
drive the latter off the market or to gain a monopoly position in 
another chain of distribution.  
As a matter of fact, Kodak had already achieved a monopoly 
position in the photographic supply market, and by refusing to 
deal it had tried to expand its dominance in the supply wholesale 
segment. Refusals, in other terms, are not examined to assess the 
extent of dominance of a firm on a market; they are instrumental 
to the market power and are interpreted as ways to exploit market 
power to hold a position that has already been gained, or to gain a 
dominant position in another chain of the market. In that respect, 
refusals to deal have been treated by Courts in a similar way to 
monopoly leveraging403.  
Another aspect of the refusal to deal is connected to the “essential 
facility” doctrine. The term “essential facilities doctrine”404 was 
firstly used in Hecht v Pro-Football, but the contours of the doctrine 
have been further outlined in MCI v. AT&T405. The hypothesis at 
stake is when a company possesses exclusive access to a facility 
that is essential to competition and that could be feasibly shared: 
in that case, the company may be required to provide access to 
that facility on a reasonable, non-discriminatory basis – even to its 
competitors. The Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit set forth 
a four-prong to establish whether the monopolist is under the 
obligation of sharing the essential facility.  
First, the departing point is to assess whether or not the firm that 
controls the facility is a monopolist in the relevant market.  
Second, the competitor must be unable to practically or reasonably 
duplicate the facility. Aside from the indispensable nature of the 
facility, it suffices that duplication of the facility would be 
economically infeasible and that “denial of its use inflicts a severe 
handicap on potential market entrants”406. The Court interpreted 
the element of essentiality by disregarding the circumstance for 
which, but for accessing the facility in question, the rival could not 
perform his activity, and focused on the economic unfeasibility of 
replicating the facility, and on the lack of a viable alternative for 
the plaintiff. Moreover, the facility in question must be truly 
                                                
403 See infra, next paragraph. 
404 Hecht v Pro-Football Inc., 570 F.2d. 992-93 (1977) 
405 MCI Communication Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983) 
406 Hecht v Pro-Football Inc., 570 F.2d. 993 (1977) 
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essential to competition, to the extent that denial to access would 
concretely endanger the competitive process;  
Third, there must be a concrete denial to a competitor to use the 
facility.  
Fourth, the provision of the facility must be feasible. As 
mentioned earlier, the general rule is that even a monopolist is 
free to decide with whom to deal, and this element of the MCI test 
proves that antitrust law does not entail that the essential facility 
must be shared if such sharing would be impractical or would 
weaken the ability of the monopolist to serve its customers 
satisfactorily, and would negatively affect its performance in the 
market. 
The leading case on the treatment of essential facilities is Aspen, in 
which the Supreme Court rephrased the fourth element “essential 
facility” doctrine, adding that the defendant must have a “valid 
business justification” for denying access to the facility, or for 
conditioning of the access to terms that are manifestly onerous for 
the plaintiff407.  
Thus drafted, the essential facility doctrine represent an exception 
to the Colgate rule, under which “in the absence of any purpose to 
create or maintain a monopoly (the intent test), the [Sherman] Act 
does not restrict the long-recognized right of trader or 
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to 
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom 
he will deal”408, as long as the exercise of monopoly power is not 
aimed at dampening competition, at obtaining an anticompetitive 
advantage, or eliminating a competitor. 
 
The valid business justification becomes fundamental in the 
evaluation of the monopolist’s conduct: the Court appears to have 
endorsed the claim of the “Chicago School” doctrine, that the 
main goal of antitrust action is to promote economic efficiency 
with a view to maximizing consumer satisfaction409. In other terms, 
the equation of the valid business justifications with the efficiency 
concerns, brought the Court to conclude that the defendant’s 
sacrifice of short-run benefits and consumer good will in exchange 
for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival was illicit. In 
considering the issue of the consumer good will, the Court relied 
on direct evidence of consumer unhappiness410.  
                                                
407 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 S. Ct. 2851 (1985) 
408 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307, 39 S. Ct. 465, 468, 63 L. Ed. 
992 (1919). See supra, para. 7.1 
409 J.A. Bouknight, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing – The Conduct 
Standard under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 6 Energy Law Journal, p. 275 (1985)  
410 “The question whether Ski Co.’s conduct may properly be characterized as 
exclusionary cannot be answered by simply considering its effect on Highlands. 
In addition, it is relevant to consider its impact on consumers and whether it 
has impaired competition in an unnecessarily restrictive way. If a firm has been 
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The way of policing § 2 in Aspen with regard to the “essential 
facility” doctrine sheds new light on the link between antitrust 
and economic theory: the monopolist should be encouraged to 
expand its output and compete for every sale, to the extent that his 
practices can be recollected in the merits of competition, and do 
not interfere in an unnecessary way with the efforts of other rivals 
to compete on the merits. The assessment of the necessary nature 
of the refusal in a perspective of competition on the merits is left 
up to the Courts, which, as it has been observed, have found 
violations of § 2 only in exceptional circumstances, namely when 
the firm’s conduct would result in an evident decrease of 
consumer welfare. 
When competition has the opposite result of hampering economic 
efficiency to the detriment of consumers, enforcement agencies 
will infer violation of § 2. Once again, the Supreme Court rejects 
the Alcoa approach, that a monopoly is lawful only when it is 
“thrust upon” a passive firm and, in general, the equation 
“bigness – badness” put forward by this judgement. The harm to 
consumers caused by an economically inefficient industrial 
relationship between two firms –of which one is dominant- is a 
ground for violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. 
Despite this significant outcome, the essential facility doctrine 
Courts have rarely found a facility to be essential. They have 
considered a facility as essential only if its control of the 
monopolist is carried with the intent to eliminate competition, 
since competitors cannot do business without it411.  
That is because an extensive application of the essential facility 
doctrine could reveal itself as a Trojan horse in antitrust law and 
enforcement, since it would allow Courts to re-interpret industrial 
relationships, on the one hand, and freedom of enterprise, on the 
other hand, in an antipodal way. Courts would be entitled to 
induce a firm to venture together with a competitor when the 
preclusion from usage of a facility that is deemed essential would 
curtail the latter’s ability to do business.  
                                                                                                                                                            
“attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency”, it is fair to 
characterize its behavior as predatory. It is, accordingly, appropriate to examine 
the effect of the challenged pattern of conduct on consumers, on Ski Co.’s 
smaller rival, and on Ski Co. itself.” Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 105 S. Ct. 2857 (1985) 
411 Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), in which 
access to the airline computer reservation system was not considered essential; 
City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co.,  955 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1992), 
in which a fully integrated power company with monopoly was found to have 
no duty to wheel power for a municipally-owned distribution company where 
wheeling would have merely shifted costs from one set of customers to another. 
See. W.E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Law and Economics of Essential Facilities in Public 
Utility Regulation, in M.A. Crew (Ed.), Economic Innovation in Public Utility 
Regulation 1, Kluwer Academic Publishers (1992) 
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Likewise, professor Areeda suggests that under § 2 there is no 
general duty to share an essential facility, but this obligation is 
only exceptional. Unlike the EU Community Courts, which 
recognizes the duty to supply more often, American Courts hold 
that a single firm’s facility is essential only when it is both critical 
to “the plaintiff’s competitive vitality and the plaintiff is essential 
for competition in the marketplace”412. EU competition law does 
not require for the claimant’s activity to be essential for the 
competitive process; however, Court holding that the sharing of a 
facility is essential for competitors in general (not for a particular 
competitor) might achieve the same result413. Moreover, whilst in 
American law of essential facility the existence of a valid business 
justification always plays out favorably for the defendant, in the 
sense of constituting a ground for not sharing, the EU Community 
law does not explore as in detail the issue of valid business 
justifications, but simply affirms that the refusal to share the 
facility is to be done without an “objective justification”414. 
The intent of the monopolist when denying access is normally 
irrelevant, since supervising the subjective status of the defendant 
would make the essential facility doctrine less narrow and more 
flexible in its application. Courts could infer violation of § 2 by 
simply proving that the defendant had intent to exclude the rival, 
in a way to curtail its freedom to compete aggressively on the 
marketplace.   
Moreover, obliging the owner of a facility to grant access to it 
against its will raises concerns about the legitimate nature of the 
gains the firm granted access would benefit from. The ability to 
retain an asset is a key element of competition and has pro-
competitive consequences, since in general competitors would 
have to compete more harshly and redistribute some of their gains 
to consumers in order to “catch up” with the owner of the facility. 
Exceptionally, if the denial were to dampen competition in the 
downstream market to the detriment of consumers (harm to 
competition), it would become relevant to § 2 scopes. 
 
10. Attempts to Monopolize 
In addition to the offenses of monopolization and conspiracies to 
monopolize, § 2 also proscribes attempts to monopolize. However, 
even if attempted monopolization can be prosecuted as a felony, 
very few cases have followed this path of enforcement.  
                                                
412 P. Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 
Antitrust Law Journal 852, (1989) 
413 Ibidem 
414 In the Bronner Case, the ECJ affirmed that access to the facility is to be 
denied without an “objective justification”: there is no mention of a ground of 
exculpation based on an industrial/business argument. Oscar Bronner v. 
Mediaprint, 26.11.1998, Case C-7/97, [1998] ECR I-7817, para. 41   
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Early, in Swift & Co. v United States it was held that attempted 
monopolization is a conduct bordering monopolization, but that 
does not attain completed monopolization. There must be a 
specific intent to a specific intent to monopolize and a dangerous 
probability that, if unchecked, such conduct will ripen into 
monopolization415.  
This definition has been expanded in American Tobacco, where the 
Supreme Court has established that “the phrase 'attempt to 
monopolize' means the employment of methods, means and 
practices which would, if successful, accomplish monopolization, 
and which, though falling short, nevertheless approach so close as 
to create a dangerous probability of it, which methods, means and 
practices are so employed by the members of and pursuant to a 
combination or conspiracy formed for the purpose of such 
accomplishment”416. 
However, this definition of leaves some issues undisclosed, such 
as the amount of market share a firm is to attain prior to being 
charged with attempted monopolization, or the exact standards 
integrating an attempt.  
The difficulty of searching attempted monopolization standards 
reflects the tension between prohibiting a conduct amounting to 
monopolization, on the one hand, and the fear of Courts of 
producing false positives, namely sanctioning pro-competitive 
business practices, on the other hand. That, together with the issue 
that attempted monopolization entails prosecuting an 
unsuccessful monopoly campaign, raised even more concern417. A 
desire to increase market share or even to drive a competitor out 
of business through vigorous competition on the merits has never 
amounted to monopolization. In attempted monopolization cases, 
Courts have emphasized that aggressive efforts to compete are not 
illegal, but are to be encouraged418. 
A more recent outcome that shed light on unanswered questions 
above is Spectrum Sports Inc. v McQuillan419, where the Supreme 
Court has adopted a three-tier test for attempted monopolization. 
In practice, plaintiff must prove:   
                                                
415 Swift and Company v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) 
416 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946) quoting and 
“welcom[ing] this opportunity to endorse” these statements from United States 
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.1945) 
417  In the judicial practice, the defendant can be convicted of both 
monopolization and attempted monopolization, but the common view is that 
the attempt of monopolizing merges into the actual offense of monopolization. 
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 784 (1946) 
418 Midwest Radio Co. v. Forum Publishing Co., 942 F.2d 1294 (1991). Hiring a 
competitor’s employee to improve performance was not considered as an 
anticompetitive conduct. 
419 Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan Et Vir, Dba Sorboturf Enterprises, 506 U.S. 447 
(1993), 113 S.Ct. 884, 122 L.Ed.2d 247. 
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1) Anticompetitive Activity:  the conduct is designed to impair the 
opportunities of rivals or to dampen competition on the merits.   It 
is important to distinguish this conduct from conduct that is 
merely competitive.  In short, the defendant must be employing 
unfair means to achieve his goal (the same activities that are 
condemned in cases of actual monopolization)420.  
2) Specific Intent to Monopolize: there must be a specific intent to 
exclude competitors and gain monopoly power, which can be 
inferred either by direct evidence from evidence that the firm had 
engaged in anticompetitive behavior421.  Direct evidence of the 
intent alone, without evidence of the anticompetitive conduct 
cannot sustain a claim of attempted monopolization422. 
The type of intent required for monopolization is different than 
the intent necessary to prove attempted monopolization. In the 
first case, plaintiff must only show that the “deliberate and 
purposeful” act of the defendant is not the result of historic 
accident or superior skill. In the second case, proof of intent is 
more substantial, entailing specific determination to exclude rivals.  
The difference rests on one of the basic tenets of antitrust law and 
Common Law in general, the fact that specific intent in common-
law sense is only necessary where the conduct fall short of results 
proscribed by antitrust law itself. Because attempted 
monopolization regards a conduct that has not produced the 
desired results, plaintiff needs a stronger proof to satisfy the 
element of specific intent. 
3) Dangerous Probability of Success: an attempt to monopolize is 
the employment of methods that, if successful, would accomplish 
monopolization and which, “though falling short, nevertheless 
approach so close as to create a dangerous probability of it”423.  
A finding of dangerous probability of success is basically a 
function of market power, because the Court reversed a line of the 
Ninth Circuit cases holding that the “dangerous probability of 
success” element of the offense might be satisfied absent the proof 
of a relevant market or the alleged monopolist’s power therein424.    
                                                
420 See supra, para. 2 
421 M&M Med. Supplies and Serv. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp.. 981 F.2d 160, 166 (4th 
Cir. 1992), “Specific intent may be inferred from the defendant’s 
anticompetitive practices”. Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Prof’l Tennis 
Council, 857 F.2d 55, 74 (2d Cir. 1988), “proof of anticompetitive or exclusionary 
conduct may be used to…infer specific intent to monopolize”. 
422 Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan Et Vir, Dba Sorboturf Enterprises, 506 U.S. 447 
457 (1993), 113 S.Ct. 884, 122 L.Ed.2d 247 
423 Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan Et Vir, Dba Sorboturf Enterprises, 506 U.S. 447 
458-59 (1993), 113 S.Ct. 884, 122 L.Ed.2d 247 endorsing American Tobacco Co. v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 784 (1946) 
424 Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 
(1964) 
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In Spectrum, the Court stated that there is a direct relationship 
between market shares, on the one hand, and dangerous 
probability of success, on the other hand; however, it held that 
inference of the dangerous probability of success could occur at 
market share levels well below those needed to establish actual 
monopolization.   
Any change in market share brought about by the activity at issue 
may also be relevant. Moreover, the Court rejected the assumption 
that a dangerous probability of success could be inferred from 
proof of predatory conduct alone, but held that satisfying the 
dangerous probability element requires an “inquiry into the 
relevant product and geographic market and the defendant’s 
economic power within that market”425. 
The assessment of the defendant’s market power was deemed 
essential for the reach of § 2. “The purpose of the Sherman Act is 
not to protect business from the working of the market…but it is 
to protect the public from the failure of the market. The law 
directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even 
severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy 
competition itself”426. 
Aside from the three elements of, as well as actual monopolization 
ones, attempted monopolization claims must entail an antitrust 
injury: plaintiff must show that interstate commerce was affected 
by the defendant’s course of conduct, not just his individual 
business. 
 
11. Other pricing abuses – Price discrimination 
When the dominant firm determines its price, it is assumed it will 
charge only one price for his product for all the customers in the 
market. However, by virtue of its monopolistic position, the firm 
may sell the same commodity at different prices to different 
customers or in different markets.  
The practice on the part of the dominant firm to sell the same 
goods at the same time to different buyers at different prices, 
being the price difference not justified by difference in costs, is 
called price discrimination.  
The monopolist may discriminate in price between different 
markets or between different customers in the same market. In 
either case, price discrimination might be presumably increase the 
likelihood of predation by risking only a portion of the 
defendant’s business while threatening the entire business of 
smaller rivals who are confined to the geographic area in which 
the selective price cut was made or who serve primarily those 
                                                
425 Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan Et Vir, Dba Sorboturf Enterprises, 506 U.S. 447 
458-59 (1993), 113 S.Ct. 884, 122 L.Ed.2d 247 
426 Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan Et Vir, Dba Sorboturf Enterprises, 506 U.S. 447 
458 (1993), 113 S.Ct. 884, 122 L.Ed.2d 247. 
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customers who will benefit from the price reduction. Thus, in 
cases of price discrimination, the predation requirement of greater 
market power may more frequently be met427. 
The possibility that price discrimination imposed by a powerful 
seller might either monopolize the market or consolidate an 
existing monopoly is a long-recognized antitrust issue. Price 
discrimination might enable large firms to obtain inputs at prices 
unavailable to smaller competitors, and might also lead buyers to 
grow market power at their competitors’ expenses, without 
relationship to their own or their competitors’ efficiency428.   
More specifically, only a firm with market power is capable of 
engaging in price discrimination, namely selling the same 
products to different customers at different prices, causing harm 
to competition in a relevant market. In economic terms, price 
discrimination occurs when identical or similar products are sold 
at prices that have different ratios to the marginal cost of 
producing the products. If two items have the same marginal cost, 
then different prices are discriminatory per se. On the other hand, 
if two items have different marginal costs, the same price for them 
would be inference of price discrimination. 
One of the negative effects of price discrimination, which makes it 
relevant to the scopes of antitrust law, is that this practice can be 
used as a predatory scheme to eliminate competitors that, due to 
the smaller size of their business, will not recover the profits lost 
in the predatory pricing scheme. Moreover, price discrimination 
may injure competition, since purchasers will be forced to pay a 
higher price. 
When price discriminating, the monopolist will have a two-fold 
purpose: first, he will seek to increase of its total revenue and 
profits and, second he will seek to produce a larger output than its 
rivals. 
Price discrimination is possible and profitable when the 
monopolist is able to control the amount and distribution of 
output and the buyers can be segregated into different sub-
markets, because of a demand curve with different elasticities. 
Assuming that the monopolist sells his product in two sub-
markets A and B, and that the demand for the product sold is 
more elastic in sub-market B than in sub market A, he will sell a 
greater amount of his product by reducing the price in market B. 
Parallel to that, he will be reducing output in market A, and sell at 
a higher price than in market B.  
Thus, price discrimination under monopoly is possible when the 
following three conditions are met: 
                                                
427 P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975) 
428 T. Calvani & G. Breidenbach, An Introduction to the Robinson-Patman Act and 
Its Enforcement by the Government, 59 Antitrust L.J 765, 766 (1991) 
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1. Monopoly power - the seller of the commodity is to have power to 
influence price. 
2. Segregation of markets - there should be no possibility of 
transferring a unit of commodity supplied from the market with 
lesser elastic demand into the one with more elastic demand.  
3. Segregation of demand - the elasticity of demand differs in the 
segregated sub-markets.  The monopolist will charge a lower price 
for a commodity in the market where demand is more elastic. 
Conversely, if demand is inelastic, the monopolist will simply fix 
higher prices for his product. 
 
The monopolist will price-discriminate in two ways: (1) between 
different geographic markets; and (2) between different 
customers, yet within the same geographic market. 
Sub 1) According to the Areeda-Turner formula, the low price in 
one market should be considered predatory only if below 
marginal cost, whereas with regard to the competitive markets the 
monopolist should be entitled to any defenses available to any 
other seller429. 
Sub 2) According to the economic principle that Courts have 
conformed to, a monopolist should be permitted to make a 
general price reduction as long as the price for the product will be 
equal or above its marginal cost.  
When it comes to selective price-cutting aimed at retaining or 
obtaining particular customers, this principle enshrined in § 2 
does not stand as a tool to for prohibiting it. In other terms, there 
are no legal arguments to prohibit selective price-cutting, because 
they offer no grounds to affirm that selective cuts are more 
harmful to small competitors than a general price reduction to the 
same level. Discriminatory price reductions are prima facie 
excluded from the reach of § 2 of the Sherman Act.  
Moreover, a necessary element of predation is missing in selective 
price cuttings at or above marginal cost, namely the harm to 
competition, on the account of the fact that the increase in sales 
generated by the price reduction will determine an increase in 
short run net returns, assuming that the demand is elastic430. 
The only possible argument for prohibiting selective cuts under 
the umbrella of § 2 is a pragmatic one. In the event small 
competitors would cut the price for their products, the monopolist 
will be confronted with two options: (1) a general price-cut, which 
would preserve his market share but would cause a loss in profits; 
(2) maintaining his price, which would preserve high profits on 
his sales, but lead to a reduction of its market share. Faced with 
                                                
429 See infra, the defenses of cost justification and meeting competition pursuant 
to the Robinson-Patman Act. 
430 P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 725 (1975) 
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that choice, the monopolist would often elect to maintain his price, 
thus facilitating the growth of competitors and the erosion of his 
monopoly. Banning discriminatory price cuts other than the 
marginal-cost-threshold rule would foster the growth of 
competitors431.    
However, establishing a rule forcing the monopolist to charge a 
higher price -namely imposing him to charge at a level above 
marginal cost- in order to prevent discrimination would reduce 
industry output and waste economic resources; at the same time, 
it would permit survival not only of equally efficient firms, but 
less efficient ones as well. And in the short run, at least, entry even 
by equally efficient firms will be undesirable since excess capacity 
already exists432. 
 
11.1 The Robinson-Patman Act 
Aside from the difficulties in applying the Sherman Act to price 
discrimination, and subject to affirmative defenses of cost 
justification and meeting competition, the Robinson-Patman Act 
prohibits price discrimination in sales of the same product where 
the effect … may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, 
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or 
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with 
customers of either of them433. 
Section 2 of the Clayton Act in 1914 is the first antitrust ban 
against price discrimination. In the preamble it is affirmed that the 
Act was passed “to supplement existing laws against unlawful 
restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes”434. Section 2 
originally forbade local price-cutting by monopolistic sellers 
seeking to exclude competitors from their markets 435 . The 
                                                
431 P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 711 (1975). The authors argue that such 
threshold would be very difficult to administer for courts, because it does not 
comply with any standard measurement of cost. Instead, they advocate for the 
use of average variable cost as a proxy for marginal cost to mitigate the 
administrative difficulties of enforcement.  
432 P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 711 (1975). The authors affirm that pricing at 
marginal cost level is the competitive and social optimum. 
433 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). See infra, the defenses of cost justification and 
meeting competition pursuant to the Robinson-Patman Act. 
434 Clayton Act (Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730) 
435 Section 2 of the Clayton Act: “That it shall be unlawful for any person 
engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or 
indirectly to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities, 
which commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United 
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular 
possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, where the 
effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend 
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Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 13 a–f) 436  amended the 
foregoing provision in 1936437, prohibiting a seller of commodities 
from selling comparable goods to different buyers at different 
prices, except in certain circumstances.  
In particular, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits a seller of 
commodities from selling comparable goods to different buyers at 
different prices, except in certain circumstances. Section 2(a) 
contains six substantive provisions: prohibits a seller from 
discriminating in price between two or more competing buyers in 
the sale of commodities of like grade and quality, where the effect 
of the discrimination “may be substantially” to “lessen 
competition...in any line of commerce”; or “tend to create a 
monopoly in any line of commerce”; or “injure, destroy or prevent 
competition with any person who grants or knowingly receives 
the benefit of the discrimination, or with the customers of wither 
of them”.  
In the wake of protectionist spirit of the New Deal, the bill sought 
to shelter small businesses from price competition of large chain 
stores, with a view to preventing the latter from attaining 
monopoly438. In political parlance, the bill is known as the “chain 
store bill”: this epithet captures more than anything the populist 
and protectionist feeling animating the endeavor to discourage 
price competition and promote price uniformity.  
Despite its antitrust origins, private parties do not resort to the 
Robinson-Patman Act nearly as often as they use the Sherman Act, 
in part because of its complexity. The government, which may 
bring an action under the Robinson-Patman Act through the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), rarely initiates actions under 
the statute439. As a matter of fact, the Robinson-Patman Act has 
                                                                                                                                                            
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce: provided that nothing herein 
contained shall prevent discrimination in price between purchasers of 
commodities on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the 
commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for difference in the cost of 
selling or transportation, or discrimination in price in the same or different 
communities made in good faith to meet competition: and provided further that 
nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, 
or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide 
transactions and not in restraint of trade”. 
436 The Robinson-Patman Act is a 1936 statute (15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a–f) that 
amended Section 2 of the Clayton Act (Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730). 
437 J.B. Kirkwood, The Robinson-Patman Act and Consumer Welfare: Has Volvo 
Reconciled Them?, 30 Seattle University Law Review 349, (2007) 
438 The bill’s namesake, Representative Wright Patman emphasized that the 
amendments to the Clayton Act were intended to eliminate the ability of large 
chain stores to exploit their mass-producing scale to extract discriminatory 
treatments from sellers. Remarks of Wright Patman 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (Mar. 
9,1936) 80 Cong. Rec. 3446 (1936). 
439 T. Calvani & G. Breidenbach, An Introduction to the Robinson-Patman Act and 
Its Enforcement by the Government, 59 Antitrust Law Journal 765, 766 (1991) 
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been criticized both for its poor drafting and its underlying 
protective economic theory. The Supreme Court has stated that it 
is “complicated and vague in itself and even more so in its 
context”440.  Moreover, price discrimination may still violate the 
Sherman Act if it constitutes a restraint of trade or an attempt to 
monopolize 441 ; or, it may constitute an unfair method of 
competition pursuant to sec. 5 § 45 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act442.  
Section 2a of the Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales of 
commodities of like grade and quality in commerce. More 
specifically, it is unlawful for any person443: 
1) engaged in commerce  
2) to discriminate in price between different purchasers  
3) of commodities of like grade and quality  
4) where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition in 
any line of commerce,  
5) or tend to create a monopoly or  
6) to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who 
either grants or knowingly receives the benefits of such 
discrimination, or with the customers of either of them444. 
A seller does not violate the Act but for selling similar 
commodities to different purchasers at different prices. The Act 
only applies to sales transactions that cross the state boundaries – 
the “in commerce” requirement-, in which there are at least two 
purchasers445 and two fairly contemporaneous transactions446. 
                                                
440 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 72 S. Ct. 800, 96 L. Ed. 1081 (1952) 
441 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 
(1993) 
442 15 USC § 41, Title 15 › Chapter 2 › Subchapter I › § 45, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/FTC_Act_IncorporatingUS_SAFE_WEB_Act.pdf . 
See infra. 
443 The word “person” or “persons” wherever used in this Act shall be deemed 
to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the 
laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of 
any State, or the laws of any foreign country.  
444 Both the seller who offers and the preferred buyer who knowingly receives 
discriminatory prices are guilty of violating section 2a of the Act. Cfr. FTC v. 
Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968) 
445 Section 2a does not cover offers to sell, leases, agency or consignment 
arrangements, or a seller’s refusal to deal. Terry’s floor Fashions, Inc. v. 
Burlington Industries, Inc., 763 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, the Act 
does not apply to the sale of intangible and services, since these are not 
“commodities”.  Tri-State Broadcasting v. UPI, 369 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1966). 
Examples of intangibles include: 1) mutual fund shares [Baum v. Investors 
Diversified Services, 409 F.2d 872 (7th Cir.1969)], 2) patent licenses [LaSalle 
Street Press v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. III. 1968), 
modified, 445 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1971)], 3) real estate leases [Export Liquor Sales v. 
Ammex Warehouse, 426 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 1000 (1971)], 
4) cellular telephone services and systems [Metro Communications Co. v. 
Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 984 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1993)]. Price 
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The “like grade or quality” requirement implies that the products 
do not have physical differences and have the same degree of 
acceptability. Differences in the brand name, or in the labeling, do 
not add sufficient physical difference, not justifying price 
discrimination447. 
The “injure to competition with any person who grants such 
discrimination” refers to the so-called “primary line” abuses, 
where the large firm applies a “substantial and sustained” 
reduction in price in a local area with the intent of destroying or 
downscaling a smaller rival to the detriment of competition448.  
The general rule is that the mere diversion of sales from the 
discriminated competitors to the discriminating firm is not 
sufficient to establish a primary line injury: the plaintiff is to show 
that the lessening on competition resulting from the price 
discrimination at stake has caused him an actual injury 449 . 
Furthermore, the discrimination ought not to be temporary, and 
the smaller-scale plaintiff must prove the intent or knowledge of 
the effect of injuring him, causing at the same time harm to 
competition450.   
Primary line abuses are generally represented by predatory price 
cuts of a nation-wide company in separate geographic areas: in 
Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co451, the Supreme Court found a 
brief local price-cutting by three “large” national firms to be a 
violation of section 2a notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff, a 
“small” local firm, held the bulk of the market and continued to 
operate at a profit throughout the period covered by the 
complaint. The “below cost” sale of two of the three firms was 
found to injure competition in both the sellers’ and the buyers’ 
market452 -albeit it was only below average cost- as evidence of the 
predatory intent sufficed to infer the discrimination intent aimed 
at lessening competition453.  
                                                                                                                                                            
discrimination in services and intangibles may still violate the Sherman Act if it 
constitutes a restraint of trade or an attempt to monopolize. Cfr. Brooke Group 
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
446 Atlanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958)  
447 Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1952) 
448 Indian Coffee Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 752 F.2d 891 (3rd Cir.), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 863 (1985) 
449 Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (110 S.Ct. 2535, 2551 n. 11. 110) (1990) 
450 F.M. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act, Boston: Little 
Brown, (1962), p. 162. “To equate the diversion of business among rival sellers 
is to indict the competitive process itself”. 
451 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). 
452 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 702 (1967). 
453 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 703 (1967). Compare further 
William Inglis & Sons Baking, Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 942 F.2d 1401 (9th 
Cir. 1991). “To serve as sufficient evidence of intent for a price discrimination 
claim, a price/cost comparison must meet the same standard required to 
establish intent for an attempted monopolization claim”. 
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Respondents were condemned for having contributed to 
deteriorate the price structure of the market, since evidence 
showed a “drastically declining price structure” that could be 
attributed to either sustained or sporadic price discriminations454. 
The Supreme Court thus affirmed the principle that a national 
company can be found guilty of price discrimination if it used 
price cuts to enter a market dominated by a local firm455. 
In the renowned Brooke Group case, the Court rethought of the 
issue of primary line abuses in light of its proximity with the 
predation standards pursuant to § 2 of the Sherman Act. After 
stating that the Robinson-Patman Act is a tool to proscribe 
conduct lawful under the Sherman Act, it stated: “the essence of 
the claim under either statute is the same: a business rival has 
priced its products in an unfair manner with an object to eliminate 
or retard competition and thereby gain and exercise control over 
prices in the relevant market”.  
As well as in the event of a predation claim, in order to hold a firm 
liable for charging low prices in violation of the Robinson-Patman 
Act, the plaintiff is to prove that: 1) the defendant charged a price 
“below an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs”456; 2) the 
defendant had a “dangerous probability” of recouping its 
investment in below cost pricing457. Failing the defendant to prove 
the second requirement, the claim was not sustained; however, the 
Court grounded the analysis of primary line predation claims on 
the likelihood of recoupment of the investment in below-cost 
sales, therefore repudiating its approach in Utah Pie, whereby 
primary line liability can be established by merely proving that 
the defendant lowered its price below an appropriate measure of 
its rival’s cost and showed intent to drive the latter off the 
market458. 
The “injure to competition with any person who knowingly 
receives price discrimination” refers to secondary line injury, 
namely injury to competitors of the seller’s customer. A powerful 
customer may injure competition by forcing sellers to give him 
unjustified discounts. Secondary line injury still refers to the effect 
of discriminatory prices, because one customer cannot obtain a 
                                                
454 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 703 (1967). 
455 W.S. Bowman Jr., Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: the Utah Pie Case, 77 
Yale L.J. 70, (1967) 
456 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) 
457 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) 
458 The Court did not overrule Utah Pie, but its post-Brooke Group outcomes are 
virtually irrelevant. AA Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 683 F. 
Supp. 680 (S.D. Ind. 1988), where the Court rejected the primary line injury case 
because ease of entry in the market would preclude the defendant from 
recouping its investment in localized price discrimination. 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
146 
 
more favorable price than its competitors, absent an upstream 
discrimination and a difference in “bargaining power” on part of 
the customer. There must be competition between the customer 
buying the commodities at the high price and the one disfavored 
by the low price459. Moreover, there must be competition from 
both a geographic and a functional standpoint; in particular, 
buyers must belong to the same functional class, otherwise 
different prices can be lawfully charged460. 
This type of injury to the buyer-level competition very often 
occurs between chain stores and small stores, less frequently in the 
context of wholesaler-retailer transactions. Even though 
wholesalers and retailers may appear not to be in the same level of 
distribution, the seller might still violate the Robinson-Patman Act 
in the event the two groups compete and the defendant sells at 
different prices to the two groups461.  
 
One of the most relevant Supreme Court decisions concerning 
secondary line abuses, based on the Robinson-Patman Act is 
Texaco v. Hasbrouck, which inquired into the legitimacy of 
functional discounts. A functional discount is one given to a buyer 
based on its role in the supplier’s distribution system, reflecting, at 
least in a generalized sense, the services performed by the 
purchaser for the supplier462.  
In Hasbrouck, twelve independent Texaco retailers sued Texaco, 
alleging that while Texaco sold gasoline to them at retail tank 
wagon prices, it sold gasoline to two other independent 
distributors –which were in competition with the Texaco retailers- 
at prices 3.65 to 6 cents lower than the retail tank wagon price463.  
The District Court ultimately found for the twelve plaintiff 
retailers and argued that “the presumed legality of functional 
discounts had been rebutted by evidence that the amount of the 
discounts to Gull and Dompier was not reasonably related to the 
cost of any function that they performed”464. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed.  
                                                
459 DeLong Equipment Co. v. Washington Mills Electro Minerals Corp., 990 F.2d 
1186 (1993). The Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit clarified that there must be 
competition in the same geographic market, even if the buyers are located in 
different areas.  
460 Adcom, Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 812 F.Supp. 81 (1993) “A plaintiff alleging a 
secondary-line injury must prove that the defendant seller made a sale to two 
different buyers at the same functional level of competition within the same 
geographic market”. 
461 Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (110 S.Ct. 2535, 2542 n. 11. 110) (1990) 
462 Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (110 S.Ct. 2535, 2542 n. 11. 110) (1990) 
463 Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (110 S.Ct. 2535, 2538-40 n. 11. 110) 
(1990) 
464 Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (110 S.Ct. 2535, 2541 n. 11. 110) (1990) 
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The Supreme Court argued that functional discounts that 
represent a mere “recognition and reimbursement for actual 
marketing functions” are not explicitly prohibited by the 
Robinson-Patman Act; therefore, they are to consider as lawful465. 
On the other hand, the Court noted that there was no evidence 
that would connect the discount accorded by Texaco to any 
market benefits enjoyed by the later, concluding that Texaco had 
engaged in price discrimination with a view to dampening 
competition of the retail gas market466.  
The Hasbrouck decision emphasizes that functional discounts are 
legitimate under the Robinson-Patman Act to the extent that they 
are a premium for actual marketing functions performed by the 
favored purchasers. The Court indicated that it would not 
approve of “a functional discount completely untethered to either 
the supplier’s savings or the wholesaler’s costs”,467 but it also 
indicated that establishing “a causation defense in a functional 
discount case does not demand the rigorous accounting associated 
with a cost justification defense”. 468  The Court found it 
unnecessary to decide, however, whether the amount of the 
discount should be reasonably related (1) to the costs incurred by 
the buyer in performing the services at issue, or instead (2) to the 
cost savings that accrued to the seller as a result of the buyer 
performing the services at issue. 
 
In Perkins v. Standard Oil, the defendant sold to plaintiff at a higher 
price than it charged Signal Oil, a wholesaler; the latter passed its 
lower price onto other dealers in competition with the plaintiff. 
The Court found Standard Oil guilty of price discrimination 
because the price difference resulted to be detrimental to the 
plaintiff, even if it was not directly targeted against him. When it 
comes to the competitive injury, it can be inferred from the 
discrimination itself, having the Court stated in Morton’s Salt that 
very little beyond a sustained and substantial difference in price 
that can influence resale price supports a finding of secondary line 
injury469. 
Morton’s Salt inference of injury can be rebutted if evidence shows 
the breaking of the causal connection between price differential 
and injury to competition. In Bois Cascade Corp. the defendant 
rebutted the claim of secondary line abuse proving that price 
differential constituted an introductory customer-attracting 
discount470. 
                                                
465 Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (110 S.Ct. 2535, 2546 n. 11. 110) (1990) 
466 Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (110 S.Ct. 2535, 2546 n. 11. 110) (1990) 
467 Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (110 S.Ct. 2535, 2546 n. 11. 110) (1990) 
468 Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (110 S.Ct. 2535, 2547 n. 11. 110) (1990) 
469 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (68 S.Ct. 822, 92 L.Ed. 1196) (1948) 
470 Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127 (1988) 
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The “injure to competition with customers of any person who 
knowingly receives” refers to tertiary line injury, which may be 
suffered by a customer of a buyer who in turn suffered the 
discrimination, if that customer competes against those customers 
who received a more favorable treatment from a seller. This type 
of discrimination is similar to those in secondary line hypotheses.  
 
11.2 Defenses to a prima facie price discrimination claims 
There are two statutory defenses to a prima facie price 
discrimination claims and a third judicially-conceived one. These 
are in turn: 1) the “meeting competition” defense, 2) the “cost 
justification” defense, and 3) the “functional availability” defense. 
The “meeting competition” defense is enshrined in Section 2b of 
the Robinson-Patman Act, which provides that discriminatory 
prices are lawful when the seller has charged that price “in good 
faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor”. This defense 
has been explained as the most potent means to minimize 
Robinson-Patman Act risks of frustrating the core objective of 
antitrust laws of encouraging competition between sellers471. It is 
an absolute defense, namely it will bar a claim regardless of 
whether the injuries were to competition or to competitors472. 
The test applied in court seeks to establish “whether a reasonable 
and prudent person [would] believe that the granting of a lower 
price would, in fact, meet the equally low price of a competitor”473. 
The Supreme Court has construed price discrimination abuses not 
as strict liability offenses, but as offenses in which the defendant’s 
state of mind or intent must be “established by evidence and 
inferences drawn therefrom, and cannot be taken from the trier of 
fact through reliance on a legal presumption of wrongful intent 
from proof of an effect on prices”474.  
The defense is construed as a “good faith believe, rather than an 
absolute certainty”, and in most cases it is a commercial belief 
that, absent the price reduction, the transaction would be lost. The 
standard is met when the seller can “show the existence of facts 
which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that 
the granting of a lower price would, in fact, meet the equally low 
price of a competitor”475. 
In Falls City v. Vanco, the Supreme Court ruled that the good faith 
standard is “a flexible and pragmatic concept” that allows the 
                                                
471  R.T. Joseph & B.T. Harrop, Proof of the Meeting Competition Defense: 
Investigation and Verification of Reported Competing Offers, 62 Antitrust L.J. 127 
(1993). 
472 http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Robinson-Patman+Act  
473 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978) 
474 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 434 (1978) 
475 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 451 (1978), quoting 
FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945). 
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seller to respond to what he believes is a situation of competitive 
necessity 476. At any rate, sellers need not communicate price 
information with each other in order to avail themselves of this 
justification477, because they can still be charged with price fixing 
under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Moreover, section 2b does not distinguish between one who meets 
a competitor’s lower price to retain a current customer and one 
who meets a competitor’s lower price in an attempt to gain new 
customers478. Thus, the defense can be invoked in either case. 
The Court has determined that “territorial price differences that 
are in fact responses to competitive conditions” satisfy the 
requirements of the defense479.  Moreover, the seller may reduce 
prices in order to secure new customers, as well as to retain old 
ones480. A firm may also rely on the meeting competition defense 
to support meeting a rival bid that the firm reasonably believes is 
lower than its own, even though the firm does not know the 
rival’s exact bid, or seeks to match only the total bid amount and 
not its individual components481. 
The “cost justification” defense allows an otherwise unlawful 
discriminatory price where the differential makes “only due 
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or 
delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in 
which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or 
delivered”482. If the difference in two selling prices reflects only a 
difference in the seller’s cost of supplying the different buyers, 
regardless of the effect of such difference on buyers themselves, 
the discrimination shall be deemed lawful. Proving a cost 
justification establishes an absolute defense to a prima facie 
violation of the Robinson-Patman Act483. 
To rely on the cost justification the defendant must document the 
quantity discount by actual cost saving due to the quantity sold, 
not by merely asserting that sales of larger lots of a commodity are 
                                                
476 Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc, 460 U.S. 428 (103 S.Ct. 1282, 
75 L.Ed.2d 174) (1983) 
477 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 438 (1978) However, 
“exchanges of price information, even when putatively for the purpose of 
Robinson-Patman Act compliance, must remain subject to close scrutiny under 
the Sherman Act”. 
478 Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc, 460 U.S. 446 (103 S.Ct. 1282, 
75 L.Ed.2d 174) (1983) 
479 Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 448 (103 S.Ct. 1282, 
75 L.Ed.2d 174) (1983) 
480 Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 445-51 (103 S.Ct. 
1282, 75 L.Ed.2d 174) (1983) 
481 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 82-83 (1979) 
482 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970) 
483 F.R. Rowe, Cost Justifications of Price Differentials under the Robinson-Patman 
Act, 59 Columbia Law Review 584, (1959); D.G. Hemminger, Cost Justification: A 
Defense with New Application, 59 Antitrust L.J. 827 (1991)  
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more economical. In order to compute the cost differential and 
justify the quantity discount, the seller may classify customers into 
reasonable categories, in accordance with the homogeneity of each 
group and cost of selling to the customers in each group484.  
A disclaimer applies to this justification, the fact that even if 
quantity discount are justified by cost savings to the seller, the 
FTC is empowered to “fix and establish quantity limits, and revise 
the same as it finds necessary, as to particular commodities or 
classes of commodities, where it finds that available purchasers in 
greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on account 
thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any 
line of commerce”485. 
The third judicially-developed defense of functional “availability” 
is based on the assumption that there can be no violation of 
section 2a of the Robinson-Patman Act if the allegedly 
discriminatory price is practically and functionally available to the 
complaining customer486. Likewise, the availability of comparable 
products at equivalent prices may preclude a finding of price 
discrimination for lack of causality487. 
 
11.3 Primary-line injuries 
The only Robinson-Patman Act issue relevant to the present 
analysis is that of primary-line injury, namely injury to 
competition between the discriminating seller and his 
competitors. Primary-line injury claims suggest that “the 
appropriate measure of cost” as under the Brooke test should 
consist of a broader prohibition of discriminatorily low prices than 
the marginal-cost test that Courts apply with regard to predation. 
In fact, in some cases it has been held that the requisite “injury to 
competition” is established merely by proof a “diversion” effect, 
namely that the lower price diverted a substantial number of sales 
from the competitors to the respondent488. That would imply a 
different understanding of the very notion of harm to competition, 
not as harm to the competitive structure of the market, but as 
                                                
484 United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962). “The groups must be 
composed of members of such self-sameness as to make the averaging of cost of 
dealing with the group a valid and reasonable indicium of the cost of dealing 
with any specific group member”. 
485 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970) and FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (68 S.Ct. 822, 
92 L.Ed. 1196) (1948) 
486 FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 406 F.Supp. 224 (1975) 
487 Hanson v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Industries, 482 F.2d 220 (1973). But compare 
Fowler Manufacturing Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248 (1969) “the availability of a 
similar product on equal terms and conditions, the circumstance of such 
availability can have no place as a defense under the Robinson-Patman Act to a 
discrimination by a seller against a purchaser in prices and allowances on 
goods which he has sold to him. 
488 See, e.g., Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 
U.S. 734 (1945). Anheuser-Busch, Inc.v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961). 
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harm to the rivals of the firm489, which would be material with the 
policy objective of the Robinson-Patman Act, namely the 
protection of “mom and pop” stores from the aggressive 
competition of big chain stores. 
The argument that actual enforcement of the Robinson-Patman 
Act necessitates a more readily determinable test than “marginal 
cost” might be mitigated by the usage of average variable cost as a 
proxy for marginal cost490. However, economics suggests that in 
the vast majority of situations concerning primary-line abuses, 
discriminatory price-cuttings will be profitable to the firm 
concerned and pro-competitive, because they would entail a 
transfer of wealth to some consumers491.  
Thus, applying the “diversion” test, or inferring violation primary 
line abuse from “deteriorating price structure” would be wrong 
from an antitrust standpoint most of the time. In fact, there is no 
mention of any injury to competitors in section 2(a); thus, the 
element of discrimination is to be anchored to the injury to 
competition, and competition is lessened when the firm will price 
below marginal cost and will recoup its investment in the post-
predation phase. Above marginal-cost cuts will cannot be 
construed as a lessening of competition; thus, the discriminatory 
effects of the price reductions will be counterbalanced by some 
redistributive pro-competitive effects and will not be deemed 
relevant to the eye of antitrust law. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the Robinson-Patman Act’s 
concern with primary-line injury to competition and by the 
Sherman Act’s concern with predation is identical. If the Sherman 
Act is interpreted to permit a monopolist to lower the price so 
long as his price equals or exceeds marginal cost, such 
discrimination is a fortiori permissible for firms with lesser degrees 
of market power, and the Robinson-Patman Act should be 
interpreted no differently in primary-line cases, unless the 
statutory language or compelling legislative history dictates 
otherwise492.  
The locution “where the effect may be substantially to lessen 
competition” does not allow the interpreter to advocate for a more 
                                                
489 As regards the different understanding of the meaning of competition, 
underlying the enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act, see Chapter III, para. 
6  
490 P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 723 (1975) 
491 A price-cutting above average cost, although discriminatory, would not be 
predatory and would not imply the exit from the market of as efficient 
competitors as the dominant firm. See supra, predation in general. 
492 P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 725 (1975) The authors argue that “Without 
fully elucidating the point, we see nothing that compels a more restrictive 
substantive interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act”. 
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restrictive interpretation of section 2a of the Robinson-Patman 
Act493. The original Clayton Act was primarily a response to fears 
of predatory pricing and primary-line effects; but the original 
language referred to effects on “competition” only, not individual 
competitors. Once again, there is no ground to deduct that the law 
of primary line injuries should be enforced by virtue of a stricter 
test than the predation one, in an attempt to grant competitors 
protect some competitors, such as the “diversion criterion”. 
 
12. Loyalty rebates 
Consistent with its focus on promoting consumer welfare, 
American jurisprudence regarding loyalty rebates tends to be 
permissive, and not sanction loyalty rebates, based on the 
presumption of legality of non-predatory prices494. In general, the 
U.S. approach to fidelity rebate schemes has been to refrain from 
challenging or interfering with dominant firms employing such 
schemes 495 . Moreover, due to the scarcity of precedents in 
evaluating rebates, courts have sought to analyze the antitrust 
implications of loyalty rebates by relying on the precedents 
regarding exclusive dealing, tying, and predatory pricing, which 
have been applied by analogy496. 
In American antitrust law, pricing above cost is generally 
regarded as lawful; in Henry v. Chloride the Court of Appeals for 
the 8th Circuit stated that non-predatory prices are to be 
encouraged under American antitrust law, adding that 
“competitors should know for certain they are pricing legally, and 
… this point should be average total cost. In other words, prices 
above average total cost are legal per se”497. 
In Brooke Group, the Supreme Court affirmed that when a discount 
scheme does not entail pricing below cost, the judicial control of 
the legitimacy of the conduct might have the effect of “chilling 
legitimate price cutting”498. On the account of that, the Court has 
established that the predation test entails two elements, the proof 
that the a product is priced below a certain measurement of the 
costs, on the one hand, and that the monopolist has concrete 
possibilities of recouping the losses incurred during predation, on 
                                                
493 FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543 & n.6 (1960); H.R. REP. NO. 
627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1914). 
494 B.H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Law in the 
United States, George Mason University School of Law, Working Paper Series, 
Paper 40, 2005, p. 115  
495 B.A. Facey & D.H. Assaf, Monopolization and Abusive Dominance in Canada, the 
United States and European Union: A survey, 70 Antitrust L.J. 513 550 (2002) 
496  S. Gates, Antitrust and Rebates: A Study in Analogies, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1495342  
497 Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1346 (8th Cir. 1987) 
498 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 
(1993) 
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the other hand. 
Loyalty discounts have been mainly analyzed by lower courts, 
whose main focus has been the assessment of the risk of exclusion 
of competitors as a result of the tying-in of customers to the 
monopolist product. In Grinnell Corp. the Court of Appeals for the 
1st circuit analyzed the practice of granting a non-predatory 
discount in the event the customer purchased almost his entire 
requirement for a product, based on an estimate of his overall 
sales for a span of two years499.  Despite acknowledging that non-
predatory discounts might have exclusionary effects, the Court 
has concluded that “the Sherman Act does not make unlawful 
prices that exceed both incremental and average costs”, because 
that interpretation of the provision would chill the pro-
competitive effects of the discounts to the benefit of consumers500. 
In Concord Boat, the Court of Appeal for the 8th circuit has 
admonished that loyalty discounts are the “very essence of 
competition”, and that when it comes to above average-variable-
cost (AVC) discounts, the plaintiff has to rebut a strong 
presumption of legality, by proving that the price charged is 
anticompetitive on the account of other circumstances than the 
amount of the discount itself501. In case at issue, the biggest 
manufacturer of boat engines had put in place a “market share” 
discount system, by virtue of which purchasers would benefit 
from a retroactive discount that would increase parallel to the 
increase in market share that the defendant would gain. The 
plaintiffs, a group of ship constructors, alleged that this discount 
system would make it more difficult for them to achieve an 
efficient dimension of the market, and as a result it would 
foreclose competition. Despite the district Court upheld the 
allegations of the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals for the 8th circuit 
quashed the decision on the grounds of the fact that the defendant 
had not imposed any exclusive term on the purchasers, who were 
free to purchase from other manufacturers of boat engines. 
Furthermore, there were no entry barriers in the market, and at 
the time the discounts took place, new entrants had ventured in 
the market, attempting to compete with the incumbent monopolist 
firm. All things considered, the “market share” discount practice 
was considered as competition on the merits, not in violation with 
§ 2, since the price cut was not below AVC, nor did the defendant 
impose any exclusive terms on purchasers502. 
                                                
499 Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 235-236 (1st Cir. 1983) 
500 Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 235-236 (1st Cir. 1983) 
501 Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F. 3d 1039, 1061, 1062 (8th Cir. 
2000) 
502 Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F. 3d 1039, 1061, 1063 (8th Cir. 
2000) 
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In British Airways503, the Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit 
investigated the same loyalty discount scheme of the national 
company that had been under the scrutiny of the Commission of 
the European Communities504. British Airways granted a bonus 
commission to travel agents who would increase their sales of 
British Airways tickets over a certain period of time compared to a 
previous reference period. The bonus only depended on the 
increase of individual sales that each agent had made compared 
with its past trend and not on the overall increases applicable to 
all travel agents. The Court of Appeals dismissed the claim that 
the granting of a bonus commission was at odds with § 2, since the 
plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant had cut prices 
below average incremental cost, on the one hand, and the 
“dangerous probability of recoupment”, on the other hand505. 
More specifically, the Court of Appeals, upheld the summary 
judgment trial court granted in favor of BA, on the grounds that 
Virgin failed to show how British Airways’ incentive rebate 
system harmed consumers.  
Notwithstanding the substantial lawfulness of loyalty discount 
schemes, other proceedings have been brought not on the grounds 
of the exclusionary effects of a discounted price below a certain 
measurement of cost, but on the exclusionary effects implied in 
the loyalty scheme, based on the concern that a monopolist firm in 
a market characterized by a monopolized demand can lever on 
loyalty scheme to expand its sales and its market shares506.  
The Supreme Court, however, is oriented in the sense of including 
                                                
503 Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 
2001) 
504 See Chapter II, para. 7.3 
505 Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 
2001) 
506 Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group, LP, 592 F.3d 
991 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court has affirmed the lawfulness of a progressive 
discount scheme based on the purchase certain minimum percentages of the 
requirement for the product in question, leaning on the argument that in the 
event purchasers would not buy the requirement to which the discount was 
conditioned, they would merely pay a higher price for the product. Such a 
scheme was not deemed exclusionary. In J.B.D.L. Corp v. Wyeth-Ayerst 
Laboratories Inc., Nos. 1:01-CV-704, 1:03-CV-781, 2005 WL 1396940 (S.D. Ohio 
June 13, 2005), conf’d in J.B.D.L. Corp v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories Inc., 485 
F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2007) the Court of Appeal excluded the predatory nature of a 
discount scheme of a manufacturer of pharmaceutical products which 
conditioned the discount to the inclusion of its product in the formularies of the 
plaintiffs, organizations of the health sector. In Southeast Missouri Hospital v. 
C.R. Bard, Inc., 643 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2011) the Court relied on the Concord Boat 
test to reject the claim of predation for a discount scheme conditioned to the 
purchase of 50% and 84% of the requirement for product at issue. The scheme 
was not exclusionary, since customers were not obliged to purchase the whole 
of their requirement for the product from the defendant and, furthermore, they 
were free to purchase from other manufacturers who would offer better prices.  
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all discount policies in the predatory pricing scheme, and 
applying the latter restrictively. In particular, in order to avoid 
false positives, and proscribe a pro-competitive conduct as 
anticompetitive, the Court “carefully limited the circumstances 
under which plaintiffs can state a Sherman Act claim by alleging 
that prices are too low”507. 
 
In its Report on Unilateral Exclusionary Conducts, the 
Department of Justice (DoJ) confirmed that loyalty rebates are 
substantially not predatory and pro-competitive, but has 
conceded that these schemes may have anticompetitive effects 
when they keep rival firms from reaching an efficient dimension 
on a monopolized market, in which customers have incentives to 
purchase either the whole or the majority of their requirement for 
the product from the dominant firm508.  
In order to gauge the anticompetitive effects of the conduct, the 
DoJ applies the predation test to the loyalty schemes, with some 
temperaments: plaintiff should be required to demonstrate that 
the discount forecloses a significant amount of the market and 
harms competition. The competition harm should be estimated 
along with the ability of the plaintiff to remain in the market after 
the discount campaign of the dominant firm. Furthermore, the 
loyalty discount should be illegal when 1) it has no pro-
competitive benefits, or 2) the anticompetitive effects outweigh the 
benefits509. 
However, in 2009 the Antitrust Division of the DoJ has formally 
withdrawn the Report, in the wake of an increased awareness on 
the potential anticompetitive consequences of loyalty rebates, and 
with a view to pursue more aggressively cases in which the 
monopolist abuses its dominance to harm consumers and dampen 
competition.  
The renewed interest in loyalty rebates and the expurgation of the 
Report has determined a new approach of the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) when it comes to policing sec. 5 § 45 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act510, which prohibits unfair methods 
of competition affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices affecting commerce; the leading case is Intel, where FTC 
has investigated the loyalty and exclusive-dealing schemes of 
Intel, the dominant manufacturer of microprocessors and general 
                                                
507 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120 (2009) 
508 Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, (2008), p. 110 available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf  
509 Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, (2008), p. 117 available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf  
510 15 USC § 41, Title 15 › Chapter 2 › Subchapter I › § 45, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/FTC_Act_IncorporatingUS_SAFE_WEB_Act.pdf  
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processor units511. Amongst the contested practices was a price 
decrease conditioned to the purchase of the whole or the majority 
of requirement from the dominant firm, which resulted even more 
penalizing, because customers who would purchase from other 
suppliers were also deprived of technical and commercial 
assistance from the defendant. 
FTC complained that Intel supplied an essential portion of the 
processor unit market and was the only manufacturer capable of 
satisfying the whole demand in that market512. Within that context, 
the discount policy of the dominant firm had the effect of inducing 
customers not to buy from other customers and, therefore, 
foreclosing competition513. In its complaint, the FTC suggested the 
measure of barring Intel from fixing prices to the level of its 
predecessors “so that the incremental price to a customer of 
microprocessors or GPUs sold in competition with another 
competitor is below cost when such price includes all rebates, 
payments, or other price decreases on other products not in 
competition”514.  
The dispute was settled by means of an agreement between FCT 
and Intel; however, that did not preclude scholars from expressing 
concern for the new extensive interpretation of sec. 5 § 45, which 
normally only seeks to protect consumers from predatory or 
unfair business practices, yet irrelevant to antitrust law, to 
antitrust complaints, in a way to circumvent the strict 
interpretation and enforcement of § 2 of the Sherman Act as 
regards rebates and exclusive dealing515. 
 
The embedding of loyalty discounts in the predation scheme of 
American jurisprudence reflects two attitudes of scholarship: 1) 
the fear that a more intense enforcement with regard to these 
practices would create false positives, whose forbearance in the 
common law realm would be even more costly than in the civil 
law one -based on the vis of the stare decisis-; 2) the assumption 
that antitrust law is better off tolerating a false negative than a 
                                                
511 In re Intel Corp., Docket No. 9341 (Federal Trade Commission,  December 
16th, 2009) 
512 In re Intel Corp., Docket No. 9341 (Federal Trade Commission,  December 
16th, 2009), para. 8 
513 In re Intel Corp., Docket No. 9341 (Federal Trade Commission,  December 
16th, 2009), para. 9 
514 In re Intel Corp., Docket No. 9341 (Federal Trade Commission,  December 
16th, 2009), para. 21 
515 J.D. Wright, An Antitrust Analysis of the Federal Trade Commission’s Complaint 
Against Intel, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-27, 2010, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1624943; D.A. Crane, Predation Analysis 
and the FTC’s Case Against Intel, University of Michigan Law & Economics 
Empirical Legal Studies Center Paper No. 10-014, 2010, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1617364  
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false positive516, because false negatives are limited by the inherent 
tendency of monopolistic positions to come to an end.  
The conservative position of scholarship has thus induced Courts 
to police loyalty rebates restrictively, on an error-cost basis.  
Having that said, it must be noticed that, after 2009, the DoJ has 
analyzed loyalty schemes in light of the principles of exclusive 
dealing, proscribing the conditioning of proportionally increasing 
discounts to the circumstance that beneficiaries would not venture 
together with rival companies517. This path has not been followed 
by the Courts, which find more reassuring to apply the predation 
test: if and when the Supreme Court were invested with the 
cognizance of a complaint regarding a loyalty rebate scheme of a 
dominant firm, it is believed that it would have the same attitude 
as lower courts. 
 
13. Exclusive dealing 
Exclusive dealing, which in Europe is also referred to as “single 
branding”, is an arrangement by virtue of which a firm induces an 
input supplier to deal with it but not with its competitors518. The 
most common form of exclusive dealing is an agreement pursuant 
to which a retailer purchases the entire requirement of a product 
from the manufacturer, agreeing not to deal in competing 
products.  
Exclusive dealing agreements may be found to have pro-
competitive effects, when they are not motivated by 
anticompetitive scopes. Arrangements that raise antitrust concerns 
are those that foreclose competitors of the supplier from the 
market, or raise the price of competitors’ price and can give rise to 
liability under various antitrust and competition theories of laws.   
Specifically, exclusive dealing arrangements have been challenged 
under four provisions of the United States antitrust laws:  (1) 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which proscribes horizontal 
agreements and contracts “in restraint of trade”; (2) Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act; (3) Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits 
exclusivity arrangements involving the sale of goods that may 
“substantially lessen competition” or tend to create a monopoly; 
and (4) sec. 5 § 45 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which 
                                                
516 F.H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Texas Law Review 1, 1984 
517  Department of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Texas 
Hospital Prohibiting Anticompetitive Contracts with Health Insurers, February 25th, 
2011, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2011/267648.htm  
518 A.D. Melamed, Thoughts About Exclusive Dealing, 12th Annual Competition 
Law and Policy Workshop Robert Schuman Centre, 8-9 June 2007 EUI, 
Florence, available at 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007%28pdf%29/200709-
COMPed-Melamed.pdf  
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forbids unfair methods of competition to the detriment of 
consumers.        
Under both § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act, 
exclusive dealing arrangements are evaluated under the rule of 
reason519, whereby on a number of factors are taken into account 
to assess the lessening of competition, including:  the defendant’s 
market power; the degree of foreclosure from the market; barriers 
to entry; the duration of the contracts; whether exclusivity has the 
potential to raise competitors’ costs; the presence of actual or 
likely anticompetitive effects; and legitimate business 
justifications.  
Furthermore, an arrangement may be treated as exclusive dealing 
even if there is no express contractual requirement that parties 
deal exclusively, but if parties de facto only deal with each other520. 
The Supreme Court has analyzed exclusive dealing arrangements 
formulating a “quantitative substantially test”, which measures 
whether the foreclosure of competition is substantial by looking at 
the percentage of the market foreclosed to competitors as a result 
of the arrangement521. 
In Tampa Electric Co.522, however, the Court changed course and 
introduced what became known as the “qualitative substantiality” 
test, which requires a more detailed analysis of the market and the 
particular circumstances surrounding the arrangement. Thus, the 
later approach calls for an application of the rule of reason.  
Within the confines of the present analysis, exclusive dealing 
arrangements can only be surveyed with regard to the scope of § 2 
of the Sherman Act. Thus, while the actus reus embedded in an 
exclusive dealing arrangement is generally the same whether the 
arrangement itself is challenged under Section 1 or 2 of the 
                                                
519 See supra, paras. 6 and 6.1 
520 For example Microsoft Corp. required computer manufacturers to pay a 
royalty on every computer they shipped, whether or not the Microsoft OS was 
installed, by virtue of a dealing arrangement named “per processor license”, 
which resulted in the burden to pay two license feed in order to install a 
competing operating system. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) 
521 Standard Oil Co. of California (Standard Stations) v. United States, 337 U.S. 
293 (1949). Standard Oil was the largest seller of gasoline in Western United 
States. It entered into an exclusive arrangement with 16% of independent 
retailer sellers of the region. The sale of the independent retailers amounted to 
7% (or 58 million) of the market for retail gasoline. The issue before the Court 
was whether the arrangement could actually or potentially lessen competition, 
or have the tendency to establish a monopoly, pursuant to § 3 of the Clayton 
Act. The Court applied the quantitative substantially test and concluded that an 
exclusivity contract foreclosing competition on 7% (or 58 million) of the market 
had enough adverse effects that the substantial standard of § 3 of the Clayton 
Act was met. Compare K.H. Hilton, Antitrust Law – Economic Theory and 
Common Law Evolution, Cambridge, University Press, p. 303 (2003) 
522 Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) 
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Sherman Act, or Section 3 of the Clayton Act, there is growing 
support for the view that conduct -which does not constitute an 
illegal exclusive dealing arrangement under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act or Section 3 of the Clayton Act- can still violate 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act523.   
In fact, Courts have held that a monopolist may be held to a 
different standard than a non-dominant firm in the context of 
exclusive dealing arrangements.  This view finds support in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Tampa Electric Co524, which states that 
the “relative strength of the parties” is a factor to consider in 
determining whether there is substantial foreclosure from the 
market.   
In Microsoft Corp., 253, the D.C. Circuit addressed the differences 
between exclusive dealing under Section 1 and Section 2, and held 
that the “basic prudential concerns relevant to §§ 1 and 2 are 
admittedly the same… [but] a monopolist’s use of exclusive 
contracts, in certain circumstances, may give rise to a § 2 violation 
even though the contracts foreclose less than the roughly 40% or 
50% share usually required in order to establish a § 1 violation”.   
Courts have subsequently held that exclusive dealing 
arrangements upheld under Section 1 or Section 3 of the Clayton 
Act may still violate Section 2525.  Having that stated, while many 
exclusive dealing arrangements do not raise competitive concerns, 
a careful analysis of the factors discussed above should be 
undertaken prior to entering into such an agreement, particularly 
if a firm has dominant market power.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
523 A.D. Melamed, Thoughts About Exclusive Dealing, 12th Annual Competition 
Law and Policy Workshop Robert Schuman Centre, 8-9 June 2007 EUI, 
Florence, available at 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007%28pdf%29/200709-
COMPed-Melamed.pdf  
524 Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 329 (1961) 
525 LePage’s Inc. v. 3M Co., 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Dentsply 
Int’l, 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005); and NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 457 F.3d 534 (6th 
Cir. 2006).  
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Commission’s Enforcement Communication; 9.4.1 The relevance 
of Average Avoidable Costs; 9.4.2 The Commission’s 
understanding of the recoupment requirement; 9.5 The law of 
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predation in a nutshell; 9.6 Economic thinking of predation; 9.7 
Final remarks on the EU law of predation. 
 
 
 
1. Introductory remarks: historical origins of article 102 
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (hereinafter TFEU) disciplines the abuse of dominant 
position. It is the most updated version of article 82 of the Rome 
Treaty (or EC Treaty – 1957) and complements the EC 
Competition Law dealing with agreements (article 101 TFEU) by 
sanctioning the abusive unilateral conducts of firms with a 
substantial market power, with a view to ensuring a system of free 
competition, in light of article 4 of the EC Treaty, which states the 
activities of the Community and its Member States should be 
conducted “in accordance with the principle of an open market 
economy with free competition”. 
The first paragraph of article 102 reads as follows: 
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it 
may affect trade between Member States”526. 
The origin of the wording and of the meaning of article 102 is 
blurry, partly because there are not many background documents 
on article 82 and on the EC Treaty in general, nor of the 1955 
Messina Conference, when the travaux preparatoires of the Rome 
Treaty began. Scholars agree that the German ordo-liberal 
thinking had a significant impact on the shaping of the law of 
abusive dominance in the European Community527.  
A second source for article 102 was the European Coal and Steel 
Community Treaty (ECSCT), created by the 1951 Paris Treaty, 
which encompassed a number of provisions regarding 
competition among firms. In particular, the ECSCT sought to 
guarantee equal access to the market for coal and steal to 
consumers, to ensure the lowest price in transactions without that 
implying a higher price by the same undertaking in a different 
transaction, to expand and promote international trade 528 . 
Moreover, the ECSCT contained two competition law provisions, 
the first one prohibiting cartels and horizontal agreements 
between firms, the second one prohibiting vertical concentrations 
                                                
526  Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E102:EN:HTML  
527 See infra, Chapter III, para. 13 
528 Article 3 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (1951), available 
at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties
_ecsc_en.htm  
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
164 
 
and abuse of economic power529. Article 66(7) firstly referred to the 
idea of dominance over a substantial part of the common market 
for the products whose jurisdiction pertained to the High 
Authority (the predecessor of the actual Commission).  
Last but not least, article 102 echoes the intellectual role of the 
American Antitrust lawyers, who provided a solid expertise 
during the negotiation of the European Treaties530, and of the 
Unites States in general for both political and economic reasons; 
on the one hand, the United States was an occupying power in 
West Germany, whereas on the other hand it reinforced its 
influence over Europe thanks to the Marshall Plan, which 
contributed to the abolition of trade barriers among Member 
States with a view to recovering from the devastation of World 
War II531.  
                                                
529 Article 66(7) of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (1951). “If 
the High Authority finds that public or private undertakings which, in law or in 
fact, hold or acquire in the market for one of the products within its jurisdiction 
a dominant position shielding them against effective competition in a 
substantial part of the common market are using that position for purposes 
contrary to the objectives of this Treaty, it shall make to them such 
recommendations as may be appropriate to prevent the position to be so used”. 
Available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties
_ecsc_en.htm  
530 In his Memoires, Jean Monnet recalls that Robert Bowie, a professor of 
antitrust law at Harvard school of law, who had been assigned the drafting of 
the competition law provisions of the ECSCT, which he designed by relying on 
the American antitrust tradition.  J. Monnet, Memoires, Paris, 1976, p. 413. The  
531 D.L. McLachlan & D. Swann, Competition Policy in the European Community, 
London, (1967), p. 196 et seq; B.E. Hawk, Antitrust in the EEC – The First Decade, 
41 Fordham L. Rev. 229 1972-1973. In spite of the American contribution to the 
competition law provisions of the ECSCT, there were and there are political, 
philosophical and substantial differences between article 102 and § 2 of the 
Sherman Act. The Sherman Act was passed in a context of a great suspicion for 
the adverse effects on people of trusts, monopolies and corporations, forms of 
industrial organizations that had dominated the US economy from the mid 
1850s’. European Competition law was arose out of the desire to eliminate trade 
barriers among those States that, up to 1945, had fought a fratricide war, in 
order to reassure stability and peace. 
The philosophical underpinning of the two legislations is also different: in the 
US it is believed that market forces can self correct market inefficiencies better 
than the government intervention, and that an excessive intrusion of the latter 
in economic matters could actually chill competition. Therefore, the approach of 
the Courts in enforcing § 2 is less interventionist, also on the grounds of the fact 
that the consequence for an antitrust violation pursuant to § 2 can be much 
more onerous for the defendant, since Courts can award treble damages 
(generally amounting to three times the actual damages), unlike the EU Courts 
that can only award single damages. In the US, private enforcement of antitrust 
law is prevalent than public enforcement compared to the EU (where it is still at 
an embryonic stage), which helps explain the reluctance of government 
agencies in intervening in litigation or in directly enforcing the law. The more 
interventionist approach of the EU is also justified by the nature itself of the 
Union, a confederation of States, each one with national interest that might 
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The application of article 102 has evolved with time; more 
specifically, three distinct phases can be identified:  
1) In the first two decades there was virtually no application, and 
the overall policy objective of the Communities was quite the 
opposite, seeking to consolidate the European industry after the 
war, rather than to quash enterprises with great market power.  
2) Starting from the mid 1970s’, the first judicial outcomes 
outlined the guidelines for interpreting the article532.  
3) From the mid 1980s’ to the present, the Commission applied 
these foundational guidelines to seek a more pressing enforcement 
of the abuse of dominant position law 533 , and both the 
Commission and the European Courts strived for a more coherent 
and economic-oriented approach534. 
 
1.1 Elements of the abuse of dominant position 
The actus reus embedded in the provision is the exploitation of a 
dominant firm of its market power with a view to strategically 
excluding one or more rivals, to the detriment of consumers. The 
normative elements for the finding of abusive dominance are: 1) 
the existence of an undertaking; 2) the subsistence of a position of 
dominance on a defined substantial part of the common market; 3) 
the commission of an abuse; 4) the harm to the inter-state trade of 
Member state. 
With regard to the notion of “undertaking”, the confines of the 
present analysis do not allow to extensively examine the meaning 
of the term. The lack of a definition of undertaking in the EC 
                                                                                                                                                            
justify some distortions of competition, such as state monopolies, or the 
remainder of the central state control over the economy of some newly entrants, 
former member States of the Eastern block. 
From a substantive perspective, while article 102 sanctions the exploitation of a 
dominant position over a market, not the mere possession of it, § 2 sanctions the 
mere conduct that creates or attempts to create a monopoly, regardless of a 
prior finding of a dominant position. Dominance is a mere presumption that 
certain conducts seek to eliminate rivals. 
532 Ex multis, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 21.02.1973, Case 6/72, [1973], ECR 215; United Brands 
Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European 
Communities, 14.02.1978, Case 27/76, [1978], ECR 207; Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. 
AG v Commission of the European Communities, 13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 
461; NV L’Oreal and SA L’Oreal v. De Nieuwe AMCK, 10.12.1980, 31/80, 1980, 
ECR 3775. 
533 Within the confines of the present essay, the Commission decisions will not 
be analyzed, by virtue of their nature of  “soft law” in the mass of EU law, and 
of the fact that in most of the cases regarding abuse of dominant position they 
have been appealed to the European Courts. Thus, the core object of the paper 
will be the definition of a jurisprudential notion of abuse of dominant position, 
by reference to the case law of the EU Courts. 
534 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359; Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European 
Communities, 14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951 
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treaty has left room to a broad interpretation of the notion by the 
EU Competition authorities. In sum, “Undertaking” stands for any 
person or company engaged in an economic activity, regardless 
pervasive of whether it possesses legal personality, or of its way of 
subsidizing itself535, or of whether or not it is profit-oriented, or of 
how it distributes its profits536.  
What is relevant to EU Competition law is that the firm engages in 
any activity of production and/or trade of products and/or 
services. Thus, the criterion adopted is functional: if the activity 
engaged complies with an economic necessity and positions itself 
on the market, it will be subject to competition law; conversely, if 
the activity fulfills a different type of necessity (health, culture, 
ethics, philanthropy), it cannot be regarded as an entrepreneurial 
activity and it will be unleashed from competition law 
constraints537. 
With regard to the second element, “dominance” is a position of 
economic strength on a defined inter-state market, which is 
narrowed down by analyzing the categories of products that 
consumers regard as direct substitutes, on the one hand, and the 
                                                
535 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elsner v. Macrotom GmbH, Case C-41/90, 23.04.1991, 
[1991], ECR I-1979; Compare also Polypropylene, Commission Decision, 
23.04.1986, 86/398/EEC, published on OJ L/230-1, 19.08.1991, para. 99 “The 
subjects of EEC competition rules are undertakings, a concept which is not 
identical with the question of legal personality for the purposes of company law 
or fiscal law. The term “undertaking” is not defined in the Treaty. It may, 
however, refer to any entity engaged in commercial activities and in the case of 
corporate bodies may refer to a parent or to a subsidiary or to the unit formed 
by the parent and subsidiaries together”. 
This broad notion of undertaking has led to apply the abuse of dominant 
position law to several enterprises, including trade associations (Nederlandse 
Vereniging voor de fruit- en groentenimporthandel, Nederlandse Bond van grossiers in 
zuidvruchten en ander geimporteerd fruit "Frubo" v Commission of the European 
Communities and Vereniging de Fruitunie, 15.05.1975, Case 71-74, [1975] ECR 563), 
sporting enterprises (Laurent Piau v Commission of the European Communities, 
26.01.2005, Case T-193/02, [2005] ECR II-209), self-employed professionals 
(Consiglio Nazionale degli Spedizionieri Doganali v Commission of the European 
Communities, 30.03.2000, Case T-513/93, ECR [2000], II-1807), professional 
bodies regulating the entry into a profession (J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and 
Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde 
van Advocaten, intervener: Raad van de Balies van de Europese Gemeenschap, 
19.02.2002, Case C-309/99 ECR [2002] I-1577) public bodies carrying an 
economic activity (Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds 
Textielindustrie, 21.09.1999, Case C-67/96, ECR [1999] I-5751), agricultural 
cooperatives (Coöperatieve Stremsel- en Kleurselfabriek v Commission of the 
European Communities, 25.03.1981, Case 61-80, ECR [1981] 851), and non-profit 
firms (Distribution of package tours during the 1990 World Cup, Commission 
Decision, 27.10.1992, 92/521/EEC, published on OJ L/326, 12.11.1992)  
536 Distribution of package tours during the 1990 World Cup, Commission Decision, 
27.10.1992, 92/521/EEC, published on OJ L/326, 12.11.1992, para. 31 
537 C. Roth, La notion d’entreprise selon la jurisprudence recent relative à l’article 85 
du Traite CEE, in Various Authors, Antitrust fra diritto nazionale e diritto 
comunitario, Milan, p. 24, (1996) 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
167 
 
area in which the product is marketed, in which the economic 
power of the undertaking at issue renders the conditions of 
competition sufficiently homogeneous, on the other hand. Once 
the relevant market is established, the evaluation of dominance 
implies the calculation of market shares of the firm, by accounting 
for the barriers to entry and other factors, such as economies of 
scale and network effects that might affect the relevant threshold. 
The substantial part of the common market refers to the 
magnitude of the abuse: EC competition law is not involved with 
localized matters, but only with conducts that are likely to affect 
the trade between one or more Member States. This requirement is 
almost always met, because even a single port in a Member State 
can be a substantial part of the relevant market538. 
With regard to the abuse, the traditional scholastic account of the 
concept distinguishes among 1) exploitative abuses, targeted at 
the vertical relationships of the firm, i.e. with its suppliers or with 
the customers (i.e. high prices); 2) anticompetitive or exclusionary 
abuses, targeted at the horizontal relationship of the firm, i.e. with 
its competitors (exclusion of rivals), and 3) reprisal abuses that can 
have both vertical and horizontal effects (retaliation for dealing 
with rivals)539. 
With regard to the last element, the abuse should affect the inter-
state trade of Member State, in order to be a matter of EU and not 
national competition law. 
 
1.2 The goals of article 102 – preliminary remarks 
It is worthwhile to introduce the main policy goals that 
historically have characterized the enactment and the 
interpretation of article 102, which will be discussed more 
analytically throughout this chapter, and in the comparative 
analysis. 
The Commission has always played a pivotal role in guiding the 
interpretation of the Treaties; with regard to article 102, it has 
highlighted the objectives of the law of exclusionary abuses, are 
reflected on the whole article at issue: “The objective of article 82 
[article 102] is the protection of competition on the market as a 
means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient 
allocation of resources. Effective competition brings benefits to 
consumers, such as low prices, high quality products, a wide 
selection of goods and services, and innovation”540. 
                                                
538 Corsica Ferries France SA v. Gruppo Antichi Ormeggiatori del Porto di Genova 
Coop. arl. and others, 19.06.1998, Case C-266/96, [1998], ECR I-1783 
539 J. Temple Lang, Some Aspects of Abuse of Dominant Positions in European 
Community Antitrust Law, 3 Fordham Int. L. J., Issue 1, p. 17, (1979-1980) 
540 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005, para. 4 
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A constantly recurring standard in EC Competition Law is the 
protection of consumer welfare, which is outlined as the difference 
in what a person is willing to pay for a commodity and the 
amount he/she is actually required to pay541. Increases in price for 
a product over a persistent period of time have two negative 
effects on consumer welfare: on the one hand, they cause a 
transfer of wealth from consumers to firms, since the former 
purchase the good or the service at a higher price than in a 
competitive market; on the other hand, they destroy rents by 
forcing some consumers with “shallower pockets” to exit the 
market. Article 102 does not sanction the mere possession of a 
dominant position, but the exploitation of it to unlawfully dampen 
competition on a market.  
The provision at stake cannot be read but in conjunction with 
other provisions of the TFUE and with other policy goals of the 
EU integration. First and foremost, the law of abuse of dominant 
position cannot impede the fostering of the internal market. Firms 
are generally barred from taking initiatives that reduce trade 
between member states, even though there is some reluctance to 
see competition law provisions as a means to promote this general 
policy objective of the Treaty542. 
Another wide policy goal affecting the application of article 102 is 
the promotion of fairness and the protection of small and medium 
enterprises. The notion of fairness appears to derive from the 
German Ordoliberal thinking that maintained that big businesses 
should not hamper the activity of small ones543. Moreover, the ban 
of “unfair” prices and contractual terms is expressly stated in 
paragraph (a) of article 102 as a means to promote fairness from a 
twofold perspective, the consumers’ and the SMEs’ one544. 
                                                
541 M. Motta, Competition Policy, Theory and Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 18. The author draws an interesting distinction between 
economic welfare, the aggregate welfare of different groups or industries in the 
economy and the single industry welfare, which is the aggregate of consumer 
surplus and producer surplus. Producer surplus is the sum of all profits made 
by producers in an industry, whereas consumer surplus (or welfare) is the 
difference between how much he is willing to pay for a good and how much he 
actually pays for it. 
542  Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias (SYFAIT) and others v. 
GlaxoSmithKline plc and GlaxoSmithKline AEVE, 31.05.2005, Case 53/03, ECR I-
4609. The case concerned the reduction of a dominant pharmaceutical 
manufacturer of supplies for traders who would parallel export the supplies to 
foreign markets with higher prices. The refuse to supply was held abusive by 
the Court, on the grounds of the adverse effect on the intra-community trade. 
However, the Advocate General concluded that the refusal to supply for 
parallel trade could be justified by the specificity of the pharmaceutical sector, 
which cannot be affected by market integration concerns. 
543 See more in details infra, Chapter III, para. 13 
544 The achievement of general fairness is extraneous to the policy goals of §2 of 
the Sherman Act.  
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2. The relevant market 
Both the definition and the narrowing of a relevant market are 
essential to EU competition law scopes. With respect to the abuse 
of dominant position under article 102, the identification of the 
relevant market is a crucial prerequisite to any inquiry on an 
alleged abuse545; matter-of-factly, the Community Courts have 
consistently affirmed that the assessment of dominance is to 
depart from the delineation of the relevant market546.  
Once the relevant market is determined, it will be possible to 
determine the market shares of a firm and assess whether its 
dominance violates article 102; furthermore, market definition is 
essential to define the competitive constraints on the exercise of 
market power of a firm that originate from the ease of entering the 
market for potential competitors. As well as in the US model, the 
relevant market implies has a twofold dimension, a product and a 
geographic one. 
The definition of the relevant market has been one of the most 
complex issues of EU competition law and policy, due to the 
absence of a definition of market of reference until recent times. 
In fact, in 1990 –and in 1994- the Form CO relating to the 
notification of a concentration pursuant to Regulation (EEC) no 
4064/89 of 21.12.1989 was published547, which reads as follows: 
 
“The relevant product and geographic markets determine the 
scope within which the market power of the new entity resulting 
from the concentration must be assessed.  
The notifying party or parties shall provide the data requested 
having regard to the following definitions:  
A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or 
services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by 
the consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, their 
prices and their intended use. A relevant product market may in 
some cases be composed of a number of individual products 
                                                
545 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461 para. 38; G. Bruzzone, L’individuazione del 
mercato rilevante nella tutela della concorrenza, in Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato (eds.), Temi e Problemi, p. 12 June 1995  
546 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 21.02.1973, Case 6/72, [1973], ECR 215, para. 32.; United Brands 
Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European 
Communities, 14.02.1978, Case 27/76, [1978], ECR 207, para. 10; NV L’Oreal and 
SA L’Oreal v. De Nieuwe AMCK, 10.12.1980, 31/80, 1980, ECR 3775, para. 25; 
AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 51; Kish Glass & CO Ltd. v Commission of the 
European Communities, 30.03.2000, T-65/96, 2000, ECR II-1885, para. 62, 
confirmed in appeal Kish Glass & Co Ltd v. Commission Case C-241/00 P [2001] 
ECR I-7159, paragraph 41. 
547 Published on the Official Journal, OJ L 377, 31.12.1994 
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and/or services, which present largely identical physical or 
technical characteristics and are interchangeable.  
Factors relevant to the assessment of the relevant product market 
include the analysis of why the products or services in these 
markets are included and why others are excluded by using the 
above definition, and having regard to, e. g. substitutability, 
conditions of competition, prices, cross-price elasticity of demand 
or other factors relevant for the definition of the product markets.  
The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the 
undertakings concerned are involved in the supply of relevant 
products or services, in which the conditions of competition are 
sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from 
neighboring geographic areas because, in particular, conditions of 
competition are appreciably different in those areas.  
Factors relevant to the assessment of the relevant geographic 
market include the nature and characteristics of the products or 
services concerned, the existence of entry barriers, consumer 
preferences, appreciable differences of the undertakings’ market 
shares between neighboring geographic areas or substantial price 
differences”.  
 
The definition of market of the Form CO is applied to dominance 
cases pursuant to article 102. The equivalence shows the intent of 
the Commission to build a common framework to police the three 
main areas of EU competition law, namely articles 101 and article 
102 of the TFEU, and the EC merger regulation548.  
Notwithstanding the theoretical proximity, the concept of relevant 
market as under article 102 and relevant market as under the EC 
merger regulation maintain a number of differences, in particular 
when it comes to the scopes of such definitions. In the merger 
control, the purpose of defining the market is to identify the 
competitive constraints faced by the merging parties at pre-
merging price, without questioning the legitimacy of those prices.  
Conversely, in the dominance cases the delimitation of the 
relevant market is used to establish whether the firm under 
investigation has illegitimate market power, based on the 
competitive constraints faced by its competitors at competitive 
prices. Hence, the market definition under article 102 is more 
                                                
548 The definition of the relevant market in Form CO is employed by the ECJ in 
the case law concerning the abuse of dominant position In United Brands 
Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European 
Communities, Case 14.02.1978, [1978] Case-27/76, ECR 207, para. 12-35 and in 
NV L’Oreal and SA L’Oreal v. De Nieuwe AMCK, 10.12.1980, 31/80, 1980, ECR 
3775, para. 25, the Court affirmed that “The possibilities of competition must be 
judged in the context of the market comprising the totality of the products 
which, with respect to their characteristics, are particularly suitable for 
satisfying constant needs and are only to a limited extent interchangeable with 
other products”. 
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ambiguous because of the difficulty of establishing whether a 
price is competitive, as opposed to identifying the relevant market 
in the merger cases, where the pre-merging prices are readily 
observable. 
The Form CO definition bears a significant resemblance with the 
US concept of relevant market, in particular as regards the 
emphasis on the substitutability of two products. However, unlike 
the US experience, the Form does not provide any indication as to 
the degree of substitutability between two products or guidelines 
to determine such degree. 
With regard to the relevant geographic market, the Form does not 
provide any guidance to evaluate whether the competition 
conditions are sufficiently homogeneous in an area and 
sufficiently different from the surrounding ones.  
The shortcomings of the Form have been partly amended after the 
Commission has published its Notice on the Definition of 
Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition 
Law549, in which it is affirmed: 
 
Market definition is a tool to identify and define the boundaries of 
competition between firms. It serves to establish the framework 
within which competition policy is applied by the Commission. 
The main purpose of market definition is to identify in a 
systematic way the competitive constraints that the undertakings 
involved (2) face. The objective of defining a market in both its 
product and geographic dimension is to identify those actual 
competitors of the undertakings involved that are capable of 
constraining those undertakings’ behavior and of preventing them 
from behaving independently of effective competitive pressure. It 
is from this perspective that the market definition makes it 
possible inter alia to calculate market shares that would convey 
meaningful information regarding market power for the purposes 
of assessing dominance or for the purposes of applying Article 
101. 
 
2.1 The relevant product market  
As it has been observed above, the European Commission 
acknowledges a twofold definition of relevant market, 
encompassing both a product and a geographic dimension. The 
product market comprises 
 
                                                
549  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, published on the Official Journal, OJ C 372, 
09.12.1997, 5 
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All those products and/or services which are regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the 
products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended use550; 
 
Whereas, the relevant geographic market 
 
Comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned are 
involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in 
which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous 
and which can be distinguished from neighboring areas because 
the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those 
areas551. 
  
The relevant product market is defined in terms of 
interchangeability. Interchangeability is the extent to what one 
product can be replaced in the market because of its features, 
application or usefulness for a specified purpose552. 
When it comes to the relevant product market, the issue rests on 
establishing whether product A and product B belong or do not 
belong to the same market. It is often the case that the inclusion of 
product B would be enough to remove any competition concerns. 
Product characteristics and intended use are insufficient to show 
whether two products are demand substitutes. Functional 
interchangeability or similarity in characteristics may not, in 
themselves, provide sufficient criteria, because the responsiveness 
of customers to relative price changes may be determined by other 
considerations as well. The Notice provides several types of 
evidence to define the relevant product market: 
(1) Evidence of substitution in the recent past 553 : when this 
information is available, it will normally define the market; 
(2) Quantitative tests 554 : these econometric and statistical tests 
estimate of elasticity and cross-price elasticity for the demand of a 
product.  
(3) Views of customers and competitors 555 : the Commission will 
consider consumer and manufactures’ reactions to increases in 
price in the candidate geographic area small amount (5-10%) 
(4) Consumer preferences 556 : the Commission can commission 
marketing studies to gather the direct views of end consumers 
about substitute products  
                                                
550 Official Journal, OJ C 372, 09.12.1997, 5, para. 7 
551 Official Journal, OJ C 372, 09.12.1997, 5, para. 8 
552 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, Case 14.02.1978, 27/76, ECR 207, 1978 
553  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, published on the Official Journal, OJ C 372, 
09.12.1997, 5, paragraph 38 
554 ibidem, paragraph 39, Compare infra, para. 2.1.1., the “critical loss analysis” 
555 ibidem, paragraph 40, see infra, para 3.3 
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(5) Barriers and costs associated with switching demand to potential 
substitutes557; and  
(6) Different categories of customers and price discrimination558.  
 
The relevant product market can also be defined in terms of 
constraints, encompassing all those products that affect the 
conduct of the undertaking under investigation, by imposing a 
competitive restraint on it. 
The main constraint is the demand-side substitution and 
originates from consumers who substitute the product with others 
that they deem interchangeable. A second constraint is the supply-
side substitution and stems from the conduct of competing firms, 
which can produce and place on the market products that are 
demand-side substitutable of the product at stake, in the event of a 
price increase of the dominant firm559. 
With regard to the demand-side substitution, the Commission 
regards it as the fundamental guideline for the narrowing of the 
product market, since it requires a factual assessment of the 
economic circumstances of the case. Consumers will substitute –
interchangeable- products in the event of a price increase of the 
product of the firm at issue. The demand substitutability limits the 
firm’s power to raise prices above competitive level, since the firm 
will be confronted with the choice of increasing the margin per 
unit sold but losing sales because of the substitution effect.   
Demand-side substitution is exclusively determined by consumers, 
regardless of the degree of convergence/commonality that 
products, which are viewed as interchangeable, have: consumers 
will define the product market when they regard other products 
as close substitutes.  
 
2.1.1 The economic inference in the relevant product market: 
demand-side substitutability 
From an economic standpoint, demand-side substitution can be 
evaluated both quantitatively and qualitatively. Qualitative 
analysis is direct and refers to consumers’ “revealed 
preference”560: if consumers react to a price increase of the product 
                                                                                                                                                            
556 ibidem, paragraph 41 
557 ibidem, paragraph 42 
558 ibidem, paragraph 43 
559 R. O’Donogue & A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford 
and Portland, 2006, p. 69 
560 Consumers’ revealed preference is a theory elaborated by the economist Paul 
Samuelson, in his article Consumption Theory in terms of Revealed Preference, 60 
Economica, 1948, pp. 243-253. Consumption can be expressed in terms of 
preferences, which reveal utility functions, namely the benefit that one gets 
from using a good or a service. Supposing that consumers are insatiable, and 
utility functions grow with quantity, utilities themselves are maximized when 
consumers have a budget restraint, and are to limit their consumption of a good 
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of the firm at issue by switching to another product, that is direct 
evidence of the demand-side substitution561. When evidence of the 
substitution between two products is available, that will easily 
define the relevant product market.  
When evidence of the product substitution is not readily available 
from the analysis of consumers’ preference, demand-side 
substitution can be inferred indirectly and quantitatively, by 
means of a counterfactual analysis of the cross price-elasticity of 
the products that consumers are likely to interchange562. Cross-
elasticity is the measurement of the degree of interchangeability of 
two products. If there is an increase in the price for a product and 
it results that many consumers switch to another product, the two 
products will be deemed as part of the same market563. 
With regard to the entity of the price increase deemed suitable to 
trigger the demand-side substitution, the Commission adheres to 
the SNIPP criterion set forth by the American Federal Trade 
Commission, insofar as the market will be narrowed down in 
accordance with the reaction of consumers to a hypothetical small 
but non-transitory price variation of the product, ranging from 5 
to 10%564.  In fact, the Notice on the Relevant Market reads as 
follows: 
The question to be answered is whether the parties’ customers 
would switch to readily available substitutes or to suppliers 
located elsewhere in response to a hypothetical small (in the range 
5 % to 10 %) but permanent relative price increase in the products 
and areas being considered. If substitution were enough to make 
the price increase unprofitable because of the resulting loss of 
sales, additional substitutes and areas are included in the relevant 
market. This would be done until the set of products and 
                                                                                                                                                            
or service. Revealed preference theory assumes that utility functions can be 
empirically deduced from consumer behavior. 
561 Compare Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, published on the Official Journal, OJ C 372, 
09.12.1997, 5, para. 38; 
562 Ibidem, para. 39, which reads: “[T]here are a number of quantitative tests that 
have specifically been designed for the purpose of delineating markets. These 
tests consist of various econometric and statistical approaches estimates of 
elasticities and cross-price elasticities…for the demand of a product, tests based 
on similarity of price movements over time, the analysis of causality between 
price series and similarity of price levels and/or their convergence. The 
Commission takes into account the available quantitative evidence capable of 
withstanding rigorous scrutiny for the purposes of establishing patterns of 
substitution in the past”. 
563 Office for Competition and Consumers’ Protection, Abuse of a dominant 
position, in the light of legal provisions and case law of the European Communities, 
Warsaw, p. 4 (2003), Study prepared by Dariusz Tokarczuk i Wspólnicy, 
Kancelaria Prawna GLN spółka komandytowa. For an economic analysis of 
demand cross-elasticity see Chapter I, paragraphs 3.2.1 and 3.3 
564 For an analysis of the SSNIP criterion See Chapter I, paragraph 3.2.1 
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geographical areas is such that small, permanent increases in 
relative prices would be profitable565. 
A quantitative measurement of the profitability of a price increase 
can be found in the economic literature. Pursuant to the classic 
assumption stemming from the downward-sloped demand curve, 
an increase in the price for a commodity has two opposite effects: 
it raises the profit per unit sold, on the one hand, it decreases 
demand, on the other hand.  
The price increase is thus profitable when the higher profits 
outweigh the loss in sales. Such assessment is made possible 
through the critical loss analysis, which compares the actual losses 
arising from the price increase with the critical-loss threshold, 
which equals the level of sale losses for which a given price 
increase is profitable566. The critical loss is the point at which the 
two opposite effects of the price increase counterpoise each other, 
making the profits after the increase (net profits) equal to the ones 
prior to the increase. In other terms, what amount of sales would 
have to be lost to make a hypothetical price increase unprofitable? 
If the actual losses are higher than the threshold, then the price 
increase itself is not profitable.  
The above analysis implies three steps: 1) the calculation of the 
critical-loss threshold; 2) the calculation of the loss of sales which 
the price increase is likely to bring about 3) the comparison of the 
two figures.  
With regard to the first step, Z is the reduction in output that the 
price increase causes. The critical-loss threshold is the value of Z 
that makes the profits before and after the price increase equal. 
Z = XX +m  
X is the 5 – 10% increase in the price for a product and m is the 
Lerner index, which expresses in percentage the gross margin 
achieved by the monopolist (the percentage difference between 
price and marginal-incremental cost (P-C)/P) and which is equal 
to the reciprocal of the elasticity of the demand curve of the firm 
(m = L = 1/Ed)567. The critical loss is lower when m is higher. 
As regards the second step, the loss in sales resulting from an X 
per cent price increase is expressed by the price elasticity (E) of 
                                                
565  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, published on Official Journal, OJ C 372, 09.12.1997, 5, 
para. 17 
566 The critical loss analysis was elaborated by B.C. Harris & J.J. Simmon, 
Focusing Market Definition, How Much Substitution Is Necessary, 12 Research in 
Law and Economics, 207 et seq., 1989 
567 For an analysis of the Lerner Index see Chapter I, para. 4.2. The Lerner index 
is expressed in percentage: if the price for a product is 100 $ and the Marginal 
Cost (MC) is 40 $, the Lerner index will be (100-40)/100 = 60%. A gross margin 
of zero means that price equals incremental cost, as under perfect competition.  
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demand of the product in the candidate market and expresses the 
amount of sales lost as a result of a small but significant and non 
transitory increase in the price of a product subject to the power of 
the monopolist. A high elasticity reflects a more downward-
sloped demand curve, implying a substantial loss in profits and 
showing that consumers are more responsive to price increases by 
substituting the products subject to the price increase with other 
products. 
As regards the third step, if the price-increase leads to a loss lower 
than the critical loss, the net profit will be positive and the product 
subject to the increase will identify the product market. 
Contrariwise, if the loss is higher than the critical loss, the increase 
will not be profitable and will lead consumers to switch to other 
products, which will have to be included in the relevant market. 
 
An emblematic application of the demand-side substitutability 
scheme can be found in the Wanadoo case 568 , in which the 
Commission had to define the relevant product market in the 
high-speed Internet access sector. In particular, the question 
whether the market included both the ADSL broadband and the 
dial-up narrowband Internet access, or whether the ADSL 
constituted a separate market from the dial-up and the cable-
based access, was controversial. Based on consumers’ behavior, 
the Commission found that there was no significant degree of 
substitutability between the low-speed to the high-speed access, 
since the migration from the former to the latter was “extremely 
asymmetrical” -as opposed to the switch from low to high speed-, 
given the intrinsic features of high-speed access569, amongst which 
were the “always on” opposed to the “dial-up” access, the higher 
download band of the high-speed access, the difference in price 
between residential and business high speed users570. 
The Hoffmann-La Roche case571 is one of the pivotal outcomes of the 
European Courts dealing with the concept of abuse of dominant 
position, which provides useful indications as how to define the 
relevant product market. The Court maintained that the product 
                                                
568 Wanadoo Interactive, Commission Decision, 16.07.2003, COMP/38.233, non 
confidential version available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38233/38233_87_
1.pdf 
569 Wanadoo Interactive, Commission Decision, 16.07.2003, COMP/38.233, para. 
193  
570 Wanadoo Interactive, Commission Decision, 16.07.2003, COMP/38.233, para. 
202  
571 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
177 
 
market encompasses all the products that have a “sufficient 
degree of interchangeability”572.  
The case at bar referred to bulk vitamins belonging to 13 groups, 
of which Hoffmann-La Roche manufactured and marketed 8 (A, 
B1, B2, B3 (pantothenic acid), B6, C, E and H (biotin) and 5 
purchased by Hoffmann-La Roche and resold by it, B12, D, PP, K 
and M)573. The Commission found that there was a dominant 
position in the case of 7 of the 8 groups of vitamins manufactured 
by the claimant. Even though parties agreed that there was no 
interchangeability among the groups, since each one served a 
different metabolizing function, the Commission eventually 
accepted that the C and E groups of vitamins formed part of a 
wider market.  
The Court concurred with the argument that vitamins C and E 
apart from their uses in the pharmaceutical industry and in food 
and animal feed, are also sold for “technological” uses –
antioxidants, fermentation agents and additives-, which uses 
expose them to the competition of other products. Moreover, it 
held that there was no sufficient degree of interchangeability 
between the C and E vitamin groups and the other products that 
could substitute the former for technological uses, since 
Conversely, ECJ case law shows how products that have similar 
characteristics can be included in different markets in accordance 
with their designated use. In the Michelin case574, the Court has not 
included in the same market for tires for heavy vehicles, on the 
one hand, and tires for passenger cars, on the other hand, due to 
material differences in the production technology, equipment or 
tools necessary to manufacture them. The switch from the 
production of light tire lines to the production of heavy tires and 
vice versa required material expenditure of time and funds, which 
indicated that these products are not similar enough to adapt their 
production in the scope of varied market demand. Because of this, 
the two product markets were held separate. 
Another controversial decision regarding the product market is 
the Napier-Brown case, in which the Court distinguished the 
market for industrial sugar, sold in 50-kilo sacks, from the market 
for retail sugar, sold in 1-kilo sacks575. 
 
2.1.2 The scholarly criticism to the Commission’s approach and 
the call for a dynamic definition 
                                                
572 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461, para. 29 
573 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461, para. 23 
574 Michelin v Commission Case C-322/81, 09.11.1983, [1983] ECR 3461 
575 Napier-Brown Commission Decision, 18.07.1988, Case No IV/30/178/CE, 
published on OJ L/284-41, 19.10.1988 
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Some scholars have affirmed that the Commission definition of 
relevant market should depart from the notion of market power, 
since the focus on demand substitutability lacks a sufficiently 
definite economic foundation. In fact, the above definition does 
not clarify what is the significant degree of interchangeability 
between two products, nor does it define the “temporal horizon” 
of substitutability relevant to delimit the market576.  
Furthermore, the Commission does not indicate a sufficient 
number of consumers who should deem a product not 
substitutable with another, therefore making that product market 
relevant to the reach of antitrust law. Following this argument, in 
order to meet the criteria of the Form, it would be sufficient that 
only one consumer would rigidly demand one product, in order 
for that product market to be considered relevant. That would 
imply a rigid definition of market, which would virtually coincide 
with one product577. 
Reference to the monopolist’s power over price would provide a 
more exact appraisal in economic terms of the number of 
consumers who can circumscribe a market.  
Matter-of-factly, a market is relevant when it is characterized by a 
small consumer mobility: a significant increase in the price of a 
product will provoke a minor product substitution or a minor 
change of the geographic area for a small number of consumers, 
so that the raise will be beneficial to the monopolist. A contrario, a 
product market is relevant if it is lacking a sufficient number of 
consumers who would be willing to either substitute the product 
or obtain that same product in another geographic area, therefore 
making the non-competitive price raise of the monopolist non 
profitable. Conversely, a consistent number of “marginal” 
consumers, who would either change product or geographic area 
parallel to the price raise, will guarantee more stable prices. 
The products’ characteristics, their price and their intended use 
are not evaluated in absolute terms, but are considered together 
with all the circumstances of the case, including consumer 
preference.  
Moreover, the price criterion (price test) resulting from the 
definition of the relevant product market is not alternative to the 
product substitutability criterion: the former and the latter 
combined will provide a more effective framework for the 
analysis of the relevant product market in economic terms578.  
                                                
576 G. Bruzzone, L’individuazione del mercato rilevante nella tutela della concorrenza, 
in Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (eds.), Temi e Problemi, p. 
25 June 1995  
577 J. Briones Alonso, Market Definition in Community’s Merger Control Policy, in 
European Competition Law Review, n. 4, p. 199, (1994) 
578 In United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of 
the European Communities, Case 14.02.1978, 27/76, ECR 207, 1978, para. 31. The 
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The product substitutability is not evaluated in accordance with 
the inherent features of the product, but by referring to the general 
use of consumers. More generally, it is not excluded that two 
eminently different products can serve the same use, and be 
included in the same relevant market. Along this line of thinking, 
scholars discern a horizontal and a vertical differentiation: in the 
first hypothesis, the relevant market encompasses products of 
different varieties; in the second, it encompasses products of 
different qualities579. When it comes to both horizontally and 
vertically differentiated products the substitutability analysis is to 
be performed on a casuistic basis, since not always will the 
different characteristics of the products coincide with the existence 
of different product markets. 
 
2.2 The economic inference in the relevant product market: 
supply-side substitutability 
The second constraint is the supply-side substitution, which 
occurs when suppliers of non-substitute products will try to 
compete with the products of the relevant market, by switching 
their production to these products. An example of supply side 
substitution can be found in the Commission Notice: 
A practical example of the approach to supply-side 
substitutability when defining product markets is to be found in 
the case of paper. Paper is usually supplied in a range of different 
                                                                                                                                                            
case involved the identification of the product market for bananas. The Court 
did not avail itself of quantitative evidence, in order to state the extent to what 
consumers would switch to substitute products in the event of a price raise of 
bananas. It based its decision on the analysis of the intrinsic characteristics of 
bananas and their differentiation from other fruits, concluding that the market 
for bananas constituted a separate one from other fruits. See infra, para. 2.4 
579 In the horizontal differentiation, consumers have different preferences for 
different types of products. The typical hypothesis is when there are two stores 
in a town, selling the same product for the same price. Consumers will 
normally prefer to go the nearest shop to their house. If one store were to raise 
prices, some consumers would find it convenient to change provider. Those are 
“marginal” consumers, for whom the disadvantage of the price raise is higher 
than the disadvantage caused by having to shop in a more distant store. In 
order to assess whether each store holds a sufficient market power to isolate a 
separate relevant market, it is to be ascertained whether the amount of marginal 
consumers who would change store in the event of a small but significant 
increase in the price operated by their habitual store would render the increase 
itself non profitable. What is relevant is the extent to what marginal consumers 
will affect the conduct of each firm. 
In the vertical differentiation, the market is characterized by different degrees of 
quality for each type of product: consumers would shop in accordance with 
their proneness to pay more for a better-quality product. In order to define the 
relevant market, it is necessary to analyze whether the power to raise price of 
each seller is diminished by the threat that consumers would prefer the other 
product in terms of price-quality. G. Bruzzone, L’individuazione del mercato 
rilevante nella tutela della concorrenza, in Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e 
del Mercato (eds.), Temi e Problemi, June 1995, p. 33  
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qualities, from standard writing paper to high quality papers to be 
used, for instance, to publish art books. From a demand point of 
view, different qualities of paper cannot be used for any given use, 
i.e. an art book or a high quality publication cannot be based on 
lower quality papers. However, paper plants are prepared to 
manufacture the different qualities, and production can be 
adjusted with negligible costs and in a short time span. In the 
absence of particular difficulties in distribution, paper 
manufacturers are able therefore, to compete for orders of the 
various qualities, in particular if orders are placed with sufficient 
time to allow for modification of production plans. Under such 
circumstances, the Commission would not define a separate 
market for each quality of paper and its respective use. The 
various qualities of paper are included in the relevant market, and 
their sales added up to estimate total market value and volume580. 
Supply-side substitution is equivalent to demand-side substitution 
when it is sufficiently immediate and not excessively costly for 
suppliers. 
Supply-side substitutability may also be taken into account when 
defining markets in those situations in which its effects are 
equivalent to those of demand substitution in terms of 
effectiveness and immediacy. This means that suppliers are able to 
switch production to the relevant products and market them in 
the short term without incurring significant additional costs or 
risks in response to small and permanent changes in relative 
prices. When these conditions are met, the additional production 
that is put on the market will have a disciplinary effect on the 
competitive behavior of the companies involved. Such an impact 
in terms of effectiveness and immediacy is equivalent to the 
demand substitution effect581. 
From an economic standpoint, several conditions are to be met in 
order to include the supply-substitution test in the criteria to 
narrow down the relevant product market.  
1) The assets to produce the relevant products are to be readily 
available, such as know-hows, machineries, infrastructures etc; 
2) The firm can purchase additional assets to produce the relevant 
products without incurring excessive costs; 
3) There is to be an economic incentive for suppliers to produce the 
relevant products; 
4) Suppliers are to be able to modify production from supply-side 
products to the relevant products at no excessive costs –for 
instance- because they have unused plant capacities; 
                                                
580  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, published on the Official Journal, OJ C 372, 
09.12.1997, 5, para. 22 
581 Ibidem, para. 20 
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5) Consumers are to regards suppliers’ products as acceptable 
substitutes for the products under investigation582. 
Aside from these conditions, “most of the suppliers” are to divert 
production to the relevant products in response to a price increase 
of these products583.  
The most renowned case concerning supply-side substitution is 
Continental Can, in which the European Court of Justice annulled 
the Commission’s decision regarding the relevant product market, 
on the grounds -amongst other things- that it had not considered 
supply-side substitution584. The Commission distinguished several 
markets: 1) light containers for canned meat products, 2) light 
containers for canned seafood, 3) metal closures for the food 
packing industry (other than crown corks). According to the ECJ, 
the Commission erred in not considering how these markets 
differed from each other and how they differed from the general 
market for light metal containers. Conversely, in Michelin I the ECJ 
concurred with the Commission’s distinction between markets for 
regular car tires and markets for heavy vehicle car tires, on the 
grounds that the infrastructures, machineries and production 
techniques to produce the latter were significantly different from 
the former. The switch from the production of the heavy tires to 
the regular tires required a significant investment; therefore, the 
two products were not considered as supply-side substitutes. As 
they were not demand-side substitutes either, the ECJ held that 
the two markets were separate585. 
 
2.3 Chains of substitution 
In order for products to be included in the same market, they are 
not to be direct substitutes, but they can be indirect substitutes, 
provided that they are linked through “chains of substitution”. 
Chains of substitution are defined in the Notice on the Relevant 
Market: 
In certain cases, the existence of chains of substitution might lead 
to the definition of a relevant market where products or areas at 
the extreme of the market are not directly substitutable. The 
geographic dimension of a product with significant transport costs 
accounts as an example. In such cases, deliveries from a given 
plant are limited to a certain area around each plant by the impact 
of transport costs. In principle, such an area could constitute the 
                                                
582  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, published on the Official Journal, OJ C 372, 
09.12.1997, 5, para. 21-23 
583 Ibidem, para. 21 
584 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 21.02.1973, Case 6/72, [1973], ECR 215, para. 20 
585 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission, Case 322/81, also 
referred to as “Michelin 1” [1983] ECR 3461, para. 41 
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relevant geographic market. However, if the distribution of plants 
is such that there are considerable overlaps between the areas 
around different plants, it is possible that the pricing of those 
products will be constrained by a chain substitution effect, and 
lead to the definition of a broader geographic market. The same 
reasoning may apply if product B is a demand substitute for 
products A and C. Even if products A and C are not direct 
demand substitutes, they might be found to be in the same 
relevant product market since their respective pricing might be 
constrained by substitution to B586. 
 
2.4 The hypothetical Monopolist Test (HMT): a more rigorous 
approach 
In order to define which products are direct substitutes, the most 
economically rigorous approach is the so called Hypothetical 
Monopolist Test (HMT), under which a market is defined as a 
product or a group of products on which a hypothetical firm, 
constituting the sole producer and seller, could impose a small but 
significant and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP). In other 
terms, the market is the narrowest area on which the hypothetical 
monopolist could exercise his market power. The HMT was first 
elaborated by the US Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission Merger Guidelines587 and has gained success among 
the Community Courts. It is based on both qualitative and 
quantitative evidence and can be applied in practice with 
discretion. 
The HMT is applied through three steps: the first step is the 
identification of the “candidate market” of the monopolist, 
encompassing a set of products whose marketability the 
monopolist aims at controlling588, namely those products subject to 
monopolist practices –such as pricing below cost- and which, 
therefore, undergo investigation.  
The second step is the evaluation of the price increase that the 
monopolist would impose on at least one product, and the effect 
of demand-substitution on the profitability of such increase. In 
particular, it is to be assessed whether in response to the price 
increase consumers would switch to products that are outside the 
candidate market.  
                                                
586  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, published on the Official Journal, OJ C 372, 
09.12.1997, 5, para. 57 
587 First Issue on April 2nd 1992, second issue on April 8th 1997. Available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf  
588 G.J. Werden, The 1992 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical 
Monopolist Paradigm, 71 Antitrust Law Journal, 253-75 (2003). The author defines 
this set of product “the candidate market”. 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
183 
 
The third step involves the assessment of supply-side 
substitutability on the profitability of the price increase, namely 
whether producers of products that are outside the candidate 
market would enter the market and offer substitutable products in 
response to a price increase of the hypothetical monopolist. In that 
event, the candidate market would include those substitutable 
products. 
With regard to assessing the demand-substitutability, the 
Commission and the ECJ rely on both quantitative and qualitative 
evidence. The most consistent quantitative evidence employed in 
the HMT is the afore mentioned SSNIP criterion, which takes into 
consideration the reaction of consumers confronted with a 5 to 
10% price increase of a product over a sustained period of time, 
assuming that the prices of other products remain constant. If data 
show that the price raise is profitable for the monopolist, the 
product market will coincide with the candidate market.  
Conversely, if data show that a sufficient number of consumers 
will switch to another product and render the increase no longer 
profitable, the substitute product will be included in the relevant 
market589.  
The example provided for in the Notice on the Relevant Market 
regards the substitutability of soft drinks of different flavors: if a 
sufficient number of consumers of flavor A switch to flavor B 
when confronted with a permanent 5 to 10% increase for flavor A, 
the market will comprise both flavors590. The market is thus the 
smallest set of products circumscribed through the sufficient 
substitutions in reaction to the price raise for one product591. 
The most consistent qualitative evidence is based on product 
characteristics, consumer preferences and needs. The market is 
defined through the mere analysis of substitutability that may 
hamper the monopolist’s attempt to raise prices in a market 
without the employment of the price raise evidence itself. In other 
terms, qualitative analysis is based on the subjective 
characteristics of products.  
The most important case involving market definition by means of 
qualitative analysis is United Brands, in which both the ECJ and the 
Commission agreed to classify the banana market as a separate 
one from the other fruits by virtue of the inherent characteristics of 
the fruit. The Court affirmed “the banana has certain 
characteristics, appearance, taste, softness, seedlessness, easy 
handling, a constant level of production which enable it to satisfy 
the constant needs of an important section of the population 
                                                
589  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, published on the Official Journal, OJ C 372, 
09.12.1997, 5, para. 17.  
590 Ibidem, para. 18 
591 With regard to the SSNIP evidence, compare Chapter I, para. 3.2.1 
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consisting of the very young, the old and the sick”. Moreover, “the 
specific qualities of the banana influence customer preference and 
induce him not to readily accept other fruits as a substitute”592. 
Even though the Court scrutinized the fact that the banana market 
is influenced by the price change, it asserted that price adapts 
affect competition in an extremely limited way. Moreover, price 
difference and cross-elasticity of demand were solely employed to 
confirm the results of the qualitative analysis593. 
With regard to the employment of supply-substitutability in the 
HMT, the Notice on the Relevant Market sets down three 
parameters594: 1) ability of other suppliers to switch production 
without major additional investment, or sunk costs, namely the 
consideration of the assets needed to produce the relevant 
products; 2) economic incentives of manufacturers to divert 
production, namely the profitability of such switch595; 3) consumer 
reaction. The third parameter is decisive, in that the facts of the 
case are to show that consumers’ behavior is concretely affected 
by the existence of substitute suppliers; more particularly, it must 
be assessed whether consumers will substitute the dominant’s 
firm product(s) with the substitute supplier’s one(s). Consumer’s 
reaction is therefore what renders supply-side substitution 
effective. 
Besides the above three parameters, the Commission further 
requires that “most of the suppliers” are able to offer and sell the 
various qualities immediately and without the significant 
increases in costs described above596. Therefore, irrespective of the 
economic incentive to switching production, the Commission 
requires that a sufficiently large number of suppliers will readily 
respond to an increase in price of the dominant firm by “hopping 
in” the production of that good or service. This situation arises 
when companies market a large range of grade and quality of one 
product. Sometimes, a mere change in the market strategy or in 
the design will reposition a product in a different market at no 
sunk cost, therefore making supply-side substitution relevant for 
                                                
592 In United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of 
the European Communities, Case 14.02.1978, 27/76, ECR 207, 1978, para. 31 
593 T. Kauper, The Problem of Market Definition under EC Competition Law, in B. 
Hawk, International Antitrust Law and Policy: Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
London Sweet and Maxwell, p. 251 (1996)  
594  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, published on the Official Journal, OJ C 372, 
09.12.1997, 5, para. 20 
595 As regards the first two parameters, see supra, para. 2.2 
596  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, published on the Official Journal, OJ C 372, 
09.12.1997, 5, para. 21 
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the narrowing of the product market597. In that respect, in Kish 
Glass & Co Ltd v. Commission598 the ECJ found that the relevant 
float-glass market was the sale of glasses of all thickness, since the 
production technique is identical and manufacturers can readily 
switch production to a certain thickness. 
 
3. The relevant geographic market  
The second dimension of the relevant market pursuant to Article 
102 is the geographic one. The relevant product market has no 
concrete meaning if it is not complemented with its geographic 
projection. At first glance, the relevant geographic market 
functions as background setting, comprising the area in which the 
product is marketed, in which the economic power of the 
undertaking at issue renders the conditions of competition 
sufficiently homogeneous, and therefore the effect of the economic 
power of the undertaking concerned can be evaluated599.  
Under the homogeneity test, the relevant geographic market is the 
area of the Common Market (interstate) where the objective 
conditions of competition applying to the product in question 
must be the same for all traders. However, the application of the 
test might be perturbed by some factors typical of the European 
frame of reference, such as national borders, cultural/linguistic 
barriers, regulatory barriers, national preferences. 
As stated above, three are the features of the relevant geographic 
resulting from the Commission Notice on the relevant market: 
first and foremost, it is to encompass the area in which the 
                                                
597 Other applications of the supply-side substitutability criterion can be found 
in the Commission’s decisions regarding merger cases, which nevertheless 
constitute good case law for the purpose of narrowing the relevant market 
pursuant to Article 102. In Electrolux/AEG, Case IV/M.458 paragraph 9, the 
Commission found that all models/sizes in each product group of major 
domestic appliances were “part of the same product market since their 
intended end uses are the same, and since the core technology and components 
used in the manufacture of these different models are largely identical”. 
Furthermore, it took into consideration the high degree of supply-side 
substitutability, in light of the fact that all major manufacturers produce a full 
range of models and that flexibility of manufacturing lines used to produce 
domestic appliances allows products that are differentiated both technically 
and aesthetically to be manufactured on the same line. In Volvo/Scania, Case 
COMP/M.1672 the Commission affirmed that all types of heavy truck –rigid 
truck, tractor truck of more than 16 tonnes- constitute a single product market, 
on the account that any major European truck producer was virtually able to 
offer a complete range of different heavy trucks, by only having to bear non-
substantial additional costs related to switching from the production of one 
heavy truck to the production of another heavy truck.  
598 Kish Glass & Co Ltd v. Commission Case T-65/96 [2000] ECR II-1885 paragraph 
68, confirmed in appeal Kish Glass & Co Ltd v. Commission Case C-241/00 P 
[2001] ECR I-7159, paragraph 41 
599 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, Case 14.02.1978, 27/76, ECR 207, 1978, paragraph 11 
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undertaking at issue operates by supplying and demanding goods 
or services; furthermore, the conditions of competition in such 
area are to be sufficiently homogeneous; finally, the conditions of 
competition are to be sensibly different from the neighboring 
areas. 
The same constraints defining the relevant product market apply 
also to the geographic market600, which is the result by both 
demand-side substitution and supply-side substitution. As 
regards the first constraint, the geographic market includes all 
those regions where consumers can find suitable substitute 
products for the products of the undertaking under investigation. 
As regards the supply-side, the geographic market includes the 
regions where suppliers, which can readily switch to the 
production of the product of the firm under investigation, operate.  
The Commission Notice on the relevant market sets down three 
fundamental steps to define the geographic market. 
[First], The Commission’s approach to geographic market 
definition might be summarized as follows: it will take a 
preliminary view of the scope of the geographic market on the 
basis of broad indications as to the distribution of market shares 
between the parties and their competitors, as well as a preliminary 
analysis of pricing and price differences at national and 
Community or EEA level. This initial view is used basically as a 
working hypothesis to focus the Commission’s enquiries for the 
purposes of arriving at a precise geographic market definition. 
The reasons behind any particular configuration of prices and 
market shares need to be explored. Companies might enjoy high 
market shares in their domestic markets just because of the weight 
of the past, and conversely, a homogeneous presence of 
companies throughout the EEA might be consistent with national 
or regional geographic markets. The initial working hypothesis 
will therefore be checked against an analysis of demand 
characteristics (importance of national or local preferences, current 
patterns of purchases of customers, product 
differentiation/brands, other) in order to establish whether 
companies in different areas do indeed constitute a real alternative 
source of supply for consumers. The theoretical experiment is 
again based on substitution arising from changes in relative 
prices, and the question to answer is again whether the customers 
of the parties would switch their orders to companies located 
elsewhere in the short term and at a negligible cost. 
                                                
600 M. Motta, Competition Policy, Theory and Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 113 (2004) 
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[Second], if necessary, a further check on supply factors will be 
carried out to ensure that those companies located in differing 
areas do not face impediments in developing their sales on 
competitive terms throughout the whole geographic market. This 
analysis will include an examination of requirements for a local 
presence in order to sell in that area the conditions of access to 
distribution channels, costs associated with setting up a 
distribution network, and the presence or absence of regulatory 
barriers arising from public procurement, price regulations, 
quotas and tariffs limiting trade or production, technical 
standards, monopolies, freedom of establishment, requirements 
for administrative authorizations, packaging regulations, etc. In 
short, the Commission will identify possible obstacles and barriers 
isolating companies located in a given area from the competitive 
pressure of companies located outside that area, so as to 
determine the precise degree of market interpenetration at 
national, European or global level. The actual pattern and 
evolution of trade flows offers useful supplementary indications 
as to the economic importance of each demand or supply factor 
mentioned above, and the extent to which they may or may not 
constitute actual barriers creating different geographic markets. 
The analysis of trade flows will generally address the question of 
transport costs and the extent to which these may hinder trade 
between different areas, having regard to plant location, costs of 
production and relative price levels. 
Finally, the Commission also takes into account the continuing 
process of market integration, in particular in the Community, 
when defining geographic markets, especially in the area of 
concentrations and structural joint ventures. The measures 
adopted and implemented in the internal market program to 
remove barriers to trade and further integrate the Community 
markets cannot be ignored when assessing the effects on 
competition of a concentration or a structural joint venture. A 
situation where national markets have been artificially isolated 
from each other because of the existence of legislative barriers that 
have now been removed will generally lead to a cautious 
assessment of past evidence regarding prices, market shares or 
trade patterns. A process of market integration that would, in the 
short term, lead to wider geographic markets may therefore be 
taken into consideration when defining the geographic market for 
the purposes of assessing concentrations and joint ventures601. 
                                                
601  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, published on the Official Journal, OJ C 372, 
09.12.1997, 5, paragraphs 28-32 
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The Notice on the Relevant Market provides several types of 
evidence to define the relevant geographic market: 
(1) Past evidence of diversion of orders to other areas602: the same 
quantitative tests used for product market definition might be 
used in geographic market definition, with the caveat that a 
number of factors such as exchange rate movements, taxation and 
product differentiation might render international comparisons 
more difficult;   
(2) Basic demand characteristics 603 : factors such as national 
preferences or preferences for national brands, language, culture 
and life style, and the need for a local presence have a strong 
potential to limit the geographic scope of competition; 
(3) Views of customers and competitors604; 
(4) Current geographic pattern of purchases605: when customers 
purchase from companies located anywhere in the Community or 
the EEA on similar terms, or they procure their supplies through 
effective tendering procedures in which companies from 
anywhere in the Community or the EEA submit bids, usually the 
geographic market will be considered to be Community-wide; 
(5) Trade flows/pattern of shipments606: information on trade 
flows may be utilized when the number of customers is so large 
that it is not possible to obtain through them a clear picture of 
geographic purchasing patterns; 
(6) Barriers and switching costs associated to divert orders to 
companies located in other areas607.  
 
The Commission identifies the geographic market on the account 
of a) the demand-side substitutability, b) the supply-side 
substitutability and c) the function of future integration of the 
Common Market. The emphasis added on the demand side leads 
to consider it as the main step in the identification of the 
geographic market. It involves gathering evidence of market 
shares and prices of an undertaking  -at a national level and at a 
Community level-, on the one hand, and evidence of whether the 
conditions of competitions are homogeneous, on the other hand. 
At this stage, the goal of the analysis is to determine whether 
companies located in different areas outside of the putative 
geographic market constitute a real alternative to the undertaking 
                                                
602 ibidem, paragraph 45 
603 ibidem, paragraph 46. See infra, para. 3.1. Consumer preference also stands as 
a barrier to trade; in fact, a region-wide market will can be isolated by the 
consumer preference for local products. 
604 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, published on the Official Journal, OJ C 372, 
09.12.1997, 5, para. 47 
605 ibidem, para, 48 
606 ibidem, para. 49 
607 ibidem, para. 50, See infra, para. 3.1 
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under investigation, with the result of enlarging the putative 
market to the areas where they operate. 
Supply-side substitutability is a means to verify whether suppliers 
outside of the putative area are able to enter the market in 
response to an increase in price for the product of the undertaking 
under investigation. Supply substitution also allows weighing 
transportation costs in the definition of the relevant geographic 
area. 
Finally attention must be paid to the ongoing market integration 
process, and to whether it results in a widening of the relevant 
market from a geographic standpoint.  
 
3.1 The role of price evidence and of barriers to trade 
In practice, both Community institutions and national authorities 
have proved demand and supply substitution by means of diverse 
sources of evidence, of which the core one is the price evidence. If 
the price for a product in the putative market is substantially 
higher than the price for the same product outside the area, the 
market will be prima facie defined, with two caveats: on the one 
hand, obstacles to trade should prevent consumers from 
purchasing the product outside of the indicated region; on the 
other hand, suppliers from outside the region face obstacles to 
shipping the product in the putative market. If price analysis 
shows an interrelation between prices at what the product is sold 
in different regions, the obstacles above referred will not isolate 
the market, which will be enlarged to the areas where consumers 
can purchase at a homogeneous price and suppliers can offer at 
homogenous conditions608. 
The second source of evidence is the analysis of existing barriers 
to trade, which will isolate a market. The main barriers to trade 
have been identified by the literature and the case law: 
1) Transportation costs: they play a pivotal role in the identification 
of the geographic market, since they have the effect of linking 
those areas where the product is exchanged at the same price, 
where that product can be transported and price differential 
exceeds shipping costs609. Yet, the lower the value of the product is 
the higher the impact of transportation costs and the stronger the 
effect of sheltering local manufacturers from suffering losses in 
sale in the event they would raise prices 610 . This way, 
transportation costs will define a geographic market by excluding 
the entry into the market itself of either external competitors or of 
external “fringe” products, and therefore by giving the 
                                                
608 ibidem, para. 49. 
609 T.F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits, 
18 Antitrust Bull., 50 (1973)  
610 E.T. Sullivan, Antitrust and its economic implications, 5th ed., LexisNexis 
Publisher, Newark (NJ), p.28 (2008) 
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undertaking a power over the market that can be evaluated 
accordingly. The Commission has taken transportation costs into 
account in the Napier Brown case611 , holding that the United 
Kingdom market for sugar constituted a separate geographic 
market from the rest of the European area because of the natural 
barrier of the English Channel, which allowed United Kingdom 
producers of sugar to charge a premium on the price of sugar 
compared with Continental prices. 
2) Consumer preferences: sometimes the geographic market of a 
product is defined on the account of the habits of consumers, who 
will isolate a region-wide market, by preferring local products612. 
The Commission has sometimes emphasized the importance of 
cultural identity the identification of a geographic market.  
3) Capacity constraints: if a firm is capable of reaching remote areas 
without incurring sunk costs, the market will be extended to those 
areas. Likewise, the market can be narrowed in accordance with 
the capacity constraints of the firm.  
4) Long-term contracts: if a firm is bound by a long-term contract to 
supply a certain area, and by virtue of that obligation is barred 
from expanding its market to other regions, the candidate market 
will be defined accordingly. 
5) Regulatory barriers: the candidate market can be defined on the 
account of legal monopolies, price regulation, exclusive rights or 
technical standards613. 
6) Local presence: a market can be characterized by the presence of a 
local distributor, who will put a competitive disadvantage on 
foreign firms and narrow the market itself. 
 
4. The notion of abuse  
                                                
611  Napier-Brown Commission Decision, 18.07.1988, Case No IV/30/178/CE, 
published on OJ L/284-41, 19.10.1988, para. 41 
612  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, published on the Official Journal, OJ C 372, 
09.12.1997, 5, paragraph 29 
613 In Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato (AAMS) v Commission, ECR 
II-3413 [2001], paragraph 40. The Commission narrowed the geographic market 
for cigarettes to the territory of Italy since AAMS enjoyed a monopoly on that 
market, under which it regulated distribution and sales. See also M. Monti, 
Policy Market Definition as a Cornerstone of EU Competition Policy, in Workshop on 
Market Definition, Helsinki, Fair Center, October 5, 2001, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-01-439_en.htm “The existence 
or absence of regulatory barriers (for example, those arising from public 
procurement, price regulations, quotas and tariffs limiting trade or production, 
technical standards, legal monopolies, requirements for administrative 
authorizations, or other regulations), is very important for geographic market 
definition. For instance, … in a case against the Italian tobacco monopolist …, 
the scope of the markets was defined as national because entry was impossible 
in view of the existence of exclusive rights or fiscal monopolies”.  
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The treatment of the unilateral conduct of the firm is one of the 
most delicate aspects of competition law of all legal systems614. 
The main difficulty is to distinguish illicit conducts from 
legitimate –yet vigorous- competition, on the hand, and conducts 
excluding competitors from competition from conducts that are 
exclusive but are still deemed competitive. As a matter of fact, in 
every capitalistic system the goal of the firm is to prevail over its 
competitors by virtue of its entrepreneurial skills and its superior 
products or services. In general, every act of the firm is oriented 
toward taking away shares of the market from incumbent rivals, 
and achieving dominance; some conducts, however, are unlawful 
since they are harmful to competition and, ultimately, to 
consumers. 
The normative tools available to the EU Courts and authorities are 
scarce and confined within the blank prohibition of the abuse of 
dominant position, absent an actual definition of abuse; it follows 
that the expansion of the notion of anticompetitive unilateral 
conduct is heavily related to the data coming of the judicial 
formant. The European Courts have attained an objective notion 
of abuse, as a conduct that places obstacles in the way of the 
maintenance or of the fostering of competition in the market. In 
other terms, every action of the dominant undertaking likely to 
lessen or distort competition and, furthermore, lacking an 
objective justification falls within the scope of article 102 Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter TFEU).  
Article 102 is rubricated “Abuse of Dominant Position” and is the 
main provision in EC competition law defining the 
anticompetitive unilateral conduct of an undertaking. It reads as 
follows: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it 
may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling 
prices or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) Limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers; 
(c) Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; 
(d) Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations, which, by their nature 
                                                
614 International Competition Network, Report on the Objectives of Unilateral 
Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market Power and State-Created 
Monopolies, presented at the 6th Annual Conference of the ICN, Moscow, May 
2007 
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or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts. 
 
4.1 Categories of abuses – an overview 
As it has been mentioned above, article 102 does not define the 
term “abuse”, but gives a list of examples of unlawful conducts, 
which have been divided in the literature into three types: 1) 
exploitative abuses, targeted at the vertical relationships of the 
firm, i.e. with its suppliers or with the customers; 2) 
anticompetitive or exclusionary abuses, targeted at the horizontal 
relationship of the firm, i.e. with its competitors, and 3) reprisal 
abuses615, which can have both vertical and horizontal effects.  
These three types are not mutually exclusive, since the same 
conduct can have both horizontal and vertical effects. The multi-
offensive nature of certain abuses is noticeably embodied by 
predation (or predatory pricing)616: at first instance, the conduct 
will be disadvantageous to the dominant firm’s competitors, 
which will be forced to sell their product at a reduced margin in 
order to stay in the market (exclusionary abuse); once all the 
competitors are driven off the market, the dominant firm will raise 
its price over the competitive level in order to recoup the losses 
occurred during the predation phase, thereby causing a loss to 
consumer welfare (exploitative abuse)617. 
 
4.1.1 Exploitative abuses 
Exploitative abuses occur when the firm takes advantage of its 
dominance over the market to obtain benefits –“rents”- which are 
not obtainable in condition of normal competition, therefore 
causing a loss in terms of consumer welfare and/or damage to its 
commercial partners. The most common example of exploitative 
abuses is charging a discriminatory price at the expense of 
consumers (art. 102(a)); additionally, the practice of “limiting 
production, markets or technical development” also falls within 
this category, insofar as the reduction in output is aimed at 
maintaining an excessive pricing or the limitation of technical 
development at avoiding product’s obsolescence618.  
Pursuant to article 102(d), tie-ins are an example of exploitative 
and exclusionary abuses that do not involve monopolization, 
because, on the one hand, they force buyers to purchase what they 
do not want and, on the other hand, they keep competitors of the 
tied product from selling their products to the customers of the 
                                                
615 J. Temple Lang, Some Aspects of Abuse of Dominant Positions in European 
Community Antitrust Law, 3 Fordham Int. L. J., Issue 1, p. 17, (1979-1980) 
616 As regards the analysis of predation, see infra, para. 9 et seq. 
617 S. Bastianon, L’Abuso di Posizione Dominante, Milano, p. 204, (2001) 
618 J. Temple Lang, Some Aspects of Abuse of Dominant Positions in European 
Community Antitrust Law, 3 Fordham Int. L. J., Issue 1, p. 17, (1979-1980) 
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dominant firm619, without necessarily an intent to monopolize the 
market.  
The leading case on discriminatory pricing is United Brands, which 
was awarded on the grounds of the exploitative nature of 
imposing unfair prices on the customers, and of the exclusionary 
nature of charging other trading parties dissimilar prices for 
equivalent transactions620. The ECJ also established a test for 
exploitative abuses, arguing that  “charging a price which is 
excessive because it has no reasonable relation to the economic 
value of the product supplied” is abusive621. 
 
4.1.2 Exclusionary abuses 
Exclusionary abuses occur when the firm increases its economic 
power over the market to the extent that inter-brand or intra-
brand competition is significantly impaired. Exclusionary abuses 
are the broadest category of abuse, entailing those strategic acts 
against the ability of competitors to compete, which cause indirect 
loss to consumer welfare. The ascertainment of consumer loss is 
the key element of exclusionary abuses, since vigorous 
competition aiming at excluding rivals is an ineludible means of 
competing, which ultimately result into wealth maximization622.  
Discerning an exclusionary abuse from vigorous competition 
proves extremely difficult and it often involves some measure of 
cost by means of economic parameters. Predation is the most 
notable example of exclusionary abuses. Other examples are 
refusal to deal, tying and bundling, price squeezes, discrimination 
against downstream rivals, discount practices, exclusive dealing, 
vexatious litigation, the use and abuse of government approval 
procedures to exclude rivals, and abuses in connection with the 
adoption of standards or other specifications623. 
 
4.1.3 Reprisal abuses 
Reprisal abuses occur when the firm significantly interferes with 
the business of another undertaking by means of its dominance624, 
                                                
619 Abuses that are not conducive to monopolization, such as tie-ins, are not 
prohibited under US Antitrust Law.  
620 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, article 1 of the 
conclusions. 
621 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, para. 250. Compare 
Chapter III, para. 7.1, for a further analysis of exploitative abuses in EC 
competition law. 
622 E. Østerud, Identifying Exclusionary Abuses by Dominant Undertakings under 
EU Competition Law: the spectrum of tests, Wolters Kluwer, London, p. 13 (2010) 
623 R. O’Donogue & A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford 
and Portland, 2006, p. 175 
624 J. Temple Lang, Some Aspects of Abuse of Dominant Positions in European 
Community Antitrust Law, 3 Fordham Int. L. J., Issue 1, p. 17, (1979-1980) 
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preventing the latter from competing too aggressively625, and/or 
preventing its own customers from venturing with the latter.  
Parallel to predatory abuses, the ultimate consequence of reprisal 
abuses is a loss to consumer welfare. United Brands suggests that 
an action by a dominant firm purposely designed to harm a rival 
without necessarily favoring the legitimate interests of the former 
is likely to result into an abuse626.  
Neither the TFUE nor the case law clarify whether it is relevant to 
assess the anticompetitive intent in reprisal abuses; however, in 
the interim measure adopted against Boosey and Hawkes, the 
Commission clarified that “a dominant undertaking may always 
take reasonable steps to protect its commercial interests, but such 
measures must be fair and proportional to the threat. The fact that 
a customer of a dominant producer becomes associated with a 
competitor or a potential competitor of that manufacturer does not 
normally entitle the dominant producer to withdraw all supplies 
immediately or to take reprisals against that customer”627. The 
above suggests that certain actions, which disproportionately 
undermine the business of a competitor, or “retaliate” customers 
for dealing with the rival firm, are anticompetitive in re ipsa, even 
if the anticompetitive intent is not ascertained.  
 
4.2 The substantive elements of abusive dominance 
Aside from the paradigms of abuse singled out in Treaty 
provisions, three conditions are to be met in order to ascertain 
violation of Article 102:  
1) The existence of a dominant position, the abuse of such 
dominance, the prejudice to trade between Member States.  
2) Mere dominance is not illegal, but it becomes illegal when it is 
used to dampen competition. Therefore, EC competition law 
regards dominance as a possible position in a market, which is 
lawful when it is obtained by virtue of business acumen, historic 
accident or a superior product, but becomes unlawful when it is 
abused to distort the market. 
3) Article 102 only prohibits the abuse, not the possession, nor the 
achievement of a dominant position on the common market. The 
wording of article 102 refers to the abuse in objective terms -“any 
                                                
625 J. Temple Lang, Some Aspects of Abuse of Dominant Positions in European 
Community Antitrust Law, 3 Fordham Int. L. J., Issue 1, p. 17, (1979-1980) 
626 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207. The plaintiff has 
abused its dominant position by ceasing to supply its bananas to one of its most 
important customers among the distributor/ripeners. The withdrawal of 
supplies was made on the grounds that the distributor/ripener concerned had 
taken part in an advertising campaign for bananas of a competing brand. 
627 BBI/Boosey & Hawkes: Interim measures, IV/32.279 – paragraph 10. BBI/Boosey 
& Hawkes: Interim measures, IV/32.279. Commission Decision, 18.07.1988, Case 
No IV/30/178/CE, published on OJ L/284-41, 19.10.1988 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
195 
 
abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market”. It follows that the subjective dimension of the 
abuse, in particular the anticompetitive intent of the conduct, is 
irrelevant. 
Therefore, the core substance of the inquiry is not whether the 
dominant position on the interstate market has been purposely 
and intentionally exploited by the undertaking, but merely 
whether such an abuse has occurred. The above is corroborated by 
the position of the ECJ, which affirmed that “the concept of abuse 
is an objective concept relating to the behavior of an undertaking 
in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure 
of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the 
undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened 
and which, through recourse to methods different from those 
which condition normal competition in products or services on the 
basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of 
hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still 
existing in the market or the growth of that competition”628.  
Moreover, in the AKZO case the Court has omitted to inquire the 
anticompetitive intent of the dominant firm’s conduct, affirming 
that some behaviors -which have anticompetitive effects- can only 
be justified by an interest in eliminating competitors, being 
abusive per se. In fact, the practice of pricing below average 
variable costs must be regarded as abusive, without the need to 
examine the market effects since “a dominant undertaking has no 
interest in applying such prices except that of eliminating 
competitors so as to enable it subsequently to raise its prices by 
taking advantage of its monopolistic position, since each sale 
generates a loss, namely the total amount of the fixed costs (that is 
to say, those which remain constant regardless of the quantities 
produced) and, at least, part of the variable costs relating to the 
unit produced”629.  
Pricing below average variable costs is presumed abusive; pricing 
above average variable costs, but below average total costs may be 
presumed abusive when it is part of a strategy to eliminate 
rivals630. 
                                                
628 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461, para. 6.  
629 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 71 
630 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 70. “From this one might assume that a price cut 
above average total costs that is not part of a plan to eliminate rivals is not 
abusive. However, the ECJ has found that unconditional price cuts below 
average variable costs could constitute an abuse in exceptional cases. It is to be 
concluded that an unconditional price cut above average total cost is abusive 
when it is qualified as such according to the circumstances, and even when the 
costs incurred by the dominant firm are lower than those of the rivals. In sum, 
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Another controversial aspect of the judicial enforcement of article 
102 is the need to ascertain the causality between the dominance 
and the abuse. Judicial interpretation of the need for causality has 
evolved in the course of time. Initially, it was held that article 102 
does not entail causation; in fact, in Continental Can the ECJ has 
affirmed that “the question of the link of causality…[which]…has 
to exist between the dominant position and its abuse, is of no 
consequence, for the strengthening of the position of an 
undertaking may be an abuse and prohibited under article [102] of 
the Treaty, regardless of the means and procedure by which it is 
achieved, if it has the effect of…substantially fettering 
competition”631. 
Elsewhere in Hoffmann-La Roche, the ECJ has endorsed this 
position, maintaining that “the interpretation suggested by the 
applicant that an abuse implies that the use of economic power 
bestowed by a dominant position is the means whereby the abuse 
has been brought about cannot be accepted”632.  
Contrariwise, in the Tetra Pak II case, the European Court has 
stated that article 102 “presupposes a link between the dominant 
                                                                                                                                                            
pricing below average total cost is abusive per se, whereas pricing below 
average total costs qualified by the circumstances of the case can be abusive”. 
See infra, para. 5.4.2.3 on the application of “the equally efficient competitor 
test” to the case. Compare Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Others v. 
Commission of the European Communities, 16.03.2000, Case C-395/96 and C-
396/96, ECR I-1365 para. 118-119, where the Court found an abuse of dominant 
position on part of the appellant, without ruling on the legitimacy of the price 
cut carried out by the latter. For an extensive analysis of the Compagnie Maritime 
Belge case and the treatment of above-cost predation, see infra para. 9.1. The lack 
of a definite standard has been seen as highly unsatisfactory by R. O’Donogue 
& A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford and Portland, 2006, 
p. 177. Similar criticism have be been made of § 2 of the Sherman Act towards 
this approach has been expressed by E. Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization 
Standards, 56 Stanford Law Review (2000), p. 253 
631 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 21.02.1973, Case 6/72, [1973], ECR 215, para. 27. Elsewhere in the 
case, the Court has affirmed that proof of the anticompetitive conduct can be 
“the acquisition of the majority holding of a competing company by an 
undertaking or a group of undertakings holding a dominant position amounts 
to an abuse of this position”. However, even when deducting a specific 
deed/fact as proof of the anticompetitive nature of the firm’s conduct, there 
have to be legally sufficient reasons or at least the plaintiff “must prove that 
competition was so essentially affected that the remaining competitors could no 
longer provide a sufficient counterweight”. Conversely, in his Opinion 
Advocate General held that article 102 “with its expression ‘abuse of dominant 
position within the Common Market’, appears to hint that its application can be 
considered only if the position on the market is used as an instrument [emphasis 
added] and is used in an objectionable manner; these criteria are therefore 
essential prerequisites of application of the law”. Opinion of Advocate General 
Roemer in Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 21.02.1973, Case 6/72, [1973], ECR 215, para. 254 
632 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461, para. 91 
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position and the alleged abusive conduct”, which is normally not 
present where conduct on a market distinct from the dominated 
market produces effects on that distinct market633.  
It cannot be denied that the main forms of practices reproached by 
article 102 imply a link of causality between the dominant position 
–in terms of power over the market- and the abuse. In fact, an 
output restriction aiming at raising the market price for a product 
would only make sense as an abusive practice if carried out by a 
dominant firm; if a non-dominant firm were to raise the price for 
its product in a competitive market, it would in all likelihood self-
marginalize from the market itself. 
The same holds valid as regards predatory pricing: a non-
dominant firm that would price below average variable costs 
would not be able to recoup the losses because it would not have a 
sufficient degree of dominance over the market to re-raise prices 
once predation is concluded. At most, predation of a non-
dominant firm would be considered as an attempt to consolidate 
its position, or make consumers loyal to its product to accept a 
price raise in the long run634. Consumers would feel no harm, 
unless the predation were part of a scheme of the dominant 
undertaking to eliminate rivals, in which case the abuse would be 
causally linked to the dominance. 
 
4.3 Definitions of abuse 
The following section will examine the most recurrent definition 
of abuse in the case law concerning article 102. 
 
4.3.1 The notion of “special responsibility” of the dominant firm 
Even if some of the abuses that traditionally fall within the reach 
of art. 102 are based on contractual arrangements – i.e. art. 102, 
paragraph 2, letter (d)-, the core idea of anticompetitive abuse 
refers to the exploitation of the dominance over a market by an 
undertaking. Based on the assumption that competitive harm is 
more likely to stem from a bilateral arrangement between two or 
more firms, which will limit their output to raise prices, than from 
a unilateral conduct, article 102 does not sanction the mere 
obtainment of dominance over a market, but the exploitation of it.  
Even if the mere dominance is lawful, the achievement of such a 
position causes a “special responsibility not to allow its conduct to 
impair genuine undistorted competition on the Common Market”, 
in other terms the proper functioning of the market635; in fact, 
some conducts that are normally lawful when put in place by non-
dominant firms are deemed unlawful when put in place by a 
                                                
633  Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities, 
14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951 para. 27 
634 See infra, para. 8.1.2 
635 Michelin v Commission Case C-322/81, 09.11.1983, [1983] ECR 3461, para. 57 
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dominant undertaking. The notion of “special responsibility”, 
however, does not provide any guidance as to discern the abuses 
from the lawful conducts. 
Thus, the European Courts have filled the concept of special 
responsibility of the dominant firm with meaning, affirming that 
the spectrum of unlawful abuses not only encompasses 
exploitative abuses, i.e. when the firms levers on its economic 
power to the detriment of consumers and of its commercial 
partners, but also exclusionary abuses, i.e. when the firm lessens 
the ability of its competitors to compete. That is ultimately 
material with the reach of Continental Can, where the ECJ has 
maintained that article 102 is directed to both conducts that 
directly harm consumers, and that impair the regime of effective 
competition636.  
In the Tetra Pak case637, Tetra Pak was the dominant firm in the 
manufacture of aseptic cartons for packaging milk and juice, and 
the machines that make them. Some contracts with its customers 
for aseptic products required the customers to buy non-aseptic 
machines and cartons, also from Tetra Pak, and some required 
exclusive dealing. The General Court held that the contracts were 
illegal. The Court of Justice affirmed. Tetra Pak’s dominant 
position in the related aseptic market “gave Tetra Pak freedom of 
conduct compared with other economic operators on the non-
aseptic market, such as to impose on it a special responsibility 
under Art. 86 [art. 102] to maintain genuine undistorted 
competition on those markets”, irrespective of the reasons for 
which it had such a dominant position in accordance with the 
general objective set out in article 4 of the Treaty of the Rome to 
guarantee an open market economy with free competition.  
 
4.3.2 The notion of abuse as deviation from “competition on the 
merits” 
Elsewhere, the exclusionary abuse has been defined as a conduct 
causing detriment to the competition on the merits638. An example 
of practices deviating from competition on the merits is when the 
firm’s conduct has “an exclusionary effect on its equally efficient 
                                                
636 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 21.02.1973, Case 6/72, [1973], ECR 215, para. 27, para. 26 
637  Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities 
06.10.1994, Case T-83/91, [1995] E.C.R. II-762 (CFI), para. 122, affirmed in 
appeal, 14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951 
638 Emphasized also by Commissioner M. Monti, in his press release after the 
conclusion of the Microsoft investigation and the imposition of a fine. 
“Dominant companies have a special responsibility to ensure that the way they 
do business doesn’t prevent competition on the merits and does not harm 
consumers and innovation”. Brussels 24 March 2004, Reference: IP/04/382 
Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-382_en.htm . As for 
the Microsoft case, see infra, para. 5.4.2.4 
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actual or potential competitors, that is to say practices which are 
capable of making market entry very difficult or impossible for 
such competitors, and of making it more difficult or impossible for 
its co-contractors to choose between various sources of supply or 
commercial partners” 639 . Consequently, the firm can compete 
aggressively, but it cannot strengthen its dominant position by 
using methods that exclude other firms from the market.  
It is apparent that in the ECJ case law the criterion of the 
impairment of competition on the merits only applies only to the 
inquiry of exclusionary abuses and not also to the inquiry of 
exploitative abuses. In fact, exclusionary abuses are the broadest 
category of illicit conduct pursuant to article 102, and are meant to 
protect competitors rather than consumers. Hence, it appears that 
the ratio underlying the safeguarding of “normal” competition is 
the protection of competitors rather than of competition and, 
ultimately, of consumers.  
The protection of the disadvantaged party seems to regress into a 
subordinate position compared to the market equilibrium, being 
this at odds with the intent of the EU Acquis to ensure a high level 
of protection for consumers640. The Commission has addressed the 
issue of the lack of protection for the competitive process in its 
Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings 641, in which it has affirmed that when applying article 
102 “the Commission is mindful that what really matters is 
protecting an effective competitive process and not simply 
protecting competitors. This may well mean that competitors who 
deliver less to consumers in terms of price, choice, quality and 
innovation will leave the market”642.  
Furthermore, “the aim of the Commission’s enforcement activity 
in relation to exclusionary conduct is to ensure that dominant 
undertakings do not impair effective competition by foreclosing 
their competitors in an anticompetitive way, thus having an 
adverse impact on consumer welfare, whether in the form of 
                                                
639 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission of the European Communities, 14.10.2010, 
Case C-280/08 P, 2010, para. 177  
640 G. Howells, A. Nordhausen, D. Parry, C. Twigg-Flesner (eds.), The Yearboook 
of Consumer Law 2007 1 –Consumer Protection Law and Legislation, 2007, Ashgate 
Publishing Lt., p. 4, G. Alpa, Introduzione al diritto contrattuale europeo, Bari, 2007, 
p. 113 
641 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, published on the Official Journal, OJ 24.02.2007, 2009/C 
45/02 
642 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, published on the Official Journal, OJ 24.02.2007, 2009/C 
45/02, para. 6 
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higher price levels than would have otherwise prevailed or in 
some other form such as limiting quality or reducing consumer 
choice”643. The Commission proposes a notion of exclusionary 
abuse entailing “foreclosure leading to consumer harm”, and is 
based on two consequent elements: 1) the anti-competitive 
foreclosure, which occurs when the conduct of the dominant 
undertaking hinders or excludes access of actual or potential 
competitors to the market or to supplies; 2) the actual or potential 
anticompetitive impact of the conduct, which occurs when the 
firm, after excluding its competitors, will be likely to profitably 
increase prices to the detriment of consumers. 
On the account of this approach, a conduct integrates an 
exclusionary abuse only when it causes an anticompetitive harm, 
which will provoke a loss in consumer welfare644. In the Deutsche 
Telekom case, the ECJ seems to have adhered to the Commission’s 
guidelines to qualify the exclusionary abuse, by ascertaining the 
anticompetitive impact of the conduct of the dominant firm solely 
on the account of an appropriate measurement of its costs. The 
Court has affirmed that a conduct cannot be classified as 
exclusionary if it does not make competitors’ market penetration 
any more difficult. However, the conduct is to hinder the growth 
of competition to the detriment of consumers’ interests645. The 
Court acknowledges the twofold dimension of article 102, which 
sanctions conducts that have concrete effects on market players, 
be they competitors or consumers, but also have distortive effects 
on competition in the internal market646. 
                                                
643 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, published on the Official Journal, OJ 24.02.2007, 2009/C 
45/02, para. 19 
644 The approach based on the anticompetitive foreclosure leading to consumer 
harm has characterized the Commission decision in the “Microsoft case”, 
Commission’s Decision 24.03.2004, 2007/53/CE, COMP 37.392, published on 
the Official Journal, OJ L 32, 06.02.2007. For an extensive analysis of the 
Microsoft case before the European Commission, see infra, para. 5.4.2.4 . Even 
though the outcomes of the European Commission are not binding for the 
European Court or for the national ones, they represent a useful point of 
reference. Compare Italy v Commission Case C-310/99 [2002] ECR I-2289, para. 
52 and the case law cited. 
645 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission of the European Communities, 14.10.2010, 
Case C-280/08 P, 2010, para. 194 and paras. 252 -254 
646  To this passage, compare the opinion that Advocate General Kokott 
delivered on 23.02.2006, British Airways plc v. Commission of the European 
Communities, Case C 95-04 P (see infra, note n. 99): “the conduct of a dominant 
undertaking is not, therefore, to be regarded as abusive within the meaning of 
Article 82 EC only once it has concrete effects on individual market participants, 
be they competitors or consumers. Rather, a line of conduct of a dominant 
undertaking is abusive as soon as it runs counter to the purpose of protecting 
competition in the internal market from distortions (Article 3(1)(g) EC). That is 
because, as already mentioned, a dominant undertaking bears a particular 
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4.3.3 The conduct lacking “objective economic justification”  
Elsewhere, the ECJ has defined the abuse a contrario, as a conduct 
lacking “objective economic justification”647, which occurs when 
the economic efficiencies produced by the conduct of the 
dominant firm outweigh the anticompetitive effects. Unlike article 
101, article 102 does not single out specific exceptions in which an 
anticompetitive conduct is compatible with the TFUE. 
Nonetheless, in the case law the exclusionary conduct is not 
deemed illicit if the dominant firm proves an economic 
justification for the anticompetitive effects of its conduct. Two are 
the requirements for justifying the anticompetitive foreclosure: on 
the one hand, it is to be necessary, on the other hand it is to be 
proportionate648.  
More specifically, the exclusionary effect arising from the conduct 
may be counterbalanced, or outweighed, by advantages in terms 
of efficiency that also benefit the consumer. If the exclusionary 
effect of the conduct brings no advantages for the market and 
consumers, or if it goes beyond what is necessary in order to attain 
those advantages, that conduct must be regarded as an abuse649.  
In practice, the assessment of the economic justification for a 
pricing practice established by an undertaking in a dominant 
position which is capable of producing an exclusionary effect is to 
be made on the basis of all the circumstances of the case: dominant 
firm is to prove an increase in efficiency, whereby its low prices 
are necessary for all the firms in the market to be able to produce 
or distribute the product, and ultimately bring an advantage for 
the consumers650.  
 
4.3.4 The assessment of the consumer harm 
Notwithstanding the call for a balance between efficiencies and 
anticompetitive effects of a conduct, the definition of 
anticompetitive effects is still a matter of dispute in case law. On 
the one hand, it is a generally acknowledged principle of the EU 
acquis that the most reliable standard to assess the anticompetitive 
                                                                                                                                                            
responsibility to ensure that effective and undistorted competition in the 
common market in not undermined by its conduct”. Compare infra, Chapter III, 
para 11, as regards the influence of the Ordoliberal thinking on the EU Courts 
approach. 
647 Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 30.09.2003, Case T-203/01, 2003, ECR II-04071, “Michelin II” 
648 British Airways plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 15.03.2007, Case 
C 95-04 P, [2007] ECR I-2331 
649 British Airways plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 15.03.2007, Case 
C 95-04 P, [2007] ECR I-2331, para. 86 
650 Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 17.02.2011, Case C 52-09, [2011] I-
527, para. 76 
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effects of a conduct is the harm to consumers651. On the other 
hand, it is not clear whether anticompetitive effects should be 
actual/likely or possible/potential, because some outcomes seem 
to suggest that potential competition harm would suffice in light 
of article 102652, whereas others suggest that actual anticompetitive 
effects need be demonstrated653. In particular, the Michelin II and 
the AKZO cases advocated for a presumption of anticompetitive 
effects when it is clear that the conduct of the dominant firm seeks 
to restrict competition. 
All things considered, a syncretic criterion stemming from case 
law is the ascertainment of actual or potential consumer harm, 
according to the circumstances. That would be material with the 
emphasis that the Commission puts on the analysis of the effects 
of exclusionary conducts and the possibility of recoupment after 
predation.  
The leading case reflecting the Commission’s endeavor to review 
the legal presumption of anticompetitive effects is the Wanadoo 
case, in which it affirmed that price reductions below average 
variable costs for a limited period of time might be deemed lawful 
under certain circumstances, such as the introduction of new 
                                                
651 Compare the words of the Commissioner for competition policy in 2005: 
“Consumer welfare is now well established as the standard the Commission 
applies when assessing mergers and infringements of the Treaty rules on cartels 
and monopolies”. Neelie Kroes, Member of the European Commission, 
European Competition Policy – Delivering Better Markets and Better Choices, 
European Consumer and Competition Day, London, 15 September 2005, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-512_en.htm  
652  In Michelin II, para. 239, the General Court affirmed that potential 
anticompetitive effects amount to abuse within the meaning of article 102, since 
it is sufficient that the conduct of the dominant firm has the object to restrict 
competition. Once such an object is established it follows that the conduct will 
have potentially restrictive effects, and it is unnecessary to ascertain the 
concrete effects of the conduct. In AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European 
Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 71 the General 
Court affirmed that some behaviors -which have anticompetitive effects- can 
only be justified by an interest in eliminating competitors, being abusive per se. 
The practice of pricing below average variable costs must be regarded as 
abusive, without the need to examine the market effects. 
653  As regards the ascertainment of actual anticompetitive effects of the 
dominant firm’s conduct, compare Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the 
European Communities, 06.10.1994, Case T-83/91, [1995] E.C.R. II-762 (CFI), para. 
151, the General Court analyzed the below-cost pricing practice of the 
defendant and affirmed that such scheme was actually “corroborated by the 
eliminatory effect of the competition endangered by Tetra Pak’s pricing policy”. 
In Van Den Bergh Foods Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities, 
29.04.1998, Case T-65/98, [2003], ECR-II 4653 the General Court analyzed the 
impact of exclusive contracts of furniture of refrigerators on the retail market 
for ice-creams, and concluded that these would lead to foreclosure of 
competition where the defendant insisted that the refrigerators be exclusively 
used for its products. The Court based its conclusion on actual effects of the 
exclusivity clause on foreclosure of competition.  
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products or the creation of network effect of economies of scale. 
However, Wanadoo’s prices were not predatory for the mere fact 
that they had been below average variable cost for a extended 
amount of time, but for the fact that the price cut was part of a 
clear scheme directed to eliminating competition on the French 
market for high-speed Internet services during a key phase of its 
development654, and that recoupment of losses, although not a 
precondition before a finding can be made of abuse through 
predatory pricing, was likely by virtue of the “structure of the 
market and the associated revenue prospects”655. The ECJ also 
argued that an analysis of the chances of the dominant firm to 
make good for its losses in the post-predation phase might shed 
light on the economic justifications for pricing below average 
variable costs, or on the existence of a plan to eliminate 
competition, whereby prices are above average variable costs, but 
below average total costs656.  
The Discussion Paper on exclusionary abuses has also fostered the 
application of the actual or potential consumer harm test657, stating 
that article 102 “prohibits exclusionary conducts which produces 
actual or likely exclusionary effects in the market and which can 
harm consumers in a direct or indirect way”. 
With regard to the definition of harm to consumers, first and 
foremost it should be noted that it does not encompass the harm 
to competitors in the connotation of anticompetitive harm, within 
the meaning of the TFUE. Second, unless there is harm to 
consumers, there is no harm to the structure of competition, 
meaning that competition can harm competitors. The point of EC 
competition policy is to serve the needs of consumers on the 
                                                
654 Wanadoo Interactive, Commission Decision, 16.07.2003, COMP/38.233, para. 
322 and 369 et seq. The Commission analyzed in depth the actual effects of the 
defendant’s course of conduct, and the put forward the following arguments: 1) 
during predation, Wanadoo’s market share rose by 30%; 2) the main 
competitor’s market share shrunk because of Wanadoo’s pricing scheme; 3) one 
of Wanadoo’s competitors went out of business following the predation phase.  
655 Wanadoo Interactive, Commission Decision, 16.07.2003, COMP/38.233, para. 
335-336 non confidential version available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38233/38233_87_
1.pdf  
656 France Télécom v. Commission of the European Communities, 02.04.2009, Case C-
202/07 P [2009], ECR I-2369, para. 111 
657 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005, para. 55. The test has been 
proposed by John Vickers, who argued that there is an abuse only if challenged 
conduct has the effect of raising prices or restricting output, innovation, or 
quality. See infra, J. Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, Speech of the 31st Conference 
of the European Association of Research in Industrial Economics, Berlin, 
September 3rd, 2004. 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
204 
 
market, “not some abstract notion of competition for its own 
sake”658.  
A first corollary to this principle is that there is no need for 
competition law where there is harm to the competitive process, in 
the sense that some competitors are driven off the market, but 
consumers feel no harm. A second corollary is that consumer 
harm is to be proved by the aggrieved party, whereas the 
dominant firm is to rebut the anticompetitive effects of its 
conduct.  
Remarkably enough, the only provision that expressly mentions 
consumer harm –“prejudice to consumers”- is article 102(b) 
sanctioning exclusionary abuses. That does not mean the other 
forms of abuse enshrined in the article do not require the 
ascertainment of prejudicial effects to consumers. In fact, 
exploitative abuses as under article 102(a) contain forms of loss in 
consumer welfare by means of excessive pricing.  
With regard to discriminatory abuses, it is really arduous to 
discern pure discrimination from an exclusionary conduct, which 
–as said- implies by law prejudice to consumers659. Aside from 
that, there is no legal ground to affirm that consumer welfare is 
the rationale under which pure discriminatory abuses are 
investigated by EC competition authorities. 
In spite of the fact that proof of actual or potential consumer harm 
is accepted as a standard test by scholars and case law, there is 
little agreement on how consumer harm should be measured: in 
particular, economists reject the claim that dominant firms should 
be able to evaluate ex ante the negative impact of their conduct on 
consumers, and courts should evaluate ex post such impact. 
Instead, they call for the elaboration of clear rules and good 
practices based on economic evidence that would not require 
firms to predict the outcomes of their conduct, such as the profit-
sacrifice test660.  
 
4.4 Abuse in a nutshell 
In sum, case law has established that: 
1. The dominant firm has a special responsibility not to allow its 
conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the 
Common Market (Michelin) 
                                                
658 J. Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, Speech of the 31st Conference of the 
European Association of Research in Industrial Economics, Berlin, September 
3rd, 2004. 
659 As for the analysis of discrimination abuses pursuant to article 102(c), see 
infra, note n.188 et seq.  
660 As regards the economic thinking of abusive conducts, see infra, paras. n. 5 et 
seq. 
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2. The dominant firm may not eliminate a competitor or strengthen 
its position by “recourse to means other than those based on 
competition on the merits” (Deutsche Telekom) 
3. The abuse involves “recourse to methods different from those 
which condition normal competition” that have the effect of 
hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still 
existing in the market or the growth of that competition 
(Hoffmann-La Roche) 
4. The concept of abuse is objective and does not require 
anticompetitive intent; 
 
5. Economic thinking of unilateral abusive conducts 
Albeit there is a great deal of uncertainty on the normative origins 
of article 102, because there are not many background documents 
on article 82 and on the EC Treaty in general, scholars agree that 
the economic foundation of the European law of abusive conduct 
can be tracked back to the Freiburg Ordoliberal school, on the one 
hand, and to the American experience of the Harvard school and 
the Chicago school of law and economics, on the other hand. 
 
5.1 The Freiburg School 
The above principles appear to circle around the postulates of the 
Ordo-liberal school of law and economics based in Freiburg in the 
1920s and 1930s, according to which competition law was central 
to the economic constitution of society as a constraint on the 
exercise of both private and state power in the economic sphere.  
In that respect, the role of the State was merely the creation of a 
legal environment suitable for the economy, and the maintenance 
of a healthy level of competition through measures that adhere to 
market principles. On the one hand, the ordoliberals conceded 
that firms’ market power could not be eliminated, but on the other 
hand it called for firms’ conduct to be constrained by competition. 
That would consent “performance competition” 
(Leistungswettbewerb) – making products more attractive for 
consumers, by improving their characteristics or lowering their 
price, but it would forbid “impediment competition” 
(Behinderungswettbewerb) – inhibiting the rivals’ capacity to 
perform661.  
In fact, ordoliberals affirmed that in a competitive market 
performance competition is natural, and there are no grounds for 
impediment competition. For instance, conduct such as non-
predatory price cuts, the offer of better quality products or better 
services were deemed performance competition and would be 
                                                
661 D.G. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting 
Prometheus, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 53 
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allowed; whereas, a below-cost pricing would be prohibited 
because it would impede competition. 
Having that said, the foundational thinking of the Freiburg school 
can be epitomized with the words of an eminent scholar:  
1) A competition policy primarily oriented toward the goal of 
securing individual freedom of action as a value in itself, from 
which the goal of economic efficiency is merely derived;  
(2) A strong role for the State in the preservation of the 
prerequisites of the competitive system but hesitancy towards 
overt price regulation;  
(3) The shaping of competition policy into a rule of law rather than 
a mechanism for discretionary decisions; and  
(4) The embedding of competition policy into the economic order 
of a free and open society662. 
In the context of article 102, the influence of Ordoliberalism 
resulted in the birth of the “doctrine of performance-based 
competition” 663 , which has been largely embraced by EU 
competition case law. In fact, the ban of “competition that is not 
based on the merits”664, or of “methods different from those which 
condition normal competition in products or services on the basis 
of the transactions of commercial operators” the dominant firm 
can recourse to665 is nothing but the judicial interpretation of the 
idea that competition based on restricting the performance of rival 
commercial operators, therefore eliminating the residual 
competition in the market in which the dominant position is held 
–impediment competition- is unlawful.  
The goal of competition law is the achievement of fairness, in 
other terms that firms with market power behave “as-if” the 
market were competitive. This view was reflected in the need for 
protection of small and medium enterprises, which were deemed 
as important to the consumers as the big businesses666. Thus, some 
restrictions on the dominant firm’s conduct were necessary to 
reassure fairness. 
                                                
662 D.G. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting 
Prometheus, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 92 
663  “Performance-based” competition directly derives from the idea of 
“performance competition” (Leistungswettbewerb) and consists of not impeding 
the rivals’ capacity of competing. Ordoliberalism thinking has had some echo in 
American Literature as well, in particular E. Why Above-Cost Price Cuts To Drive 
Out Entrants Are Not Predatory — and the Implications for Defining Costs and 
Market Power, 112 Yale L. Jour., 681 (2003), who deems conduct enhancing the 
firm’s efficiency as lawful, whereas conducts limits other firms’ efficiency as 
unlawful. 
664 See supra, para. 4.3.2 
665 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461, para. 91 
666 D.G. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting 
Prometheus, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 92 
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Other traces of Ordoliberalism in the EU case law can be found in 
the concept that the dominant firm is under a special 
responsibility “not to allow its conduct to impair genuine 
undistorted competition on the Common Market” 667 , which 
resembles the ordoliberal need to protect the competition 
structure as a goal in itself, parallel to the protection of market 
players (competitors and consumers). In other terms, article 102 
applies not only to conducts to the detriment of consumers or of 
competitors, but also to conducts that have a negative impact on 
the competitive process668. 
 
5.2. The Harvard School 
One of the most important economic theories that also have 
played a significant role in the formation of EC competition law is 
the Harvard School, which is also called structure-conduct-
performance school669, because it analyzes the interaction between 
the structure of an industry and the conduct of the firm involved 
in that industry. The structure of the industry -such as the 
technological development or the concentration level- determines 
the conduct of the firms, and, ultimately, the profits of the firms 
themselves and the consumer welfare. Consequently, whenever 
the government intervenes on the structure of the industry by 
indirectly imposing taxes or competition laws, it will indirectly 
affect the performance on the firms670. 
The structure affects the conduct of the firm and its performance. 
For instance, if the structure of the market is close to perfect 
competition conditions, the firm can only decide how much it 
wishes to sell at the price set by the market conditions. 
Conversely, if the market structure is monopolistic or 
oligopolistic, dominant firms can be able to set the price without 
considering their competitors conducts. Based on the assumption 
that perfect competition is the best status for the market, since 
price is always at the competitive level, competition law should 
always strive for achieving this condition and suppressing 
monopolistic structures. 
Another postulate of the Harvard School is the close relationship 
between the number of firms operating in an industry and the 
performance of the firm. The so-called “concentration doctrine” 
assumes that the more a market in concentrated in the hands of a 
                                                
667 See supra, Michelin I, case note n. 87 
668 E. Fox, Abuse of Dominance and Monopolisation: How to Protect Competition 
Without Protecting Competitors, in C.D. Ehlermann & I. Atanasiu (eds.), 2003 
European Competition Law Annual – What is an Abuse of a Dominant Position?, Hart 
Publishing, 2006, p. 69 
669 H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise – Principle and Execution, Harvard 
Press, p. 36 (2005) 
670 M. Glader, The Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis: EU Competition 
Law and US Antitrust Law, Lund University, Malmo, 2004 
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small number of firms, the higher the market power of these firms 
is, and the more likely the power of these undertakings to affect 
the price level with their course of conduct is. The doctrine does 
not take into account the fact that a high concentration can be the 
result of economies of scale or the superior product of the firms in 
one industry, maintaining that a high concentration in the market 
is always evidence of strong market power for the purposes of 
competition law; thus a high concentration is always a market 
failure and should always be a ground for government 
intervention. Parallel to that, competition authorities thus should 
enact an active policy against the mergers and concentration671.  
Influence of the Harvard School on EU Competition Law can be 
traced in the fact that the competition authorities still focus on the 
market share rather than entry barriers, on the one hand, and 
support the small and medium sized enterprises, on the other 
hand672.  
 
5.3 The Chicago School 
Major attacks to the Harvard School and the concentration 
doctrine came from the Chicago School, which mainly advocated 
for a free market system, untied from government intervention by 
means of competition law.  
Unlike the Harvard scholars, Chicagoans thought that highly 
concentrated market structures do not necessarily result in 
monopoly or collusion. Instead, the high concentration ratios are 
the result of different structures, more specifically the economies 
of scale and the network effects, since high concentration is 
observed in markets where the mass-scale production is 
economically more advantageous. They abhorred government 
regulation on market entry and price and emphasized efficiency 
explanation for many phenomena, including industrial 
concentration673.  
In other terms, firms operating at the maximum efficiency level 
increase their market shares and improve their performance 
according to the concentration rate of the market, benefiting from 
the economies of scale. Therefore, a high concentration is 
something desirable whereas the real problem is the collusion, 
which results in artificially high prices and restricted output 
level674.  
                                                
671 D. Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules, 
Kluwer Law International, Second Edition, The Hague/London/New York, 
2002 
672 M. Glader, The Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis: EU Competition 
Law and US Antitrust Law, Lund University, Malmo, 2004.  
673 W.E. Kovacic & C. Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal 
Thinking, 14 Journal of Economic Perspective 54, (2000) 
674 The Chicago school developed the argument that vertical ownership and 
contract integration should be lawful per se, with the exception of practices 
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The attitude of both Harvard and Chicago scholars towards 
perfect competition is the same, since both hold that this market 
structure maximizes both the economic efficiency of the firm’s 
performance and consumer welfare. However, while the Harvard 
School argues for government intervention to make the market 
structure closer to perfect competition, the Chicago School 
maintains that this condition should be achieved by means of the 
free display of market forces, and the only hurdle to forces of the 
market was the existence of artificial barriers to entry, among 
which the most common are predation, exclusionary practices 
(with regard to unilateral conducts), and collusion (with regard to 
multilateral conducts)675.  
With regard to the concentration issue, according to Chicago 
scholars that is the result of superior performance of the firms. 
Moreover, high concentration is necessary for the achievement of 
greater efficiency levels in an industry, since the economies of 
scale –brought about by concentration- will lower prices for the 
benefit of consumers, who are the ultimate beneficiaries of 
antitrust law. 
Therefore, Chicago scholars argue that the area in which 
competition law should intervene should be narrowed to control 
and eliminate the overtly collusive behaviors of firms, under the 
assumption that the free market forces will be conducive to the 
perfect competition condition without government intervention676. 
The effect of both Chicago and Harvard School can be observed in 
EC competition law, in which the efficiency concern is getting an 
increasingly vast echo. It should be noted, though, that the 
integration of the internal market is the most important goals 
                                                                                                                                                            
shown to facilitate horizontal collusion. They saw far fewer situations where 
monopoly could be created or maintained for long periods, and they disputed 
the notion that a monopolist in one market could readily leverage its monopoly 
position into related markets. Their Criticism to the “monopoly leverage” 
theory was grounded on the following argument: a firm with both market 
power and the ability to charge prices above cost would not increase its 
overcharge by tying or other forms of vertical integration, but by operating a 
sort of price discrimination, which permitted to extract more profits, but also to 
increase output (and decrease price). To the contrary, in the case of successive 
or complementary firms with market power, combining two products or 
process stages into a single firm would actually create efficiency, by increasing 
output and reducing price through the eliminations of double marginalization. 
H.J. Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago and the Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust 
Analysis, University of Iowa Research Paper, Number 10-35, December 2010, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1592476, p. 3 
675 I. Schmidt & J.B. Rittaler, A Critical Evaluation of the Chicago School of Antitrust 
Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, p.75 
(1989); R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books, 
Inc. Publishers, New York, p.328 (1993) 
676 These views were maintained by R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at 
War with Itself, Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, New York, p.166 (1993), R.A. 
Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA.L.REV. 925 (1979) 
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mandated to the EC competition law; therefore, the axiological 
prius of the EU action cannot be the achievement of efficiency of 
the market, but its integration. The further market integration is 
clearly conflicting with the unrestricted free market concept of the 
Chicago School677. 
 
5.4 Post-Chicago approaches 
According to an eminent scholar, there is a need for convergence 
between the Harvard School and Chicago School for the proper 
functioning of EC competition law. Apparently, the European 
Approach, which is very much affected by the Harvard School, is 
unsuccessful in utilization of economic theories in antitrust cases, 
whereas the arguments of Chicago School are against the 
protectionist attitude and common objectives of the European 
Union678. 
Economic thinking of unilateral conduct has significantly evolved 
in the course of the years, and has been influenced by the above 
referred schools of law and economics, which have advocated that 
competition law rules and outcomes should be designed in a way 
to make their enforcement economically efficient679, by way of 
balancing the anticompetitive and the pro-competitive effects of 
the firm’s unilateral conduct. 
 
5.4.1 The dichotomy between per se rules and rules of reason 
Based on the American experience, the Economic Advisory Group 
on Competition Policy has evaluated the benefits of adhering to an 
absolute per se approach or to a more nuanced rule of reason 
approach. On the account of the per se test, when it comes to 
policing the legality of a unilateral conduct, no exceptions apply; 
per se rules, however, are suitable for competition purposes only 
when experience suggests that the anticompetitive effects of a 
conduct are so unequivocal that there is no reason to further 
investigate the effects themselves680.  
Conversely, rules of reason entail the evaluation of the “goods and 
the evils” of a unilateral practice, the untangling of a conduct in 
that harms and benefits are appraised and compared. Economists 
have emphasized that this effect-based approach is deemed more 
                                                
677 B. J. Rodger, The Oligopoly Problem and the Concept of Collective Dominance: EC 
Developments in the Light of US Trends in Antitrust Law and Policy, 2 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 25, (1996) 
678 E. Johansen, I Say Antitrust; You Say Anticompetitive: Why Bridging the Divid 
between US and EU Competition Policy Makes More Economic Sense, 24 Penn State 
International Law Review, 333, (2005) 
679  R.A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial 
Administration, 2 Journal of Legal Studies, p. 399, (1973) 
680 Examples of per se offences are price fixings, since experience over the years 
has shown that they are so harmful to both competition and to consumers that 
they are prohibited outright. 
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appropriate when dealing with unilateral conduct, and have 
criticized past policy under article 102 due to its extreme reliance 
on form over effects681. They have endorsed the application of 
effect-based rules versus form-based rules on the account of the 
following reasons: 
A more consistent approach would start out from the effects of 
anticompetitive conduct, such as exclusion of competitors in the 
same market or in a horizontally or vertically related market one, 
and consider the competitive harm that is inflicted on consumers. 
Adopting such an effects-based approach would ensure that these 
various practices are treated consistently when they are adopted 
for the same purpose. In contrast, a form-based approach creates 
the risk that they will be treated inconsistently, with some 
practices possibly enjoying a relatively more lenient attitude (e.g., 
because of different standards). Arbitraging among these different 
treatments may facilitate exclusion, or induce the dominant firm 
to adopt alternative exclusionary methods, which may well inflict 
a higher cost on consumers682.  
Matter-of-factly, effect-based rules should take into consideration 
the anticompetitive effect of the conduct on the market and the 
detriment caused to consumers. Furthermore, an effect-based 
approach would permit an ex-post evaluation of the consequences 
of the conduct, whereas a form-based one would impose the 
establishing of ex-ante parameters for anticompetitive conducts. 
The former would allow Courts and competition authorities to 
include diverse practices in the anticompetitive conduct and a 
better evaluation of the concrete circumstances of the case. In both 
approaches, however, neither should the enforcement organs 
allow that anticompetitive conducts go unpunished (“false 
positives” in statistical parlance), nor that pro-competitive 
practices be condemned (“false negatives”)683. 
A self-explanatory example of the conflict between the two 
approaches regards unconditional price cuts by a dominant firm. 
Even if price competition is always fostered, an excessive price 
reduction aiming at driving competitors off the market might 
result into a subsequent price raise when the market has been 
predated.  
Economists traditionally suggest that price reductions are lawful 
as long as price is kept above production costs. Production costs 
are generally defined in terms of marginal costs, but since these 
are difficult to evaluate in court, they normally match average 
                                                
681  Report by the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy, “An 
Economic Approach to Article 82”, July 2005, p.5 
682 Ibidem, p.6 
683 Ibidem, p.7 
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variable costs684. The ECJ in the AKZO case -the first ECJ outcome 
on predatory pricing- has endorsed this approach, arguing that 
pricing below average variable costs (a proxy for marginal costs) 
is presumed to be exclusionary685. Nonetheless, this presumption 
has been relaxed lately, in particular as regards the new 
technologies, and price reductions below average variable costs 
for a limited period of time have been deemed lawful under 
certain circumstances, such as the introduction of new products or 
the creation of network effect of economies of scale. In fact, in the 
Wanadoo case the Commission concluded that the dominant firm’s 
prices were not predatory for the mere fact that they had been 
below average variable cost for a extended amount of time, but for 
the fact that the price cut was aimed at pursuing a predatory 
policy686.  
In all, a form-based rule stating -“all price cuts below average 
variable costs are unlawful”- would prevent authorities from 
evaluating all the circumstances and practices, and might result in 
a false negative. Conversely, a rule stating “all price cuts below a 
certain threshold (to be defined with reference to possible 
practices and circumstances”) would allow courts to better 
investigate the facts of the case and police it by resorting to more 
elements. This method is more nuanced than the simply 
accounting of costs, but it does not alter the rationale underlying 
the competition/consumer harm test. 
Undoubtedly, one could argue that a per se rule is less arduous to 
apply than a rule based on the effects of a conduct. Yet, the ex-post 
approach is also a means to adapt a general rule to the evolution 
of the legal and economic policies underlying competition law. 
Modern case law has shown that there are virtually no practices 
that could be described as per se unlawful pursuant to article 102. 
 
5.4.2 The inputs of law and economics in the definition of a 
standard of abuse687 
                                                
684 See Chapter I, para. 9.2, the Areeda-Turner criterion. P. Areeda & D.T. 
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 
Harv. L. Rev. 697 716-718 (1975) 
685 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, paragraphs 70-71 
686 Wanadoo Interactive, Commission Decision, 16.07.2003, COMP/38.233, para. 
322 and 369. Compare supra, note n. 110 the emphasis of the Commission on 
analyzing the actual anticompetitive effects of the dominant firm’s conduct, and 
the swings of the European Courts between the ascertainment of actual or 
potential anticompetitive effects.  
687 A more detailed assessment of the tests elaborated by Law and Economics 
scholars will be made in Chapter III, para. 11 et seq., in an attempt to find the 
most suitable approach to identify monopolization or abusive standards to 
apply in both systems. 
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Based on the call for evaluating the circumstances of the case 
surrounding the unilateral abusive conduct, legal and economic 
literature has provided different tests to single out an abuse: fit 
1. The first one is based on the notion of profit-sacrifice, meaning 
that the firm is to deliberately forego some profits in the short run 
in order to induce exit from the market and to recoup the losses in 
the long term688; conduct is unlawful if it is unprofitable for the 
dominant firm but for the exclusion of rivals and the post-
exclusion supra-competitive recoupment; 
2. A second test is the “no economic sense” one, which can be 
regarded as a variation of the profit-sacrifice test and considers as 
conduct as an abuse when it makes no economic sense but for the 
intent to drive competitors off the market or soften competition689.  
3. A third test is the equally efficient competitor one, based on which 
the only exclusionary conduct is the one that would exclude from 
competition an equally or more efficient competitor, since conduct 
aiming at excluding a less efficient rival is deemed competition on 
the merits690. 
4. The final test is based on consumer welfare: the conduct that 
harms consumer welfare, or harms consumer welfare more than it 
promotes efficiency is deemed exclusionary691. 
 
5.4.2.1 The “profit-sacrifice” test 
The most obvious example of profit-sacrifice conduct is predatory 
pricing, whereby the losses incurred by selling under price should 
be outweighed by the gains of excluding competition over a 
market. Criticism of the profit sacrifice test has been addressed to 
the fact that it is not clear to what extent a firm should sacrifice its 
profits for its conduct to be characterized as unlawful, or if any 
sacrifice aimed at excluding competition should be automatically 
unlawful. Furthermore, the profit-sacrifice test lacks certainty 
when it asks the court to prefigure the likely conduct of the firm in 
the absence of an ability to raise prices, once the predation period 
has ceased692.  
 
                                                
688 A.D. Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements andOther Exclusionary Conduct—
Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 Antitrust L.J. (2006); J. Ordover & R. Willig, An 
Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 Yale Law 
Journal 8 (1981) 
689 A.M. Mateus & T. Coelho Moreira, Competition Law and Economics – Advances 
in Competition Policy Enforcement in the EU and in North America, Edward Elgar 
Publishing (Inc.), Northampton, Massachusetts, (2010) p.190 
690 R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2001, 
p. 194 
691 A.I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a 
better Balance, 72 Antitrust Law Journal 3, (2004) p.3  
692 M.R. Patterson, The Sacrifice of Profits in Non-Price Predation, 18 Antitrust 37, 
(2003) p. 37 
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5.4.2.2 The “no-economic sense” test 
Under the “no-economic sense”, a business strategy is not abusive 
if it would not make economic sense for the dominant firm but for 
its probable consequence of eliminating competition over a certain 
market. Compared to the “profit-sacrifice test”, this test permits to 
distinguish lawful short-term profit sacrifices –such as 
investments in network effects- from unlawful courses of conduct 
whose only rationale is eliminating competition, by granting more 
lenience for conducts that are yet aggressive, but are not solely 
anticompetitive. A shortcoming of this test is that the there is 
actually no way to effectually distinguish a volume growth 
(caused by the reduction in output/price) justifiable under the 
competition-on-the merits from a volume growth centered on 
eliminating rivals. 
As a corollary to the above, both the profit-sacrifice test and the 
no-economic-sense test have the advantage of shifting the inquiry 
on competition on the merits from a subjective to an objective 
standpoint, since they are both grounded on the objective 
rationale of a sacrifice of the dominant firm, and they are both 
grounded on the assessment of the economic rationality of a firm’s 
wealth maximization.  
However, even though both approaches have the merit of 
shedding light on the willfulness of the conduct of the dominant 
firm, they leave the question of what is an exclusionary conduct 
essentially, which task is ultimately left to the Courts693. But 
Courts are left free to police article 102 in a maximalist way, 
sanctioning every profit-sacrifice of the firm resulting in a 
lessening of competition on a market, or in a 
libertarian/conservative way, sanctioning those profit-sacrifices 
purposely seeking to eliminate competition, but upholding a 
strenuous antagonism of the dominant firm on the market694. 
 
5.4.2.3 The “equally efficient competitor” test 
Under the “equally efficient competitor” test, an abusive conduct 
is a practice that would exclude an equally efficient rival firm. 
Judge Posner elaborated this test, departing from the question 
whether the dominant company itself would be able to survive the 
exclusionary conduct if it were the target. Concisely, the equally 
                                                
693 J. Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, 115 Economic Journal 244, (2005), p. 259 
According to the author, lax policy would jeopardize the competitiveness of 
markets, but rigid policy would chill pro-competitive, pro-consumer conduct. 
694 Ordoliberal theory holds that the role of the State is merely the creation of a 
legal environment suitable for the economy, and the maintenance of a healthy 
level of competition through measures that adhere to market principles. On the 
policy reasons underlying the Courts’ interpretation of norms, see in particular 
M. Hesselink, A Spontaneous Order for Europe? Why Hayek’s libertarianism is Not 
the Right Way Forward for European Private Law, available at the website 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1270566 
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efficient competitor test is developed as follows:  
“The plaintiff must first prove that the defendant has monopoly 
power and second that the challenged practice is likely in the 
circumstances to exclude from the defendants’ market an equally 
or more efficient competitor. The defendant can rebut by proving 
that although it is a monopolist and the challenged practice 
exclusionary, the practice is, on balance, efficient. Only when 
monopoly power is used to exclude equally or more efficient firms 
and thus perpetuate a monopoly not supported by superior 
efficiency should the law step in. Even then, it should be alert to 
the possibility that the exclusionary effect of the monopolist’s 
practice is offset by efficiency gains”695. 
The conduct of the dominant firm would be presumed abusive 
when it harms equally efficient competitors, absent overriding 
efficiencies that might excuse such an abuse. 
With regard to article 102, in the AKZO case696  the “equally 
efficient competitor test” was applied, in that the ECJ found that 
unconditional price cuts below average variable costs could 
constitute an abuse when they are qualified as abusive being part 
of a scheme to eliminate rivals, which are equally or more efficient 
than the defendant. Less efficient firms should not be granted 
protection from strenuous competition by the dominant firm, 
because consumers can benefit more from more economically 
efficient market players.  
In that respect, the dominant firm should be allowed to price 
down at least to its average variable costs, even if these are lower 
than those of the rivals, since such pricing is economically efficient 
and will bring gains to consumers, who are the ultimate 
addressees of competition law measures. In other terms, the 
exclusionary effects caused by pricing down to average variable 
cost are offset by the efficiency produced in terms of consumer 
welfare. 
In the Deutsche Telekom case, the General Court has further 
admitted the test, on the assumption that the assessment is solely 
based on the measurement of the dominant firm’s cost, and not on 
the subjective intent of eliminating rivals697. 
Criticism to this approach has been expressed by those scholars, 
who stressed on the need of the presence of less efficient 
undertakings, which could bring benefits to the consumers thanks 
                                                
695 R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2001, 
p. 196 
696 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 70 
697 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission of the European Communities, 14.10.2010, 
Case C-280/08 P, 2010, para. 192 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
216 
 
to the enlarging of competition in the market698. Economic theory 
has showed that the inclusion of less efficient rivals can reduce the 
deadweight loss699 caused by the dominant firm and thus offset 
the allocation inefficiencies produced by the presence of less 
efficient firms on the market700. 
Another criticism addressed to Posner’s test is that it 
underestimates the first-mover advantage or the scale-of-scope 
advantage of the dominant firm: even if the latter’s conduct is not 
likely to exclude an equally efficient rival, it might curtail 
competition and prevent less efficient rivals from increasing 
business and becoming at least as competitive as the dominant 
firm701.  
Second, even if a conduct is not likely to exclude an equally 
efficient rival in the short run, it might be aimed at creating 
economies of scale, which in the long run might drive competitors 
off competition anyways. Therefore, other scholars have 
suggested adopting the “not-yet-as-efficient competitors test”, 
entailing the evaluation of the likelihood of a firm to reach the 
same levels of efficiencies as the dominant firm’s, absent the 
latter’s exclusionary conduct702. 
 
5.4.2.4 The “consumer welfare” test 
The fourth and final “consumer welfare test” seeks to assess 
whether the course of conduct of the dominant firm increases its 
market power and causes a net harm to consumer welfare703: the 
magnitude of the benefits - increased consumer welfare from 
lower prices or improved quality, and perhaps increased total 
welfare from cost savings – is to offset the amount of welfare loss 
attributable to the exclusion of rivals - reduced consumer surplus 
or perhaps the deadweight loss attributable to market power 
maintained or created by the conduct. If the latter is greater than 
the former, the conduct is anticompetitive. Thus, the  analysis is 
based on all the available data that might have an impact on 
consumers and on the balance of the pro-competitive and the anti-
competitive effects of the conduct704. 
                                                
698 M. Armstrong & J Vickers, Price Discrimination, Competition and Regulation, 41 
Journal of Industrial Economics 334, (1993) 
699 For a definition of “deadweight loss”, see Chapter I, para. 4.2 
700 M. Armstrong & J Vickers, Price Discrimination, Competition and Regulation, 41 
Journal of Industrial Economics 335, (1993) 
701 A.S. Edlin, Stopping Above Cost Predatory Pricing, in 111 Yale Law Journal 941, 
(2002)  
702 J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 
367-374 
703  S.C. Salop, Section 2 Paradigms and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 
Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Spring Meeting (Mar. 31, 2005). 
704 A. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a 
Better Balance, 72 Antitrust Law Journal 3, (2004) 
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This test has a basis in article 102(b) which reproaches the act of 
“limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers”: the inquiry whether the conduct causes a 
net harm to consumers in grounded in the European law of 
unilateral abusive conducts.  
Moreover, in the controversial Microsoft case, the Commission 
applied the balancing test in relation to the tying of Windows 
Media Player (WMP) with Windows Operating System (OS). It 
found that Microsoft had “not submitted adequate evidence to the 
effect that tying WMP is objectively justified by pro-competitive 
effects which would outweigh the distortion of competition 
caused by it.   …What Microsoft presents as the benefits of tying 
could be achieved in the absence of Microsoft tying WMP with 
Windows. As regards other benefits identified by Microsoft, they 
primarily relate to Microsoft’s own profitability and, being 
furthermore disproportionate to the anti-competitive effects in the 
market caused by the tying, cannot therefore serve as a valid 
justification”705.  
The Commission analyzed the proportionality of Microsoft’s 
conduct, and whether the increase of consumer welfare could 
justify restriction to competition caused by the tying. It leaned on 
four lines of argument: 1) the ease of use could be achieved 
without tying706; 2) distribution efficiencies were minor and could 
not be achieved without distortion of competition707; 3) there was 
no evidence of technically superior performance due to code 
integration of WMP with the OS708; 4) platform efficiencies (i.e. 
desire to keep applications focused on Microsoft interfaces) was 
not a recognized efficiency709.  
Thus, in judging ex post the effects of Microsoft’s conduct, the 
Commission did not rely on economic elements that would 
guarantee the predictability ex ante of the competitive gains of a 
conduct -such as a price reduction from which consumers could 
benefit-, or on clear rules, due to the lack of statutory definition of 
“abuse” pursuant to article 102, but it rather applied a rule of 
reason and a policy judgment, by merely weighing the 
proportionality of the conduct of the defendant. The risk implied 
in the proportionality test, in fact, is that “the outcomes will 
                                                
705 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, Commission decision March 24th 2004, 
para. 970 
706 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, Commission decision March 24th 2004, 
para. 956ff 
707 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, Commission decision March 24th 2004, 
para. 958 
708 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, Commission decision March 24th 2004, 
para. 962 
709 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, Commission decision March 24th 2004, 
para. 962-966 
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represent matters of policy rather than precision”710. 
 
6. The evaluation of dominance 
In EU competition law, the evaluation of dominance is, together 
with the definition of the relevant market, a basic prerequisite for 
the assessment of liability under article 102. That represents a 
significant difference from the US legal system, where under § 2 
the firm can be held liable for monopolizing or attempting to 
monopolize, even when it does not have a market share 
amounting to monopoly per se. Nonetheless, market power and 
market shares stand as a symptom of the dangerous probability 
that the firm will monopolize the market.  
Conversely, under EU competition law the abuse of dominant 
position cannot but depart from the calculation of a relevant 
dominance over a clearly defined relevant market. If follows that a 
conduct -considered abusive if carried out by a dominant firm- 
will be held lawful if carried out by a firm that does not hold the 
sufficient market shares to be dominant, irrespective of the fact 
that, by virtue of the conduct itself, the non-dominant firm might 
reach the relevant threshold of dominance in the long run. 
The economic concept of dominance does not fully match its legal 
definition: in fact, in the realm of economics dominance is 
associated with market power, as the power to set the price for a 
product, which will be accepted by the other small operators in 
the market, also known as the competitive fringe. A firm is 
dominant because its rivals do not have sufficient strength to 
increase or decrease output and influence the market. The market 
power is exercised over the remaining demand that is left 
unsatisfied by the competitive fringe711. 
 
6.1 The economic thinking of dominance 
When it comes to the assessment of the relevant dominance 
threshold for the declaratory of abuse of dominant position, the 
economic argument set forth in Chapter I with regard to the 
measurement of market power712 holds valid also as regards the 
interpretation and application of article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, for the argument as follows: 
  
                                                
710 R. O’Donogue & A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford 
and Portland, 2006, p. 194 
711 GJ Stigler, The Dominant Firm and the Inverted Price Umbrella, 8 Journal of Law 
and Economics 167 (1965) 
712 See Chapter I, para. 4.2 
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713 
In the above graph D is the total demand curve for a product. K 
indicates the competitors’ production capacity; DR is the remaining 
demand the dominant firm is capable of satisfying and is obtained 
by moving D towards the left by K units. QM is the output that the 
dominant firm would offer at price PM if there were no competitors 
where marginal cost equals marginal revenue; QD is the output of 
the dominant firm at price PD on the demand curve DR, where 
marginal cost equals marginal revenue. If K is small, the difference 
between PM and PD will be small and it can be maintained that the 
dominant firm will act as if it were a monopolist. Thus, the 
monopoly model714 can be used to analyze the dominant firm’s 
conduct with a satisfying degree of approximation. 
Cases of extensive monopolies, i.e. of firms detaining the whole of 
the shares of a market for a product are rare. It is not unusual that 
a market is characterized by the presence of a firm that has a 
substantial share of the market on the one hand, and a myriad of 
smaller firms each detaining a significantly lesser market share. 
That is the case of a market in which a firm is dominant and 
withholds a competitive advantage. The measurement of the 
market shares is the first step to assess dominance. 
                                                
713 Source L. Cabral, Economia Industriale, Carocci Ed., Rome, p. 95 (2002) 
714 See Chapter I, para. 4.2 
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6.2 The legal definitions of dominance 
When it comes to the legal definition of dominance, three different 
types have been identified in the case law: 1) Single firm 
dominance, when the firm is the sole seller able to influence the 
market; 2) collective dominance, when two or more firms with an 
extensive degree of market power coordinate their conduct on the 
market instead of competing with each other; 3) 
“superdominance”, a situation of overwhelming dominance in 
which the firm enjoys a position of quasi-monopoly, and in which 
price cuts can be implemented autonomously from costs, or with a 
view to selectively eliminating one or more rivals715.  
Within the confines of the present essay, only the single 
dominance will be analyzed, since it is believed that the concept of 
“superdominance” has no different legal basis than the idea of 
single firm dominance, but simply covers the likely 
anticompetitive effects that a quasi-monopolist firm will cause by 
virtue of its conduct. It goes without saying that a quasi-
monopolist will have more chances to succeed in excluding rivals 
by means of its practices; however, the same categories of abuses 
under 102, as elaborated and declined in the case law, should 
apply.  
In fact, there is no legal ground to affirm that firms with very high 
market shares have stricter duties under article 102 than “less” 
dominant firms, because the jurisprudential concept of 
“superdominance” is merely descriptive of a specific position of 
the firm in the market, but does not help characterize some 
conducts –that would be deemed pro-competitive if carried out by 
a dominant firm- as anticompetitive716.  
In order to assess if an otherwise pro-competitive practice of a 
dominant firm can amount to an abuse, if put in practice by a 
super-dominant firm, Courts should evaluate whether high entry 
barriers characterize the market at issue; if not, the possibility for 
new entrants to subtract market shares to the super-dominant firm 
precludes to treat “superdominance” differently from mere 
dominance. However, in the case law regarding 
“superdominance”, there is no evaluation of the entry barriers717. 
                                                
715 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Others v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 16.03.2000, Case C-395/96 and C-396/96, [2000] ECR I-
1365. Opinion of the Advocate General Fennelly, para 115. It is suggested that a 
super-dominant firm may be subject to stricter duties than a merely dominant 
one. 
716 In particular, the same rules regarding predatory price-cuts should apply 
regardless of the degree of dominance. 
717 Favorable to treat “superdominance” as “normal” dominance are J. Temple 
Lang & R. O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition, How to Clarify Pricing 
Abuses under Article 82, 26 Fordham Int. L. J. 135-136 (2003). The authors also 
argue that other renowned cases, such as Tetra Pak and Irish Sugar could have 
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When it comes to the legal definition of dominance, it has been 
affirmed above that, albeit being an essential prerequisite, article 
102 does not condemn the mere possession of a dominant 
position, but the exploitation of it.  
Dominance is assessed by virtue of several factors, and market 
shares are not an absolute term, but only an expression of the 
degree of dominance, untied from the lawfulness of it. In 
particular, “a dominant position derives from a combination of 
several factors which, taken separately, are not necessarily 
determinative”718.  
These factors have been outlined in the case law practice:  
1) The first step is the measurement of the firm’s market shares;  
2) Second, it should be assessed whether entry barriers 
characterize the market;  
3) Third, it should be assessed whether competitor(s) have 
sufficient economic strength to contrast the dominant firm;  
4) Fourth, these elements should be evaluated against the 
evidence of actual competition on the market;  
5) Fifth, the facts put forward as acts amounting to abuses should 
be evaluated without necessarily having to acknowledge that they 
are abuses719. 
 
6.3 Structural and behavioral elements of dominance 
Antitrust literati divide the above elements into two broad 
categories, structural factors, on the one hand, and behavioral 
ones, on the other hand720, arguing that European competition 
authorities tend to preponderantly evaluate the structural factors 
rather than the behavioral ones, which are only encompassed in 
the analysis residually, when the structural analysis has not 
produced any useable result. This hierarchy seems to be endorsed 
by the ECJ, which has affirmed that in order to establish the 
dominance on a relevant market, it is necessary first of all to 
examine the structure of the firm and then the situation on the 
said market as far as competition is concerned721. 
The structural elements of dominance have been firstly and 
incisively outlined in Hoffmann-LaRoche, where the General Court 
maintained that what is material to the application of article 102 is 
“a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking 
                                                                                                                                                            
been explained on the account of the “superdominance” theory, due to the 
extent of the defendants’ dominant position, but there is no mention of it in the 
outcomes whatsoever. 
718 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, para. 66-67 
719 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, para. 68 
720 S. Bastianon, L’Abuso di Posizione Dominante, Milano, p. 43, (2001) 
721 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, para. 67  
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which enables it to prevent effective competition being 
maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
its customers and ultimately of consumers”722.  
The most significant component of the evaluation of dominance is 
the calculation of market shares in a defined market -from the 
twofold product and geographic dimension- for a sustained 
period of time. In particular, market share for suppliers is 
calculated on the basis of their sales of the relevant product and in 
the relevant geographic market 723 . Nevertheless, holding a 
significant market share does not represent absolute evidence of 
dominance, but its relevance varies in accordance with the 
characteristics of the market, of the production, of demand and 
offer.  
Therefore, a significant market share, with its correspondent 
volume of production and offer, enables the firm to act 
independently on the market of reference for a sustained period of 
time: the dominant position consists of this independence, and is 
implicit when market shares oscillates between 100% and 80%.  
In the Akzo case, the Court purported that “Market share of over 
70% is most likely to be considered to be in a dominant position.  
A share of between 40% and 50% raises a presumption of 
dominance”724. Consequently, when market shares are between 
40% and 70%%, the calculation of the competitors’ market power 
becomes of capital importance.  
In fact, according to how the remaining shares are divided among 
competitors, the dominant firm’s share can have a different weigh. 
If the dominant firm has a 50% market share, and the market is 
characterized by the presence of 10 competitors each holding 5%, 
the position of the bigger firm can be equated to the dominant 
one 725 . However, in more recent outcomes (Akzo), the Court 
appears to have adopted an absolute approach, stating that a 50% 
                                                
722 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461 para. 4 
723  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, published on the Official Journal, OJ C 372, 
09.12.1997, 5, para. 53 
724 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359. In this case the Court held that 50% market share is a 
dominant position per se, unless some perturbing circumstances allow to state 
the opposite. 
725 In the United Brand case, the Court concluded that the 40-45% market share 
of United Brands was not enough to infer dominance per se, given the presence 
of one competitor, holding a substantial share, and several other rivals holding 
non-substantial positions. However, the 45% market share, together with the 
price discrimination that the defendant operated on each national market, were 
considered substantial elements to assess violation of article 102. United Brands 
Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European 
Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207 
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market share stand as proof of dominant position per se, unless 
some other factors perturb such a dominance. 
The temporal dimension of market share is also of capital 
importance, being a symptom of the strength of the dominance: 
the unlikelihood that new entrants or existing rival firms will 
subtract market shares from the dominant firm in the short run 
makes the firm dominant on the market. The Commission 
highlighted the importance of the temporal aspect of dominance 
in its UIP decision, holding that dominance in the cinema industry 
could not be represented by the yearly changes in the distributors’ 
market share, since these changes merely depended on the success 
of the single movies that distributors had commercialized, and not 
on the market power of the single distributors726.  
 
6.4 The relationship between dominance and entry barriers 
Another fundamental aspect in the evaluation of dominance is the 
existence of entry barriers in the market: a traditional assumption 
in economics is that the existence of entry is one of the difference 
between a competitive market and a monopolized one. When it 
comes to defining the term entry barrier, scholars divide between 
two models: on the one hand, an entry barrier is considered as any 
market condition that enables an incumbent firm to charge 
monopoly price without attracting new entry727, whereas on the 
other hand it consists of “a cost of producing (at come or every 
rate of output) which must be borne by firms which seek to enter 
an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry”728. 
On the account of the first definition, the investment necessary to 
enter the market is not considered as an entry barrier, since it is 
assumed that the new entrant will bear the same costs that the 
incumbent firms had previously borne.  
This notion of entry barrier is general and is drafted in terms of 
divergence between the difficulty for a new entrant to enter a 
market and the ease of the incumbent firm to charge a monopolist 
price. On the account of the second definition, investment costs 
                                                
726 UIP, 12.07.1989, published on OJ L-226 (1989) 
727 J.S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition: their Character and Consequences in 
Manufacturing Industries, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p.3 (1962). The 
author considers economies of scale as barriers to entry, since in a market 
characterized by economies of scale the existing firm tends to have lower costs 
at a high output rate than the new firm. 
728 G.J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry, University of Chicago Press, p.67 
(1983). The author argues that economies of scale and demand conditions of the 
firm –as well as of the industry- are the only factors governing the firm size. His 
definition of barrier as a higher entry cost overrides economies of scale, because 
the incumbent dominant firm is confronted with the same problem, namely the 
achievement of a lower cost through higher output. The incumbent firm is to 
bear higher entry costs, such as the losses arising out of selling below 
competitive price, in order to obtain higher market shares.   
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are an entry barrier depending on the characteristics of each 
market. Entering a high-tech market implies significantly higher 
costs than entering a fruit distribution market. Therefore, the 
notion is selective and the more burdensome the requirements for 
a firm to enter a market are, the higher the entry barriers. 
The European Courts have adopted a wide concept of entry 
barrier, encompassing the whole of the costs that a new entrant is 
to bear, including of all the costs that the dominant firm had 
previously borne to gain its position on the market729: the main 
obstacles to competition derive from the investments that the new 
entrant is subject to and from the lack of economies of scale he 
cannot benefit from.  
With regard to the most recurring examples of entry barriers, in 
the EU case law there are two types of obstacles: on the one hand, 
they can be established by law, such as the existence of a patent730, 
an exclusive right or a legal monopoly for the product731, the need 
of a license to carry out an activity; on the other hand, they can be 
related to the market structure, such as the inelasticity of demand, 
the control of an essential facility by the dominant firm. 
 
6.5 The treatment of essential facilities 
The American “essential facility” doctrine consists of an entry 
barrier contiguous to the enjoyment of exclusive rights. In the US, 
its restrictive interpretation is emblematic of a way of conceiving 
antitrust law and freedom of competition: the refusal of a firm 
detaining an essential facility to deal with another firm is 
generally lawful, except for some exceptional circumstances. In 
fact, imposing obligations on a firm to do business with its rivals 
                                                
729 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, para. 122. Compare 
M.H FitzPatrick, United Brands Company v Commission of the European 
Communities: Windows to Price Discrimination Law in the European Economic 
Community, 1 Northwestern J. Int'l L. & Bus. 342 (1979) 
730 The interface between patent law and competition law has always been a 
matter of debate in both case law and scholarship. The European Court of 
Justice has repeatedly established that the existence of a patent right does not 
suffice in giving a firm a dominant position. Three are the conditions for 
violation of article 102: the existence of a dominant position, the abuse of it and 
the prejudice to interstate commerce. The exercise of patent rights over a 
product does not imply that the three conditions are met. Parke Davis v. 
Centrafarm, 29.01.1968, Case 24/67 [1968] ECR 81 
731 Firms enjoying a legal monopoly over a substantial part of the common 
market are subject to the same limits pursuant to article 102 as the other firms. 
Thus, they cannot exploit their dominant position even if they have been 
granted exclusive rights by the Member States. Merci Convenzionali Porto di 
Genova v. Siderurgica Gabrielli, 10.12.1991, C-179/90 [1991] ECR 5889, Klaus 
Höfner and Fritz Elsner v. Macrotom GmbH, 23.04.1991, Case C-41/90, [1991], ECR 
I-1979.  
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is at odds with other antitrust rules that discourage agreements 
among competitors that may unreasonably restrict competition732.  
However, courts have, in some circumstances, found antitrust 
liability when a firm with market power refused to do business 
with a competitor. For instance, if the monopolist refuses to sell a 
product or service to a competitor that it makes available to others, 
or if the monopolist has done business with the competitor and 
then stops, the monopolist needs a legitimate business reason for 
its policies733. 
A significant contribution to shed light on this doctrine can be 
found in the conclusions of the Advocate General in the Bronner 
case734, who has argued that the essential facility doctrine entails 
the incidence of 5 conditions: the firm controlling the essential 
facility is to be a monopolist; the rival firm cannot reproduce the 
essential facility (i.e. a railway bridge, a telecommunication 
network, an electricity net); the facility is to be available for usage 
of other firms; access to the essential facility is to be denied; the 
denial is not supported by any business justification. Besides that, 
a valid justification can also be the safeguard of business efficiency 
of the monopolist. 
In the EU case law, the borderline between freedom not to venture 
with a competitor and duty to share an essential facility is blurrier, 
and there is no reference to the notion of “essential facility” itself. 
However, an emblematic application of the doctrine can be found 
in the CBEM case735, where 
CBEM was a telemarketing company that had been practically 
denied access to Belgian RTL television channels owned by CLT, 
after the latter’s decision to make access to telemarketing on RTL 
subject to the usage of its call center system, IPB. The Court held 
that the RTL TV stations were an essential infrastructure for the 
telemarketing activity and the position of CLT/IPB had a 
dominant position on such market, which they had exploited to 
eliminate the claimant. 
In the Bronner case, the Austrian company Bronner, a small editor 
and distributor of the magazine Der Standard was denied access to 
the distribution of Mediaprint, a big distributor. Bronner filed an 
injunction to oblige Mediaprint to nation-widely distribute the 
magazine at the Austrian Court, arguing that the distribution 
through the postal service was not as effective as the door-to-door 
                                                
732 B.A. Facey & D.H. Assaf, Monopolization and Abusive Dominance in Canada, the 
United States and European Union: A survey, 70 Antitrust L.J. 513 552 (2002) 
733 See Chapter I, note n. 286 et seq. 
734 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, Conclusions of the Advocate General Jacobs, 
26.11.1998, Case C-7/97, [1998] ECR I-7808 
735  Centre belge d'études de marché - Télémarketing (CBEM) v SA Compagnie 
luxembourgeoise de télédiffusion (CLT) and Information publicité Benelux (IPB), 
03.10.1985, Case 311/84, [1985] ECR paras. 26-27 
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delivery of Mediaprint to compete on the magazine market, and 
that, due to the small size of the magazine, the creation of a 
distribution arrangement just for the magazine was not 
economically efficient. 
The ECJ argued that in order to proof the essential character of the 
distribution of Mediaprint, it was not sufficient to maintain that an 
alternative distribution was not economically convenient due to 
the small size of distribution of the magazine736 , nor was it 
sufficient to merely maintain that the distribution through the 
postal service was not as effective as the door-to-door delivery of 
Mediaprint. Thus, Mediaprint distribution was not considered as an 
essential facility, and the company was not obliged to distribute 
the magazine for Bronner.  
The Court went on and affirmed that three are the conditions for 
forcing owners of an essential facility to grant access: 1) the refusal 
to access a facility must prevent any competition at all on the 
applicant’s market; 2) the access must be indispensable or 
essential for carrying out the applicant’s business; 3) the access 
must be denied without any objective justification737. Thus, the 
interpretation of the essential nature of the facility is objective, in 
that the Court does not account of the intent to exclude a 
competitor, by denying access to the facility, or to the existence of 
valid business justifications, as in the American model.  
Moreover, there is no reference or inquiry of the competition harm 
that could stem from a denial of access to a facility; in other terms, 
there is no reference to consequences to the consumer 
downstream market of the denial. 
The Hofner decision has not been exempt from criticism on other 
grounds, on the account that, thus framed, the law of the essential 
facilities bars small-sized firms to be able to act as big-sized ones 
on the market. In order to establish whether or not a facility is 
essential, Competition authorities should evaluate whether the 
refusal to deal would make the performance of competitors 
activities in the market in question “either impossible or 
permanently, seriously, and unavoidably uneconomical”738. 
 
6.6 Behavioral elements of dominance 
                                                
736 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, 26.11.1998, Case C-7/97, [1998] ECR I-7808, 
Conclusions of the Advocate General Jacobs. Contrariwise, the raise in the 
number of the memberships (15%) and in the number of advertisements which 
the magazine Der Standard had benefited from in the year when the litigation 
started was at odds with the claim that access to the Mediaprint distribution 
was necessary to effectively compete on the magazine market. 
737 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, 26.11.1998, Case C-7/97, [1998] ECR I-7817, para. 
41 
738 J. Temple Lang, Definining Legitimate Competition: Companies’ Duties to Supply 
Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities, 18 Fordham Int. L. J. 488 (1994),  
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Next to the above-referred structural factors, in order to confirm 
and integrate the structural analysis of the position of a firm, 
Competition Authorities take into consideration other factors that 
are by their nature behavioral. In the United Brand case, the 
leading outcome on the analysis of dominance factors, the Court 
has deemed relevant to the assessment of dominance on part of 
United Brands the fact that it had succeeded in personalizing its 
product by means of commercial campaigns and that its 
competitors had not succeeded in raising their market shares. 
Similarly, the Commission has affirmed that a high market share 
does not imply a presumption of dominance per se. However, 
when a manufacturer avails itself of its share to control the prices 
or to limit the access to the market, article 102 will apply. Other 
factors contributing to confirm the subsistence of dominance are: 
the preference for the product of the firm, the influence that the 
firm has on retailers, the higher price of the firm’s product 
compared to its rivals, its technical advantage over competitors, 
and the strict identification of the product category with the 
product the firm manufactures739. 
More generally, structural and behavioral factors do not exclude 
each other, but help account of the interplays between the firm’s 
behavior and the market structure, in a way to disclose that a 
course of conduct independent of the other firms’ behavior is only 
conceivable if the firm has a sufficient degree of dominance on the 
market740.   
 
7. Categories of abuse 
As it has been said above, there is no statutory definition of 
“abuse”, but article 102 merely singles out four examples of 
abusive conducts. Furthermore, as the Commission has pointed 
added, the second paragraph of Article 102 does not contain an 
exhaustive list of abusive practices, list that the case law has 
developed on an individual basis, mainly in response to 
complaints to the European Commission and appeals to the 
Community Courts against Commission decisions on the grounds 
of such complaints741.  
The Commission has never developed a comprehensive notion of 
abusive conduct, and both the Commission and the EC Courts 
have interpreted article 102 without an analytical approach, or a 
                                                
739 BBI/Boosey & Hawkes: Interim measures, IV/32.279 – paragraph 10. BBI/Boosey 
& Hawkes: Interim measures, IV/32.279. Commission decision 29.07.1987, 
published on OJ L/286-36, 09.10.1987, para. 36 
740 A. Frignani & M. Waelbroek, Disciplina della Concorrenza nella CE, Torino 
(1996) p. 228 
741  Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities, 
14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951 para. 37 
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general regard to the economic thinking. Instead, it has adopted a 
non-technical notion, untied from the examples of article 102: 
“There is abusive exploitation of the market from a dominant 
position when the holder of the position uses the possibilities 
which flow from it in order to obtain advantages which he would 
not have obtained if there were effective competition”742. 
It has been seen above that the four clauses can be classified into 
three broad categories: exploitative, exclusionary and reprisal 
abuses. An author has affirmed that the only true form of abuse is 
the exploitative one, since it is the only unilateral conducts which 
has an adverse effect on consumers in the form of exploitation of 
market power743. Moreover, it has been seen that some forms of 
abuses can be exploitative and exclusionary at the same time744. 
For the sake of the analysis, however, the examples of abusive 
conducts set out by article 102 are to be in turn scrutinized. 
Article 102(a) directly refers to exploitative practices, which are 
perpetrated by “directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or 
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions”. This entails taking 
undue advantage of consumers by using market power to charge 
grossly excessive prices or impose unjustifiably onerous or unfair 
terms.  It arguably applies only in cases where there are significant 
barriers to entry that cannot be overcome by investments in 
anticipation of monopoly rents. 
Article 102(b) sanctions exclusionary conducts, which are aimed at 
“limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice 
of consumers”. Examples are foreclosure or handicapping of 
competitors, by which competition is reduced still further, and 
harm is caused to consumers.  
Article 102(c) sanctions discriminatory abuses, namely “applying 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
partners, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage”.  It is 
often invoked also for exclusionary abuses, and it is submitted 
that in such cases harm to consumers is necessary under 102(c) as 
it is expressly under 102(b).   
Finally, Article 102(d) refers to tying abuses, “making the conclusion 
of contracts subject to the acceptance by the other party of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts”. Tying can also 
                                                
742 Premier Rapport sur la Politique de Concurrence (1972), available at 
http://www.ceric-aix.univ-cezanne.fr/documentation/centre-de-
documentationeuropeenne-cde/fonds-darchives.html, para. 78 
743  E.M. Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors, European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2003 EU 
Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, published on 26 World 
Competition 149 (2003) 
744 See supra, chapter II, note n. 
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lead to excessive pricing, in which case the conditions of 
exploitative abuse should be met. 
Some cases involve more than one kind of abuse, e.g., both 
foreclosure of competitors and discrimination between customers 
with primary line injury.  Simultaneous abuses may reinforce or 
aggravate one another. 
 
7.1 Exploitatitve abuses 
Under article 102(a), the most recurring forms of exploitative 
abuse are the excessive pricing and the imposition of excessively 
onerous terms to the transactions.  
As regards excessive pricing, in the United Brand case the Court 
used a two-prong test to evaluate whether the defendant’s pricing 
was excessive: first, it compared actual costs and prices of the 
defendant (cost-price analysis), second it analyzed the defendant’s 
price by itself and compared it with the price for the competitors’ 
product745, to assess whether there were legitimate reasons why 
the price grossly exceeded costs.  
Given the EC authorities’ reluctance to appraise what is a 
“competitive price” in cases concerning excessive pricing –and 
therefore using competition law to regulate prices on the Common 
Market-, this exploitative abuse has often been associated with 
markets characterized by high barriers to entry, since either actual 
or potential entry of rivals is likely to keep prices on a competitive 
level. 
The imposition of unfair trading conditions is the second form of 
exploitative abuse, whereby the dominant undertaking leverages 
on its market power to impose conditions that would not be 
otherwise imposed absent the market power itself.  
The exploitation entails taking undue advantage of the dominance 
on the market, by imposing unfair conditions746. Put better, the 
underlying assumption appears to be that such conditions would 
be impossible to impose but for the dominance of the undertaking. 
Aside from a unique definition of “unfair trading conditions”, one 
common feature of such behavior stemming from the case law is 
                                                
745 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, para. 252. The ECJ 
charged the Commission with the burden of demonstrating the excessiveness of 
the price charged by United Brands. 
746  This definition of exploitation stems from the German Ordoliberal 
subdivision of abuses into “exploitative” and “impediment” abuses. With 
regard to exploitative practices, they are identified by means of a hypothetical 
and ideal standard of competition, the “as-if competition”, which economic 
thinking could determine with reasonable accuracy: a dominant firm utilizes 
economic power to achieve a transactional cost that is significantly more 
advantageous than it could have achieved under this standard. Compare D.G. 
Gerber, Law and Abuse of Economic Power in Europe, 62 Tulane Law Review 63-82 
(1987-1988) 
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that the dominant undertaking’s imposes terms on its customers 
that are directly harmful to them, usually by excessively 
restricting their freedom of action. 
Examples of unfair conditions have been set forth in Tetra Pak II, 
as contract clauses deemed as “unfair”, because they exceeded the 
recognized right of a dominant firm to protect its commercial 
interests; more specifically:  
1. Contractual clauses prohibiting a customer from making 
modifications to a machine purchased from a dominant 
supplier747; 
2. Limits to the purchasers’ right to resell or transfer the equipment 
to third parties748; 
3. Clauses giving exclusive rights to repair and maintain the 
equipment and749; 
4. Equipment leases of excessive duration (three to nine years with 
penalty clauses for breach of these terms)750. 
In Alsatel v SA Novasam, the “unilateral fixing of the prices of 
supplements to the contract due to modifications and the 
automatic renewal of contract for 15 years” was found to be 
“unfair” trading conditions751.  
In Michelin II a discount system applied by a dominant 
undertaking and which left it a considerable margin of discretion 
as to whether the dealer may obtain the discount was considered 
‘unfair’ and abusive752.  
The question is, although the “unfairness” of any contract term 
may be objectionable, this should be regarded as a contract law 
issue rather than a competition law concern. It has been argued 
that a definition of “unfair contract terms” under Article 102(a) 
entails inquiring whether the clause is one that would be imposed 
and accepted in competitive conditions, and whether the gains in 
efficiency are sufficient to outweigh the onerous effect for the 
other parties bound by the clause. Hence, the clause should:  
1) Have a legitimate objective other than exploitation,  
2) Be effective in achieving the legitimate goal,  
                                                
747  Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities, 
14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951, para 2.1.1 
748  Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities, 
14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951, para 2.1.5 
749  Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities, 
14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951, para 2.1.6 
750  Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities, 
14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951, para 2.2.5 
751 Alsatel v SA Novasam, 05.10.1988, Case 247/86 reference for a preliminary 
ruling [1988] ECR 5987, para. 10 
752 Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 30.09.2003, Case T-203/01, 2003, ECR II-04071, “Michelin II” 
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3) Be necessary in that there are no alternative equally effective 
means for achieving the same goal with a less 
restrictive/exploitative effect, and  
4) Be proportionate in the sense that the legitimate objective pursued 
should not be outweighed by its exploitative effect on the trading 
party in question753. 
 
7.2 Exclusionary abuses 
Under article 102(b), the conduct aiming at “limiting production” 
is the broadest form of exclusionary abuse, encompassing all 
conducts seeking to shrink competition on a market and cause a 
consumer net harm. The vast majority of decisions on article 102 
concerns exclusionary abuses, which are all based on the 
restriction of output on a market to make competition untenable 
for rivals with a smaller market power.  
Two types of production restrictions fall within the overarching 
parameter set out in art 102(b): 1) on the one hand, the dominant 
firm can limit its own production, by increasing the price for the 
product, and at the same time creating reserves of its own product 
to place on the market once its rivals are driven off competition; 2) 
on the other hand, the dominant firm can adopt strategies to limit 
its rivals’ capacity to compete and marginalize them, due to the 
increase of the costs they are to bear754. 
The limitation of output needs to have an adverse effect on 
consumer welfare, since a mere limitation of rivals’ capacity of 
competing with no harm for consumers, by means of superior 
product or lower prices, will be considered as competition on the 
merits.  
The consumer harm is a more specific normative consideration to 
define exclusionary conducts than “normal competition”, or 
“genuine undistorted competition”, since it allows to police the 
lawfulness of a practice by balancing the gains and the losses in 
terms of consumer welfare arising out of the dominant firm’s 
conduct755.  
Yet, if, on the one hand, the EU Courts can adjudicate a case based 
on a more normative claim, by formulating an ex post evaluation 
of the consumer harm occurred, the dominant firm should be able 
to judge ex ante whether its conduct will cause a consumer net 
                                                
753 R. O’Donogue & A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford 
and Portland, 2006, p. 654 
754 Consorzio Italiano della Componentistica di ricambio per autoveicoli and Maxicar v. 
Régie national de usines Renault, Case 53-87, 05.10.1988, [1988], ECR 6039, para 16.  
Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elsner v. Macrotom GmbH, Case C-41/90, 23.04.1991, [1991], 
ECR I-1979, para. 30 
755 See Michelin v Commission Case C-322/81, 09.11.1983, [1983] ECR 3461, para. 
57, for the meaning of “genuine undistorted competition”; Hoffmann-La Roche & 
Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, 
ECR 461 para. 6, for the meaning of “normal competition”. 
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harm, on the other hand. That is not always realistic of the 
dominant firm756. Therefore –as it has been argued above, the 
decision on the case not based on an ex ante clear legal rule can 
become a matter of policy rather than competition law757. 
The “limiting production test” captures the common element of all 
exclusionary conducts, which all result into making the rival’s 
product less attractive or less available to the detriment of 
consumers.  
That is the reason why predation falls within the spectrum of 
exclusionary abuses banned by article 102(b): pricing below 
average variable costs (a proxy for marginal costs) will in the short 
run have a advantageous effect for consumers, who will buy 
product of the dominant firm at a lower price758.  
However, the equally efficient firm will be affected negatively by 
the dominant firm’s predatory price and will eventually be 
marginalized from competition. Once predation is perfected, the 
dominant firm will raise prices by restricting output –the 
limitation of production-, and cause a loss in terms of consumer 
welfare, as long as the price raise would enable the firm to recoup 
past losses, which have been redistributed to consumers. In 
economic terms, there would be a consumer net harm as long as 
the deadweight loss exceeds the gains consumers benefited from 
during the predation phase759. 
The same analysis can be applied to non-pricing abuses falling 
within the reach of article 102(b), such as refusals to deal. In EC 
Competition law, as well as in American Antitrust law, there is no 
general provision requiring that a company deal with its 
competitors. However, under certain circumstances there are 
some exceptions to the principle of freedom of business for a firm 
with market power760.  
A dominant firm may invest on technological innovation or may 
invest in patent or other intellectual property rights, whereby it 
can limit the business of competitors and expand its production 
on the market. Many cases have regarded the issue of the 
obligation of a dominant to consent its competitor to access its 
products or services, in the event that the limitation of the latter’s 
production has such a negative impact on consumers, that the 
                                                
756  Compare, J. Temple Lang, Legal Certainty and Legitimate Expectations as 
General Principles of Law, in U. Bernitz & J. Nergelius (eds.), General Principles of 
European Community Law, Boston, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p. 170 
757  Compare supra, the “consumer-harm test”, supra para. 4.3.4 and infra, 
Chapter III, para. 11.1 
758 Evidence for the judicial ban of predation as a type of exclusionary abuse can 
be found in AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 
03.07.1991, Case 62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, paragraphs 70-71.  
759 For a definition of deadweight loss, compare Chapter I, para. 4.2  
760  See Guidelines of the Federal Trade Commission, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/refusal_to_deal.shtm  
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obligation to share a technology or to deal with the competitor 
outweighs the extent of intellectual property rights or the 
principle of freedom of business; given the exceptional nature of 
such a restraint, the abuse of refusal to deal is applied narrowly, 
under strict conditions: the refusal is to eliminate competition 
from the market, and thwart the placement of new products on 
the market, leaving a clear and identifiable portion of consumer 
demand unsatisfied.  
Notwithstanding their limited application, refusals to deal well 
capture the mechanism of adopting non-pricing strategies to limit 
the rival’s production and limit competition on a market, as 
outlined in article 102(b). 
By means of the Discussion Paper on Exclusionary Abuses761 the 
Commission has shed light on the interpretation of article 102(b), 
affirming that the usage of the wording “prejudice to consumers” 
is to foster protection of consumers rather than competitors. In 
other terms, the scope of the norm is the protection of competition, 
rather than of the market players. Furthermore, the norm at issue 
intends to protect consumers from all the conducts, which are 
both directly and indirectly detrimental762. 
Then Commission relied on the definition of exclusionary abuse in 
Hoffmann-La Roche763 and maintained that it involves “foreclosure 
leading to consumer harm”, based on two elements: 1) the anti-
competitive foreclosure of competitors, which occurs when the 
conduct of the dominant undertaking is capable of hindering or 
excluding access of actual or potential competitors to the market 
or to supplies: to verify such capability it is sufficient to 
investigate the form of the conduct; 2) the establishment of market 
distorting foreclosure, i.e. the establishment of actual or potential 
anticompetitive impact of the conduct, which occurs when the 
firm, after excluding its competitors, will be likely to raise prices at 
supra-competitive levels764. 
The degree of dominance is also an important factor to gauge in 
exclusionary cases: firms detaining market shares close to 
monopoly have a greater ability to foreclose competitors than 
                                                
761 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005, para. 54 
762 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005, para. 54 
763 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461, para. 91 
764 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005, para. 58. Also compare 
Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, published on the Official Journal, OJ 24.02.2007, 2009/C 
45/02, para. 19 
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firms which are still dominant, but are at the minimal threshold of 
what can be seen as dominance765. 
Criticism has been addressed to the above definition of exclusion, 
in that it does not draw a distinction between efficient conducts 
harming competitors and unlawful conducts. The practice of 
pricing a product below competitive level can be interpreted as a 
promotional operation to make consumers familiarized with the 
product itself, in a way that they will be willing to pay a higher 
price in the long run by virtue of the better qualities of the 
product.  
By no means can such a conduct be regarded as abusive, even 
though, in terms of outcome, it will lead to the foreclosure of 
competitors.  
The Discussion Paper acknowledges an efficiency defense available 
to the defendant, affirming that article 82 only applies to conducts 
that would exclude firms that are as efficient as the dominant one, 
since their foreclosure would cause a loss in consumer welfare; 
however, the dominant firm would not have to deploy such a 
defense if its conduct did not foreclose competition to begin with, 
but it merely foreclosed not-as-efficient competitors by virtue of 
an aggressive strategy766.  
As a corollary, the Discussion Paper states that in exceptional 
circumstances protection needs to be afforded to smaller firms 
that are not as efficient as the dominant one, but might become 
equally efficient, where the market shows potential economies of 
scale or scope, or is characterized by first mover advantages767.  
Thus, the Discussion Paper does not make clear that foreclosure of 
competitors with no-harm for consumers –in other terms efficient 
foreclosure- is legitimate competition. In that respect, the ECJ 
appears to have clarified that foreclosure of competition is not 
abusive per se, but it is up to the Court to discern those acts of 
foreclosure that have no business nor efficiency justification. Thus, 
the Court will balance the exclusionary effects and the advantages 
in terms of efficiency of the conduct on a casuistic basis768. 
Finally, the Discussion Paper distinguishes between horizontal and 
vertical exclusion769. The former concerns exclusion of rivals on a 
                                                
765 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005, para. 59. 
766 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005, para. 67 
767 Compare supra the “equally efficient-test”, para. 5.4.2.3; also, compare the 
argument in favor of sanctioning above average cost pricing as predatory in A.S. 
Edlin, Stopping Above Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 Yale L.J. 941 (2002) 
768 British Airways plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 15.03.2007, Case 
C 95-04 P, [2007] ECR I-2331, para. 67 
769 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005, para. 69-73; For the identification 
of anticompetitive foreclosure in the ECJ jurisprudence, compare  
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horizontal level, whereas the latter exclusion of an input of 
downstream rivals, being the dominant firms the upstream 
supplier. Examples of horizontal exclusions are predatory pricing 
and tying; examples of vertical exclusions are refusals do deal and 
margin squeezes. 
 
7.3 Discriminatory abuses 
Under article 102(c), discriminatory abuses consist of “applying 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage”. The 
provision is extremely broad and gives room to a great deal of 
uncertainty regarding its extent. Unlike the homologous American 
anti-discriminatory law, the Robinson-Patman Act, article 102(c) 
requires dominance as a prior condition for the abuse770.  
One of the main difficulties in applying this provision is 
distinguishing the discriminatory nature of the conduct of the 
dominant firm from other more manifest consequences of the 
conduct itself, such as its exclusionary effects. In other terms, 
discrimination is implied in many other abuses that are more 
discernible for the judge. For example, refusals to deal can be 
                                                
770 Compare Robinson-Patman Act 1936. The Robinson-Patman Act is a 1936 
statute (15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a–f) that amended Section 2 of the Clayton Act (Oct. 15, 
1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730), which was the first antitrust statute aimed at price 
discrimination. The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits a seller of commodities 
from selling comparable goods to different buyers at different prices, except in 
certain circumstances. The Act contains six substantive provisions: 
Section 2(a) prohibits a seller from discriminating in price between two or more 
competing buyers in the sale of commodities of like grade and quality, where 
the effect of the discrimination “may be substantially” to “lessen 
competition...in any line of commerce”; or “tend to create a monopoly in any 
line of commerce”; or “injure, destroy or prevent competition with any person 
who grants or knowingly receives the benefit of the discrimination, or with the 
customers of wither of them” 15 U.S.C. 13(a).  
The fundamental question, with respect to section 2(a), is the type and extent of 
injury to competition that can satisfy this standard. The recovery of damages in 
a private Robinson-Patman Act suit requires showing not only a violation of the 
Act, but also that the plaintiff has suffered actual injury as a result of the price 
discrimination at issue. Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (110 S.Ct. 2535, 
2551 n. 11. 110) (1990). In Brooke v. Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court 
held that competitive injury stemming from a discriminatory price-cutting 
scheme under the Robinson-Patman Act is “of the same general character as the 
injury inflicted by predatory pricing schemes actionable under 2 of the Sherman 
Act. . . . With whatever additional flexibility the Robinson-Patman Act standard 
may imply . . . two prerequisites to recovery remain the same. First, a plaintiff 
seeking to establish competitive injury resulting from a rival's low prices must 
prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its 
rival's costs. . . [Second, the plaintiff must prove] . . . that the competitor had a 
reasonable prospect, or, under 2 of the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, 
of recouping its investment in below-cost prices”. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 277, 113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 
(U.S.N.C. 1993) 
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investigated under the reach of article 102(b) –exclusion-, but also 
under the reach of article 102(c) –discrimination-. Likewise, 
predation can be targeted towards the elimination of a particular 
rival, and share therefore some commonalities with 
discriminatory conduct.  
In this respect, a judicial trend in policing article 102(c) is 
adjudicating exclusionary conducts that have discriminatory 
features are under article 102(c), rather than under 102(b), because 
ascertaining the discriminatory nature of a conduct is a simpler 
operation than ascertaining the exclusionary effects of the conduct 
itself. In fact, proving a difference in treatment suffices in the 
finding of violation of article 102, without striving to determine 
the exclusionary nature of a practice, on which aspect European 
Courts still tend to have a casuistic attitude771. 
There are various examples of exclusionary abuses involving 
elements of discrimination, most of which can be recollected in the 
discriminatory predatory price schemes, i.e. when the dominant 
firm discriminate between its own customers and its rivals’ 
customers by applying selective price cuts, and in margin squeeze 
practices, when the dominant firm discriminates a vertically 
integrated incumbent business in favor of its own downstream 
business. In sum, discrimination is one way in which the 
exclusionary conduct can be manifested. 
The British Airways case772 draws a distinction between the act of 
foreclosing and the act of discriminating. British Airways granted 
a bonus commission to travel agents who would increase their 
sales of British Airways tickets over a certain period of time 
compared to a previous reference period. The bonus only 
depended on the increase of individual sales that each agent had 
made compared with its past trend and not on the overall 
increases applicable to all travel agents. The General Court 
distinguished between the exclusionary effects of the reduction 
scheme vis-à-vis British Airways’ competitors, on the one hand, 
and the discriminatory effects of the scheme on the other agents, 
                                                
771  One of the most emblematic examples of the above referred trend of 
European Courts can be found in Irish Sugar plc v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 07.10.1999, Case T-228/97, [1999], ECR-2969, in which the General 
Court seemed to confuse the act of foreclosing competitors of the dominant firm 
(exclusionary abuses), with discrimination distorting competition between 
customers of the dominant firm. In fact, the Court condemned Irish Sugar’s 
rebates offered at border areas (the UK and Northern Ireland) exposed to 
competition as exclusionary, motivating that the rebates were illegitimate 
because they created differences in treatment with customers from non-border 
areas. 
772 British Airways plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 15.03.2007, Case 
C 95-04 P, [2007] ECR I-2331, For a further analysis of the case, see infra note n. 
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on the other hand773. In assessing the discriminatory nature of the 
bonus commissions on competition between agents, the 
Commission only relied on article 102(c). 
The core idea underlying pure discrimination –different from 
exclusion- is the treatment of two like customers of the dominant 
firm, being a buyer or a seller, differently, to the extent that the 
discriminated party is hampered by a “competitive disadvantage” 
vis-à-vis the non-aggrieved party. As said above, even if 
discriminatory intent is very often implied in exclusionary 
practices, there is no legal ground to affirm that the consumer 
welfare rationale, which justifies the intervention in case of 
exclusion, can prove as a solid test in case of pure discrimination. 
In other terms, there is no economic or legal foundation that can 
sustain judicial intervention on discriminatory conducts per se.  
A tentative argument in favor of including consumer welfare in 
the analysis under article 102(c) is an a contrario argument: 
discriminatory abuses can actually enhance consumer welfare, for 
instance by reducing the price for a product applied to some 
trading parties on the grounds of the dissimilar terms conditions 
that are applied to them, and ultimately create efficiencies for 
consumers. In EC law there is no general principle that a 
dominant firm cannot charge different prices of apply different 
terms for the same product or service. A contract establishing 
more favorable terms for some advantaged trading parties is 
material with article 3(b) TFEU, which prescribes that the EU is 
competent to establish competition rules only for the functioning 
of the internal market. In other terms, contracts that have 
discriminatory terms but create efficiencies for consumers should 
not be matter of competition law. Contrariwise, those 
discriminations not resulting in wealth redistribution for 
consumers could be a contrario considered abusive as under article 
102(c).  
Aside from this argument, the consolidation of the internal market 
is the sole policy consideration that can sustain an intervention 
under competition law for discriminatory prices among member 
states, as it has been argued in the United Brands case, together 
with the caveat that the firm is to artificially partition the 
markets774. 
In search of a legal standard for pure discrimination, the issue 
remains to verify whether in the context of an exclusionary course 
of conduct some elements of actual discrimination of the 
dominant firm against its downstream business can be traced. In 
                                                
773 British Airways plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 15.03.2007, Case 
C 95-04 P, [2007] ECR I-2331, para. 97 (exclusion), para. 108, 233, 241 
(discrimination). 
774 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, para 233(a) 
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that case, it will be less arduous to apply article 102(c) strictly and 
assert the abusive character of the practice. 
Aside from the difficulties of grounding pure discrimination on 
the consumer-protection rationale, article 102(c) does not play a 
pivotal role in EC Competition law, for several reasons: 
1. The wording of the article requires proof that the aggrieved party 
has suffered a competitive disadvantage from the price difference; 
2. Effectively, it is unlikely in practice that a company charges its 
customers significantly different prices for similar products, even 
if customers are from different Member States. To the extent that 
the dominant firm has done nothing to artificially 
compartmentalize the member states’ geographic markets, 
charging different prices in different member states is usually 
lawful775. 
3. Even if a downstream customer of the dominant firm manages 
proving the damage suffered from the competitive disadvantage, 
the dominant firm could still deploy an array of defenses that can 
justify the difference in price776. 
 
7.4 Tying abuses 
The last abuse set out in article 102(d) is the tying, i.e. “making the 
conclusion of contracts subject to the acceptance by the other party 
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according 
to commercial usage have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts”. There are three types of tying: 1) contractual, where the 
two products are bundled by agreement and the one product 
cannot be sold without the other; 2) economic, where the price for 
the two products is so low to make the purchase of a single item 
inconvenient; 3) technical, where two separated products are 
integrated as one. 
The most divisive case on tying that invested the Commission is 
the Microsoft case777, involving the tying of Windows Media Player 
(WMP) with Windows Operating System (OS), which allegedly 
caused a harm to other providers of stand-alone Media Players 
and a competition damage for consumers. The most controversial 
issues of tying abuses: 1) defining when two products are tied or 
they can be regarded as stand-alone (particularly in the 
technological bundles); 2) assessing the anticompetitive effects of a 
                                                
775 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, paras. 228, 232 and 
233(a) 
776 Compare infra the defenses available to the dominant firms which price 
discriminate by means of exclusive dealing terms, loyalty rebates, or target 
rebates, para. 8.1 et seq. 
777 Commission’s Decision 24.03.2004, 2007/53/CE, COMP 37.392, published on 
the Official Journal, OJ L 32, 06.02.2007 
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tying; 3) assessing whether the economic efficiencies of a tying 
outweigh its anticompetitive effects. 
 
7.5 Leveraging abuses and the interface between tying and 
exclusionary conducts 
Another category of abuse falling within article 102, which has not 
been set out as a separate type of unlawful conduct is the 
“leveraging abuse”, which occur when the dominant firm uses its 
position in one market to commit an abuse in an adjacent 
horizontal or vertical market. There is no leveraging abuse 
considered isolated, but the idea of leveraging entails the idea of 
exploiting the dominant position in a dominated market to 
commit an abuse in a related market.  
In practice, leveraging abuses are policed either under article 
102(b), when they result into the exclusion of competitors from the 
related market, or under article 102(d), when they result into tying 
of a product of which the dominant firm has a monopoly (or 
quasi-monopoly) to another product in order to gain an 
anticompetitive rent in the market for the second product, to the 
detriment of consumers778. But the essential requirement in order 
to state causation between the dominance and the abuse is the 
ascertainment of an abusive conduct in the dominant market: the 
dominant firm which merely obtains competitive advantage in a 
second market absent an abuse in the leveraged market does not 
violate article 102779. 
Moreover, pursuant to what affirmed in Tetra Pak II780, leveraging 
“presupposes a link between the dominant position and the 
alleged abusive conduct”, which is normally not present where 
conduct on a market distinct from the dominated market produces 
effects on that distinct market. This causality is found where the 
distinct markets are associated and the effects of the conduct of 
the dominant firm on the associated non-dominated market can be 
justified by “special circumstances”781. 
In that respect, the Court found sufficient “associative links” 
between the aseptic carton market (dominated by Tetra Pak) and 
the non-aseptic carton market (non-dominated) to give the 
defendant a position “comparable to that of holding a dominant 
position on the markets in question as a whole and” treat its 
predation on the non-dominated one as abusive782. Put better, the 
                                                
778 The Microsoft case is also illustrative of a leverage abuse.  
779  Report by the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy, “An 
Economic Approach to Article 82”, July 2005, p. 23 
780  Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities, 
14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951 para. 27 
781  Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities, 
14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951 para. 27 
782 The Court took the following circumstances into account to assess the 
associative links: 1) a substantial portion of Tetra Pak customers would purchase 
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ECJ maintained that purchasers using aseptic machines and 
cartons very often need non-aseptic materials and machines as 
well. That sufficed to find the conduct in the related market 
abusive.  
Some scholars have considered the Tetra Pak II outcome as an 
unnecessary stretch of the reach of article 102, on the grounds that 
the “associative links” test is too obscure to be applied in 
leveraging abuses783. Conversely, Courts should be able to discern 
a) situations in which the abuse takes place in the dominated 
market, but its effects are felt in the related market, b) situations in 
which the abuse is committed in the non-dominated market in 
order to preserve the dominance over the dominated one and, 
finally, c) situations in which the abuse is committed in a separate 
market, which has close connections to the market the dominant 
firm is concerned with.  
Sub.a) The first scenario is typical of refusals to deal, in which the 
refusal to supply an essential input on the upstream market has a 
detrimental effect on the downstream one. In this case, the link 
between the two markets is manifest784. In antitrust parlance, this 
situation is referred to as “bottleneck” monopoly785, in which a 
firm controls a raw material or an essential facility whereby it 
restricts entry into the downstream market of other firms.   
In the Bronner case, the ECJ provided three conditions for forcing 
owners of an essential facility to grant access: 1) the refusal to 
access a facility must prevent any competition at all on the 
applicant’s market; 2) the access must be indispensable or 
essential for carrying out the applicant’s business; 3) the access 
must be denied without any objective justification786. 
Sub.b) The second scenario occurs when the abuse is committed to 
perpetrate an already existing monopoly. The links between the 
                                                                                                                                                            
both aseptic and non-aseptic cartons; 2) the fact that Tetra Pak held nearly 90% 
shares in the aseptic carton market implied that it also was the favored supplier 
of non-aseptic cartons; 3) the main producers of cartons operated on both 
aseptic and non-aseptic markets; 4) Tetra Pak was able to focus its effort on the 
non-aseptic market without fearing a retaliation of rivals on the aseptic market, 
on the account of its consolidated monopoly on the latter. 
783 N. Levy, Tetra Pak II: Stretching the Limits of Article 86, 2 Competition Law 
Review, p. 105 (2005)  
784 Joined Cases 6-7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvens 
Corporation v. Commission of the European Communities, 06.03.1974, [1974] ECR-
223. The Court held that refusal to supply raw material to a rival would amount 
to an abuse pursuant to article 102 if the refusal led to the exclusion of the rival 
from the market. Elsewhere, the refusal to deal was expanded by reference to 
the “essential facilities” doctrine.  
785 A.B. Lipsky Jr. & J.G. Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1187 (1999) 
786 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, 26.11.1998, Case C-7/97, [1998] ECR I-7817 
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two markets is exemplified by the strengthening of the dominance 
on which the firm is already dominant787. 
Sub.c) In both the Tetra Pak II and the Microsoft cases, the 
dominant position of the defendant in the dominated market 
allowed the firm to exploit the vertical and horizontal links 
between its market and the non-dominated market to the extent 
that it committed an abuse in the second market: that exemplifies 
the third scenario above referred. The Court found causality 
between the dominance in one market and the abuse in the 
adjacent one by analyzing the inherent connection between the 
two markets. It argued that factors to consider are 1) the structure 
of supply and demand on the two markets 2) the use –leverage or- 
of the dominant firm of its market power in the dominated market 
to penetrate the non-dominant market; 3) the market shares in the 
dominated and in the non-dominated market. Both cases regarded 
firms possessing a monopoly on the dominant market and a 
market share on the connected market that was at the threshold at 
which dominance is presumed under article 102788.  
Leveraging conducts are often justified by pro-competitive 
reasons, among which is the achievement of economies of scope. 
When it is more economical to produce two products together 
                                                
787 GVG/FS, Commission’s Decision of 27.08.2003, COMP/37.685 published on 
OJ L11, 16.01.2004 para.17. GVG, a German railway undertaking intended to 
provide a service from Basel to Milan and back. In order to do so, GVG had to 
enter an “international grouping arrangement” with Ferrovie dello Stato, the 
Italian railway firm that held a legal monopoly over the Italian rail passenger 
transport system, by virtue of which GVG had to be provided with the 
necessary infrastructure capacity on the Italian market (information of train 
tickets, train paths, traction to move trains ect.). When Ferrovie dello Stato 
refused to provide the information needed GVG complained before the 
Commission, alleging violation of article 102. The Commission held that: 1) 
GVG had no alternative means to obtain the necessary infrastructure but to 
address to Ferrovie dello Stato; 2) refusal to provide infrastructure was not 
justified by any particular reason; 3) refusal by Ferrovie dello Stato could imply 
the risk of eliminating competition on the market for railway passenger 
services. Therefore, Ferrovie dello Stato was found to have violated article 102 
by strengthening its position on the relevant market on which it was already 
dominant. 
788 At the time of the litigation, Tetra Pak held 90% market share of the dominant 
market and approximately 48% market share in the non-dominant market. 
Microsoft had over 95% share of the OS market and 50-60% of the market for 
work group servers. With regard to the Microsoft case, the Commission came to 
similar conclusions as in Tetra Pak II, in connection with the bundling of 
Personal Computer (PC) Operating Systems (OS) and work group servers and 
Microsoft’s refusal to grant interoperability information to rivals. In particular, it 
stressed: 1) customers that purchase work group servers also need to purchase 
a client PC; 2) Microsoft has a monopoly in the client PC operating system and a 
leading position on the market for work group servers; 3) technological links 
exist between the PC-OS and the work group servers. Therefore, the bundling 
of the two products at issue amounted to abuse. 
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instead of separately, the leveraging will be justified by the lower 
price consumers can benefit from. 
Moreover, as it has been maintained by the Economic Advisory 
Group on Competition Policy, the behavior of the dominant firm 
on the dominated market differs –in which it directly exercise 
market power- from the behavior of the same firm on the adjacent 
market, in which it has no market power. The causality between 
the dominance and the abuse can be very dim789.  
Furthermore, if the rivals in the adjacent market also were the 
customers of the downstream business of the dominant firm, the 
latter would have little incentive in foreclosing the former from 
competition by raising prices and lose business in the non-
dominated market. Conversely, according to an economic result 
that was developed by Chicago School economists and legal 
commentators, a dominant firm generally has no such incentive. 
Because there is no anticompetitive incentive for leverage, it is 
argued, a dominant firm’s decision to integrate into the adjacent 
market must be motivated by pro-competitive rationales. These 
rationales would involve either producing a superior product, 
reducing costs, facilitating entry, or increasing price 
competition790.  
This criticism has been developed in the “single monopoly profit” 
theory, which holds that the dominant firm can extract all of 
profits available in the first market without vertically integrating 
the non-dominated market, because in a single chain of 
production there is only one monopoly profit and the extension of 
dominance from the dominated market into the vertically-
integrated non-dominated one is anticompetitive: a firm with both 
market power and the ability to charge prices above cost would 
not increase its overcharge by tying or other forms of vertical 
integration, but by operating a sort of price discrimination, which 
permitted to extract more profits, but also to increase output (and 
decrease price)791. 
Post-Chicago economic analysis has suggested that there are a 
number of limiting assumptions required for this single monopoly 
profit theory to apply. There are a number of common market 
situations in which integration into a second market may raise 
anticompetitive concerns. These include a) markets in which the 
first monopoly is regulated, b) markets that are characterized by 
economies of scale and scope and in which the inputs are not used 
                                                
789  Report by the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy, “An 
Economic Approach to Article 82”, July 2005, p. 23-29 
790  S.C. Salop, R.C. Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal 
Standards, and Microsoft, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 617, 623 (1999) 
791 H.J. Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago and the Transaction Cost Economics in 
Antitrust Analysis, University of Iowa Research Paper, Number 10-35, December 
2010, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1592476, p. 3 
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in fixed proportions, and c) markets with multiple types of buyers. 
In such markets, it is possible for a monopolist to profitably 
extend its power into a second market and harm consumers792. 
Having that said, a number of unlawful leveraging practices have 
been identified in case law, in which a dominant firm has used its 
dominance to restrict competition or otherwise commit an abuse 
in a second market: 1) denial of an essential raw material to 
downstream rivals793, 2) extension of a monopoly in primary 
equipment into competitive aftermarkets 794 , 3) exclusionary 
discounting in a non-dominant market which is closely related to 
the dominant market 795 , 4) extension of legitimate state 
monopolies into ancillary markets796. 
 
8. Pricing Abuses 
Within the confines of the present analysis, only those abuses 
involving pricing issues will be analyzed more in detail. The 
reason superseding this is twofold: first and foremost, not only are 
pricing abuses material to the firm’s lifecycle –irrespective of its 
dominance-, but they are also have a significant and direct impact 
on consumers.  
Second, pricing abuses display, more than any other unlawful 
unilateral behavior, the fundamental political struggle of 
competition authorities to strike a balance between the risk of 
discouraging legitimate price competition and the threat to leave 
unlawful price competition to go unpunished. Economics has 
shown how consumer welfare will grow when price 
discrimination leads to a lower price and, consequently, to a 
redistribution of that wealth, which the firm with market power 
will not subtract to market forces in the form of deadweight loss. 
Moreover, one of the EU Community policy reasons is the 
fostering of price competition, as one of the inherent goals of the 
establishment of the internal market797. Price competition “favors 
more efficient firms and it is for the benefit of consumers both in 
                                                
792 L. Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power through Leverage, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 
515 (1985); M.H. Riordan & S.C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-
Chicago Approach, 63 Antitrust L.J. 513 (1995) 
793 Joined Cases 6-7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvens 
Corporation v. Commission of the European Communities, 06.03.1974, [1974] ECR-
223  
794 AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd, 05.10.1998, Case 283/87, [1988] ECR 6211  
795 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, [1991], ECR I-3359 
796 France v. Commission of the European Communities (Telecommunication terminals), 
19.03.1991 Case C-202/88, [1991], ECR-I 1223, para. 51  
797 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Others v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 16.03.2000, Case C-395/96 and C-396/96, [2000] ECR I-
1365. Opinion of the Advocate General Fennelly. 
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the short and in the long run. Dominant firm not only have the 
right but should be encouraged to compete on price”798. 
The analysis of price competition allows filtering the idea of 
iustum pretium in competition law. Is there a fair price that would 
make both business and consumers better off, and that could serve 
as the threshold at which competition law should intervene to re-
balance market forces? Put differently, are competition authorities 
entitled to police a pricing abuse of a dominant firm by referring 
to a price that market conditions will indicate as “fair”? 
In the realm of contract law, Romans knew the principle “res 
tantum valet quantum vendi potest” (a good is worth the price for 
which one manages selling it), but this principle was applied 
within the context of the market: it was the market determining 
the fair price, and the violation of market standards entitled the 
party to avoid the contract. In modern contract laws, although 
theoretically all systems reject a iustum pretium doctrine, namely a 
fair price imposed by law, some grant relief on the mere ground of 
economic lesion arising out of the contract799.  
In EC competition law, it has been seen that private enterprise will 
not be impeded as long as it does not cause harm to consumers. 
Because low prices virtually always benefit consumers, 
competition rules should not be too restrictive towards certain 
forms of pricing behavior and discourage favorable competition 
for consumers. It is on pricing issues that the statement of clear 
legal and economic principles and standards is more needed, with 
a view to avoid per se rules that can harm desirable competition. 
Earlier economic thinking on price discrimination – in particular 
that which underlies the enactment of the U.S. Robinson-Patman 
Act 1936 – relied on two main assumptions800. 
First, protecting smaller retailers from aggressive competition of 
bigger ones was deemed to be a viaticum to welfare; in other 
words, fair competition was guaranteed through the maintenance 
of equal competitive opportunity for small businesses, since it was 
assumed that a smaller business is as efficient as a large one and 
only needed equality of opportunity801.  
Second, rules against price discrimination were necessary to 
prevent the consolidation of monopolies at the level of 
distribution. Advocates of this theory argued that, but for the 
establishing of anti-discrimination rules, large businesses would 
inevitably attempt to drive small businesses off competition. 
                                                
798 Ibidem 
799 H. Beale, A. Hartkamp, H. Kötz, D. Tallon (eds.), Cases, Materials and Text on 
Contract Law, Oxford, 2002, p. 432 
800 See Chapter I, para 11.1, the Robinson Patman Act (1936) 
801 D. Ridyard, Exclusionary Pricing and Price Discrimination Abuses under Article 
82 – An Economic Analysis, 23 European Competition Law Review, p. 286-303 
(2002) 
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Consequently, concentration would have caused an increase in 
prices in the long run; conversely, the presence of more 
competitors would serve consumers best from a social and 
economic standpoint802. 
Nowadays, the above assumptions are no longer valid. The basic 
theory of perfect competition, for which sellers price at marginal 
cost to buyers who have perfect knowledge of market conditions, 
is merely an assumption, since it is acknowledged that all market 
players price discriminate. In fact, the process of setting prices is 
far more dynamic in real world markets than the under perfect 
competition. Prices will usually depend more on the parties’ 
relative bargaining position and skills, demand structure, and the 
availability of alternative suppliers than on the cost of production. 
Furthermore, many industries with high fixed costs will fix price 
above marginal cost in order to recover as much of those costs as 
possible. Likewise “new economy” industries have marginal costs 
close to zero –i.e. the cost to produce the last unit of a software-, 
but high research, development and innovation costs; it is very 
unlikely that these industries will fix prices at marginal cost. 
With the above affirmed, the primary welfare goal of competition 
law is the distinction between favorable and unfavorable price 
discrimination. The following points epitomize price 
discrimination in static economics: 
1) Consumer welfare is maximized when prices equal marginal cost 
(the level of the extra cost of producing the last unit of 
production); such is one of the posits of perfect competition, in 
which no firm is able to influence the price, but all firms sell at 
marginal cost. 
2) The threshold of marginal cost is merely hypothetical, since 
industries often have high fixed costs they need to recoup to stay 
in business in the long run; therefore, each firm will charge a price 
above marginal cost and, for that matter, each one will be said to 
have some degree of market power803.  
3) Firms can fix price above marginal cost and recoup all the costs, 
and it is economically efficient to discriminate between customers 
which can ill afford to pay for the list price for the product in 
question, and those who are willing to pay more804.  
                                                
802 Ibidem 
803 Compare the Lerner Index, expressing proportional deviation of price at the 
firm’s profit maximizing output from the firm’s marginal cost at that output. 
Chapter I, para.4.3.  
804 Compare D. Ridyard, Exclusionary Pricing and Price Discrimination Abuses 
under Article 82 – An Economic Analysis, 23 European Competition Law Review, 
p. 286-303 (2002). The author provides this example: if marginal costs amount to 
10% of the list price for the product and a customer cannot afford paying more 
than 50% of the list price, it is in the interest of both the firm and the customer 
to grant him a 50% discount off the charged price. 
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4) As long as consumers get an advantage from price discrimination, 
transactions are economically efficient and pro-competitive, even 
if they are made at a level above marginal cost.  
5) Dominant firms should be allowed to charge discriminatory prices 
consumers to the extent each one can benefit from it. 
It has been seen above that the only provision of article 102 that 
recalls price discrimination is paragraph (c), which bans the 
application of “dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
with other trading parties”, in a way to place them at a 
competitive disadvantage. The provision is broad and paves the 
way to diverse applications: aside from pure discrimination, 
which consists of treating of two like customers of the dominant 
firm differently, four situations of discrimination can be 
distinguished: 
1) “Primary line abuses”, where the dominant firm applies different 
conditions that are conducive to the unlawful exclusion of one (or 
some) of its rivals805; two are the typical scenarios where this kind 
of discrimination is likely to occur: in the first situation, the 
dominant firm conditions a price reduction to an exclusive terms 
for purchasers, which is to buy the product in question only from 
the dominant firm -the condition at which the discounted price is 
given is discriminatory, not the mere discount- (“exclusive 
dealings”, “loyalty rebates”, “target rebates”); in the second 
situation, the dominant firm offers its product for a predatory 
price, in order to drive its competitors off competition 
(“predation”)806; 
2)  “Secondary line abuses”, where the dominant undertaking 
applies to downstream companies not associated and in 
competition with one another dissimilar conditions big enough to 
create a competitive disadvantage for those companies aggrieved 
by the higher prices or the more onerous terms. (“Customer 
discrimination”); 
3) “Secondary line abuses”, where the dominant undertaking treats 
customers differently according to their nationality; 
4)  “Downstream abuses”, where a vertically integrated dominant 
undertaking controls a raw material or an essential facility 
whereby it restricts entry into the downstream market of other 
firms. This situation principally resembles treatment of essential 
facilities, and not price issues. For the sake of brevity, they will not 
                                                
805  As it has been said above, that exclusionary abuses, which also have 
elements of discrimination, are policed under article 102(c), rather than under 
102(b), because ascertaining the discriminatory nature of a conduct is a simpler 
operation than ascertaining the exclusionary effects of the conduct itself. In fact, 
proving a difference in treatment suffices in the finding of abuse under article 
102, without having to determine the exclusionary nature of a practice, on 
which aspect European Courts still tend to have a casuistic attitude. 
806 G. Faella, Pratiche di Sconti delle Imprese Dominanti, Turin (2012) 
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be discussed in depth in this section; therefore the reader can refer 
above807. 
 
8.1 Primary line abuses 
EU competition authorities have identified three main categories 
of “primary lines” abuses, involving abusive discounting 
conducts, which are, in turn: 1) exclusive dealing rebates, 2) 
loyalty rebates and 3) target rebates808.  
 
8.1.1 Exclusive dealing rebates 
Exclusive dealing rebates in the vertical context involve 
agreements in which the buyer purchases most or all of a 
particular type of good or service from one supplier. If the 
supplier is dominant, exclusive dealing is generally prohibited 
under article 102, where it is capable of affecting trade between EC 
Member States, since it has the effect of tying in customers and 
strengthening the position of the dominant firm on the market. 
In the Suiker Unie case809, the Court found rebates granted by a 
dominant firm upon condition that a buyer purchased its 
requirements for the relevant product exclusively from that 
supplier abusive. Moreover, the abusiveness of such rebates is per 
se, regardless of the fact that the purchasers entered an exclusive 
agreement or purchased all of the requirements for the product 
voluntarily: in Suiker if customer had made one purchase from 
another supplier, he would have lost the entire rebate on all its 
purchase from the dominant firm applicable to one year.  
This scheme allowed Suiker Unie to control the amount of sugar 
that its purchasers bought from foreign suppliers. The Court did 
not verify whether competitors could sell one consignment at a 
price that gave the buyer a cost saving equal to the lost rebate on a 
year’s purchases from the dominant firm, but declared the scheme 
illicit pursuant to article 102, because rebates did not depend on 
the volume of the purchases, but sought to foreclose other 
suppliers from the market. 
 
8.1.2 Loyalty rebates 
The rationale underlying the ban on exclusive dealing also 
extends to loyalty rebates, because of their effect of tying-in 
purchasers to the dominant undertaking to the detriment of 
                                                
807 See in general refusals to deal and “bottleneck” monopolies, supra, note n.193 
et seq. 
808 Compare H.G. Kamann-E. Bergmann, The Granting of Rebates by Market 
Dominant Undertakings under Article 82 of the EC Treaty, European Competition 
Law Review, p. 83 (2005) 
809  Cooperatieve Vereniging Suiker Unie U.A. v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 16.12.1975, Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 and 114/73, E.C.R. 
2001-04, paragraphs 502-26 
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competing suppliers but also, due to their unjustified 
discriminatory effects in relation to customers810. Loyalty rebates 
provide an incentive for purchasers to obtain their entire 
requirement for the product in question, or most of them, from the 
dominant undertaking.  
In Hoffmann-La Roche, the leading case on loyalty rebates, the 
worldwide dominant manufacturer of vitamins had granted 
purchasers discounts on the basis of their fidelity: in some cases 
the discount was conditioned to signing an exclusive dealing 
agreement for the provision of the requirements, whereas, in other 
cases, the reduction was conditioned to the actual purchase of all 
of the requirements for the relevant product from the defendant. 
The Court banned loyalty rebates, i.e. “discounts conditional on 
the customer’s obtaining all or most of its requirements from the 
undertaking in a dominant position811 tout court, on the grounds 
that they “intended to give the purchaser an incentive to obtain 
his supplies exclusively from the undertaking in the dominant 
position”, in a way to preclude other potential suppliers the access 
to the market812. Thus, in case law it is not material to the 
application of article 102 that purchaser entered the exclusive 
agreement or bought all of its requirements voluntarily, but the 
fact that the dominant firm availed itself of these contract to 
consolidate its dominance, by means of abusive conditions 
attached to the price813.  
Moreover, loyalty rebates differ from “quantity rebates”, because 
they do not dependent on a volume of purchases preemptively 
established for all the purchasers, but on estimates of the 
dominant firm to provide for the entire requirement of the 
purchasers814.  
The same approach was followed in the Irish Sugar case815, in 
which the Court found that the defendant had promoted a rebate 
strategy among Irish sugar purchasers in order to exclude the 
expansion of a French brand (Eurolux) on the Irish retail market816. 
The rebate was subject to the customers’ purchasing of “all or 
                                                
810 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461 para. 90 
811 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461 para. 89 
812 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461, para. 90.  
813 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461, ibidem. 
814 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461, para. 100 
815 Irish Sugar plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 07.10.1999, Case T-
228/97, [1999], ECR-2969, para. 194 
816 Irish Sugar plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 07.10.1999, Case T-
228/97, [1999], ECR-2969, para. 198 
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large proportion” of their retail sugar allotments from Irish Sugar. 
The Court followed the Hoffmann-La Roche reasoning, whereby the 
granting of loyalty rebates is at odds with article 102 when it is not 
based on an economic performance that justifies it, such as the 
achievement of a volume of purchases from the producer in 
question, but it is only aimed at limiting or eliminating other 
possible sources of supply for the purchasers and, therefore, 
foreclosing the market817.  
 
8.1.3 Target rebates 
Similar considerations also apply in the case of target rebates, 
which not only tie-in purchasers but also imply an element of 
discrimination, in that the target amounts and discount rates may 
vary from customer to customer818. Target rebates are retroactive 
discounts, which are anticompetitive when are aimed at shrinking 
the number of suppliers of a product. The dominant undertaking 
incentives purchasers to buy incremental volumes of the product 
by offering a retroactive discount on the overall turnover for a 
certain period of time, tied to a sales target. 
The leading case on target rebates is Michelin I819, where the Court 
affirmed the anticompetitive nature of the rebates of Michelin on 
the Dutch market for tires for heavy vehicles, since these were 
entwined to annual purchase targets the dominant undertaking 
had negotiated with each individual dealer, and subject to the 
purchase of a bigger volume of tires compared with the previous 
year820. Dealers were not informed on the criteria to calculate the 
discount rate and the target amount, because Michelin’s 
representatives confirmed these orally, not in writing: the lack of 
transparency precluded them from confronting the Michelin net 
price with the price of other suppliers821. 
The Court, therefore, found that dealers were restricted from an 
effective choice of suppliers by means of Michelin’s rebate system, 
which bound the former to Michelin tires. The abusiveness of the 
practice laid on the fact that the rebate was applied on the 1-year 
sale amounts (if the dealer achieved the sales target, it received a 
retroactive discount on its entire year’s purchase from Michelin), 
which meant that even a small percentage reduction in the 
discount rate could affect the dealer’s profit margin for the whole 
                                                
817 Irish Sugar plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 07.10.1999, Case T-
228/97, [1999], ECR-2969, para. 213-214 
818 Michelin v Commission of the European Communities Case C-322/81, 09.11.1983, 
[1983] ECR 3461, para. 28 
819 Michelin v Commission of the European Communities Case C-322/81, 09.11.1983, 
[1983] ECR 3461 
820 Michelin v Commission of the European Communities Case C-322/81, 09.11.1983, 
[1983] ECR 3461, para. 24 
821 Michelin v Commission of the European Communities Case C-322/81, 09.11.1983, 
[1983] ECR 3461, para. 48 
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year.  
The Court rested on a significant policy argument: “Any system 
under which discounts are granted according to the quantities 
sold during a relatively long reference period has the inherent 
effect, at the end of that period, of increasing pressure on the 
buyer to reach the purchase figure needed to obtain the discount 
or to avoid suffering the expected loss for the entire period”822. 
In sum, the factors that the Court evaluated are:  
1) The excessive length of the reference period to which the 
retroactive rebate was tied (one year);  
2) The market share of Michelin, which controlled around 65% of the 
market for heavy vehicle tires, whereas the next largest competitor 
only had 8% shares. According to the Court, this discrepancy 
forced dealer to inescapably do business with the dominant 
undertaking, and the risk of losing its discounts discouraged them 
from buying a smaller amount of product from a smaller supplier, 
even at a lower price than Michelin.  
3) The lack of transparency around Michelin’s rebate system, 
whereby dealers could not foreshadow the consequences of not 
achieving the purchase target to obtain the retroactive discount. 
All things considered, the Court confirmed the Commission’s 
view that the system was aimed at preventing dealers from being 
able to select the most favorable offers made by other competitors, 
and at “making it difficult for other producers to gain a foothold 
in the market”823. 
The Court applied the same line of reasoning of Michelin in the 
British Airways case824 . The Court focused on British Airways’ 
market share in the UK markets for air transport (42% of the 
market compared to 5,8% for the next largest supplier). As a result, 
British Airways could offer travel agents larger commission rates 
based on annual sale targets, defined as a percentage of that 
agent’s sales of British Airways tickets in the previous year825. 
Because of the substantial amount of the rebate, agents were 
reluctant to deal with other air carriers, since the risk of not 
achieving the sale target offered by British Airways outweighed the 
incentive to sell other carriers’ tickets even at more attractive 
prices. 
                                                
822 Michelin v Commission of the European Communities Case C-322/81, 09.11.1983, 
[1983] ECR 3461, para. 81 
823 Commission Decision N. 81/969/EEC published on the OJ L 353/33, para. 38. 
This view was confirmed in 2001 in Michelin II. Manufacture française des 
pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission of the European Communities, 30.09.2003, 
Case T-203/01, 2003, ECR II-04071 
824 As for the facts of the case, see supra, para. 7.3. British Airways plc v. 
Commission of the European Communities, 15.03.2007, Case C 95-04 P, [2007] ECR 
I-2331 
825 British Airways plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 15.03.2007, Case 
C 95-04 P, [2007] ECR I-2331, para. 30 
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This practice of the dominant firm was designed to foreclose 
competition, leaving no choice to travel agents as to the airline 
with which they dealt. 
 
8.1.4 Defenses from a prima facie claim of violation of article 
102(c) 
Once “primary line” abuses have been defined in line with the 
judicial interpretation and expansion of article 102(c), it is essential 
that the main defenses or justifications which were developed by 
economic thinking, but which have also been accepted by both the 
Court of Justice and the Commission, be in turn discussed. 
1) First and foremost, quantity rebates are not normally 
objectionable. In fact, the European Courts and the Commission 
have not questioned the legitimacy of a discount to all customers 
whose purchases exceed a certain threshold level, since it would 
not entail the application of different conditions to similar 
transactions, pursuant to article 102(c)826.  
EC Competition authorities see quantity rebates favorably, when 
they reflect the scope of creating economies of scale through the 
offer of anticipated (non-retroactive!) cost-savings, based on the 
purchase of large volumes of a product827. In general, discounts 
are justified when they are related to purchasing volumes828. 
Discounts offered by a dominant undertaking are to reflect cost-
savings, and at any rate they are to be justified in an economics 
perspective; in other terms, quantity discounts are to bear a 
limited anticompetitive-discriminatory weight and ought not to 
result in discriminatory pricing829. 
Quantity rebates are justified when they have pro-competitive 
effects, i.e. when they are based on cost savings and do not 
discriminate among customers. American scholarship dispute this 
assumption of EC competition authorities, arguing that dominant 
firms with high fixed cost should be able to charge different prices 
to different customers in order to recover fixed costs, if price 
discrimination benefit both parties to the lower price transaction. 
Moreover, article 102(c) does not oblige the dominant company to 
                                                
826 J. Temple Lang & R. O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition: How to 
Clarify Pricing Abuses Under Article 82 EC, 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 100 (2002-2003) 
827 Portuguese Republic v. Commission of the European Communities, 29.03.2001, 
Case C-163/99, [2001], ECR 3461, paras 6-9. In the British Airways decision, the 
Commission acknowledged that “a dominant supplier can give discounts that 
relate to efficiencies, for example discounts for large orders that allow the 
supplier to produce large batches of product”. British Airways Decision, O.J. L 
30/1 (2000), p. 20, para. 101 
828 Irish Sugar plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 07.10.1999, Case T-
228/97, [1999], ECR-2969, para. 173 
829 J. Faull & A Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition, Oxford, University Press, p. 
246, (1999) 
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make similar cost savings in other cases830. 
2) Price reductions may be given in return for services provided 
by the buyer: in Irish Sugar the Court and the Commission agreed 
on the fact that the rebates would have been justified if they had 
been given in return for marketing and transport costs paid by the 
customer, or for other functions that the customer might have 
performed831. If the dominant undertaking’s rebate is solely based 
on tying-in the customers, it will not be justified. 
3) “Meeting Competition” defense: rebates scheme offered to meet 
the competitors price are generally lawful under article 102; in the 
United Brands case, the Court of Justice affirmed: “the fact that an 
undertaking is in a dominant position cannot disentitle it from 
protecting its own commercial interests if they are attacked, and 
…such an undertaking must be conceded the right to take such 
reasonable steps as it deems appropriate to protect its said 
interests”832.  
Conversely, in the Compagnie Maritime Belge case the Court 
suggested that when discounts are offered to “selectively” match 
competitors’ pricing, they might amount to an abuse833. However, 
in this particular case the matching discounted prices were 
combined with other exclusionary practices, such as loyalty 
contracts 834 , which prevent from affirming that the Court 
sanctioned the matching discount as a single abuse. 
Again, the rationale implied in this judicial approach is that EC 
competition law is a matter of protection of consumers, rather 
than competitors: to the extent that dominant companies compete 
in a way to lower prices, and to meet or undercut the competitor’s 
price, to a more convenient level to the consumers, provided that 
the effect is not to eliminate the only competitor, competition will 
be encouraged. 
4) “New product/new market” defense: price reductions may be 
regarded as competition on the merits when the dominant firm is 
                                                
830 J. Temple Lang & R. O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition: How to 
Clarify Pricing Abuses Under Article 82 EC,  26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 102 (2002-2003) 
831 Irish Sugar plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 07.10.1999, Case T-
228/97, [1999], ECR-2969, para. 173 
832 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, para. 189 
833 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Others v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 16.03.2000, Case C-395/96 and C-396/96, [2000] ECR I-
1365, paras. 117-120. “There is an abuse of a dominant position where an 
[undertaking] in a dominant position, having a share of over 90% of the market 
in question and only one competitor, selectively cuts its prices in order 
deliberately to match those of its competitor”. 
834 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Others v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 16.03.2000, Case C-395/96 and C-396/96, [2000] ECR I-
1365, para. 126. 
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launching a new product or is entering a new market835. 
 
8.5 Unlawful discounting practices in a nutshell 
With regard to the “primary line” abuses, discounted prices that 
remain above cost should presumptively be allowed, because they 
enhance efficiency on the market, to the benefit of consumers. 
According to the practices that EC Competition authorities have 
reviewed, it should be distinguished: 
1) Discounts subject to the purchase of the entire or the most part of 
the requirement for a product from the dominant firm on part of 
the customers usually violate article 102, because they tie-in the 
latter to the dominant firm and eliminate other sources of supply.   
2) A dominant firm is normally allowed to grant quantity discounts 
for all of its customers, in the absence of predation and other 
anticompetitive conditions attached to them; 
3) Discounts individually negotiated and subject to the purchase of 
an incremental volume of product from a dominant firm 
compared to a certain target (usually an estimate of sales of the 
dominant firm, or the overall sale volume of the previous year) are 
unlawful on the account of the fact that customers will be barred 
from buying from other competitors under the menace of losing 
the discount on the whole volume of purchases, having the target 
not been met. 
4) A dominant firm can grant a discount on the condition that the 
total quantity exceeds a target figure, since that would have pro-
competitive effects, in that the supplier can benefit from a lower 
non-discriminatory price. Conversely, if the price reduction is 
individually negotiated and is structured in such a way that 
incentives the customers to buy their entire requirement from the 
dominant firm is illegal, on the grounds that such practice is 
conducive to foreclosure of competition.  
 
8.2 Secondary line abuses 
The second category of pricing abuses is the so-called “Secondary 
line abuses”, or customer discrimination, where the dominant 
undertaking applies to downstream companies not associated and 
in competition with one another dissimilar conditions big enough 
to create a competitive disadvantage for those companies 
aggrieved by the higher prices or the more onerous terms. 
Although the wording of article 102(c) expressly refers to this type 
of abuse, when it forbids the application of dissimilar conditions 
to similar transactions, there is a scarce analysis in the case law of 
the meaning of “competitive disadvantage between customers”. 
Arguably, the most renowned case on discrimination between 
                                                
835 M. Dolmans & V. Pickering, The 1997 Digital Undertaking, 19 European 
Competition Law Review, p. 113 (1998) 
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customers is the United Brands case836, where the Court found that 
the defendant had discriminated between wholesaler banana 
ripeners, in view of the different retail price in each Member State. 
The Court held that a dominant supplier may not apply 
geographically differentiated prices, at least where the different 
geographic areas are all part of the same relevant geographic 
market and the geographically differentiated pricing policy 
contributes to the artificial partitioning or compartmentalizing of 
the market along national borders837. By “artificial” the Court 
meant measures that are linked to practices that restrict 
competition, and are not based on precompetitive reasons, such as 
the need to maintain quality. 
According to the ECJ, all bananas marketed under the brand name 
“Chiquita” had the same geographic origin, belonged to the same 
variety, and were of almost the same quality. They were unloaded 
in two ports where unloading costs only differed by a few cents 
and were resold with limited exceptions subject to the same 
conditions of sale and terms of payment. Ripeners paid the costs 
of carriage from the unloading ports to the ripening installations. 
United Brands charged a selling price that differed appreciably 
according to the Member State where the customer was 
established. The Commission found that this practice abused 
United Brands’ dominant position, in violation of Article 102(c), in 
a relevant geographic market for bananas consisting of the 
territory comprised of a number of Northern European countries. 
On appeal, the ECJ upheld the Commission’s decision, affirming 
that United Brands had created artificial partitioning of national 
markets.   
In Aéroports de Paris the airports had charged different fees to 
companies providing certain ground services. The Court affirmed 
that there was no justification for distinguishing between 
companies doing their own ground-handling and companies 
providing ground-handling for third parties838.  
In the Portuguese Airports case, the dominant concessionaire 
granted discounts on the basis of the number of landings made839. 
The Court ignored the Commission’s argument that quantity 
discounts are to be objectively justified by economies of scale, but 
maintained that a dominant firm can only offer quantity discounts 
that are linked to the volume of purchases the customers make. By 
                                                
836 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, Case 27/76, [1978], ECR 207 
837 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, Case 27/76, [1978], ECR 207, para. 4 
838 Aéroports de Paris v. Commission of the European Communities, 12.12.2000, 
Case C-82/01, [2002], ECR I-2613, para. 210 
839 Portuguese Republic v. Commission of the European Communities, 29.03.2001, 
Case C-163/99, [2001], E.C.R. I-2613 
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adding that “the mere fact that the result of quantity discounts is 
that some customers enjoy in respect of specific quantities a 
proportionally higher average reduction than others in relation to 
the difference in their respective volumes of purchase is inherent 
in this type of system, but it cannot be inferred from that alone 
that the system is discriminatory” 840 , the Court implicitly 
acknowledged the principle that bigger customers get bigger 
deals; however, in the case at bar the absence of a linear 
progression in the increase of the discount was evidence of 
discrimination, which resulted in the fact that discounts were only 
enjoyed by the two Portuguese airlines. Similarly, the Court said 
that different landing charges for domestic and international 
flights were discriminatory. The discrimination resulted from the 
application of a different tariff system for the same number of 
landings of aircraft of the same type841. 
In the Corsica Ferries case, the duty of shipping companies in the 
Italian ports of Genova and La Spezia to avail themselves of the 
mooring service of Italian Companies –which held exclusive rights 
to provide those services by maritime regulations- had allegedly 
put the claimant in a competitive disadvantage. In fact, Corsica 
Ferries contended that it had been prevented from using its own 
staff to carry out mooring operations, forced to bear the costs of 
these unwanted services, and bear costs which had no relation to 
the actual cost of the service provided842.  
The Court, albeit affirming that granting exclusive mooring rights 
for the supply of mooring services to local mooring groups 
created a statutory dominant position within the meaning of 
article 102, countered there was no abuse pursuant as such, since 
the need to provide a universal mooring service for reasons of 
safety in port waters justified the monopoly843. Moreover, article 
102 is only concerned with the conduct of undertakings and not 
                                                
840 Portuguese Republic v. Commission of the European Communities, 29.03.2001, 
Case C-163/99, [2001], E.C.R. I-2613, para. 51. Compare R. O’Donoghue, Over-
Regulating Lower Prices: Time for a Rethink on Pricing Abuses under Article 82, in 
C.D. Ehlermann & I. Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2003: 
What Is an Abuse of a Dominant Position?, Oxford Hart Publishing, (2006), p. 132 
841 Portuguese Republic v. Commission of the European Communities, 29.03.2001, 
Case C-163/99, [2001], E.C.R. I-2613, para. 64-66 
842 Corsica Ferries France SA v. Gruppo Antichi Ormeggiatori del Porto di Genova 
Coop. arl. and others, 19.06.1998, Case C-266/96, [1998], ECR I-1783, para. 37. The 
case regards primarily the restriction to freedom to provide services and the 
free movement of goods, as under article 59 of the EC Treaty, which was 
alleged by the claimant, and secondarily the infringement of competition 
community rules, on the grounds that the defendant had been conferred a 
monopoly position in the provision of mooring services by the Italian public 
authorities.  
843 Corsica Ferries France SA v. Gruppo Antichi Ormeggiatori del Porto di Genova 
Coop. arl. and others, 19.06.1998, Case C-266/96, [1998], ECR I-1783, para. 45 
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with law or regulations adopted by Member States844. This passage 
is of particular interest, because the Court acknowledges that there 
can be restrictions to competition by Member States law or 
regulations, which may render ineffective the competition rules 
applicable to undertakings, provided that there is a public 
overriding interest justifying the granting of a monopoly position. 
 
8.2.1 The conceptual and normative limits of secondary line 
abuses 
Aside from the above applications of article 102(c), “secondary 
line” abuses are very limited in EC Competition law, and for 
several reasons. First of all, the aggrieved party is to prove that it 
has suffered a competitive disadvantage from the price difference. 
That implies that the downstream customers have no alternative 
product on the market and are forced to buy a product or a service 
from the dominant undertaking.  
There are very few situations in which these conditions are met, 
and case law has mostly regarded the course of conduct of State-
owned concessionaires of exclusive rights to provide services in 
airports or railways, which operated in a way to favor national 
carriers, to the detriment of international operators. Even if in the 
wording of the outcomes there was no express referral to the 
protection of national companies, it is evident that the purpose of 
this discrimination was protection on the grounds of nationality845. 
It is not easy, in practice, to envisage a non State-owned company 
charging a different price in similar transactions to downstream 
customers that were in competition846. 
In other cases, the granting by law or regulation of a dominant 
position, which put a firm at a competitive disadvantage, has been 
justified by virtue of overriding interests, such as public safety. 
The ground to uphold the legitimacy of statutory dominant 
position rests immanently on the fact that in certain circumstances 
Member States can create monopolies which, despite falling 
within the spectrum of article 102, escape the application of EC 
competition rules, because competition law is concerned with the 
conduct of the firm, not with the Member States’ legitimate 
restrictions of competition. 
9. Predation – introductory remarks 
Predatory pricing is a strategic pricing below a certain threshold 
of cost with the intent of eliminating incumbent competitors or 
deterring the entry in the market of new competitors; once the 
                                                
844 Corsica Ferries France SA v. Gruppo Antichi Ormeggiatori del Porto di Genova 
Coop. arl. and others, 19.06.1998, Case C-266/96, [1998], ECR I-1783, para. 35 
845 Compare J. Temple Lang & R. O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition: 
How to Clarify Pricing Abuses Under Article 82 EC, 26 Fordham Int. L.J. 120 (2002-
2003).  
846 ibidem 
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market is predated, the dominant firm would normally raise price 
in a way to recoup the losses suffered during the predation 
phase847.  
Unlike price-cutting aimed at increasing the firm’s market share, 
predatory pricing has its objective in eliminating competition, 
discouraging new entries, or deterring competitors “with 
shallower pockets” from competing aggressively, for fear of being 
driven off competition by a price battle with the dominant firm. 
The identification of a measure of cost below which a price is 
considered predatory is arguably the most arduous task of both 
American and European competition authorities, and today there 
is no consensus as to which price strategies involving low pricings 
should be anticompetitive. The debate has also heated around 
which analytical framework should be employed to test the 
predatory nature of a price848.  
Parallel to that, another current issue concerning this type of 
abusive practice is whether a price above cost, yet part of a 
strategy to eliminate rivals can amount to predation. That raises 
difficult issues: on the one hand, economic analysis of law holds 
that such a strategy should not be deemed unlawful under 
competition law, owing to the fact that price would still remain 
above costs, therefore competitors should be able to compete on 
the basis of such a price, by achieving the same level of efficiency 
as the dominant firm849. On the other hand, other legal scholars 
affirm that such a conduct should be deemed unlawful under 
competition law since, in terms of outcome, it would still lead to a 
permanent exclusion of rivals, so that the dominant firm would 
still be able to raise prices post-exit850.  
The case law of the European Courts has been criticized for not 
placing sufficient weight on the anticompetitive effects of low 
                                                
847 M. Moura and E. Silva, Predatory Pricing under Article 82 and the Recoupment 
Test: Do Not Go Gentle into that Good Night, European Competition Law Review 
61 et seq. (2009), D. Crane, The paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 Cornell Law Review 
1, (2005) W.J. Baumol, Principles relevant to Predatory Pricing, in 
Konkurrensverket (ed.), The Pros and Cons of Low Prices, Stockholm, (2003), p. 15 
et seq, L. Cabral, Economia Industriale, Carocci Ed., Rome, p. 328 (2002), J.A 
Ordover, Predatory Pricing, in P. Newman (ed.) The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law, vol. III, London (1998), p. 77 et seq., P. Bolton, J.F. Brodley 
and M.H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 
Georgetown Law Journal 2239 (2000),  
848 As for the analytical framework to analyze predation, see Chapter I, paras. 
9.2 and 9.2.1 
849 E. Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive out Entrants are not Predatory – 
and the Implications for Defining  Costs and Market Power, 112 Yale Law Journal 
681 (2003) 
850 A.S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 Yale Law Journal 941 
(2002) This applies in cases in which the market is characterized by high entry 
barriers. 
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pricing strategies851, or on the economic reasons why firms need to 
price their products below cost852. It has been often argued that EC 
competition law enforcement chills vigorous competition, in that 
it prevents firms for competing on price and sells their products as 
closely as possible to the minimum profitable price. 
 
9.1 The case law on predation – below-cost and above cost 
pricing 
The leading case on predation is the AKZO case853, whose facts 
exemplify the mechanism of this abusive strategy: AKZO was the 
dominant supplier of various organic peroxides used in the 
manufacture of certain plastics and also the supplier of a 
whitening agent for flour. The claimant, ECS was a small 
manufacturer of flour whitening agents, which attempted to enter 
the plastic sector. In response, AKZO started selling peroxides to 
the claimant’s clients for very low prices, compelling ECS either to 
abandon the customer or to match a loss-making price in order to 
retain the customer; at the same time, the defendant maintained 
regular prices for the other customers. ECS brought proceedings 
against AKZO before the Commission, alleging that the latter had 
charged prices below costs with the object of eliminating a 
competitor, contrary to article 102854. 
AKZO advocated for the application of the Areeda-Turner test855 for 
predation, holding that prices below average variable costs are 
predatory; however, the Commission rejected the idea that 
predation can automatically be inferred from a price threshold, 
and argued that any price cutting can amount to predation, when 
it is part of a strategy to eliminate rivals856. 
On appeal, the ECJ confirmed the Commission’s holding that 
AZKO’s pricing was part of a strategy to eliminate ECS, but based 
its decision on a different ratio decidendi: under article 102 a firm 
cannot eliminate its rivals with methods different from those 
which come within the scope of competition on the merits857.  
                                                
851  R.J. Van Der Bergh & P.D. Camesasca, European Competition Law and 
Economics: A Comparative Perspective, 2nd ed., London, 2006, p. 294 et seq. 
852 V. Korah, The Paucity of Economic Analysis in the EEC Decisions on Competition 
– Tetra Pak II, 46(2) Current Legal Problems 149, (1993)   
853 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359 
854 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 75 et seq. 
855 See Chapter I, para. 9.2, P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and 
Related Strategies under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 716-718 
(1975). 
856 Commission decision ECS/AKZO, Case n. IV/30.698 [1985], O.J. L. 347/1, para. 
80 
857 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 70 
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A price strategy aiming at excluding equally efficient competitors 
from the market cannot be held as legitimate competition, but in 
order to distinguish between aggressive competition and 
illegitimate predation regard should be had to a price below 
which competition is no longer sustainable for competitors858. 
The Court recognized this benchmark in a pricing strategy below 
average variable costs, since they generate a sale loss, that the 
dominant firm has no interest in applying them but for the scope 
of eliminating competitors, so as to “subsequently…raise its prices 
by taking advantage of its monopolistic position”859.  
The ECJ followed the Areeda-Turner criterion, which stands, as 
said above, as a proxy for marginal costs860, on the ground that the 
latter are not always readily available. Based on the critique that 
not necessarily does pricing below average variable costs reflect 
an abusive strategy of the dominant firm861, the Court rejected a 
safe haven for prices above average variable costs, and further 
added that pricing above average variable costs, but below 
average total costs, can also be abusive pursuant to article 102, 
when it is part of a plan to eliminate a competitor862, meaning that 
there must be an additional element for above cost pricing to be 
considered as illegal.  
In Tetra Pak II, the Court applied and amended the AKZO holding, 
by adding that pricing below average variable costs must always 
be regarded as abusive, no grounds of exculpations being 
available to the dominant firm, since such pricing “has no 
conceivable economic purpose other than the elimination of a 
competitor”863. 
Unlike the US Supreme Court, according to which prices above 
the appropriate measure of average variable costs are considered 
legal per se864, article 102 exceptionally applies to situations in 
which a dominant firm with a very high degree of market power 
                                                
858 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 72 
859 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 71 
860 M.J. Salinger, The Legacy of Matsushita: the Role of Economics in Antitrust 
Litigation, 38  Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 476 (2007) 
861 D. Howarth, Pricing Abuses – Unfair and Predatory Pricing under Article 82 EC: 
From Cost-price Comparisons to the Search for Strategic Standards, in G. Amato & 
C.D. Ehlermann (eds.), EC Competition Law: A Critical Assessment, Oxford, (2007), 
p. 249; R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
2001, p. 218; O.E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 
87 Yale L.J. 320 (1977); 
862 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 72 
863  Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities, 
14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951 para. 41 
864 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993)  
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cuts price above average total costs, provided that the price cut is 
coupled with other exclusionary strategies and, more importantly, 
aimed at eliminating the remainder of competition in the 
market865.  
In the Hilti case, a manufacturer of nail guns put in practice 
strategies to deter customers from buying nails from competitors, 
by means of discriminatory pricing strategies and tied sales866. In 
particular, Hilti was found to have offered more profitable 
discounts to customers who purchased both nails and nail-guns 
than those that purchased the guns from Hilti and the nails from 
the competitors. The prices were not found to be below cost, but 
the Court nonetheless maintained that the defendant’s course of 
conduct was not a legitimate mode of competition, since Hilti was 
liable to deter other firms from establishing in the market; 
regardless of that, the Court did not clarify whether the behavior 
on Hilti’s part amounted to an exploitative or to an exclusionary 
abuse867. 
Irish Sugar is another case in which the General Court condemned 
a series of discounts by the dominant firm, which were not found 
to be below cost, but were deemed designed to isolate the Irish 
market for sugar from imports of sugar produced in other 
Member States 868 . The defendant had deployed a series of 
measures, such as selective pricing, price discrimination, rebates 
to customers located in border areas, as part of a scheme to 
entrench the Irish market from competing imports. The Court 
found the rebates illegitimate, without inquiring whether the 
prices had an exclusionary effect because they were below cost. 
Instead, as it has been seen, it only focused on the discriminatory 
partition of the market and on the discrimination between 
customers: “It follows that, by the applicant’s own admission, its 
economic capacity to offer rebates in the region along the border 
with Northern Ireland depended on the stability of its prices in 
other regions, which amounted to recognition that it financed 
those rebates by means of its sales in the rest of Irish 
territory…The applicant abused its dominant position in the retail 
sugar market in Ireland, by preventing the development of free 
                                                
865 J. Temple Lang & R. O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition, How to 
Clarify Pricing Abuses under Article 82, 26 Fordham Int. L. J. 127 (2003) 
866 Hilti AG v. Commission of the European Communities, 12.12.1991, Case T-30/89, 
[1991], E.C.R. II-1439, para. 7 
867 Hilti AG v. Commission of the European Communities, 12.12.1991, Case T-30/89, 
[1991], E.C.R. II-1439, para. 100. The Court merely affirmed that the “The 
Commission had good reason to hold that such behavior on Hilti’s part was 
improper”.  
868 Irish Sugar plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 07.10.1999, Case T-
228/97, [1999], ECR-2969. 
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competition on that market and distorting its structures, in 
relation to both purchasers and consumers”869.  
The leading case on above-production-cost predation is, however, 
Compagnie Maritime Belge, in which CEWAL, a Belgian liner 
shipping conference operating between Democratic Republic of 
Congo and some European Ports, enjoyed a de facto monopoly 
over those routes (90% of the market in question), which allowed 
it to carry out the practice of “fighting ships”, a selective price-
matching, whereby sailing times are established as close as 
possible to those of a competing liner and special rates apply for 
those sailings. The purpose of the “fighting ships” was to get rid 
of the competitor G&C870.  
The ECJ rejected the appellant’s argument that selective discount 
practices are abusive only when they are below price within the 
meaning of AKZO871, and found CEWAL’s conduct abusive on the 
grounds: 
1) The “fighting ships” practice was carried out exclusively to 
exclude the only competitor of the dominant firm from 
competition872; 
2) The dominant firm spread the losses incurred during the discount 
period between the members of CEWAL conference873; 
3) The maritime transport market is a very specialized sector, where 
competition is fettered by the applicable legislation. It is because 
of the specificity of that market that the Council established, in 
Regulation No 4056/86, a set of competition rules different from 
that which applies to other economic sectors. The authorization 
granted to liner conferences to cooperate in fixing rates for 
maritime transport is exceptional in light of the relevant 
regulations and competition policy874. 
                                                
869 Irish Sugar plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 07.10.1999, Case T-
228/97, [1999], ECR-2969, para 188. 
870 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Others v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 16.03.2000, Case C-395/96 and C-396/96, [2000] ECR I-
1365 
871 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Others v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 16.03.2000, Case C-395/96 and C-396/96, [2000] ECR I-
1365, paras. 97-115 
872 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Others v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 16.03.2000, Case C-395/96 and C-396/96, [2000] ECR I-
1365, paras. 118-119. “The appellants never seriously disputed, and indeed 
admitted at the hearing, that the purpose of the conduct complained of was to 
eliminate G & C from the market”. 
873 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Others v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 16.03.2000, Case C-395/96 and C-396/96, [2000] ECR I-
1365, para. 101 
874 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Others v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 16.03.2000, Case C-395/96 and C-396/96, [2000] ECR I-
1365, para. 115 
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The selective price cuts, together with the practice of the “fighting 
ships” amounted to an abuse, because it was directed to 
eliminating competition. That, coupled with the structural 
lessening of competition in the maritime sector and the very high 
market share of CEWAL, brought the Court to declare liability 
under article 102, regardless of a cost analysis, to ascertain 
whether the defendant had cut prices below cost. 
 
9.2 The recoupment element 
Notwithstanding the lack of a clear standard for predation, one 
aspect recurring in all the above courses of conduct is the sacrifice 
of today’s profits for tomorrow’s gains. Once the competitor(s) is 
eliminated, the dominant firm will recoup the losses incurred 
throughout the price-cut phase by raising prices at monopoly level 
to make good those losses. Without the possibility of recouping, 
the business strategy of the firm is not profit maximizing but, 
conversely, is beneficial to consumers, because the predator will 
inflict losses onto himself only875.  
There is no consensus, however, as to the factors that should be 
taken into account to verify the possibility of recoupment. 
American Scholarship has highly influenced the debate on the 
incorporation of recoupment test in predation cases, and has 
suggested two tests to distinguish predatory discounts from pro-
competitive strategies: 
3) The structural recoupment test seeks to infer the possibility of 
recoupment from the structural factors of the market, such as high 
barriers to entry, the excess capacity of the dominant firm, its 
market position vis-à-vis the competitor, and the increase of 
market shares during the predation phase876. 
4) The strict recoupment test seeks to infer predation from an 
economic quantification of losses and estimated post-predation 
gains. Only if this information is available, and economic calculus 
shows that the predator can recoup all the money lost during 
predation, should then he be held liable for the price-cutting 
strategy877. Post predation gains can be quantified in the form of 
prices established after the market has been jacked up. 
In the wake of the Brooke Group decision, the debate on the need of 
ascertaining the recoupment in EC competition law has reached 
its momentum up until the Tetra Pak II decision, where the 
recoupment requirement has been rejected tout court, because the 
Court found it not appropriate “to require [in addition to the 
                                                
875 K.G. Elzinga & D.E. Mills, Testing for Predation: is Recoupment Feasible, 34 
Antitrust Bulletin 874, (1989)  
876 P.L. Joskow & A.K. Klevorick, A framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing 
Policy, 89 Yale Law Journal 245 et seq, (1979) 
877 K.G. Elzinga & D.E. Mills, Testing for Predation: is Recoupment Feasible, 34 
Antitrust Bulletin 874, (1989) 
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AKZO rules] proof that the predator had a realistic chance of 
recouping its losses”878, arguing that there could be no economic 
reason for the below-cost pricing other than predation, therefore 
aligning with the argument of the Advocate General, for which 
predatory pricing is anticompetitive per se, regardless of whether 
the dominant firm achieves that aim879.   Despite the doubts on the 
existence of causation in the case880, both the Commission and the 
Court concluded that Tetra Pak’s profits in the aseptic carton 
market allowed it to make up for the losses occurred in the 
predation phase of the non-aseptic carton market. Moreover, by 
resorting on the argument of the “associative links” between the 
two markets the ECJ argued that the pricing policy in the predated 
market was a logical tool for fettering competition, irrespective of 
the analysis of the actual chances of recouping losses through 
post-predation price raising above competitive level881. 
After Tetra Pak II, the ECJ partly reviewed its position on the 
recoupment requirement in the France Télécom case: the 
Commission found that the prices charged by Wanadoo Interactive, 
a company of the French Telecom Group, for high-speed internet 
access were predatory, since they cover neither variable costs in 
the short term, nor the full cost for the longer period of time. On 
the account of that, the Commission deduced that such pricing 
strategy was part of a plan to eliminate competition on the French 
market for high-speed Internet services during a key phase of its 
development882, and that recoupment of losses was probable by 
virtue of the “structure of the market and the associated revenue 
prospects”883. 
The General Court upheld the Commission’s decision, confirming 
that the recoupment is not a general precondition for finding 
liability in predation claims; the ECJ also argued that an analysis 
of the chances of the predator to make good for its losses in the 
post-predation phase might shed light on the economic 
justifications for pricing below average variable costs, or on the 
existence of a plan to eliminate competition whereby prices are 
above average variable costs, but below average total costs884. 
                                                
878  Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities, 
14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951 para. 44.  
879  Opinion of A.G. D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Tetra Pak International SA v 
Commission of the European Communities, 14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] 
ECR I-5951 para. 44 
880 Compare supra, para. 4.3.1 
881 Compare supra, para. 7.5 
882 Wanadoo Interactive, Commission Decision, 16.07.2003, COMP/38.233, para. 
255 
883 Wanadoo Interactive, Commission Decision, 16.07.2003, COMP/38.233, para. 
335-336 
884 France Télécom v. Commission of the European Communities, 02.04.2009, Case C-
202/07 P [2009], ECR I-2369, para. 111 
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Nevertheless, it went on and affirmed that, absent the possibility 
of recouping losses, the dominant firm can still lessen competition 
by eliminating a rival, and ultimately cause a consumer harm as a 
result of the limitation of the choices available to consumers 
themselves885.  
In light of the above, it appears that the ECJ rejected a strict 
analysis of the gains and losses (strict recoupment test), and 
sustained the application of a structural recoupment test, which 
brings to evaluate the rationality of predation by referring to the 
market structure, in other terms by referring to the market setting 
to prove that the low price strategy did not make economic sense, 
except for exclusionary scopes.  
Such a determination does not affect probation, since predatory 
pricing law only applies to firms that are already dominant, for 
which circumstances already suggest a large market share, and 
certain immunity to competition. This dominance may also offer 
indication that exclusion of a rival by means of a predation 
scheme will lead to monopolistic prices in the long run and, in all 
likelihood, to recoupment. 
 
9.3 The relevant cost threshold and the strategies of the firm 
With regard to pricing below average variable costs, it also 
appears that the Court has overcome the Tetrapak II approach, by 
virtue of which pricing below average variable costs must always 
be regarded as abusive886, and adopted a more nuanced approach, 
since the price cut is to concur to eliminate rivals together with a 
set of strategic circumstances.  
Similarly, when it comes to pricing above average variable cost, 
that can only be considered abusive only when it is part of a 
strategy to eliminate rivals. Price reductions above average 
variable cost are anticompetitive if they coincide with an 
exclusionary policy. The Tetra Pak II, Irish Sugar, and Hilti cases 
can only be explained on the account of the various practices to 
drive competitors off the market (tying sales, target rebates, 
exclusive dealing contracts), coupled with a price reduction that 
would weigh minimally on the dominant firm. These practices 
incidental to the predation plan are to be regarded as abusive in 
the first place, in the sense that they are to represent a barrier to 
entry and cannot be regarded as competition on the merits887.  
These practices, on top of the low price, may provide evidence of 
the exclusionary plan; most of all, it would a cumulative pattern 
evidence of the intent to eliminate rival per se, as under the second 
AKZO rule (prices above average variable costs but below average 
                                                
885 France Télécom v. Commission of the European Communities, 02.04.2009, Case C-
202/07 P [2009], ECR I-2369, para. 112 
886 Compare supra, para. 9.2 
887 See supra the analysis of all price discriminatory practices, para. 7.3  
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total cost are considered predatory “if they are part of a plan to 
eliminate rivals”) without actually having to provide 
circumstantial evidence of the intent888. That is also consistent with 
the wording of the AKZO case –“part of a plan”-, and with the fact 
that firms that are profit-maximizing aim at eliminating rivals by 
means of price discrimination. 
 
With rgard to price cuts below average variable cost, there are a 
few defenses available to the defendant889:  
1) The company can show that it did not know that its price was 
unlawful and corrected it as soon as it found out890; 
2) The dominant firm may launch a product in a new market and the 
first sales, whatever the price charged, will not cover the costs 
incurred. Else, no companies will not be able to break into any 
new market; 
3) The low price constitutes a short term trial offer to attract more 
clientele; 
4) The product might be phased out and small revenues to recover 
fixed costs are better than no recovery at all. 
Defenses for pricing above average variable costs but below 
average total cost are available when such a conduct is not 
coupled with the intent to exclude rivals891. 
1) The dominant firm should be allowed to respond to competitive 
offers, by undercutting rivals price even below the average 
variable cost threshold; 
2) If demand shrinks, the dominant firm should be allowed to reduce 
its price for cash flow purposes; 
3) A dominant firm with high capital costs should be allowed to sell 
at reduced price until it reaches a certain scale of operations and a 
minimum number of customers in a network industry; 
4) If a dominant firm is to bear high storage costs, it should be 
allowed to sell below average total cost to make some saving. 
 
9.4 The Commission’s Enforcement Communication  
                                                
888 Even though article 102 is interpreted objectively, without reference to the 
subjective anticompetitive intent, some authors have argued that the unlawful 
element of the price-cut above cost is the subjective intent to injure or eliminate 
a rival. Therefore, the analysis of the predatory nature of the price cut would 
shift from the discriminatory effects of the predator’s conduct to the its 
discriminatory intent. Compare P. Andrews, Is Meeting Competition a Defense to 
Predatory Pricing? – The Irish Sugar Decision Suggests a New Approach, 19 
European Competition Law Review, p. 53 (1998) 
889 J. Temple Lang & R. O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition, How to 
Clarify Pricing Abuses under Article 82, 26 Fordham Int. L. J. 145 (2003) 
890 Ibidem; Compare General Motors Continental NV v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 13.11.1975, Case 26/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1367, paras. 20-21 
891 Ibidem 
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Economic thinking of predation has heavily criticized EC case law 
on predation on the grounds of the lack of an adequate measure of 
cost892, of the difficulties underlying the identification of predatory 
intent 893 , and on the reluctance of making the possibility of 
recoupment a precondition to sanction a pricing policy as 
predatory894.  
As regards the lack of a thorough analysis of costs amounting to 
predation, the main criticism has been addressed to the refusal of 
a safe harbor for above average variable cost (Compagnie Maritime 
Belge), on the one hand, and to the acknowledgement of an above 
cost predation qualified by other circumstances, although such 
prices rarely stand as exclusionary, on the other hand895. Moreover, 
a price cut below average variable cost is generally held abusive, 
even if firms can price cut below such threshold for various 
reasons different from predation896. 
With regard to the intent element, direct identification of the 
predatory intent raises problems, owing to the inherent profit-
maximizing nature of the firm, and to the fact that price 
competition is the most straightforward way to generate profits by 
eliminating competitors. The Commission has addressed this issue 
and affirmed that “it does not consider an intention even by a 
dominant firm to prevail over its rivals as unlawful”897.  
Depending on the intent, a price cutting of the dominant firm may 
either encourage competition, since it will bring competitors to 
lower their price -or to exit the market because of their 
inefficiency-, or fetter competition, because it will be targeted to 
the predation of the market. Evidence of direct predatory intent 
can be absent in the documents or the statements of the case, and 
Courts often are to resort to indirect inference to show that the 
price-cutting is predatory. 
The Commission has addressed the above criticism in the “the 
Enforcement Communication” on December 2008898, in which an 
                                                
892 W.J. Baumol, Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test, 39 
Journal of Law and Economics, p. 57 (1996) 
893 R. O’Donogue & A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford 
and Portland, 2006, p. 250-251 
894  R.J. Van Der Bergh & P.D. Camesasca, European Competition Law and 
Economics: A Comparative Perspective, 2nd ed., London, 2006, p. 299 
895 E. Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive out Entrants are not Predatory – 
and the Implications for Defining  Costs and Market Power, 112 Yale Law Journal 
727 (2003) 
896 R. O’Donogue & A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford 
and Portland, 2006, p. 283 
897 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 81 
898 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, published on the Official Journal, OJ 24.02.2007, 2009/C 
45/02 
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attempt has been made to refine the general AKZO rules on 
predation by means of a more effect-based approach, and to tackle 
the issue of predation in conjunction with other aspects of 
unilateral abusive conduct, such as anticompetitive foreclosure,899 
price based exclusionary conduct900, and objective justifications901. 
In short, the predation scheme the Commission seeks to sanction 
concerns the hypothesis in which a dominant firm cuts prices and 
foregoes profits in the short run with a view to foreclosing one or 
more competitors and, therefore, causing a competitive harm. 
Apart from that, the Commission has pointed out circumstances in 
which the sacrifice of a short run profit is not conducive to 
foreclosure of competition, but is justified by a legitimate business 
goal. 
 
9.4.1 The relevance of Average Avoidable Costs 
In terms of sacrifice, the Commission has re-defined the price cut 
relevant to the scopes of article 102, as the one that causes losses 
that could have been avoided. The Commission benchmark to 
assess if a price is predatory is therefore the Average Avoidable 
Costs (AAC), instead of the Average Variable Costs, as in the 
AKZO case902.  
Compared with average variable costs, average avoidable costs 
include certain product-specific fixed costs, which are attributable 
to the single sales and are not caught by the AKZO rule. Thus, 
some authors have argued that, should this benchmark be 
adhered to, Courts will be stricter in policing predation, since 
more cases will infringe the sacrifice-criterion903. 
The AAC criterion is only the starting point of the analysis, since 
pricing above cost can be predatory when it implies a sacrifice that 
led to net revenues lower than what could have been expected to 
                                                
899 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, published on the Official Journal, OJ 24.02.2007, 2009/C 
45/02, paras. 19-22 
900 Ibidem, paras. 23-27 
901 Ibidem, paras. 28-31 
902 Ibidem, para. 64. The Commission applied the Average Avoidable Cost in the 
Wanadoo case, where it regarded certain product-specific fixed costs, such as 
marketing costs, as variable (i.e. avoidable) costs, considering the peculiarities 
of the market for Internet services, which allowed the attribution of marketing 
costs to single sales. The marketing costs could have been avoided had the 
defendant not offered its services, Wanadoo Interactive, Commission Decision, 
16.07.2003, COMP/38.233, para 62  
903 W. Wurmnest, Predatory Pricing: from Cost-Price Comparison to Post-Chicago 
thinking, in J. Basedow & W. Wurmnest (eds.) Structures and Effects in EU 
Competition Law – Studies on Exclusionary Conduct and State Aid, Kluwer law 
International, p.122 
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result out of a reasonable alternative conduct904. It follows that the 
Commission does not fully embrace any economic cost concept 
that could systematically define conducts as anticompetitive, but 
rather resorts to a rule of reason, based on the unreasonableness of 
the sacrifice of the dominant firm905, or, in other terms, on the 
“avoidability” of the sacrifice.   
This could transform article 102 into a tool to police business 
decisions that did not end up being profitable maximizing, and 
caused a loss that a rational actor could have avoided906, on the 
one hand, and the judicial control as a control of the 
opportuneness of a pricing decision, rather than on the legitimacy 
of it, on the other hand.  
The Commission strives to overcome this possible impasse by 
taking into account only economically rational and predictable 
alternatives that, considering the realities of the market at stake, 
can realistically constitute a profitable business scheme for the 
dominant undertaking907. In order to assess that, it would be 
sufficient to rely on documents (where available) showing plans to 
forego a profit in order to exclude a competitor, to prevent the 
entry of another firm in the market, or to pre-empt the emergence 
of a market908. 
The anticompetitive foreclosure of competitors that are as efficient 
as the dominant undertaking” is the second mandating 
requirement to declare a conduct predatory 909 . Judge Posner 
elaborated the “equally efficient competitor test”, departing from 
the inquiry whether the dominant firm itself would be able to 
survive the exclusionary conduct in the event it were the target. 
The General Court has adopted this test, to the extent that the 
assessment is solely based on the measurement of the dominant 
firm’s cost, and not on the subjective intent of eliminating rivals. 
                                                
904 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, published on the Official Journal, OJ 24.02.2007, 2009/C 
45/02, para. 64 
905 D. Howarth, Pricing Abuses – Unfair and Predatory Pricing under Article 82 EC: 
From Cost-price Comparisons to the Search for Strategic Standards, in G. Amato & 
C.D. Ehlermann (eds.), EC Competition Law: A Critical Assessment, Oxford, (2007), 
p. 259 
906 H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, Cambridge 
(Massachusetts), p. 166 
907 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, published on the Official Journal, OJ 24.02.2007, 2009/C 
45/02, para. 65 
908 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, published on the Official Journal, OJ 24.02.2007, 2009/C 
45/02, para. 66 
909 Ibidem, para. 20 
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In the Enforcement Communication, the benchmark to evaluate 
whether a hypothetical competitor is able to compete with the 
dominant firm is whether the dominant undertaking has priced its 
products or services below LRAIC910.  
The Commission seems to overcome the second AKZO rule, for 
which pricing below average variable costs (AVC) is always 
abusive, without the need to examine the market effects 911, and 
pricing above average variable cost, but below average total costs 
(ATC) may be presumed abusive when it is part of a strategy to 
eliminate rivals. ATC includes all fixed and variable costs, 
whereas LRAIC is by definition the “cost of producing the 
predatory increment of output whenever such costs [are] 
incurred”.912  
Unlike average variable cost, it includes all product-specific fixed 
costs, “even if those costs were sunk before the period of 
predatory pricing”913. That is, long-run average incremental cost 
by definition includes both recoverable and sunk fixed costs, 
making it traditionally higher than ATC. This would make it more 
difficult to prove the anticompetitive foreclosure than under the 
AKZO rule.  
 
9.4.2 The Commission’s understanding of the recoupment 
requirement 
As regards the recoupment, the Enforcement Communication 
rejects the idea that it has to be proved strictly, but acknowledges 
in general that consumers are only harmed if the firm is expected 
to benefit from the sacrifice, by having a stronger market power 
once predation is completed914. More specifically, in order to prove 
whether the predatory strategy leads to recoupment – and to 
consumer harm-, it is not necessary to prove that the dominant 
firm has a concrete possibility to charge supra-competitive prices 
                                                
910 Ibidem, para. 67 
911 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 71.  
912 P. Bolton, J.F. Brodley & M. H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and 
Legal Policy, 88 Geo. L.J. 2239, 2250 (2000) Long-run average incremental cost 
has been suggested as the appropriate cost measure in predation claims 
involving intellectual property; in this case a long-run cost measure is the only 
one that can account of the research and development cost, which are not 
encompassed in AVC and AAC. Moreover, after the product is developed and 
launched, AVC and AAC equal zero. In computer software, for example, once 
the software product has been developed “the short-run incremental cost of a 
program downloaded from the Internet is nil”. 
913 D.W. Carlton & J.M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 4th ed., Prentice 
Hall, 2005, p. 785.  
914 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, published on the Official Journal, OJ 24.02.2007, 2009/C 
45/02, para. 70 
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in the post-predation phase, but it is sufficient to show that a 
predatory strategy is likely to lead to a “strong foreclosure effect”, 
through the analysis of structural factors and strategic 
considerations indicating that predation is a rational strategy to 
exclude incumbent rivals or deter entry915.  
These factors are the acquis of the Commission’s practice and case 
law and, with regard to the structural factors, are in turn:  
1) The excess capacity of the dominant firm compared to its 
competitors’; 
2) The existence of high entry barriers in the market; 
3) The extension of the price-cutting and impact of such a strategy on 
the competitors’ course of business916. 
With regard to the strategic considerations, the Enforcement 
Communication avails itself of some insight of recent models of 
predation elaborated by post-Chicago thinking, and in particular 
by economic game theory, usually referred to as reputation, signal 
jamming and financial predation917. 
1) If the effects of the price-cutting are likely to be felt multiple 
markets or in successive periods of time, the dominant firm might 
be seeking a reputation for predatory conduct, whereby it could 
dampen competition and deter future entries918. 
2) If the dominant firm is better informed on costs, or can distort 
market signals about profitability so as to influence the 
expectations of potential entrants and therefore deter entry919. 
3) The predation scheme can also affect the access of the targeted 
firms to external financing, and undermine their performance by 
foreclosing their economic viability and their access to credit920. 
                                                
915 Ibidem, para. 71 
916 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, published on the Official Journal, OJ 24.02.2007, 2009/C 
45/02, paras. 71-72 
917 J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 
372; R. O’Donogue & A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford 
and Portland, 2006, p. 243 
918 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, published on the Official Journal, OJ 24.02.2007, 2009/C 
45/02, para. 68. It appears that in the Tetra Pak II case the General Court has 
applied the reputation predation criterion to censor the conduct of the 
dominant firm, which used different aggressive pricing strategies across 
different but related geographic and product markets in order to affect the 
interstate competition by means of its reputation. Tetra Pak International SA v 
Commission of the European Communities, 14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] 
ECR I-5951, para. 27. Compare supra note n. 202 
919 ibidem.  
920 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, published on the Official Journal, OJ 24.02.2007, 2009/C 
45/02, para. 73 
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With regard to the third structural element of predation, the 
analysis of the objective justifications for the dominant firm’s 
conducts overlaps to a substantial extent with the assessment of 
both the sacrifice and the anticompetitive foreclosure. The 
Enforcement Communication encompasses only one type of 
exculpation, i.e. the efficiency defense921. A price may be below 
cost, yet not exclusionary, when the market is structured in a way 
that efficiencies can only be achieved in the long run by means of 
large upfront investments on the one hand, and implies sizeable 
start-up costs in order to create economies of scale that will reduce 
costs over time, on the other hand. This defense is applied very 
strictly, since the Commission purports that low price strategies 
put in practice by dominant firms are rarely conducive to 
efficiency gains, but are more frequently a symptom of the 
creation or consolidation of a monopoly922. 
Owing to the above, by no means can this defense substantiate 
either the creation or consolidation of a monopoly position by the 
dominant firm. Therefore, in terms of balancing freedom to cut 
prices to gain efficiencies, on the one hand, with the strive to 
consolidate a monopolistic position by virtue of the same course 
of conduct, on the other hand, the protection of the competitive 
process will prevail, and competition law will intervene on the 
strong position of the dominant firm, not leaving room for 
efficiency arguments923.  
A last corollary to this ground of exculpation is that when price-
cut strategies leading to anticompetitive foreclosure are limited in 
time, they will be justified924. It appears that the Commission chose 
a more nuanced approach than the blunt rule of the Tetra Pak II 
                                                
921 Ibidem, paras. 130-133 
922 Ibidem, para. 74 
923 Scholars have argued that the normative prevalence of the need to protect 
the competitive process by thwarting strong monopoly positions is a direct 
consequence of the fact that, despite the official parlance that the Enforcement 
Communication follows a consumer welfare approach (para. 30), the 
competitive between firms is the essential driver of economic efficiency. W. 
Wurmnest, Predatory Pricing: from Cost-Price Comparison to Post-Chicago thinking, 
in J. Basedow & W. Wurmnest (eds.) Structures and Effects in EU Competition Law 
– Studies on Exclusionary Conduct and State Aid, Kluwer law International, p.129. 
In spite of that, the Enforcement Communication does not indicate the 
threshold when a position close to monopoly is reached. Conversely the DG 
Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005, para. 92 establishes that when the 
market share of the dominant firm exceeds 75%, the competitive pressure from 
the other competitors can no longer bar the dominant firm from using 
indiscriminately its market power 
924 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, published on the Official Journal, OJ 24.02.2007, 2009/C 
45/02, para. 130-133 
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case, according to which prices below average variable costs are 
always abusive. 
 
9.5 The law of predation in a nutshell 
All things considered, the EC case-law principles regarding 
predation can be epitomized as follows: 
1. Prices below average avoidable costs will generally be regarded as 
abusive, no evidence of a plan to eliminate competition being 
required. 
2. Prices above average avoidable costs but below average total costs 
will be regarded as abusive if they are found to be part of a plan to 
eliminate one or more competitors from the market. 
3. It is not necessary to show that competitors have exited the market 
in order to prove that there has been abusive conduct on a market. 
4. It is not necessary to show that a dominant undertaking would 
have a reasonable prospect of recouping its losses in order for the 
Commission to prove predatory pricing. This is a breaking point 
between EC law and US law, in which evidence of recoupment is 
required. 
5. In general, the main ground of exculpation the Commission’s 
Enforcement Communication considers is that predatory scheme 
will create efficiencies that outweigh the foreclosure effects on 
competition; moreover, the Commission will consider the claim 
that low pricing enables economies of scale. 
6. Dominant undertakings have no absolute right to align their 
prices with those of their competitors if such price alignment 
results in the dominant undertaking engaging in abusive conduct. 
9.6 Economic thinking of predation 
Leading economic antitrust scholarship agrees that all pricing 
above average variable cost should be lawful, on the account of 
the fact that at that threshold firms that are equally or more 
efficient than the dominant one should be able to compete on the 
merits. Firms unable to sustain competition on above average 
variable cost are inefficient, thus their elimination would cause no 
net welfare loss to the detriment of consumers925 
A limited number of scholars is of the opinion that there are cases 
in which a price can be predatory if the dominant firm prices 
                                                
925 R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2001, 
p. 188: “A seller may want to destroy a competitor, but if the only method used 
is underselling him by virtue of having lower costs there is no rational antitrust 
objection to the seller’s conduct”. Compare P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory 
Pricing and Related Strategies under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 706 
(1975): “The low price at or above average cost is competition on the merits and 
excludes only less efficient rivals”. 
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above its own costs but below those of the rival926. The majority of 
antitrust scholars agree that the economic cost of predation is 
better captured by the average avoidable cost (AAC), because this 
threshold provides a better insight of the alternative for the 
predated firm between continuing to produce or exiting the 
market. In fact, unlike average variable cost, AAC do not require 
separating fixed costs from variable costs, nor allocating common 
costs, which is often arbitrary: whether costs are fixed or variable 
largely depends on the time frame in which they are taken into 
account, and in the long run all costs become variable927. 
Economists also agree that there is no cost threshold above which 
pricing is legal for it: there is no cost measurement standing as a 
competitive safe haven, since there cannot be a precise 
measurement of marginal costs in competition litigation, and all 
the proxies usually adopted for marginal cost (AVC, AAC, 
LRAIC) can indicate predation where a pure marginal cost 
investigation would show the opposite928. Furthermore, an above 
cost safe haven could only be justified to avoid “false negatives”, 
namely that pro-competitive practices be condemned929.  
Rather, price-cost comparisons are to be complemented with the 
analysis of market realities and of the strategic thinking 
underlying the conduct930: in that respect, considering reputation 
                                                
926 A.S. Edlin, Stopping Above Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 Yale L.J. 941 (2002). 
Compare Chapter I, para. 9.2.1 
927 L.A. Sullivan & W.S. Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook, 2nd 
ed. St. Paul (Minnesota), p. 167 
928 O.E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 
284 (1977) 
929  Report by the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy, “An 
Economic Approach to Article 82”, July 2005, p.7. American legal and economic 
scholarship speaks in favor of sustaining an above cost safe haven, owing to the 
fact that the enforcement of the law lies primarily in the hands of private parties, 
who suffer directly from a low pricing strategy. The absence of a cost threshold 
-together with the lack of a definite dominance threshold, with the plaintiff-
friendly structure of litigation, and with the possibility of granting treble 
damages-, may lead to interfere with pro-competitive goals of competition law; 
therefore, the need for a clear-cut rule is more urgent. Compare Barry Wright 
Corp. v ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2, 227, 235-236 (1st Cir. 1983). Against the 
above cost safe haven A.S. Edlin, Stopping Above Cost Predatory Pricing, in 
111Yale Law Journal 991, (2002). Contrariwise, in the European Union 
predation allegations are investigated by the Commission or by national 
authorities –the strengthening of private enforcement of competition law that 
the Commission has advocated for is still in an embryonic phase-; because the 
cases in which defendants are condemned for charging unduly low prices are 
traditionally few in number (the Compagnie Maritime and Irish Sugar cases see 
supra, note n. 290 et seq), the risk of chilling competition is not felt as high to 
sustain a safe harbor above a measurement of cost.  
930 D. Howarth, Pricing Abuses – Unfair and Predatory Pricing under Article 82 EC: 
From Cost-price Comparisons to the Search for Strategic Standards, in G. Amato & 
C.D. Ehlermann (eds.), EC Competition Law: A Critical Assessment, Oxford, (2007), 
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effects and signal jamming can provide a better insight of whether 
the price-cut has a foreclosure effect, even though these scenarios 
are hard to prove in practice. For instance, the dominant firm may 
cut prices to distort the information about the cost of venturing in 
the market in order to keep a new entrant from learning about the 
actual business conditions; the price reduction can be above cost 
and stand as a normal response to potential competition in the 
market, yet cause foreclosure in the long run: the predatory 
scheme in this case is to be supported by strong evidence. 
With regard to the foreclosure effect of the predatory conduct, the 
Commission has refined the AKZO rule that states that only prices 
capable of driving out competitors “which may be as efficient as 
the dominant firm”931 , by indicating that only pricing below 
LRAIC (long run average incremental costs) is likely to achieve 
this effect, because this test does not focus on the short-run profits, 
but tries to account of the profit maximization in the long run, by 
an estimation of the total cost of supplying the product or service, 
including the research, development and marketing of the 
product932.  
An eminent scholar has affirmed that the Commission’s approach 
is too narrow and might bring to an excessive restriction of 
competition, pointing out a major flaw, in that it focuses on the 
price/cost analysis without any reference to the market structures, 
in particular to whether the market is characterized by economies 
of scale or scope, or network effects. When monopolized market 
tend to exhibit these features, the dominant firm will produce at 
lower average costs than its rivals’ -by always producing in 
greater quantities than the latter-; therefore, practices that might 
not be capable of excluding an equally efficient competitor, would 
in fact exclude the only competitors that the dominant firm faces 
on the market933. 
Moreover, the LRAIC threshold is of little practical value, for it is 
highly unlikely that a company would disclose all the information 
about its costs934. 
With regard to the recoupment, the general economic take 
approves of the Commission’s approach, disregarding the strict 
recoupment test as an overriding requirement to affirm liability 
                                                                                                                                                            
p. 249; R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
2001, p. 259 
931 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 72 
932 R. O’Donogue & A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford 
and Portland, 2006, p. 269 
933 H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, Cambridge 
(Massachusetts), p. 153 
934 W. Wurmnest, The Reform of Article 82 in the light of the Economic Approach, in 
M.O. Mackenrodt, B. Conde Gallego & S. Enchelmaier (eds.), Abuse of Dominant 
Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms?, Berlin, 2008, p. 18 
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for predation. Two are the main arguments against a strict 
recoupment test:  
1) Foreclosing a competitor might be beneficial even if not all the 
losses are recouped: if the competitor can avail itself of a better 
technology than the dominant firm, the latter might be better off 
driving the former off the market –and sustain some losses- than 
losing market share in the long run935. 
2) It is too heavily anchored to the comparison of losses and gains on 
a market, disregarding the financial gains arising out of reputation 
effects from other markets. Thus, the recoupment. Recoupment 
can also take place across several markets whereby the firm can 
reap reputation rents. 
Having that affirmed, the structural recoupment test appears to be 
more suitable to represent the second stage of the predation 
strategy. Following the approach that the ECJ had in the France 
Télécom case, factors whereby the possibility of recoupment can be 
inferred are some structural factors of the market, such as high 
barriers to entry, the excess capacity of the dominant firm, its 
market position vis-à-vis the competitor, and the increase of 
market shares during the predation phase936. 
A last remark on the Tetra Pak II rule, and in particular on the 
AVC threshold, under which prices are always deemed predatory, 
can be made with regard to the business justifications for which 
modern firms price below AVC, AAC, LRAIC for a limited period 
of time: the acquiring of scale, the gaining of learning experience, 
the rise of consumer interest are all economic reasons to price 
below a certain measurement of cost generally considered 
                                                
935  C.S. Hemphill, The Role of Recoupment in Predatory Pricing Analyses, 53 
Stanford Law Review 1592, (2001)  
936 France Télécom v. Commission of the European Communities, 02.04.2009, Case C-
202/07 P [2009], ECR I-2369, para 110. The ECJ ruled that “it does not follow 
from the case-law of the Court that proof of the possibility of recoupment of 
losses suffered by [France Telecom], by an undertaking in a dominant position, 
of prices lower than a certain level of costs constitutes a necessary precondition 
to establishing that such a pricing policy is abusive. In particular, the Court has 
taken the opportunity to dispense with such proof in circumstances where the 
eliminatory intent of the undertaking at issue could be presumed in view of 
that undertaking's application of prices lower than average variable costs”. The 
ECJ noted that the fact that recouping losses is not a precondition to a finding of 
predatory pricing in EC law does not prevent the Commission from finding the 
possibility of recoupment (or the lack thereof) to be a relevant factor in 
assessing whether or not the conduct in question is abusive. In particular, in 
cases where prices are lower than AVC, recoupment may assist in excluding 
economic justifications other than the elimination of competition, and where 
prices are above AVC but below average total costs, it may assist in establishing 
a plan to eliminate competition. 
P.L. Joskow & A.K. Klevorick, A framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 
89 Yale Law Journal 245 et seq, (1979) 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
276 
 
predatory, and sustain losses in order to stay in the market in the 
long run.  
Economic thinking regards the ECJ’s approach in Tetra Pak II as 
too Manichean and too oblivious of those market conditions that 
may rebut the presumption of predation of the dominant firm, on 
the account of evidence of a legitimate business strategy. 
This call for a more nuanced approach appears not to have gone 
unnoticed in the France Télécom case, where the Court has 
considered the AVC threshold as predatory only when qualified 
by circumstances, affirming that such a pricing strategy is to be 
“considered prima facie abusive inasmuch as in applying such 
prices, an undertaking in a dominant position is presumed to 
pursue no other economic objective save that of eliminating its 
competitors”937.  
 
9.7 Final remarks on the EU law of predation 
The more economic approach brings to reconsider the traditional 
take on predation without causing a drastic alteration of the 
enforcement policy. Modern industrial organization theory has 
shown that pure price/cost analysis is not always an effective 
means to distinguish vigorous competition from predation, when 
it is not supported by an observation of both the objective market 
conditions and the strategy in which the price cut positions itself. 
The three-prong analysis proposed by the EU competition 
authorities (sacrifice-anticompetitive foreclosure-lack of an 
economic justification) can be re-read in light of a scrutiny of the 
circumstances, in a way to reject both the safe harbor of US 
antitrust law (prices above average total cost are considered legal 
per se) and the strict recoupment test, which also appears 
overriding in the US jurisprudence. 
The stricter standard in the US enforcement of the law of 
predation is the result of the Courts endeavor to avoid false 
positives, and discourage temerarious allegations brought by 
private plaintiffs; conversely, the risk of an over-enforcement 
implied in the approach to law of predation in Europe might be 
counterbalanced by the factual absence of private enforcement of 
competition law and the reduced risk of false positives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
937 France Télécom v. Commission of the European Communities, 02.04.2009, Case C-
202/07 P [2009], ECR I-2369, para 109 
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1. Introductory remarks 
The following chapter focuses on the comparison between the 
laws of unilateral conduct of a firm enjoying monopoly power or a 
dominant position, which have been successively described in the 
previous chapters. Moreover, some critical conclusions will be 
drawn with a view to account of the differences of the two models. 
The analysis will be centered on the main commonalities of the 
two models, on the one hand, and on the major divergences in the 
two approaches to the monopoly phenomenon, on the other hand, 
in search of a tertium comparationis, a common unity underlying 
each model, which can render “the comparison comparable”938, 
based on the assumption that “in law the only things that are 
comparable are those that which fulfill the same function”939. 
Functionality is the departing point of every comparative science. 
With regard to the present essay, functionality is the awareness 
that there is a precise correspondence between the concepts of 
monopolization and of abuse of dominant position.  
Having that affirmed, the comparison consists of bringing the 
analysis beyond the description of the two models, and of 
highlighting the legal and political stakes that are more peculiar to 
one model or that represent both, with the view to ambitiously 
identifying a minimum common multiple. 
                                                
938 E. Orucu, Metodology of comparative law in Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law, Cornwall, 2006, p. 422  
939 K. Zweigert, H. Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, Oxford, 1998, p. 34 
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1.1 Macro-comparison: common law and civil law attitudes 
Thus, at a macro-comparative level, the two models place 
themselves on the same sociological, legal and economic 
standpoint, because they both tackle the same substantive issue, 
yet under the lens of two different legal families and attitudes.  
The Common law attitude is best captured by the adversarial 
nature of the American model, in which the possibility of both 
private and public enforcement of monopolization laws makes 
appellate courts relatively accessible to market players; moreover, 
the possibility of awarding treble damages in the event of a 
finding of monopolization makes the enforcement of the Sherman 
Act slightly conservative, also on the grounds of the vis espansiva 
of false positives.  
Conversely, the Civil law attitude is conveyed by the more 
centralized and administrative features of the European model, in 
which private enforcement of antitrust law is virtually absent and 
the European Commission plays the main role in the 
ascertainment of abusive dominance, owing to the lack of a 
standing for private bodies to sue at a EU level940.  
Furthermore, the two above referred attitudes can be emphasized 
with respect to the substantial treatment of the relevant conduct, 
whereby the EU model is marked by a per se approach and favors 
the singling-out of proscribed behaviors, whereas the US model 
shifts towards a rule of reason, considering the specific 
circumstances of each case, particularly in relation to any defenses 
that may arise. The firm’s behavior is relevant when it can 
reasonably provoke an injury to competition.  
The EU treatment of abusive dominance is more administrative 
and straightforward; the Commission investigates and takes 
action backed by detailed releases and the delegation of 
appropriate conduct941. Conversely, in the US the absence of lists 
of unlawful acts makes the system more suited to adapting to 
changing circumstances and to re-interpret entrenched 
doctrines942. 
Despite this difference in terms of attitudes, it should be noticed 
that the judicial formant plays a predominant role in both models, 
                                                
940 The Commission is empowered by Regulation 01/2003 (see infra, para 8.3, 
note n. 130, for an in-depth analysis of both the Regulation and of the powers of 
the Commission). The Regulation confers the Commission the power to issue 
structural, behavioral and deterrence remedies. Any Commission decision is 
appealable to the General Court (the previous Court of First Instance) and the 
European Court of Justice.  
941  D. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting 
Prometheus, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 358 
942 K. Abutbul, The US and EU approaches to Competition Law – Convergent or 
Divergent Paths?, 17 Colum. J. Eur. L. 101 123 (2010) 
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since the scarcity of the two normative provisions lends itself to be 
an invitation to the judge to develop a legal framework for the 
treatment of unilateral abusive practices of firms with market 
power. In that respect, the role of the judge and of the precedent is 
more archetypal to the Common law than to the Civil law model.  
At a political level, it can be affirmed at first blush that the values 
of American antitrust law and of European Competition law are 
similar, in that both models aspire to conduct investigations in 
such a manner that is more grounded on economic reasoning. 
Leaving momentarily aside the ongoing debate on whether 
American antitrust law protects competition in terms of consumer 
welfare, whereas European competition law protects 
competitors943, it can be affirmed that the possibility of private 
standing remains a strong protective force for market players and 
consumers, which does not characterized the European model. In 
the US, private enforcement of antitrust law is prevalent than 
public enforcement compared to the EU (where it is still at an 
embryonic stage), which helps explain the reluctance of 
government agencies in intervening in litigation or in directly 
enforcing the law. 
Therefore, the protective rationale rests on a more radical and 
ostensible call for incentivizing SMEs and consumer 
considerations, as a stated goal of EU competition law 944 . 
Accordingly, both systems undeniably afford protection to market 
players and promote social welfare; however, they operate in two 
different manners, granting “procedural” protection as regards 
the US, and “political” protection as regards the EU945. 
The philosophical underpinning of the two legislations is also 
different: in the US, it is believed that market forces can self 
correct market inefficiencies better than the government 
intervention, and that an excessive intrusion of the latter in 
economic matters could actually chill competition. This attitude is 
material with the traditional mercantile inclination of Common 
law systems, which tend to abstain from a regulation of economic 
transaction, and to intervene solely against market failures. Thus, 
the approach of the Courts in the enforcement of § 2 is less 
interventionist, also on the grounds of the fact that the 
consequence for an antitrust violation pursuant to § 2 can be much 
more onerous for the defendant, since Courts can award treble 
                                                
943 With regard to the main policy considerations inspiring the two provisions at 
issue, see infra, para 12 
944 See infra, para. 12.2 
945 The political protective concerns of the EU system do not refer to the political 
process of the European Union, but rather relate to the role of the Commission, 
as part of the overall development of EU competition law, in the development 
and implementation of a policy on the application of EU competition law in 
keeping with the treaties.  
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damages (generally amounting to three times the actual damages), 
unlike the EU Courts that can only award single damages.  
The more regulatory approach of the EU is also justified by the 
nature itself of the Union, a confederation of States, each one with 
national interest that might justify some distortions of 
competition, such as state monopolies, or the remainder of the 
central state control over the economy of some newly entrants, 
former member States of the Eastern block. 
 
1.2 Demarcating the boundaries of the comparative analysis 
Following the structure of the previous chapters, the comparison 
will regard the hypothesis of monopolization as under § 2 of the 
Sherman Act and the hypothesis of abuse of dominant position 
pursuant to article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.  
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that “every person who 
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any person or persons, to monopolize any part of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony...”. Article 102 rules 
that “any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the common market or in a substantial part of it 
shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so 
far as it may affect trade between member States. It then provides 
several examples of types of abuse.  
These provisions have much in common, being both invitations to 
courts and competition authorities to develop a body of rules 
governing the conduct of the dominant firm. Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, however, appears to be a remarkably broad 
invitation, not giving any definition of the substance of monopoly, 
hence leaving to courts the development of a notion of 
monopolization, in accordance with the remedy in turn elaborated 
for the claim at bar.  
Conversely, article 102 spells out a detailed list –yet not 
exhaustive- of the proscribed abuses, thereby leaving less room for 
the judicial development of the law of unilateral conduct of the 
firm. From a substantive perspective, while article 102 sanctions 
the exploitation of a dominant position over a market, not the 
mere possession of it, § 2 sanctions the mere conduct that creates 
or attempts to create a monopoly, regardless of a prior finding of a 
dominant position. Dominance is a mere presumption that certain 
conducts seek to eliminate rivals. 
In spite of this theoretical difference, the development of both 
provisions has been predominantly left to case law. In this respect, 
the American experience is illuminating, having begun much 
earlier than the European venture. The Sherman Act was enacted 
in 1890, giving more than 100 years of case law interpreting it. 
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Instead, the case law on Article 102 goes back to the early 1970s946. 
 
1.2.1 The three macro areas of the analysis 
The analysis of both the act of monopolizing and of the abuse of 
dominant position has been divided into three macro-areas 
parallel to the three main subdivisions of monopolization or 
abusive dominance claims, and in turn concerning the market 
power and the market dimension relevant to antitrust law -in the 
twofold perspective of the product and the geographic market-, 
the market share the firm is to detain to be deemed dominant, and 
the anticompetitive conduct which Courts found at odds with § 2 
of the Sherman Act, and with Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of European Union. As a corollary to the structural 
elements, a brief comparison of the role of intent in the two 
systems will follow.  
The European concept of discriminatory abuse will also be 
compared with its American functional equivalent, namely the 
prohibition of price discrimination pursuant to § 2(a) of the 
Robinson-Patman Act. It will be argued that the American abuse 
of price discrimination is situated outside of the law of 
monopolization, and does not require a monopolistic position on 
the market to be applied.  A parallel will be traced between the 
other main European primary-line pricing abuses and the 
interpretation of primary line abuses in the US system. 
The comparison of the relevant exclusionary conducts will be 
drawn with respect to the main economic analytical tests that have 
been developed by both courts and scholars. The linking of the 
exclusionary standards to meta-legal tests will show the tension 
between the achievement of market efficiency and the protection 
of consumers’ interests, on the one hand, and the inescapable 
economic foundation of the laws of monopoly and abusive 
dominance, on the other hand. 
After the comparison of the structural elements, attention will be 
drawn to the three parts of the law of the two systems that have 
revealed a significant degree of divergence, in turn the treatment 
of exploitative abuses, of predation and of refusals to deal. 
 
1.3 The rethoric of the two models 
Following the comparative analysis, a reflection on the different 
policy considerations animating the two systems will be outlined, 
in order to show how the fairness and the market integration 
considerations that inform the EU are extraneous to the US 
system, which is solely characterized by the consideration for 
consumer welfare, or in other terms by the increase of the wealth 
of the nation. It will be argued that the different policy 
                                                
946 See supra, Chapter II, introductory remarks. 
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considerations of the two systems reflect opposite rethorical 
formal modes for deciding substantive issues of private law, 
ranging according to Professor Duncan Kennedy from an 
“individualistic” attitude, which favors self-reliance, namely the 
conviction that someone is entitled to enjoy the benefits of his 
effort without having to sacrifice them to the interest of others, as 
opposed to an “altruistic” attitude, which favors solidarity, even 
when this is exposed to the possibility of non-reciprocity, and 
enjoins individuals “to make sacrifices, to share, and to be 
merciful”947.  
The common view is that law is the eminent domain of 
individualism, and private legal justice entails the respect for 
rights, not the performance of altruistic duties. The individualistic 
slant of law entails the clear application of neutral rules, in a way 
to allow individuals to weigh their gains and losses in deciding 
what to do. However, legal institution can also fit “into the 
altruistic mold”948, because virtually all the rules of a given legal 
regime impose to a certain extent to regard for the interests of the 
others, which would not be considered if there were no rules.  
The concepts of individualism/altruism are complementary, not 
conflicting, as they capture the “continuum” between two ideas of 
the organization of society949.  
According to Kennedy, the substantive dichotomy of 
individualism and altruism manifests itself in the debate about 
formal private law rules. In terms of formal rules, the 
conceptualization of individualism is the idea of law as a rigid 
body of neutral rules that define a legal order based on freedom 
and property rights, in order to make the intervention of those 
who enforce the rules as less discretionary as possible. 
The conceptualization of altruism is the preference for equitable 
standards of “reasonable understanding”, producing ad hoc 
decisions, along with the discredit for the idea that a legal order is 
composed of rules that judges merely apply.  
Interestingly enough, Kennedy manages to recollect the rethorical 
and formal dichotomy in the economic discourse, arguing that the 
                                                
947 D. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1685, 1717 (1976). Three are the main altruistic duties: first, there exists between 
parties a sense of communal involvement or solidarity. Second, the duty of 
solidarity is justified by a sense of moral virtue in the conduct by one party and 
another. Third, there is a correspondence between sacrifice and the securing of 
a benefit in relation to the intensity of the sacrifice itself demanded by altruism.  
948 D. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1685, 1719 (1976) Tort law is a realm of the law in which some degree of 
altruism is enforced, because the interest of the injured party must be taken into 
account by the tortfeasor, who cannot rely on the balance between his gain and 
losses in deciding what to do. 
949 D. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1685, 1720 (1976) 
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fundamental premise of “economic individualism is that people 
will create and share out among themselves more wealth if the 
state refuses either to direct them to work or to force them to 
share”950; thus, the economic rationale of individualism is the 
guarantee of “rights” through non-intervention, or in other terms 
the achievement of consumer welfare through laissez faire.  
Contrariwise, the foundation of economic altruism is the attack on 
lassaiz faire, on the one hand, and the refusal of the idea that those 
who enforce the rules are not accountable for the allocation of 
resources that their outcomes produce, but they sometimes 
enforce their substantive values in particular cases, on the other 
hand.   
More specifically, altruists think that judges have been enforcing 
their economic biases, and thus challenge the assumption that 
interferences with the “free market” would make everyone worse 
off951, by arguing that no single theory can predict the effects of 
legal intervention in the economy. The judge must take 
responsibility for affecting the balance of economic powers by 
choosing in favor of one side and to the disadvantage of the other 
side, without paralyzing private economic energies.  
In other terms, the legal order should move to regulate “the public 
interest”, also by virtue of paternalist instruments –such as the 
enforcement of protective policies-, rather than relying on the 
assumption that economic actors should never be subject to 
political restraints or altruistic interferences. In the altruistic view, 
the normative notion of what is “right” is not construed on strict 
rules reflecting the abstraction of the concepts of freedom and 
property, but on standards through which substantive values or 
purposes of the community. 
In this chapter, the dichotomy individualism-rules Vs altruism-
standards individual will be utilized to generalize about what 
form best suits the nature of American antitrust law, on the one 
hand, and European competition law, on the other hand. It will be 
argued that the individualist slant of the American system relies 
on applying rules, whereas the altruist approach of the European 
system casts rules as standards reflecting more communitarian, 
regulatory, and –sometimes- paternalist stakes. 
The persistence of these attitudes reflects a conflict about the 
understanding of society and economy in the two models. 
American individualism is sometimes referred to as “liberalism”, 
a social order in which players have total discretion to pursue 
their goals without worrying about the impact of their conduct on 
others. European altruist justice is sometimes referred to as 
                                                
950 D. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1685, 1742 (1976) 
951 D. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1685, 1749 (1976) 
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“collectivism”, a social order in which ends are shared and in the 
process of development.  
The altruist European judge applies the rules by looking at the 
results, and he will be driven by both fairness and market 
integration consideration, as essential parts of the enforcement of 
article 102. Conversely, the individualist American judge regards 
legal certainty as a means to bar individuals from accomplishing 
antisocial ends, in particular when it looks at outcome efficiency 
as the only stance through which consumer welfare can be 
maximized.  
 
2. Market power and the relevant market 
The American Supreme Court has offered a concise definition of 
market power in US v. Du Pont (the Cellophane case – 1956), as 
power to prices or to exclude competition. This notion is vague 
and does not give guidance as to the actual way of exerting 
market power. Hence, Economic analysis of law has expanded the 
formula maintaining that market power consists of a power to set 
prices above marginal cost, namely a power to raise prices above 
competitive level without incurring in losses of sales that would 
outweigh the benefits of the higher price. The monopolist has in 
fact power to raise the price for a product, thereby causing a loss 
in consumer welfare. The acquisition or maintenance of monopoly 
power, namely the action of monopolizing, violates § 2 of the 
Sherman Act. 
Conversely, both the European Treaties and Courts have 
conceptualized the notion of monopoly as power to price, and 
adapted it to the rejection of a per se prohibition of monopoly. The 
mere acquisition of dominance is not unlawful for it, because the 
dominant firm is required to set price “as if” it were operating in a 
competitive regime952; such dominance infringes article 102 of the 
TFEU when it is used to dampen competition on the merits. 
 
2.1 The two-fold dimension of the relevant market 
In both the US and the European system, the segment of market 
relevant to the reach of the law of exclusionary unilateral conduct 
has a twofold dimension, a product and a geographic one. To put 
it better, the “product market” includes the group of products 
with which the dominant firm’s product or service effectively 
competes, whereas the “geographic market” entails the physical 
area within which the effects of the monopolizing conduct are felt. 
Most of the case law concerning the offense of monopolization 
and of abuse of dominant position departs from the analysis of 
market power in the aforesaid twofold dimension953. 
                                                
952 The approach clearly dates back to the ordo-liberal origins of article 102. See 
chapter II, para. 1. 
953 T.G. Krattenmaker et al., Airlie House Conference on the Antitrust Alternative: 
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2.1.1 The relevant product market in the US system 
The first dimension of the market is the product dimension. In the 
American system, product market is identified by means of three 
major criterions, of which the first was elaborated by the courts, 
the second by the scholarship and the third by the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The jurisprudential 
criterion is the “reasonable interchangeability” one, firstly drafted 
in the Cellophane case, and calls for an inclusion in the relevant 
market of all the products that are reasonably interchangeable 
according to their quality, their use and their price954.  
The second criterion is based on the assessment of the demand 
cross-elasticity of two products, namely the degree to which the 
change of price/output of a product of a monopolized industry is 
likely to affect the change of price/output of the alternative 
commodity. If the change of price determines a shift of consumers 
to an alternative product, the market of the latter will be 
considered as relevant.  
It has been seen that the cross-elasticity test might end up 
resulting in an “analytic trap”, insofar as the finding of high cross-
elasticity of demand is considered as a prima facie proof of 
monopolization, or, put better, proof that the firm has 
monopolized the market by raising prices to supra-competitive 
levels, after which purchasers would divert their preference to 
fringe products. The cross-elasticity criterion nothing shows more 
than one of the conditions of the market, namely the 
responsiveness of purchasers to the charging of a monopoly price; 
it does not suffice in proving a claim of monopolization per se955. 
The third “diversion” criterion was enshrined in the 1992 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
Guidelines on horizontal mergers and focuses on the Small but 
Significant and Non-transitory increase in price (SNNIP) of 5% for 
at least 1 year: if the SSNIP as indicated were to lead a significant 
number of customers to purchase substitute products, it would 
not be profitable for the hypothetical monopolist, therefore the 
market definition should be expanded to include those substitute 
products that constrain the monopolist’s pricing956. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 251-52 
(1987);  
954 U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 381, 76 S. Ct. 994, 999, 
100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956) 
955 Compare the “Cellophane fallacy” chapter I, para. 3.3. L. Kaplow, The Accuracy 
of Traditional Market Power Analysis and a Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95 Harv. 
L. Rev., 1817, 1832-35 (1982). The author has affirmed that analysis of 
substitution possibilities with reference to prevailing market conditions… 
“presents a subtle, but most important, analytic trap”. 
956 http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.shtm 
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2.1.2 The relevant product market in the EU system 
As well as in the US system, the two dimensions of the market 
relevant to the scope of article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Europe are the product and the geographic one. 
The Commission of the European Communities has published a 
Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purpose of 
Community Competition Law in 1997, in which it has deliberately 
adhered to the US approach in the market definition.  
With regard to the product market, the Notice focuses on two 
main criteria: first, regard is to be paid to both demand and 
supply substitutability. The demand-side substitutability is the 
attitude of consumers to substitute reasonably interchangeable 
products in the event of a price increase of the product of the 
dominant firm. The supply-side substitutability branches from the 
competing firms of non-substitute products, which can produce 
and place on the market products that are demand-side 
substitutable of the product at stake, in the event of a price 
increase for the product of the dominant firm. Both demand and 
supply substitutability operate as competitive constraints for the 
dominant firm, which is barred from raising prices above 
competitive level, thereby shaping the contours of the product 
market as well.  
The second criterion is the Hypothetical Monopolist test which, 
elaborated by the US Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission Merger Guidelines 957 , under which a market is 
defined as a product or a group of products on which a 
hypothetical firm, constituting the sole producer and seller, could 
impose a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price 
(SSNIP). In other terms, the market is the narrowest area on which 
the hypothetical monopolist could exercise his market power, 
without consumers substitute the product at stake with any 
interchangeable products. More specifically, the HMT consists of a 
three-prong analysis, namely the identification of the “candidate” 
target market within, the effect of demand-substitution on the 
profitability of the SSNIP, and the effect of supply-substitution on 
the profitability of the SSNIP itself.  
It can be noticed that the European demand-side substitutability is 
at all similar to the American reasonable interchangeability of 
products. Conversely, there is no mention of supply-side 
substitutability in the American literature regarding 
monopolization or case law and, as a result, American Courts do 
not focus on suppliers’ conduct in the narrowing of the product 
market, unlike the European Courts, which have notably applied 
the supply-side substitutability test in the Continental Can case, 
                                                
957 First Issue on April 2nd 1992, second issue on April 8th 1997. Available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf  
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widening the product market on the account of the ease of the 
defendant’s competitors to adapt their production and enter the 
latter’s market. 
The Hypothetical Monopolist Test entails both quantitative and 
qualitative inferences since, in order to evaluate the impact of 
demand substitution on the exercise of market power, Courts 
resort to both the SSNIP test, and to evidence based on product 
characteristics, consumer preferences and needs; likewise, in the 
assessment of supply-side substitution, Courts evaluate both 
quantitative elements, such as the costs of suppliers in switching 
production, the number of suppliers switching production, and 
the economic incentives in doing that, and qualitative evidence 
that a sufficiently large number of suppliers will readily respond 
to an increase in price of the dominant firm by “hopping in” the 
production of that good or service. 
It can be noticed that the European Commission employs the 
American SSNIP diversion criterion as the departing point for the 
product-market analysis, but intertwines it with qualitative 
elements that allow Courts to consider the inherent peculiarities of 
products, regardless of economic data. Put better, the economic 
argument recedes when the product under investigation shows 
features that clearly isolate it from other goods or services. The 
United Brands case puts more emphasis on the characteristics of 
the product rather than on the quantitative analysis of consumer 
preference: in fact, the Court isolated the banana market as a 
separate one from the other fruits by virtue of the inherent 
characteristics of the fruit. 
 
2.1.3 The relevant geographic market in the US system 
The second dimension of the relevant market is the geographic 
one. Parallel to the product market, three criterions have been 
developed to narrow down the area in which market power is 
exerted. With regard to the first criterion, as a general rule of 
thumb Courts tend to identify the relevant market as the area in 
which the firm and its competitors sell their product and in which 
their customers buy without a ready access to an outside source of 
supply; that typically includes the whole of the US territory in the 
relevant geographic area (Grinell), for two reasons: Courts are 
reluctant to provide any incentive to create localized competition, 
one the one hand, and to pave the way to separate local litigations 
on the same issue, on the other hand. This second argument is a 
so-called floodgate argument: if more litigations were to rise 
around the same issue, the “flood” of superfluous claims would 
bring about high and untenable social costs. It goes without 
saying, however, that the purpose of the Sherman Act is to 
prevent undue restraints of interstate commerce; thus, the 
geographic market is to encompass at least two states of the 
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Union.  
The second criterion elaborated by the scholarship is a “diversion” 
principle based on demand cross-elasticity: the relevant area is the 
one where market would be diverted if a relevant increase in price 
for the primary product or service took place. If cross elasticity is 
high, the relevant geographic market will encompass the areas in 
which the other suppliers operate958. 
At any rate, there is no consensus among scholars as regards how 
to gauge transportation costs in the delineation of the geographic 
market. Some authors argue in favor of including them as an entry 
barrier, since have the effect of sheltering local producers from 
suffering losses in sale in the event they would raise prices959. This 
way, transportation costs will define a geographic market by 
excluding the entry into the market itself of either external 
competitors or of external “fringe” products, and therefore by 
giving the firm a power over the market that can be evaluated 
accordingly.  
Other authors apply the diversion criterion without account of 
transportation costs, given the mere interest of local producers in 
setting prices for their product below the cost of external –or 
foreign- producers, in order to keep the latter out of the market960. 
The geographic frame of reference is therefore shaped by the 
tendency of local producers to make the entry of external 
producers unprofitable.  
The existence of entry barriers –such as transportation costs- is 
irrelevant compared to the appraisal of whether an external 
product has overcome these logistic barriers and entered the 
domestic market, in a way to expand the geographic area and to 
erode the market dominance of the local producer. This approach 
allows to associate local markets on the account of the constant 
presence on the market for several years of local and external 
producers, and to include outputs of foreign sellers in the relevant 
market for American antitrust purposes, in a way to scale down 
some domestic monopolies. 
The third criterion was drafted in the 1992 Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission Guidelines on horizontal 
mergers, and encompasses the region within which the firm 
selling the relevant product can profitably impose a small but 
significant and non-transitory increase in price, holding constant 
                                                
958 P. Areeda & D.F Turner, Antitrust Law, volume 2, p. 533, (1978), K.G. Elzinga 
&  T.F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits, 
18 Antitrust Bull., 45 (1973), W.M. Landes &  R.A. Posner, Market Power in 
Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 963, (1981). 
959 E.T. Sullivan, Antitrust and its economic implications, 5th ed., LexisNexis 
Publisher, Newark (NJ), p.28 (2008) 
960 W.M. Landes &  R.A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. 
Rev. 964, (1981) 
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the terms of sale for all products produced elsewhere961. 
 
2.1.4 The relevant geographic market in the EU system 
As regards the geographic market, the first case-law criterion has 
been established in Continental Can, and is referred to as 
“homogeneity test”, pursuant to which the relevant area of the 
interstate Common Market is the one where objective conditions 
of competition applying to the product in question must be the 
same. This test is at all similar to the general rule of thumb applied 
by US Courts. One of the caveats of this approach is that the 
analysis might be perturbed by factors such as national borders, 
cultural/linguistic barriers, regulatory barriers and national 
preferences.  
To overcome these limitations the Commission Notice on the 
relevant market has expanded the homogeneity parameter by 
focusing on the same constraints used to determine relevant 
product market, namely a) the demand-side substitutability, b) the 
supply-side substitutability and c) the function of future 
integration of the Common Market. The demand-side 
substitutability implies gathering evidence of whether products of 
companies located in different areas outside of the putative 
geographic market constitute a real alternative to the dominant 
firm’s product, with the result of enlarging the putative market to 
the areas where they operate. Supply-side substitutability can be 
used to verify whether suppliers outside of the putative area are 
able to enter the market in response to an increase in price for the 
product of the firm in question, including the weight of 
transportation costs in the definition of the relevant geographic 
area. Finally attention must be paid to the ongoing market 
integration process, and to whether it results in a widening of the 
relevant market from a geographic standpoint.  
It can be noticed that the European approach allows the inclusion 
of transportation costs in the definition of the geographic market. 
Transportation costs have the effect of isolating a market from the 
competition of substitutable products; their inclusion has in all 
likelihood the effect of segmenting the market, which by law is to 
encompass at least two countries (“interstate market), but will 
hardly include the whole of the European Union.  
Contrary to that, in Irish Sugar the General Court weighed 
transportation cost, but concluded that their impact did not isolate 
the Irish market for sugar from the British one962. One of the 
possible justifications underlying the inclusive approach is that 
the ongoing market integration process, which also binds different 
geographic markets for the scopes of competition law, 
                                                
961 http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.shtm 
962 Irish Sugar plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 07.10.1999, Case T-
228/97, [1999], ECR-2969, para. 73 
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counterbalances the segmenting force of transportation costs. 
Other constraints producing market fragmentation from the 
geographic perspective, which are absent in the American 
approach, are the cultural and linguistic difference between 
territories, the lack of information on the part of potential 
purchasers, administrative barriers/technical norms. These 
constraints are related to the inherent nature of the European 
Union as a confederation of States, whose degree market 
integration is obviously less penetrating than the US Union. 
The market integration stake is also absent in the American 
approach -given the sameness of the language and the absence of 
administrative barriers-. This EU policy objective also plays a 
centripetal force for the scopes of competition law, and stands a 
qualitative closing test that allows evaluating the individualities of 
the case aside from the economic data.  
In all, aside from the evaluation of transportation cost, whilst the 
analysis of demand cross-elasticity and the SSNIP test are at all 
similar to the demand-side substitutability analysis, together with 
the reverberation of the American reasonable interchangeability in 
the European evaluation of the characteristics of the product, the 
market integration objective appears to be the real element of 
discontinuity, which makes the European approach more 
interventionist and regulatory compared to the US approach, 
which seems to be anchored to efficiency goals. 
 
2.4 The relevant market: a synopsis 
Relevant 
Market 
US EU 
Product 
dimension 
- Reasonable 
interchangeability 
- Demand cross-elasticity 
- SNNIP 
- Demand-
side/supply side 
substitutability 
- Hypothetical 
Monopolist test 
Geographic 
dimension 
- Rule of thumb 
- Diversion / demand-side 
substitutability 
- SNNIP 
- Homogeneity 
test 
- Demand-
side/supply side 
substitutability + 
future 
integration of EU 
Market  
 
3. The role of market shares in the finding of monopoly or 
dominance  
In establishing “monopoly power” under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 
or “dominance” under Article 102, the U.S. and EU authorities 
share an approach that is in some degree similar, since both 
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ground evidence of monopoly power on the calculation of the 
dominant firm’s market shares, but also consider a variety of other 
factors. The difference is that the EU relevant threshold tends to be 
lower and that American Courts tend to include other factors in 
addition to market share, such as excellent technology and 
innovation963.  
Moreover, in the US system the relevance of market shares is 
inescapably tangled with the inquiry into market power and the 
commission of an abuse; more specifically, a certain threshold of 
share becomes relevant if the firm has used its market power to 
unlawfully attain such threshold. Under the EU approach the 
evaluation of market shares is the substantive departing point for 
the assessment of the abuse of dominant position: absent the 
ascertainment of the relevance of market shares, there is no abuse 
whatsoever. 
 
3.1 Market shares in the US system 
In the Alcoa case, according to Justice Hand’s formula, 90% of 
market share is considered enough to constitute a monopoly; it is 
doubtful whether 60% or 64% would be enough; and certainly 
33% per cent is not. Even though the no-fault test has been 
overruled in the later case law, relevance of this statement is still 
valid today.  
Pursuant to the Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. rule, market 
shares are not relevant per se, but are evaluated in accordance with 
the commission of an abuse. Therefore, while the a 60% to 90% 
share of a market is a potentially relevant threshold, the mere 
share does not suffice to assess monopoly under § 2, but is to be 
read in accordance with the action of monopolizing or the attempt 
to monopolize, i.e. it becomes relevant in the presence of an 
exclusionary scheme. More specifically, under § 2 the firm can be 
held liable for monopolizing or attempting to monopolize, even 
when it does not have a market share amounting to monopoly per 
se. Nonetheless, market power and market shares stand as a 
symptom of the dangerous probability that the firm will 
monopolize the market.  
In Spirit Airlines v. Northwest Airlines the Court has tackled the 
relationship between market shares and the existence of entry 
barriers. The modern interpretation of market shares is to consider 
them only as a way of estimating market power, which cannot 
stand alone without an appraisal of entry barriers964. As a general 
rule of thumb, when a firm controlled nearly 100% of an industry 
                                                
963 P. Jebsen & R. Stevens, Assumptions, Goals and Dominant Undertakings, the 
Regulation of Competition under Article 86 of the European Union, 64 Antitrust L.J. 
479 (1996) 
964 Ball Memorial Hosp. Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Inc., 784 F.2 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 
1986) 
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characterized by easy entry, Courts have declined to infer 
monopoly power, since either actual or potential entry of rivals is 
likely to keep prices on a competitive level. Elsewhere, 70% 
market share in conjunction with numerous barriers to entry the 
US market has been deemed sufficient to integrate 
monopolization of the industry pursuant to § 2965. 
The view on the role of market share has been re-discussed in the 
wake of United States v. Microsoft Corp966, in light of both network 
effects and economies of scale that monopolies in high 
technological markets are likely to bring about. When network 
effects and economies of scale characterize the market, high 
market shares are not inherently detrimental to competition, since 
consumers might get a more advantageous price for some 
products or services in accordance with the increase of the number 
of people using them, on the one hand, and with the increase of 
the demand for these, on the other hand. Therefore, the traditional 
idea that the unilateral practices of big businesses unavoidably 
erode consumer welfare, which has animated the antitrust action 
from the outset, has given way to the idea that in certain markets 
the size of the firm can actually be beneficial to consumers. 
 
3.2 Market shares in the EU system 
The European reading of market shares sensibly differs from the 
US interpretation. Under article 102 of the TFEU, the evaluation of 
dominance is, together with the definition of the relevant market, 
a basic prerequisite for the assessment of liability. Thus, a conduct 
that is not abusive if carried out by a non-dominant firm becomes 
abusive when a firm whose market shares amount to dominance 
performs it.  
The appraisal of market shares functions as a background test for 
the inquiry of the abuse: unlike the US system, article 102 does not 
sanction the acquisition of a high market share by means of an 
abusive course of conduct, but the size of the firm makes the 
course of conduct abusive. More specifically, a market share 
amounting to dominance is the essential precondition to declare 
the firm’s conduct abusive, because it is assumed that dominance 
affords the firm the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors. 
Pursuant to the Hoffmann-La Roche outcome, the calculation of 
market shares is the most significant component of the assessment 
of dominance. Nevertheless, holding a significant market share 
does not represent absolute evidence of dominance, but its 
relevance varies in accordance with the characteristics of the 
                                                
965 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 451 (4th 
Cir. 2011) 
966 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
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market, of the production, of demand and offer967.  
In the Akzo case, the Court purported that “market share of over 
70% is most likely to be considered to be in a dominant position.  
A share of between 40% and 50% raises a presumption of 
dominance”968. Consequently, when market shares are between 
40% and 70%, the calculation of the competitors’ market power 
becomes of capital importance.  
In fact, according to how the remaining shares are divided among 
competitors, the dominant firm’s share can have a different weigh. 
If the dominant firm has a 50% market share, and the market is 
characterized by the presence of 10 competitors each holding 5%, 
the position of the bigger firm can be equated to the dominant 
one969. Likewise, in its Tenth Report on Competition Policy970, the 
Commission appeared to accord importance to the reciprocal 
market shares, with the result that the larger the gap between one 
firm and its rivals, the more likely the finding of a position of 
dominance on part of the former. 
However, in spite of this programmatically nuanced statement, 
the Azko Court’s appears to have tackled the market share issue in 
absolute terms, since a 50% market share was deemed to be proof 
of dominant position per se, absent some other perturbing factors 
that allow to state the opposite. The Court considered a 50% share 
as “extremely high market share”, which constitute, “save in 
exceptional circumstances, proof of the existence of a dominant 
position”.  
At least in one case the EU competition authorities have suggested 
that market shares in the single digits might indicate dominance. 
Even if a 5 to 10% share is generally an irrelevant threshold, it left 
open the possibility that these shares might indicate dominance, in 
particular in highly technological markets, where products appear 
to the majority of consumers to be readily interchangeable; a high 
degree of product interchangeability, and the concomitance of 
“exceptional circumstances” might lead to find dominance even in 
single-digit shares971.  
                                                
967 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461 para. 4 
968 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359.  
969 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207 
970 Commission of the European Communities, Tenth Report on Competition 
Policy, para. 150, n. 4 (1981), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/ar_1980_en.pdf
, in which it affirmed “a dominant position cannot even be ruled out in respect 
of market shares between 20% and 40%”. 
971 In Metro SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 22.10.1986, Case 75/84, [1986] E.C.R. 03021, para. 86, the ECJ 
stated that where the undertaking had a market share of between 5 and 10 
percent in the sale of electronic equipment for leisure purposes, and of 6-7 
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That offers an argument to affirm that the EU model is 
characterized by a stronger presumption of dominance, since a 
firm by controlling the half of the market is regarded as dominant. 
Parallel to that, even if the European Union does not appear to be 
imminently inclined to find single-digit market share 
undertakings to be monopolists, the approach above described 
certainly indicates a particular mindset, “one that is almost as 
interested in the existence of a large producer as it is of the abuse 
of a dominant position”972. 
 
3.3 Market shares and other structural constraints – the impact of 
entry barriers 
Parallel to the US experience, European Courts and Authorities 
have also analyzed the impact on role of market shares of 
structural factors; among these, particular significance have entry 
barriers. Two types of barriers have been identified, the legal and 
administrative ones inherent in the political configuration of the 
European Union, on the one hand, and the ones implied in the 
market structure, such as the control of an essential facility by the 
alleged dominant firm, or the inelasticity of demand for the 
product at stake.  
The treatment of the control of an essential facility as an entry 
barrier represents a peculiarity of the European approach, but also 
has the practical effect of lowering the relevant threshold of 
relevant shares to infer dominance; consequently, it will be more 
likely to find a firm controlling an essential facility to have 
contravened article 102, because the relevant threshold of shares 
decreases alongside with the position of the firm on the market. In 
the US, essential facilities are treated in a conservative manner, 
and the finding of monopoly refusal to deal stemming from the 
control of an essential facility represent a narrow exception to the 
freedom of not doing business with rivals. In contrast, the 
European Court of Justice has been considerably more receptive to 
the essential facilities doctrine and has not attempted to limit its 
application to a narrow set of circumstances973. 
                                                                                                                                                            
percent in televisions, it did not have a dominant position. Nevertheless, “the 
share of the market occupied by an undertaking does not necessarily constitute 
the sole criterion for the existence of a dominant position”. “It is however 
proper to conclude that …shares of the market as insignificant as that held by 
SABA preclude the existence of a dominant position save in exceptional 
circumstances [emphasis added]”. 
972 P. Jebsen & R. Stevens, Assumptions, Goals and Dominant Undertakings, the 
Regulation of Competition under Article 86 of the European Union, 64 Antitrust L.J. 
483 (1996) 
973 D.  Geradin, Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the EC Treaty: What can the EU 
Learn from the US Supreme Court's Judgment in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, 
IMS, and Deutsche Telekom, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=617263  
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3.4 Market shares and the relevance of behavioral constraints in 
the EU system 
More recently, market shares have been analyzed in light of other 
behavioral factors. In particular, the Commission has purported 
that high market shares are not unlawful for it, but become 
unlawful when avails itself of its share to control the prices or to 
limit the access to the market. Other factors contributing to 
confirm the subsistence of dominance are: the preference for the 
product of the firm, the influence that the firm has on retailers, the 
higher price of the firm’s product compared to its rivals, its 
technical advantage over competitors, and the strict identification 
of the product category with the product the firm manufactures974. 
Structural and behavioral constraints disclose the interplay 
between the firm’s behavior and the market structure, together 
with the assumption that a course of conduct independent of the 
other firms’ behavior is only conceivable if the firm has a sufficient 
degree of dominance on the market. That has not affected the 
dependence of the concept of dominance on the market shares of 
the allegedly dominant firm, by virtue of two arguments: first, 
there is no case where the Court has found the second biggest firm 
on the market liable for abusing its position. Second, the European 
Competition authorities are more prone to identify a safe haven 
for the sake of a swifter functioning of antitrust procedures; in the 
words of the Commission “the higher the market share, and the 
longer the period of time over which it is held, the more likely it is 
to be a preliminary indication of dominance. If a company has a 
market share of less than 40%, it is unlikely to be dominant”975. 
 
3.5 Market shares and the relevance of network effects and 
economies of scale in the US system 
Unlike in the US system, the European Competition Authorities 
have not tackled the issue of the impact of network effects and 
economies of scale relevance on market shares. One possible 
explanation for this disregard can be found in the different 
approach of Courts in the two systems. The European approach 
aims more at a more objective intervention as opposed to the US 
approach, which is more conservative and reluctant to penalize a 
firm simply because of its monopoly status. In that respect, the US 
Courts allow wider scope for efficiency defenses to be asserted, 
and tend more towards an effect-based assessment of the 
dominant firm’s conduct. Europe, in comparison, prefers to affirm 
                                                
974  BBI/Boosey & Hawkes: Interim measures, IV/32.279 – paragraph 10. 
Commission decision 29.07.1987, published on OJ L286, 1987, para. 36 
975 Commission of the European Communities, Antitrust Procedures in Abuse of 
Dominance (Article 102 TFEU cases), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/procedures_102_en.html  
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standards regardless of whether they lead to superior economic 
results, since the fundamental understanding of article 102 is not 
only about protecting market efficiency, but also protecting the 
rights of competitors at the same time. 
The error-cost analysis plays a pivotal role in the conservative 
attitude of American Courts, whose logic is more bound by the 
threat of issuing a mistaken decision, on the account of the 
magnifying force of legal errors in Common law. Conversely, the 
decreased force of the precedent for European judges makes these 
less inclined to evaluate the magnitude of the harm generated by 
an error. 
 
4. The treatment of anticompetitive conduct 
Parallel to the divergences in the finding an undertaking has 
monopoly power or a dominant position. The U.S. and EU 
approaches sensibly differ also in the way they identify the 
exclusionary standards that must be met before they will impose 
sanctions.  
The United States is much more reluctant to restrict what some 
perceive as monopoly power abuses 976 ; the European Union, 
devoted to its dirigiste tradition, states that the dominant 
undertaking is under a “special responsibility” towards their 
competitors and must act accordingly. American courts have 
never translated § 2 in static precedents, but have resorted to price 
theories to assess whether a certain restraint was reasonable, 
scrutinizing the economic consequences of the firm’s conduct977. In 
other terms, the act of monopolization has been interpreted not as 
a list of forbidden practices, but with a view to the economic 
conditions surrounding an arrangement.  
Conversely, the drafting of article 102 already lends itself to 
interpret the abuse of dominant position as a list of proscribed 
practices, given the identification of specific unlawful conducts. 
Furthermore, the fact the list is not exhaustive allows proscribing 
all the conducts of the dominant firm that have no competitive 
effects. That, unlike the US system, shows some regulatory 
tendencies as regard the treatment of the anticompetitive conduct. 
                                                
976 It has been outlined throughout this essay that § 2 of the Sherman Act has 
been traditionally enforced in a conservative way, partly because of the risk of 
awarding false positives, partly because of the deeper influence of economic 
analysis on Courts than in the EU, partly because of different underlying 
rationales (see infra the American consumer welfare perspective versus the 
European ordoliberal assumptions as a possible policy explanation of the 
substantial divergence between the two models). With such different 
philosophies, a business that might continue to flourish under the U.S. 
approach may be the object of investigation by EU competition authorities. 
977 A.J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
77, 90 (2003). Compare Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 
79 S. Ct. 705, 3 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1959). 
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4.1 The Sherman Act and the early conservative approach: the 
rule of reason 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits both monopolization and 
attempted monopolization, namely acts aiming at changing the 
competitive structure of the market. The above analysis has shown 
that no attempt is made to police the conduct of the firm vis-à-vis 
the consumers, namely proscribing those conducts that are 
exploitative of the latter. Contrariwise, exploitative abuses are 
encompassed in the scopes of article 102. 
Section § of the Sherman Act does not prohibit the existence of 
monopolies per se, but rather prohibits certain conducts that create 
or threaten to create a monopoly. The judicial enforcement of this 
provision has traditionally fluctuated between a consideration for 
the structural elements or for the conduct elements of the offense. 
At the outset of American antitrust law, courts took a conservative 
approach to § 2, applying the provision to conducts that 
microscopically seemed to violate it. The most important 
enforcement of § 2 of the early years is the Standard Oil decision, 
which, despite its vagueness, manages to deliver some basic 
lessons. 
First of all, the Supreme Court adopted the “rule of reason” 
standard, under which a dominant firm can be found guilty of 
violating § 2 if it engages in conduct that would violate § 1 if 
deployed by a combination of firms. Furthermore, the standard 
requires a finding of specific intent to monopolize, which can be 
reasonably inferred by an unjustifiable conduct on the basis of 
legitimate competitive goals, but can only be debunked as an 
effort to destroy competition978. The early enforcement of § 2 is an 
objective inquiry based on facts, and structured in a way to forbid 
only the unreasonable restraints of trade.  
Second, the mere attainment of monopoly is not unlawful for it, 
but the prohibition of the action of monopolizing, i.e. destroying 
competition, was identified as the rationale of § 2. Therefore, the 
statute was not interpreted as a direct prohibition against 
monopoly in the concrete979, but as a ban of the monopolistic size 
of the firm that was achieved or maintained through malevolent 
intent and exclusionary practices, in a way that size achieved by 
efficiency would not be relevant for antitrust purposes. This 
understanding of § 2 is still valid in American Law today. 
The conservative approach imposed Courts to determine whether 
the conduct of the monopolist had some pro-competitive 
justifications for the defendant. Absent any justification, the 
                                                
978 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62, 31 S. Ct. 502, 
516, 61-62-65 L. Ed. 619 (1911) 
979 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62, 31 S. Ct. 502, 
516, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911) 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
301 
 
defendant would be found guilty of violating § 2 Sherman Act 
was thus interpreted as an externality regulation, which can be 
used to abridge freedom of business only when the latter 
produces monopoly and harms consumers and society980.  
 
4.2 The “structuralist” approach and the per se illegality 
The conservative approach was overcome in 1945, when Justice 
Hand delivered his renowned judgment in the Alcoa case981, giving 
way to the structuralist approach in the interpretation of § 2, 
which is characterized by the shift from an inquiry of the firm’s 
intent to an inquiry of firm’s business expansion. Whereas in 
Standard Oil monopoly was proscribed inasmuch as it was the 
result of a specific intent to restraint, in Alcoa the Court concluded 
for a per se illegality of the act of monopolization. 
The Court found violation of § 2, simply because Alcoa had 
obtained and had managed to maintain a vast market share. Alcoa 
was found liable just for engaging in vigorous competition, merely 
by meeting the growing demand for aluminum with its superior 
market capacity982. The outcome stopped just short of establishing 
a per se proscription of monopoly, because it did not condemn 
monopoly “thrust upon it”. The distinction between lawful and 
unlawful monopoly appears to be grounded on the difference 
between “unlawful achievement and lawful passivity” 983 . 
However, argument appears to be more semantic than substantial, 
because in practice it was held that a 90% market share achieved 
without predation or merger is monopoly within the meaning of § 
2 and that the firm had inexorably monopolized the market. The 
achieved monopoly is always unlawful, but it is very unlikely that 
a firm possesses monopoly without having monopolized. 
In light of this plaintiff-friendly judicial attitude, regardless of 
whether or not a firm with a dominant position has foreclosed 
competition by virtue of an illicit conduct, it could be held liable of 
monopolization when it drives competitors off the market by 
simply defending its superior market position.  
The structuralist attitude towards §2 interpretation was criticized 
as lacking a more vigorous inquiry of the competitive legitimacy 
and the efficiency of the methods deployed to acquire or maintain 
monopoly.  Courts began to question the rule of reason, arguing 
that the judgment as to the reasonableness of a conduct 
                                                
980 Compare A.J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 
2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 77, 88 (2003) 
981 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424-426 (2d Cir. 1945) 
982 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424-426 (2d Cir. 1945); 
U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See also 
Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952). 
983 R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books, Inc. 
Publishers, New York, p. 166 (1993) 
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necessitated a judgment as to the reasonableness of the price levels 
that the firm had established. However, Courts would not be 
allowed to set a standard of reasonable price, because there would 
be too many parameters to factor in such assessment. 
Following this line of argument, the per se approach was 
elaborated in response to the inefficiency of the rule of reason984. 
The inquiry of anticompetitive conduct proved vague and 
arbitrary, because of the lack of unanimity as to whether it was 
solely grounded on economic ends, or whether political and social 
considerations were at stake985.  
In addition to that, there was no consensus as to the values 
underlying the application of this standard, in particular whether 
the sole consideration ought to be consumer welfare, or whether 
the law should acknowledge competition considerations. The 
simultaneous use of conflicting values rendered the 
reasonableness approach insufficient for the purposes of the 
Sherman Act986.   
United States v. Griffith indicated that antitrust laws may be 
contravened without a specific intent to restrain trade or to build 
monopoly, if the restraint of trade or monopoly results as 
consequence of defendant’s conduct, and specific intent in 
common-law sense is necessary only where the conduct fall short 
of results condemned by the antitrust laws 987 . A landmark 
application of the per se rule is United States v. Grinnell Corp., in 
which the Supreme Court stated the prevailing formula that 
monopoly entails two elements, market power in conjunction with 
willful acquisition or maintenance of it, irrespective of the finding 
of the reasonable intent to monopolize988.  
 
4.3 The “Chicago” conceptualization of the offense of 
monopolization 
Judicial enforcement of § 2 in the 1970s and 1980s reflected the 
endeavor of the Chicago School of law and economics to re-
conceptualize American Antitrust law, in a way to focus on 
consumer welfare as the only and ultimate goal of the law. That 
resulted in a deeper employment of price theory in the evaluation 
of the firm’s unilateral conduct, which had as a consequence a 
                                                
984 T.A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to 
Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 685, 691 (1991) 
985 R.H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division II, 75 Yale L.J. 373, 376 (1965) 
986 R.H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division II, 75 Yale L.J. 373, 376 (1965) 
987 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 68 S. Ct. 941, 92 L. Ed. 1236 (1948) 
disapproved of by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 
752, 104 S. Ct. 2731, 81 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1984).  
988 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 1704, 16 L. 
Ed. 2d 778 (1966) 
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more permissive approach, based on the assumption that firms 
with monopoly power would have little incentive to engage in 
welfare reducing practices. The renowned Areeda-Turner formula 
for which the relevant conduct is to consist of a “behavior that not 
only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) 
either does not further competition on the merits or does so in an 
unnecessarily restrictive way”989 started to gain acceptance among 
Courts, which refused to censor lawful conducts of the dominant 
firm that were available to its smaller rival, merely on the grounds 
of the firm’s dominance. In particular, following the Berkey case 
reasoning990, the existence of a slight business justification for the 
dominant firm’s conduct would exclude application of § 2.  
Under the influence of the Chicago School, the protection of 
competition occurs in a quantitative way: Courts would ensure 
the appropriate amount of competition that protects society from 
practices resulting in monopoly. Under this assumption, 
restraining practices were classified as either pro-competitive or 
anti-competitive, and the defendant was granted grounds to prove 
that his restraint might have “potentially redeeming value” or 
“pro-competitive justification” 991 . On their part, Courts were 
barred from conducting their own consumer-welfare test on the 
dominant firm’s conduct, but could only assert liability for 
monopolizing when the dominant firm’s conduct had manifestly 
produced exclusionary effects from an efficiency standpoint. 
 
4.4 The post-Chicago thinking of monopolization 
In last two decades, “Post-Chicago” thinking, despite subscribing 
the view that efficiency is the ultimate goal of American Antitrust 
law, challenged the under-inclusive approach of the Chicago 
School, and identified pricing strategies through which dominant 
firms would harm competition992, principally by resorting to the 
tools of game theoretic analysis993, decision theory994 and a greater 
                                                
989 P. Areeda & D.F Turner, Antitrust Law: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles and 
their Application, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, vol. 3 § 651 p. 78 (1978).  
990 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979) 
991 Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 73 L. Ed. 
2d 48 (1982) 
992 T.G. Krattenmaker & S.G. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ 
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209, 236 (1986). See infra 
993 For an extensive survey game theoretic analysis of monopolization P. Rey & 
J. Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in M. Armstrong & R. H. Porter eds., 3 
Handbook of Industrial Organization, 2007. Within the confines of the present 
analysis, the game theoretic interpretation of predation in Chapter I, para. 9.2 
will provide an overview of this method, which entails the strategic and 
relational analysis of the monopolist’s behavior. 
994 M.S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule of Reason, and 
the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 Antitrust L.J. 435. In 
particular, decision theory accounts for the fact that courts will err in 
implementing any standard. It seeks to maximize the net benefits of antitrust 
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factual inquiry that may better account for market 
imperfections995.  
 
4.5 The early enforcement of the European law of abusive 
dominance 
The Treaty of Rome entered into force in 1958; nonetheless, article 
82 (the original version of article 102) was not applied for over a 
decade. The first case that reached the European Court of Justice 
was Continental Can, in which the law of abusive dominance was 
understood in a functional manner: the general scope of EC 
competition law was to establish a system of undistorted 
competition in the common market as under article 3(1)(G) EC 
Treaty was found to be material for the application of article 102996. 
The non-exhaustive list of abuses of article 102 covered both 
exploitative and exclusionary abuses, for the provision aimed at 
practices which may cause damage to consumers directly 
(exploitative abuses), but also at those which are detrimental to 
them through their impact on effective competition structure, such 
as is mentioned in article 3(1)(G) of the Treaty (exclusionary 
abuses)997.  
The Treaty establishes a common market with real competition. In 
light of the systemic interpretation of the Treaty, the goals of 
article 102 are the protection of both the competitive structure of 
the market for the benefit of consumers, and of residual 
competition on a market characterized by the presence of a 
dominant firm for the benefit of competitors. In other terms, the 
core idea of the law of abusive dominance is to proscribe all those 
conducts that would lead to a strengthening of dominance of a 
firm, since they would be detrimental to both consumers and 
competitors.  
 
4.6 the Hoffmann-La Roche and Michelin seminal outcomes – 
from “competition on the merits” to the “special responsibility” 
of the firm  
In Hoffmann-La Roche the ECJ embraced an objective notion of 
abuse –not requiring anticompetitive intent-, as a conduct 
                                                                                                                                                            
enforcement by minimizing the sum of expected costs from false positives 
(condemning pro-competitive conduct) and false negatives (failing to condemn 
anticompetitive conduct), focusing on the probability of such errors and the 
magnitude of resulting harms. 
995 Symposium: Post-Chicago Economics, Editor’s Note, 63 Antitrust L.J. 445, 448 
(1995) 
996 The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that article 3(1)(G) EC Treaty was 
a mere programmatic provision, devoid of legal effect. Europemballage 
Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission of the European Communities, 
21.02.1973, Case 6/72, [1973], ECR 215, para. 23 
997 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 21.02.1973, Case 6/72, [1973], ECR 215, para. 26 
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resulting in the creation, extension or maintenance of dominance, 
and entailing “recourse to methods different from those which 
condition normal competition” that have the effect of hindering 
the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the 
market or the growth of that competition998. Furthermore, it drew 
a distinction between lawful “competition on the merits” and 
unlawful anticompetitive-exclusionary conduct, distinction that 
has been maintained ever since. The outcome shaped the contours 
of the abuse, but failed to provide a solid test to identify the 
anticompetitive conduct, and uncontrovertibly discriminate it 
from legitimate competition999.   
Another seminal case for the definition of the anticompetitive 
conduct is Michelin I, in which the Court has affirmed the 
existence of a “special responsibility” of the dominant firm “not to 
allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on 
the Common Market”1000; even though dominance is not unlawful 
per se, some otherwise lawful conducts are deemed unlawful 
when put in place by a dominant undertaking.  
The European Courts have interpreted the concept of special 
responsibility of the dominant firm as not only banning 
exploitative abuses, i.e. when the firms levers on its economic 
power directly to the detriment of consumers, but also 
exclusionary abuses, i.e. when the firm harms the competitive 
structure, by lessening the ability of its competitors to compete. 
That is ultimately material with the reach of Continental Can, 
where the ECJ has maintained that article 102 is directed to both 
conducts that harm consumers, and that impair the regime of 
effective competition1001.  
 
4.7 Main differences between monopolization and abuse of 
dominant position 
The more recent jurisprudence on article 102 allows emphasizing 
the main differences with the features of § 2.  
First, the ban of abusive position has today come to stand for the 
broader claim that EC competition law of unilateral conducts 
protects the competitive structure as such, not requiring direct 
evidence of harm caused to consumers 1002. The protection of 
consumers reposes in re ipsa on the protection of competition, 
from which consumer welfare itself is deemed to stem. More 
                                                
998 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461, para. 6.  
999 R. O’Donogue & A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford 
and Portland, 2006, p. 176 
1000 Michelin v Commission Case C-322/81, 09.11.1983, [1983] ECR 3461, para. 57 
1001 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 21.02.1973, Case 6/72, [1973], ECR 215, para. 27, para. 26 
1002 British Airways plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 15.03.2007, 
Case C 95-04 P, [2007] ECR I-2331, para. 107 
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specifically, competition is held to bring about more efficiency and 
technological innovation than monopoly; thus, the protection of 
the competitive process will have favorable repercussions on 
consumers for it.  
Second, the main device to protect the competitive structure is to 
guarantee market access for competitors. The actus reus embedded 
in article 102 is the foreclosure of competition not supported by 
any business justification. Foreclosure of competition is not 
abusive per se, but Courts are to balance the exclusionary effects 
and the advantages in terms of efficiency of the conduct1003. The 
abuse is interpreted as an act of foreclosure that bears no relation 
to the advantage for the market and consumers. 
Third, European law of abusive dominance is not merely a matter 
of protecting outcome efficiency, but also a matter of protection of 
individual rights of competitors. In both American and European 
antitrust law, the main challenge is to distinguish those acts that 
have exclusionary effects from those with legitimate business 
justifications.  
Unlike the US model, EU competition law assumes that individual 
rights of competitors can be excluded also by means of lawful acts 
–if perpetrated by a dominant firm, regardless of whether or not 
such exclusion results in a decrease of efficiency or competition on 
the market place.   
Conversely, in the US the only goal of antitrust is the protection of 
consumer welfare, whose decrease requires a showing of 
verifiable effects on the marketplace; thus, the protection of 
individual liberties places itself outside of the reach of § 2, or, put 
better, is directly dependent on the proof of a welfare loss. The 
American approach is more consistent with one of the basic tenets 
of economics, for which a conduct is proscribed when it is 
inefficient, whereas the European approach shows some 
regulatory tendencies as regards the identification of the lawful 
conducts.  
 
5. The role of the intent in the two systems 
Consideration of the intent of the monopolist plays a 
distinguished role in the two systems. In the US system only 
general intent (which is presumed and operates as a legal fiction) 
is required for actual monopolization under § 21004. Specific intent 
is required for attempts to monopolize, namely when conduct falls 
short of results condemned by the antitrust laws. However, 
specific intent is ordinarily inferred from anticompetitive 
                                                
1003 British Airways plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 15.03.2007, 
Case C 95-04 P, [2007] ECR I-2331, para. 67 
1004 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 68 S. Ct. 941, 92 L. Ed. 1236 (1948) 
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conduct1005.  
Although intent is not expressly a general substantive element of 
an Article 102 violation, it has been mentioned as an element in 
predatory pricing claims where the challenged prices are above 
average variable cost but below average total cost. Intent serves as 
the tool to discern the exclusionary character of the conduct. 
In neither system, intent is a substantive element of the offense; as 
it has been described above, § 2 sanctions the attainment of 
maintenance of monopoly by means of a “bad” conduct, not by 
means of a specific intent to monopolize. It has been seen that 
some difficulties arise when it comes to inquiring what makes the 
behavioral element undesirable under § 2, irrespective of any 
inquiry on the psychological element. Notwithstanding that, 
someone might argue that Grinnell defines monopolization as the 
“willful” acquisition or maintenance of monopoly 1006 , which 
would suggest an evaluation of the defendant’s intent. Courts 
generally infer this element from the conduct itself, whereby the 
intent to monopolize follows the determination that the conduct 
was unlawful1007. 
Under the EU model, the disregard for the subjective element is 
even clearer, because article 102 requires the finding of an 
“abuse”, singling out the unlawful conducts. Hence, both systems 
focus on the objective element, making the subjective intention to 
monopolize existing in the mind of the actor immaterial. 
The relevance of the subjective intent is at odds with the objective 
enforcement of both § 2 and article 102, on the grounds of a 
further meta-legal argument: because dominance or monopoly 
alone does not constitute a violation, it is arguable whether an 
actor can be said to intend to monopolize (or abuse) if the scope of 
his intent exists only after an ex post judicial evaluation of the 
unlawfulness of the conduct1008. In other words, the defendant can 
be said to intend to monopolize only after the judge has found 
that his conduct was unlawful, and from this finding the tortious 
nature of the intention has derived.  That is why the ascertainment 
of the intent dissolves in the finding that the conduct is unlawful. 
 
6. The treatment of discriminatory pricing and the different 
understanding of the meaning of “competition” within the 
scope of the Robinson-Patman Act 
                                                
1005 M&M Med. Supplies and Serv. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp.. 981 F.2d 160, 166 
(4th Cir. 1992), “Specific intent may be inferred from the defendant’s 
anticompetitive practices”. 
1006 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 1704, 16 L. 
Ed. 2d 778 (1966) 
1007 B.E. Hawk, Article 82 and Section 2, in ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2 Issues 
in Competition Law and Policy, 875 (2008) 
1008 R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
2001, p. 214 
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It has been seen that under article 102(c), discriminatory abuses 
consist of “applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage”.  
The homologous American anti-discriminatory provision is § 2(a) 
of the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits a seller of 
commodities from selling comparable goods to different buyers at 
different prices, except in certain circumstances.  
The Act was Congress’s attempt to re-balance the difference in 
bargaining power between the small or medium-size firms and 
the big distributors, on the grounds that the latter were generally 
able to obtain their supplies at lower prices than were their 
smaller rivals1009.  
Section 2(a) contains six substantive provisions: prohibits a seller 
from discriminating in price between two or more competing 
buyers in the sale of commodities of like grade and quality, where 
the effect of the discrimination “may be substantially” to “lessen 
competition...in any line of commerce”; or “tend to create a 
monopoly in any line of commerce”; or “injure, destroy or prevent 
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly 
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with the customers 
of either of them”.  
The main difference between the two provisions is that article 102 
requires dominance as a prerequisite for the finding of the abuse, 
together with a competitive disadvantage and absence of objective 
proportional justification 1010. The American treatment of price 
discrimination, instead, might be conducive to monopoly, but 
under no circumstances does a monopoly market share represent 
a prior requirement for the application of the provision. Moreover, 
even though the Act directs most of its provisions against the 
discriminating sellers, its premise is that buying power is being 
misused at the purchaser level, because big chain stores are 
traditionally capable of obtaining more favorable purchasing 
prices, which would allow them to price discriminate in a 
geographic area.  
Thus, discriminatory price cuts aimed at retaining or obtaining 
particular customers, or at driving small competitors off the 
market, fall out of the reach of § 2 of the Sherman Act, which is 
only concerned to predatory price reductions, directed to the 
exclusion of a market player from the market, and resultant into a 
subsequent raise in price to recoup the losses.  
                                                
1009 H.C. Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law: A Review and Analysis, 51 Fordham L. 
Rev.1113, 1122 (1983) 
1010 Compare Robinson-Patman Act 1936. The Robinson-Patman Act is a 1936 
statute (15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a–f) that amended Section 2 of the Clayton Act (Oct. 15, 
1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730). With regard to case law, compare Texaco, Inc. v. 
Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (110 S.Ct. 2535, 2551 n. 11. 110) (1990).  
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The issue of the relevance of the element of recoupment in claims 
of discrimination, however, remains open: whereas in Utah Pie the 
Court found it sufficient to prove discrimination the mere “below 
cost” reduction1011, in Brooke Group case, the Court rethought of the 
issue of primary line abuses in light of its proximity with the 
predation standards, advocating for the ascertainment of the 
dangerous probability of recoupment, following a price reduction 
below an appropriate measure of the rival’s cost1012. 
In other terms, even though both price discrimination and 
predation share the same core substance entailing a price cut 
directed to foreclosing competition, and the Robinson-Patman Act 
takes the simple view that a price reduction equals price 
discrimination, regardless of the economic definition of 
discrimination, entailing that two or more similar goods are being 
sold at prices that bear different ratios to their marginal costs, or 
that buyers are separated into two or more classes whose elasticity 
of demand is different1013. 
Aside from the ascertainment of dominance, what is the element 
of discontinuity between §2 of the Sherman Act and §2(a) of the 
Robinson-Patman Act? Apparently, a different understanding of 
“injury to competition” than its meaning for the scopes of the 
Sherman Act. The construction of the statutory language, the 
reference to injuring, destroying or preventing competition with 
“any person who grants . . . such discrimination” would equate 
harm to rivals of the discriminating seller with harm to 
competition, thereby making the discrimination unlawful. Unlike 
that, the injure to competition arising out of violation of § 2 of the 
Sherman Act implies a harm to the competitive structure of the 
market, aside from the exclusion of less efficient competitors1014. 
Thus drafted, the element of the discrimination is extraneous to 
the treatment of predation, even though there are no grounds to 
affirm that discriminatory cuts are more harmful to small 
competitors than a general price reduction to the detriment of the 
competitive structure. Discriminatory price reductions are prima 
facie excluded from the reach of § 2 of the Sherman Act merely on 
the grounds of the different meaning of “competition”.  
                                                
1011 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 703 (1967). Also Compare 
William Inglis & Sons Baking, Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 942 F.2d 1401 (9th 
Cir. 1991). 
1012 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) 
1013 G.J. Stigler, The Theory of Price, Macmillan 4th Edition, 210, (1987) 
1014 Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 
734 (1945) The Court found it illegal tended to divert trade to the respondent 
from its competitors, arguing that “…the lower price must prevent, or tend to 
prevent, competitors from taking business away from the merchant which they 
might have got, had the merchant not lowered his price below what he was 
charging elsewhere”. 
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6.1 The Robinson-Patman Act and the distinction between 
primary line and secondary line abuses 
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act was adopted as a 
response to the complaints of “mom and pop” stores that they 
were being unfairly exposed to the competition of large grocery 
and chain stores, which were able to obtain their supplies at lower 
prices compared their smaller rivals.  
The substantive foundation underlying the ban of price 
discrimination at a seller’s level is the same as the prohibition of 
predation under the Sherman Act1015. What § 2(a) adds to this 
scheme is the requirement of charging two different prices and the 
diversion of trade to the respondent from its competitors, which 
probably makes price discrimination easier to verify, based the 
traditional fallacy of the recoupment test in predation claims.  
However, scholars have argued that the Robinson-Patman Act is 
an unwelcome addition to existing law of predation: since the 
monopolist already charges the profit-maximizing price in other 
markets already, he would not be able to raise prices in the other 
markets to recoup the losses incurred in the low-price market1016. 
Thus, § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act does not confer any 
further features to the act of price discriminating than predation 
under § 2 of the Sherman Act does.  
Aside from its normative substance, the Robinson-Patman Act 
applies regardless of whether or not the seller possesses monopoly 
power. If the seller is competing with active rivals, it is very 
difficult to assess whether a price cut is a means of injuring 
competition rather than of creating it. Where there are rivals, no 
seller is able to persistently discriminate, because his rivals will 
have an incentive in offering a lower price to the discriminated 
customers in order to take them away from the discriminating 
seller. However, the way § 2(a) is construed implies that the loss 
of sales by a rival constitute a threat to competition in a 
geographic area in itself, without the possibility of distinguishing 
between vigorous competition and predation at the seller’s 
level1017.  
In the event the discriminating seller possesses monopoly power, 
no rivals would be capable of underselling him to the disfavored 
customers. However, it is highly unlikely that the discriminating 
                                                
1015 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 277, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) 
1016 R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books, Inc. 
Publishers, New York, p. 386 (1993) 
1017 In Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) the defendants 
were condemned solely for having contributed to a decrease in the market price 
for frozen pies in the Salt Lake City area by means of a non-systematic price 
discrimination. No evidence was found of an anticompetitive or anti-consumer 
behavior. 
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monopolist has the intent of destroying any customer or class of 
customers, for he would ultimately lose returns, since in order to 
transfer the lost business from the disfavored customers to other 
customers he would face higher costs of reaching them to his own 
detriment.  
The Act also applies to secondary line abuses, when the 
competitors of the seller’s customers suffer the discrimination, 
entailing a selective discount to the benefit of some categories of 
customers. The same doubts can be raised with respect to this type 
of abuse: where sellers compete against each other, large 
customers cannot extract any discounts that are not cost-justified, 
because if sellers would were cut prices only for some categories 
of purchasers, they would have to face higher costs of transferring 
the lost return from the disfavored customers to other 
customers1018. 
As antitrust observers have remarked, competition involves 
business firms attempting to take sales away from their 
competitors, by undercutting them or surpassing them on the 
quality or attractiveness of their products. Whenever a firm 
succeeds in diverting business from one of its rivals, it has 
“harmed” that rival, but in a way that is beneficial to the 
competitive process itself. However, Courts found exactly that 
kind of activity unlawful under the Robinson-Patman Act1019.  
For these reasons, of price discrimination with a mere price 
difference is not exempt from criticism, on the grounds that some 
conducts falling within the reach of § 2(a) can be neither 
anticompetitive nor anti-consumer, but simply economically 
detrimental to one or more purchasers. 
The drafters of the law have sought to compensate this normative 
flaw by providing a “cost-justification” defense, pursuant to 
which a seller is entitled to prove that price differences are not 
price discrimination because they are justified by differences in 
cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery. Likewise the defendant can 
rebut a prima facie claim of discrimination by means of a “meeting-
competition” defense, namely by showing that his lower price to a 
purchaser “was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of 
a competitor”1020. 
 
6.2 The reach of article 102(c) of the TFEU with respect to 
discrimination  
It has been seen that the Sherman Act falls short of protecting 
purchasers from price discrimination, namely the practice of 
                                                
1018 Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 
734 (1945) 
1019 R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books, Inc. 
Publishers, New York, p. 389 (1993) 
1020 Robinson-Patman Act, Section 2(b) 
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selling the same commodity at different prices. The Robinson-
Patman Act re-approximates the two systems, but implies that the 
American law of discriminatory is positioned outside of the 
monopolization laws. Conversely, Article 102(c) addresses the 
issue of applying different conditions to equivalent transactions as 
a typical abuse of the dominant firm. 
Contrary to §2(a), Article 102(c) only applies to dominant sellers. 
Even if it covers both primary line abuses against the dominant 
firm’s rivals and secondary line abuses against the downstream 
customer market, the proscribed conduct solely regard the 
behavior of the dominant seller. In that respect the American 
statute is more far-reaching than its European homologous. 
Secondary line abuses, in which customer discrimination is 
viewed as an artificial application of different prices in different 
geographic areas not based on precompetitive justification but 
merely aimed at compartimentalizing the market along national 
borders, is a major concern for EU competition also on the 
grounds of the market integration policy mandated the law 
itself1021. 
With regard to the defenses against a prima facie claim of violation 
of article 102(c), they do not ostensibly diverge from their 
American equivalents: first, the defendant can deduct the pro-
competitive effects of quantity non-discriminatory discounts to 
the benefit of all the customers whose purchases exceed a certain 
threshold level, if the discounts reflect cost-savings or economic 
efficiencies 1022 ; second, price reductions offered to meet the 
competitors price are generally lawful under article 102 (meeting 
competition defense)1023; third, price reductions may be given in 
return for services provided by the buyer1024. 
Whilst both Article 102(c) and the §2(a) are designed to protect 
buyers from competitively disadvantageous prices, it appears that 
the two provisions focus on an opposite perspective: Article 102(c) 
is concerned with the pricing behavior of powerful sellers, 
whereas § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act is concerned with both 
the pricing behavior of powerful sellers and the purchasing 
behavior of powerful customers. In line with that, even though the 
Robinson-Patman Act directs most of its provisions against the 
discriminating sellers, its normative premise is that buying power 
                                                
1021 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, Case 27/76, [1978], ECR 207 
1022 Portuguese Republic v. Commission of the European Communities, 29.03.2001, 
Case C-163/99, [2001], ECR 3461, paras 6-9 
1023 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, para. 189 
1024 Irish Sugar plc v. Commission of the European Communities, 07.10.1999, Case T-
228/97, [1999], ECR-2969, para. 173 
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is being misused at the purchaser level, because bigger stores are 
able to purchase at a lower level in the upstream market.  
The American statute proceeds from the idea that price 
discrimination is a means to injure competitors, and that injury to 
a competitor results into injury to competition. The European anti-
discrimination prohibition reflects the struggle to consolidate the 
common market.   
Overall, the U.S. and European legal and political concerns come 
close to being juxtaposable: the U.S law represents a historic desire 
to protect small retail merchants from the competition of powerful 
buyers, while the focus of the European law is protection of 
protecting incumbent sellers from the competition of their 
dominant rivals, with a view to market integration. It is not 
coincidental that the possible defenses against claims of 
discrimination are at all similar in the two models. 
 
6.3 Other pricing abuses 
By contrast, Article 102(c) applies only to dominant sellers within 
the meaning of article 102 in general. Therefore, while Article 
102(c) and the Robinson-Patman Act are ostensibly designed to 
prevent buyers from being competitively disadvantaged, the two 
provisions actually appear to be concerned with the behavior the 
two different parties to a commercial transaction: Article 102(c) 
proscribes the anticompetitive discrimination of dominant sellers, 
while the Robinson-Patman Act is focuses on the discriminatory 
behavior of powerful buyers1025.  
With respect to the seller’s rivals, has been seen that in the US 
system sellers are afforded protection against discriminatory price 
cuts to the extent that they amount to predation1026. In other terms, 
the discriminatory effects of the conduct of the monopolistic firm 
dissolve into the ascertainment of its predatory character.  
In that respect, the European model appears to be more regulatory, 
equating the price discrimination with a price difference tout court, 
which causes a disadvantage to a class of sellers, regardless of the 
ascertainment that the price cut is below a measurement of cost, 
and that recoupment of the losses incurred in the predation phase 
has taken place. It has been seen that it is arduous to recollect 
these types of abuses in a perspective of consumer welfare: price 
discrimination can actually enhance consumer welfare by 
reducing the price for a product applied to some trading parties, 
                                                
1025 FTC v. Morton Salt co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948) “The legislative history of the 
Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly clear that Congress considered it to 
be an evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive advantage over a small 
buyer solely because of the large buyer’s quantity purchasing ability”.  
1026 Brooke-Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 
(1993). Compare the interference between predation and primary line abuse in 
the case. 
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and ultimately create efficiencies for consumers. That is why the 
application of article 102(c) is rather narrow, and the 
interpretation of price discriminations mainly conveys the concern 
for the integration of the common market and the prevention from 
the compartimentalizing of national markets.  
However, from a broader perspective, the protective rationales of 
the two models tend to match, in that they both ultimately seek to 
shelter small businesses from the aggressive competition of big 
ones: it has been seen that the core policy reasons of the two 
disciplines are overlapping, in that both provisions treat the harm 
to competition as harm to competitors. That appears to be a 
significantly striking point of contact, on the one hand, and an 
element of divergence in terms of underlying policies between the 
law of discriminatory prices and the law of monopolization within 
the American model, on the other hand. 
Moreover, both models acknowledge a non-technical notion of 
price discrimination, as the mere difference in price, disregarding 
a more in-depth analysis of the demand elasticity of the 
discriminated sellers. 
 
6.3.1 The treatment of other discounting practices – primary line 
and secondary line abuses 
With regard to other pricing abuses, it has been seen how the 
practice of the supplier of offering a discount to the purchaser on 
the account of the purchase of a certain requirement for the 
product over a certain period of time, under certain circumstances 
will fall within the spectrum of the proscribed conducts under 
article 102 paragraph (c), which bans the application of “dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties”, 
in a way to place them at a competitive disadvantage. 
Contrariwise, these discounting practices are generally deemed 
lawful in the US system, insofar as the conduct does not integrate 
a finding of predation1027.   
More specifically, European Law censors “primary line” abuses, 
where the dominant firm applies different conditions that are 
conducive to the unlawful exclusion of one (or some) of its rivals, 
in the form of price reductions conditioned to an exclusive terms 
for purchasers, being the purchase of a specific target amount over 
                                                
1027 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 894-911 (9th Cir. 
2008); LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 154-57 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc); 
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1058-63 (8th Cir. 2000); 
SmithKline Corp. v. Edli Lilly, 575 F.2d 1056, 1061-62,, 1065 (3d Cir.1978); Ortho 
Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 920 F.Supp. 455, 466-71 
(S.D.N.Y.1996); Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 69 
F.Supp.2d 571, 580-81&nn.7-8 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); J.B.D.L. Corp. v. Wyeth-Ayerst 
Laboratories, Inc., 485 F.3d 880, 884-86 (6th Cir. 2007). 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
315 
 
a period of time -“target rebates”1028-, or the purchase of either the 
whole or of a significant amount of requirement for the product 
from the dominant firm -“exclusive dealings” 1029 , “loyalty 
rebates”1030-; in the second situation, the dominant firm offers its 
product for a predatory price, in order to drive its competitors off 
competition (“predation”).  
U.S. courts have generally been reluctant to condemn these 
practices, provided that they are not recollectable in the predation 
scheme 1031 , and primary line abuses merely regard the 
discriminatory conduct of a seller, who applies a “substantial and 
sustained” reduction in price in a local area with the intent of 
destroying or downscaling a smaller rival and deteriorating 
competition1032, regardless of a finding of monopolization for its 
application. Furthermore, the US Supreme Court has ruled for the 
legitimacy of functional discounts, given to a buyer based on its 
role in the supplier’s distribution system, reflecting, at least in a 
generalized sense, the services performed by the purchaser for the 
supplier1033. Even if in the US system they are treated as secondary 
line abuses, functional discounts are at all similar in their 
substance to the European exclusive dealing arrangements and 
loyalty rebates, in which the granting of a discount is conditioned 
to the purchase of either the whole or of a significant amount of 
requirement for the product.  
The European law of primary line abuses is embedded in the law 
of abusive dominance as under article 102(c), whereas the 
American notion of primary line abuses marginally borders the 
law of monopolization as under § 2 of the Sherman Act, if the 
defendant’s conduct also displays predatory features, or is 
interpreted as a price discrimination on part of the seller with a 
view to harming one or more sellers, and absent any finding of 
monopolization.  
Because the seller offering loyalty rebates extends them to some 
purchasers but not to others, they involve price discrimination. 
Loyalty and target rebates may generate effects on both the 
                                                
1028 Michelin v Commission of the European Communities Case C-322/81, 09.11.1983, 
[1983] ECR 3461 
1029  Cooperatieve Vereniging Suiker Unie U.A. v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 16.12.1975, Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 and 114/73, E.C.R. 
2001-04, paragraphs 502-26 
1030 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461 para. 90; Irish Sugar plc v. Commission of 
the European Communities, 07.10.1999, Case T-228/97, [1999], ECR-2969, para. 
194 
1031 Ex multis, compare Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 
1109, 1120 (2009) 
1032 Indian Coffee Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 752 F.2d 891 (3rd Cir.), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 863 (1985) 
1033 Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (110 S.Ct. 2535, 2542 n. 11. 110) (1990) 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
316 
 
upstream and the downstream lines. The EC Treaty seems to focus 
on the effects on the downstream market, but the Court of Justice 
has directed much of its attention to their effects on the primary 
line: it tends to see loyalty rebates, target rebated and exclusive 
dealing as an anticompetitive weapon directed against 
competitors of the seller offering those rebates, because they are 
“intended to give the purchaser an incentive to obtain his supplies 
exclusively from the undertaking in the dominant position”, in a 
way to preclude other potential suppliers the access to the 
market1034. 
The U.S. cases that have dealt with loyalty rebates have been 
entrenched in the law of monopolization or attempted 
monopolization pursuant to § 2 of the Sherman Act, but not under 
the Robinson Patman Act; thus, loyalty schemes are not 
commonly understood as discriminatory practices.  
Secondary line abuse cases, affecting the downstream market, are 
rarely tried in the EU, and mostly concern of State-owned 
concessionaires of exclusive rights to provide services in airports 
or railways, which operated in a way to favor national carriers, to 
the detriment of international operators. Even if in the wording of 
the outcomes there was no express referral to the protection of 
national companies, it is evident that the purpose of this 
discrimination was protection on the grounds of nationality1035. 
In the US, aside from functional discounts, secondary line abuses 
are treated as a corollary of primary line one, since it is assumed 
that a price discrimination is to take place in the upstream market, 
which consequences are felt also at a purchaser level.   
 
7. The areas of critical divergence of the two systems 
Three are the areas where the two models at stake have proved to 
stand for a significant divergence, namely the treatment of 1) 
exploitative abuses, 2) predatory pricing and 3) monopoly refusal 
to deal/essential facility. These divergences will be in turn 
scrutinized. 
 
7.1 The treatment of exploitation 
The different attitude towards exploitative abuses arguably 
displays more than any other part of the laws of the two systems 
the different extent of the law of abusive unilateral practices. 
Article 102(a) directly pursues exploitative abuse, whereas § 2 
does not. It has been argued above that under the Sherman Act, 
pricing abuses either fall within the scope of the law of predation, 
                                                
1034 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461, para. 90.  
1035 Compare J. Temple Lang & R. O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition: 
How to Clarify Pricing Abuses Under Article 82 EC, 26 Fordham Int. L.J. 120 (2002-
2003).  
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provided that the requirements for a claim of predation are met, 
or position themselves outside of the scope of the law of 
monopolization. 
 
7.2 The absence of a law of exploitative abuses in the US system 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not condemn the possession of 
monopoly, but the acquisition or maintenance of it, by protecting 
the competitive structure. If competition is safeguarded, price and 
output will level off at an optimum level. Ever since the enactment 
of the Sherman Act, sanctioning excessive price has been regarded 
as an excessive interference with both freedoms of contract and of 
enterprise. Hence, monopoly and monopoly price has been 
traditionally seen as an inescapable phase of American industrial 
relations that, absent entry barriers, would necessarily call for new 
entries that would bring back the price down.  
Under the assumption that an excessive judicial activism would 
fetter freedom of business, the Congress -not the judge- was the 
entity in charge of regulating those monopolies that competition 
forces would not be able to dismantle. Owing to that, a distinctive 
peculiarity of the US system is the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 
which immunizes from antitrust liability individuals or groups 
who petition/lobby the federal or state government to take actions, 
such as pass legislation, that may impose restraints on trade. The 
rationale underlying this doctrine is the same aversion for an 
extensive role of the judge in regulating the unilateral conduct of 
the firm. Provided that the action is pursued in bona fide and is not 
a mere sham to cover an attempt to interfere with a competitor’s 
business capacity 1036 , individuals are allowed to invest the 
government to regulate certain conducts by law. In other terms, 
never in antitrust law history has the judicial power acted as a 
market regulator: that explains why exploitative abuses have 
traditionally been excluded from the extent of § 2.   
7.3 The European attitude towards exploitative abuses and the 
difficulties of identifying specific standards 
Conversely, the application of article 102 to cases of exploitation of 
consumers –mainly by excessive pricing- has never been 
questioned either at a scholarly level or at jurisprudential one. The 
inclusion of exploitation in the list of abuses derives German 
Ordoliberal subdivision of abuses into “exploitative” and 
“impediment” abuses. With regard to exploitative practices, they 
are identified by means of a hypothetical and ideal standard of 
competition, the “as-if competition”, which economic thinking 
could determine with reasonable accuracy: a dominant firm 
abuses its economic power to achieve a transactional cost that is 
                                                
1036 E. R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136, 
81 S. Ct. 523, 529, 5 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1961) W. Holmes and M. Mangiaracina, 
Antitrust Law Handbook, Thomson Reuters, 2011, § 8:8 
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significantly more advantageous than it could have achieved 
under this standard1037.  
As regards the case law, starting from the United Brands case, the 
ECJ established a test for exploitative abuses, confirming the 
abusive nature of the act of “charging a price which is excessive 
because it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the 
product supplied”1038. Whether a price meets the economic value 
of the product is to be established by resorting to a two-prong test: 
first, the difference between costs actually incurred and price 
actually charged needs to be calculated; second, if the difference is 
excessive, if must be determined “whether a price has been 
imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared with 
competing products”1039. 
Both scholarship and competition authorities have claimed that 
article 102(a) should be applied only when strictly necessary, in 
order to minimize the risk of false positives. In particular, 
intervention should be restricted to industries 1) with high entry 
barriers, 2) where one firm enjoys a substantial market power, and 
3) where technological innovation does not play a paramount 
role1040. 
In General Motors the Court has further shaped the contours of 
price discrimination in an objective manner, requiring the 
existence of serious impediments to parallel imports that 
neutralize the possibly more favorable price levels applying in 
other sales areas in the Community –harm to the internal 
market1041. In Tournier, the Court affirmed that the discrepancy 
between the price of the dominant firm and the price for the same 
product in other Member States is to be justified by the dominant 
firm by referring to the “objective dissimilarities between the 
situation in the Member State concerned and the situation 
prevailing in all other Member States”1042. 
Absent such further requirements, the Commission has declared 
its reluctance to act as a price regulator for dominant firms1043, on 
                                                
1037  D. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting 
Prometheus, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 92. 
1038 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, para. 250 
1039 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, para. 252 
1040 R. O’Donogue & A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford 
and Portland, 2006, p. 638. Office of Fair Trading, Draft Competition Law 
Guideline for Competition, Assessment of Conduct, April 2004, para. 2.6 
1041 General Motors Continental NV v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.11.1975, Case 26-75, [1975], ECR 01367, para. 12 
1042 Ministère Public v. Jean-Louis Tournier, 13.07.1989, Case 395/87, [1989], ECR 
2521, para. 38 
1043 Commission of the European Communities, XXIVth Report on Competition 
Policy, 1994, para. 207 available at http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-
bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-Site/en_GB/-
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the grounds of the same reasons underlying the idiosyncrasies of 
American Courts for addressing exploitative abuses, the fact that 
it is extremely difficult to estimate the “excessiveness” of a price 
with a sufficient degree of predictability 1044, in conjunction with 
the threat to innovation and investments implied in the 
introduction of a regime of price control1045.  
Parallel to that, US Courts have argued that “judicial oversight of 
pricing policies would place the Courts in a role akin of that of a 
public regulatory commission”1046. With regard to the threat to 
technological innovation, the Supreme Court has stated as follows: 
“the mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant 
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an 
important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to 
charge monopoly prices –at least for a short period- is what 
attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking 
that produces innovation and economic growth”1047.  
 
7.4 An attempt to reconcile the two antipodal positions 
Having that affirmed, although the two models have a different 
perspective on exploitative abuses, at the same time, the distance 
does not appear unconditionally irreconcilable. Both systems, in 
fact, share the view that competition law should intervene only 
when the market is incapable of self-correcting exploitative 
practices. Furthermore, both systems accept that a price-regulation 
can exist only if high entry barriers are likely to exclude 
competition in the long run 1048 . The systems diverge on the 
                                                                                                                                                            
/EUR/ViewPublication-Start?PublicationKey=CM9095283 . “The existence of a 
dominant position is not itself against the rules of competition. Consumers can 
suffer from a dominant company exploiting this position, the most likely way 
being through prices higher than would be found if the market were subject to 
effective competition. However, the Commission in its decision-making practice 
does not normally control or condemn the high level of prices as such. Rather it 
examines the behavior of the dominant company designed to preserve its 
dominance, usually directly against competitors or new entrants who would 
normally bring about effective competition and the price level associated with 
it. A dominant company therefore has a special obligation not to do anything 
that would cause further deterioration to the already fragile structure of 
competition or to unfairly prevent the emergence and growth of new or existing 
competitors who might challenge this dominance and bring about the 
establishment of effective competition”. 
1044 R. O’Donogue & A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford 
and Portland, 2006, p. 622 
1045 R. O’Donogue & A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford 
and Portland, 2006, p. 624 
1046 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979) 
1047 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 410, 124 S. Ct. 872, 880, 157 L. Ed. 2d 823, 836(2004).  
1048  The temporal dimension of price discrimination is relevant in both 
American and European litigation. In General Motors, the Court based its 
ruling against the Commission opinion that the five-month long price 
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different allocation of competence as to the regulation of 
exploitative prices: while the US postulation is that the Congress is 
the last resort to assess whether a regulatory scheme is necessary, 
and courts are not charged with the task of policing the excessive 
price, in the European system the same authorities in charge of the 
enforcement of competition law (the European Courts and the 
Commission) can exercise price regulation. 
In that respect, the fact that article 102 does cover exploitative 
abuses –whereas § 2 does not- shows no direct evidence of a 
different antitrust philosophy of the two models at stake, but 
simply a different allocation of competences in addressing these 
type of exploitation against consumers by non-transitory 
monopolies. Against this view is the part of the scholarship that 
claims that the inclusion of exploitative abuses in the European 
law of abusive dominance reflects different ideological objectives, 
in particular the achievement of a fair redistribution of wealth, as 
praised by the Ordoliberal Freiburg School1049.  
Evidence has shown that both the ECJ and the Commission have 
manifested the same reservations against assessing the fair price 
for a transaction as the US Courts and scholars. In that respect, it is 
unlikely the European Courts will challenge the excessiveness of a 
price aside from the narrow setting of non-transitory non-
technological monopolies protected by high entry barriers. 
 
8. The different treatment of predation 
When it comes to predatory pricing, the degree of divergence 
between the two models is more significant than in the treatment 
of exploitative abuses. Whilst the two systems agree on the 
general description of the proscribed conduct, a price reduction 
seeking to eliminate rivals followed by a post-predation supra-
competitive price raise aimed at recouping the losses incurred 
during the predation campaign.  
 
8.1 The requirements for a prima facie claim of predation in US 
system 
With regard to the US system, modern law of predation has found 
its normative underpinning in the attitude of both the Chicago 
and the Harvard Schools towards predation. Chicago scholars 
praised for a less interventionist approach to predation, on the 
account of the fact that it is a highly speculative scheme and rarely 
occur. They focused on the firm’s substantive conduct and argued 
that once the price is established above the competitive threshold, 
                                                                                                                                                            
discrimination of the defendant was of minute importance. General Motors 
Continental NV v Commission of the European Communities, 13.11.1975, Case 26-75, 
[1975], ECR 01367, para. 16-18 
1049 M. Gal, Monopoly pricing as an antitrust offense in the U.S. and the EC: Two 
Systems of belief about monopoly?, 49 Antitrust Bulletin 346 (2004) 
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recovery of losses is often hindered by the prospect of new entries: 
thus, predation should be excluded from the list of proscribed 
conducts under § 21050. Harvard scholars, conversely, focused on 
the administrability of legal rules on predation and the capacity of 
the institutions entrusted with implementing them. In Brooke 
Group, the Supreme Court endorsed the narrow test elaborated by 
Areeda and Turner (Harvard School) stating that predatory 
pricing is to be pondered in economic terms: the plaintiff has to 
prove that the defendant has set price below cost; the defendant is 
to have a dangerous probability of recouping the losses incurred 
during the below-cost sale1051.   
It is generally acknowledged that proof of strict recoupment (strict 
recoupment test) is a considerable barrier to plaintiffs trying to 
establish a predation claim, since failing to show that the 
predatory scheme has not led to some recovery of the defendant 
will convey evidence that competitors have offset the 
anticompetitive effects of the price reduction, or that the market is 
so lacking of entry barriers that the competitive structure has not 
been affected by the conduct of the dominant firm1052.  
Furthermore, the strict “below-cost” test suffers from the risk of 
oversimplifying the conduct of the monopolist, because not 
necessarily does pricing below average variable costs reflect an 
abusive strategy of the dominant firm1053. 
 
8.2 The requirements for a prima facie claim of predation in EU 
system 
The EU model takes a significantly different approach towards 
predation, which is not anchored to the recoupment requirement: 
a firm in a dominant position that sells below average variable 
costs is presumed to have a predatory intent, because “the only 
interest which the undertaking might have in applying such prices 
is that of eliminating competitors [so as to]…subsequently…raise 
its prices by taking advantage of its monopolistic position”1054. 
                                                
1050 J.S. MacGee, Predatory Price Cutting: the Standard Oil (N.J.) case, 1 Journal of 
Law and Economics 137, (1958); also compare R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 
A Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, New York, p.154 (1993). 
“It seems unwise…to construct rules about a phenomenon that probably does 
not exist or which, should it exist in very rare cases, the courts will have great 
difficulty distinguishing from competitive price behavior”. 
1051 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 
(1993) 
1052 J. Temple Lang & R. O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition, How to 
Clarify Pricing Abuses under Article 82, 26 Fordham International Law Journal 
143 (2003) 
1053 R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
2001, p. 218; O.E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 
87 Yale L.J. 320 (1977); 
1054 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 71 
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Thus, despite following the Areeda-Turner test in the appropriate 
measurement of predatory price, the ECJ rejected a safe haven for 
prices above average variable costs, by further adding that pricing 
above average variable costs, but below average total costs, can 
also be abusive pursuant to article 102, when it is part of a plan to 
eliminate a competitor 1055 , meaning that there must be an 
additional element for above cost pricing to be considered as 
illegal. This appears to be an attempt to address the issue of the 
strategic reasons of the dominant firm in charging a below-cost 
price, by means of an inquiry of the firms’ anticompetitive intent 
and of its strategy to pre-empt the market1056, inquiry that is absent 
in the American test for predation. 
In all, unlike the US Supreme Court, according to which prices 
above the appropriate measure of average variable costs are 
considered legal per se1057, article 102 exceptionally applies to 
situations in which a dominant firm with a very high degree of 
market power cuts price above average total costs, provided that 
the price cut is coupled with other exclusionary strategies and, 
more importantly, aimed at eliminating the remainder of 
competition in the market1058.  
Contrary to the US approach, the EU model has firstly rejected the 
recoupment requirement tout court1059, save reviewing its position 
in its later outcomes and arguing that, because the law of 
predation only applies to firms that are already dominant, 
dominance may also offer indication that exclusion of a rival by 
means of a predation will lead to monopolistic prices in the long 
run and, in all likelihood, to recoupment (structural recoupment 
test)1060. Put better, both the size of the firm and the below-cost 
campaign conducive to the establishment of monopoly are prima 
facie elements of the fact that the recoupment will take place. 
 
8.3 The relevance of recoupment  
Aside from converging on the average-variable-cost threshold as 
the first element to assess predation, the US model entirely relies 
on proof of below cost pricing to assess liability, disregarding the 
                                                
1055 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 72 
1056  Also compare Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European 
Communities, 14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951 para. 41 
1057 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993)  
1058 J. Temple Lang & R. O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition, How to 
Clarify Pricing Abuses under Article 82, 26 Fordham International Law Journal 
127 (2003) 
1059  Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities, 
14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951 para. 44 
1060 France Télécom v. Commission of the European Communities, 02.04.2009, Case C-
202/07 P [2009], ECR I-2369, para. 112 
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element of predatory intent. In the EU, the intent becomes the 
main criterion to assess liability when the price cut places itself 
between the average total variable costs and the average total 
costs. 
Furthermore, the recoupment is a strict element of the unlawful 
conduct in the US model, whereas it can be inferred from 
circumstances under the EU approach. 
The reason why the US Courts have enforced predation in such a 
strict and objective manner, compared to the more nuanced 
approach of the ECJ, rests in all likelihood on the strong influence 
of the school of law and economics in the interpretation of § 2, 
whereby it is assumed that predatory pricing schemes are “rarely 
tried and even more rarely successful”, and a false negative in 
adjudicating a predatory claim would result in an injury to the 
core interest protected by the Sherman Act, namely competition1061. 
By contrast, the EU case law is based on the assumption that 
predatory pricing is a rational and profitable strategy for the 
dominant firm to eliminate competitors 1062 . The risk of false 
positives is also expressed in the American under-deterrence of 
the phenomenon, based on the view that “the mechanism by 
which a firm engages in predatory pricing –lowering prices- is the 
same mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition”1063: if a 
broader test were to be applied, firms might become to be 
reluctant to reduce price aggressively, fearing to be charged with 
predation. That would provoke a chilling in price competition to 
the detriment of consumers1064.  
American scholarship has argued in favor of a narrow application 
of the law of predation, based on the deterrence effects of private 
enforcement of antitrust law in the US. As a matter of fact, the 
possibility of awarding treble damages and the high costs of 
litigations in the US might bring Courts to interpret § 2 
restrictively, and exclude the predatory intent from the test1065.  
In the EU, the virtual absence of private enforcement of 
competition law, and the fact that liability under 102 implies the 
sanction of nullity, the injunction to restore the situation as prior 
                                                
1061 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 89 L.Ed.2d 601 (1986) 
1062 J. Temple Lang & R. O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition, How to 
Clarify Pricing Abuses under Article 82, 26 Fordham International Law Journal 
122 (2003) 
1063 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993)  
1064 Weyerhaeuser Company v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, 
549 U.S. 312, 127 S.Ct 1069, 1074 (2007). The Weyerhaeuser Court applied the 
same standards of predation as in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp.  
1065 W.E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for 
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 22 Columbia Bus. L. 
Rev. 54 (2007)  
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to the infringement, or the imposition of a fine1066, might justify the 
less conservative attitude of both the ECJ and the Commission 
towards predatory conduct.  
The absence of a strict recoupment test in the EU system shows a 
different view of the role of competition law. In the US system, the 
                                                
1066 Article 102 does not single out any remedies for a finding of abuse of 
dominant position. However, case law has provided a legal basis for private 
enforcement, establishing that EU Competition Law may be enforced through 
private action at a national level Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan 
v Courage Ltd and Others, 20.09.2001, Case C-453/99, [2001] ECR I-06297, para. 23, 
(article 102… produces “direct effect in relations between individuals and 
create rights for the individuals concerned which the national courts must 
safeguard”), and that article 101 and 102 are “a matter of public policy which 
must be automatically applied by national courts” Vincenzo Manfredi and Others 
v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others, 13.07.2006, Joined Cases C-295/04 
to C-298/04 [2006], ECR I-06619 para. 2; thus, in case of a finding of abuse of 
dominant position, the ‘civil’ remedies available will be the ones that Member 
States provide, namely the award of damages for the violation of Articles 101 
and/or 102 TFEU (either compensatory and/or restitutionary) and injunctions 
(prohibitory or mandatory) with the aim to terminate the infringement and 
restoring the competitive process or the situation of the parties prior to the 
infringement.  
In light of the multi-level discipline of the abuse of dominant position, Article 
10 of the Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty has set forth the principle of 
decentralization of EC competition law, establishing a system of close 
cooperation between the European Commission, the National Competition 
Authorities (NCAs) and the national Courts, and delegated an active role for 
local/national actors. Furthermore, it has opened the way for private 
enforcement of competition law, and encouraged private actors to enforce 
competition rules before their own domestic courts. More specifically, Article 1 
of the Regulation has established that the abuse of dominant position referred 
to in article 102 is prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required. 
Furthermore, pursuant to article 6 of the Regulation, National Courts have the 
power to apply article 102 directly. Thus, the sanction for the abuse is the 
nullity, and the burden of proof of the abuse rests on the party or on the 
authority alleging the infringement. Notwithstanding that, private enforcement 
of competition law, in the sense of stand-alone litigation independent of the 
public authority, is still at an early stage in the EU. Compare K.J. Cseres, The 
Impact of Regulation 1/2003 in the New Member States, 6 Competition Law Review 
148, 2 (2010).  
With regard to the powers of the Commission, Regulation 1/2003 has 
established that competence of the Commission to instruct an administrative 
procedure, empowering the latter with powers of investigation and decision on 
an allegation of abuse brought by either Member States or by natural or legal 
persons (article 7(1)(2) Reg. 1/2003), or on an allegation of abuse raised ex officio 
by the Commission itself. When the Commission finds that there is an 
infringement of article 102, it may require the undertaking to bring such 
infringement to an end; it may impose to the undertaking behavioral or 
structural remedies necessary to end the infringement; it may order an interim 
measure against the undertaking; it may accept commitments of the 
undertaking to meet the concerns expressed to them in its preliminary 
assessment; it may impose a fine, periodic payments, or any other penalty 
provided for in their national law  (article 5 Reg. 1/2003);  
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predation test reveals that the protection of consumer welfare is 
the only goal of antitrust action; therefore, if the dominant firm’s 
below cost pricing jeopardizes the business of competitor, but the 
likelihood of recoupment is thin, the system will not consider such 
conduct as unlawful, because no consumer harm -in the sense of a 
welfare loss- will be proved. The type of infringement that 
antitrust law deems relevant is the seeking of rents to the 
detriment of consumers, not to the detriment of competitors, 
which, absent proof of recoupment, will enjoy no protection in 
monopolization claims. To put it better, the significance between 
the dominant firm’s conduct and the consequences on its 
competitors is filtered through the assessment of a market 
outcome, namely the harm to consumers brought about by the 
price-reduction1067. 
In the EU system, the departing point of the analysis of predation 
is not the protection of a market outcome, but the protection of the 
competitive process, which inescapably passes through the 
protection of competitors. The unilateral exercise of market power 
resulting in a price reduction below a proper measurement, which 
has the effect of foreclosing competition suffice to integrate an 
abuse of dominant position. The axiological priority is given to the 
market foreclosure, rather than to the consumer welfare loss1068. 
 
8.4 The notion of competition underlying the different 
treatments of predation 
Here lies the different understanding of the essence of 
competition: in the EU, competition is effective when players can 
exercise their individual liberties, whereas in the US competition 
is a process that looks directly to consumer welfare. EU 
competition law is therefore grounded on the need to assure that 
the lifecycle of the business of all market players depend on their 
skills, on their business acumen, and on their superior product or 
service, not on the exercise of market power by a dominant firm. 
US antitrust law is grounded on the assumption that only those 
                                                
1067 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) “Without recoupment, 
“predatory pricing produces lower aggregate prices in the market, and 
consumer welfare is enhanced”. 
1068 Compare Irish Sugar plc, Commission Decision of 14 May 1997 relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty, 97/624/EC: (IV/34.621, 
35.059/F-3), published in OJ L 258, 22/09/1997 P. 0001 - 0034 para. 134 “The 
dominant firm must not deliberately attempt to effectively shut out competitors. 
It has a special responsibility not to diminish further the degree of competition 
remaining on the market. … The maintenance of a system of effective 
competition does, however, require that competition from undertakings which 
are only small competitors … be protected against behavior by the dominant 
undertaking designed to exclude them from the market not by virtue of greater 
efficiency or superior performance but by an abuse of market power”.  
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conduct that are not economically efficient and consumer friendly 
an intervention.  
The European idea of the law of predation might strengthen the 
incentives to enter the market, since new entrants –together with 
competitors- may be afforded more protection than under the US 
regime; conversely, the American declination of the law of 
predation might provide firms with more incentives to strive for 
dominance, since proof of violation of § 2 exclusively depends on 
the economic calculus of the below cost pricing and of the 
recoupment, which makes a claim of predation less likely to 
succeed.  
Aside from this theoretical divergence, the fact that in both 
systems predation is expressed in terms of below-cost pricing 
shows the same concern for protecting price competition: both 
systems rely on the same economic theory for discerning lawful 
competition from illicit exclusion, which can be fully captured by 
the “equally efficient competitor test”. The theoretical 
underpinning of stopping at Average Variable Cost is the 
protection of equally efficient competitors, based on the 
assumption that firms that are equally or more efficient than the 
monopolist are able to compete against above average variable 
cost, and that there is no net welfare loss if less efficient firms are 
driven off competition1069. In that respect, neither of the two 
systems seeks to protect inefficient competitors. 
Modern industrial organization theory has shown that pure 
price/cost analysis is not always an effective means to distinguish 
vigorous competition from predation, when it is not supported by 
an observation of both the objective market conditions and the 
strategy in which the price cut positions itself1070.  
The three-prong analysis proposed by the EU competition 
authorities (sacrifice-anticompetitive foreclosure-lack of an 
economic justification) should be re-read in light of a scrutiny of 
the circumstances, in a way to reject both the safe harbor of US 
antitrust law (prices above average total cost are considered legal 
per se) and the strict recoupment test, which also appears 
overriding in the US jurisprudence. 
 
                                                
1069 Compare the AKZO outcome as regards the EU system, where the Court 
affirmed that unconditional price cuts below average variable costs could 
constitute an abuse when they are qualified as abusive being part of a scheme 
to eliminate rivals, which are equally or more efficient than the defendant 
AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 70. Areeda and Turner, analogously, maintain 
that “the low price at or above average costs is competition on the merits and 
exclude only less efficient rivals” P. Areeda & D.T. Turner, Predatory Pricing and 
Related Strategies under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 706 (1975) 
1070 P.L. Joskow & A.K. Klevorick, A framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing 
Policy, 89 Yale Law Journal 245 et seq, (1979) 
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9. Refusal to deal and the doctrine of essential facilities 
The treatment of the so-called monopoly “refusal to deal” and of 
the “doctrine of essential facilities” is another field in which the 
two models under investigation diverge to a significant extent.  
 
9.1 The European approach 
In the ECJ case law, in order to find that a dominant firm’s refusal 
to venture together with a competitor constitutes an abuse, a 
number of narrow preconditions must be met: first, the access to 
the dominant firm’s facility must be indispensable for the 
competitor’s business; second, duplication of the facility is 
virtually impossible (i.e. a railway bridge, a telecommunication 
network, an electricity net); third, the refusal to the firm 
controlling the essential facility is to be a monopolist; fourth, the 
facility is to be available for usage of other firms; fifth, the access 
to the essential facility is to be denied; sixth,  the denial is not 
supported by any objective justification 1071 . In Bronner these 
conditions were not met: the Court narrowed down this doctrine 
following what the AG Jacobs identified in his conclusions as the 
underlying rationale. First, the rights of an entrepreneur to 
venture with a partner and to “freely to dispose of one’s property 
are generally recognized principles in the laws of the Member 
States, in some cases with constitutional status. Incursions on 
those rights require careful justification” 1072 . Secondly, “the 
justification in terms of competition policy for interfering with a 
dominant undertaking’s freedom to contract often requires a 
careful balancing of conflicting considerations. … [At any rate,] 
the incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in efficient 
facilities would be reduced if its competitors were, upon request, 
able to share the benefits. Thus, the mere fact that by retaining a 
facility for its own use a dominant undertaking retains an 
advantage over a competitor cannot justify requiring access to 
it”1073. Thirdly, “in assessing this issue it is important not to lose 
sight of the fact that the primary purpose of article 102 is to 
prevent distortion of competition - and in particular to safeguard 
the interests of consumers - rather than to protect the position of 
particular competitors”. The fact that the dominant firm uses its 
market power in the upstream market to reserve to itself a part of 
the downstream market is not in itself an abuse, because “such 
conduct will not have an adverse impact on consumers unless the 
                                                
1071 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, 26.11.1998, Case C-7/97, [1998] ECR I-7817, 
paras. 37-48 
1072 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint,  Conclusions of the Advocate General Jacobs, 
26.11.1998, Case C-7/97, [1998] ECR I-7808, para. 56 
1073 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint,  Conclusions of the Advocate General Jacobs, 
26.11.1998, Case C-7/97, [1998] ECR I-7808, para. 57 
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dominant undertaking’s final product is sufficiently insulated 
from competition to give it market power”1074. 
Thus drafted, the degree of divergence between the European 
refusal to deal and the American one is not substantial, because it 
can be seen that the European intellectual foundation of Bronner 
echoes the US Supreme Court approach in the Verizon v. Trinko 
decision, in which the Colgate test was applied to the hypothesis of 
the refusal to share an essential facility. In Colgate it was held that 
“in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly 
(the intent test), the [Sherman] Act does not restrict the long-
recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely 
private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion 
as to parties with whom he will deal”1075. On the account of that, in 
Trinko the Court found it unnecessary to repudiate the essential 
facilities doctrine, because it would not apply in the case: Verizon 
was under no obligation to share its telephone network with its 
competitors, because the presence of a substantial degree of 
regulation in that industry (the 1996 Telecommunication Act) did 
not imply that the Sherman Act could be an independent source of 
liability. The justices declined to add a new claim by making an 
exception to the proposition that there is no duty to aid 
competitors, in particular because there had been no previous 
course of business between parties, unlike in the Aspen case1076.  
Duties to share a facility by law are at odds with the scopes of 
antitrust law on a twofold standpoint, since they might lessen the 
incentive of the monopolist, the rival, or both, to compete for those 
economically beneficial facilities, therefore engendering 
technological innovation for the benefit of consumers, on the one 
hand, and might facilitate collusion -one of the “supreme evils of 
antitrust”-, on the other hand1077.   
 
9.2 The American approach 
As well as the European Courts, US Supreme Court interpreted 
this doctrine narrowly, and set forth due justifications for the 
monopolist’s refusal to cooperate with rivals: pursuant to the 
Aspen test, only voluntary and unilateral termination of an 
agreement under circumstances that suggest the anticompetitive 
intent to forsake short-term profits to achieve long-term 
                                                
1074 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint,  Conclusions of the Advocate General Jacobs, 
26.11.1998, Case C-7/97, [1998] ECR I-7808, para. 58 
1075 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307, 39 S. Ct. 465, 468, 63 L. Ed. 
992 (1919). 
1076 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 411, 124 S. Ct. 872, 881, 157 L. Ed. 2d 823 (2004) The Court refused to 
extend the essential facility doctrine beyond the facts of the controversial Aspen 
case. Compare note n. 190 
1077 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 406, 124 S. Ct. 872, 881, 157 L. Ed. 2d 823 (2004) 
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exclusionary goals violates § 21078. More specifically, for a refusal-
to-deal claim to be viable, there must be a pre-existing and 
voluntary business relationship, and a decision by the monopolist 
to sacrifice short-term profits without any economic 
justification1079. 
Outside of the termination of a business relationship with an 
anticompetitive scope, liability for refusal to deal has been 
affirmed by resorting to the “essential facility doctrine”1080. The 
Supreme Court has purported the need to perform a cost-benefit 
analysis, comparing the benefits of antitrust intervention with the 
costs that remedying refusal-to-deal situations will entail, namely 
continuous supervision of Courts of their inference in the 
requirement to share an essential facility. Mistaken inferences and 
false condemnations would be “highly costly, because they chill 
the very conduct that the antitrust laws are designed to protect”1081. 
The high costs and the practical difficulties in applying the 
essential facility doctrine make its employment in antitrust 
litigation almost exceptional. 
 
9.3 Differences in the understanding of the term “essential” 
Even though both systems have applied tests based on the 
assumption that the facility in question is essential, the 
understanding of the term “essential” differs. Whilst in the EU the 
access must be indispensable for carrying out the applicant’s 
business1082, in the US the essentiality derives from the fact that it 
is not economically feasible to reproduce the facility.  The 
interpretation of the essential nature of the facility is objective in 
both systems, but European Courts do not refer or inquire the 
competition harm that could stem from a denial of access to a 
facility; in other terms, there is no reference to consequences for 
the consumer downstream market of the denial. 
Thus, the American concept of essential facility is intended as 
critical to “the plaintiff’s competitive vitality and the plaintiff is 
essential for competition in the marketplace”1083, whereas EU case 
                                                
1078 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605, 105 S. 
Ct. 2847, 2859, 86 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1985) 
1079 See infra, the influence of the no economic sense test on the Aspen case. 
1080 MCI Communication Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983) The four 
elements necessary to infer the duty to share an essential facility are 1) control 
of the essential facility by a monopolist; 2) a competitor’s inability practically or 
reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; 3) the denial to the use of the 
facility to a competitor; 4) the feasibility of providing the facility. 
1081 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 414, 124 S. Ct. 872, 881, 157 L. Ed. 2d 823 (2004), quoting Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 89 L.Ed.2d 574 (1986) 
1082 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, 26.11.1998, Case C-7/97, [1998] ECR I-7817, para. 
41 
1083 P. Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 
Antitrust Law Journal 852, (1989) 
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law does not require for the monopolist’s activity to be essential 
for the competitive process, but for competitors in general. That 
might explain why the essential facility doctrine in Europe is 
mostly treated as an entry barrier for competitors of the dominant 
firm, whereas in the US it is regarded as an exclusionary conduct, 
which is capable of causing a loss in consumer welfare. The 
influence of the Chicago School on the American model is sensible. 
In spite of this conceptual difference, scholars have argued that 
the two interpretations might lead to the same results1084.  
 
9.4 Objective justifications for denying access to the essential 
facilities 
Another common element of the two models is the relevance of 
the objective justification (EU) or valid business justification (US) 
for justifying the refusal to deal or to give access to the facility in 
question. Even though neither model offers further elements to 
define the idea of “justification”, in the US the existence of a valid 
industrial justification always plays out favorably for the 
defendant, in the sense of constituting a ground for not sharing; 
conversely, the EU Community law does not explore as in detail 
the issue of valid business justifications. In Bronner, the ECJ 
merely affirmed that access to the facility is to be denied without 
an “objective justification”, without referring to any 
industrial/business argument to justify the exculpation1085. 
An element of divergence is the perception of the doctrine of 
essential facility: whilst in the US the doctrine exists but Courts 
tend to avoid its application, to narrow it down to the greatest 
extent possible, or to infer violation of § 2 on different grounds, in 
the EU the borderline between freedom not to venture with a 
competitor and duty to share an essential facility is blurrier, and 
there is no reference to the notion of “essential facility” itself. That 
makes the spectrum of applications wider, as it has been shown 
that liability under article 102 for denying access to a facility can 
be established even if no course of dealing between the parties 
existed prior to the refusal; contrariwise, the US model has proved 
reluctant to affirm §-2 liability for denying access when litigants 
had not been in a business relationship prior to the denial. That 
might explain why the essential facilities doctrine has revealed 
itself as a valid tool in Europe to liberalize State monopolies, 
                                                
1084 Ibidem 
1085 In the Bronner Case, the ECJ affirmed that access to the facility is to be 
denied without an “objective justification”: there is no mention of a ground of 
exculpation based on an industrial/business argument. Oscar Bronner v. 
Mediaprint, 26.11.1998, Case C-7/97, [1998] ECR I-7817, para. 41   
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whereas in the US it has been regarded as potentially disruptive of 
the whole antitrust system1086. 
In sum, both the Supreme Court and the ECJ displayed the same 
reservations with regard to an extensive application of the 
doctrine, but the ECJ shows a slant towards assuring access to a 
facility in those markets where a market-access-problem had been 
previously identified by imposing broader duties to deal; in that 
respect, it is significant that the AG Jacobs refers to the 
constitutional pedigree of the “right to choose one’s trading 
partner”1087. Conversely, in Trinko the Supreme Court once more 
demarcated the narrow scope of the doctrine by emphasizing the 
high costs of false positives, regardless of an assessment of the 
costs of false negatives1088. 
Notwithstanding that, the European way of tackling this issue 
does not stand the claim that it favors fairness over market 
efficiency, nor that it serves to protect competitors instead of 
competition, nor that it shows regulatory tendencies compared to 
the American model, whereby the doctrine has been imported. In 
fact, it has been showed that there are more similarities between 
the two systems than differences; to conclude, the final 
observation is that the doctrine does exist and its application in 
both systems is justifiable in certain circumstances, at least when 
its application is the only tool to remedy actual or potential 
anticompetitive effects in a given market.  
 
10. The offense of monopolization and the abuse of dominant 
position in a nutshell: open questions 
In sum, the European notion of abuse implies that there must be 
an undertaking, namely any person engaged in an economic 
activity, which is to hold a dominant position on a relevant 
market. The dominance is to affect a substantial part of the 
common market and is to be used by the undertaking to commit 
an abuse, which must affect trade between Member States. Mere 
dominance is lawful, but there is a causative link between the 
dominance and the abuse. In other terms, a conduct that would be 
licit if performed by a non-dominant firm is abusive when put in 
place by a firm with a substantial degree of dominance. 
In the US, something more than the mere existence of monopoly is 
                                                
1086 H. Schweitzer, Parallels and Differences in the Attitudes towards Single Firm 
Conduct: What are the Reasons? The History Interpretation and Underlying Principles 
of § 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 82 EC, in C.D. Ehlermann & M. Marquis 
(eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 
EC, Oxford/Portland Oregon, (2008), p. 158 
1087 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint,  Conclusions of the Advocate General Jacobs, 
26.11.1998, Case C-7/97, [1998] ECR I-7808, para. 56 
1088 The emphasis on the risk of false positives, and not on the risks of false 
negatives, is recurrent in the treatment of predation as well. Compare 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 89 L.Ed.2d 601 (1986) 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
332 
 
required, generally some means that are not honestly industrial, 
through which monopoly is achieved or maintained: in fact, under 
§ 2, the relevant conduct is the action of monopolizing, not the 
sole attainment of a monopolistic position. Figuratively, under 
scrutiny is not the status of monopoly, but the steps through 
which monopoly is attained or maintained. The offense of 
monopolization is policed in a dynamic way. Thus, monopoly 
“solely” attributable to economies of scale, natural advantages, 
patents or legal license, superior skill or accident is lawful, on the 
grounds of the typical defenses. However, even in such 
occurrences the monopolist may engage in unlawful exclusionary 
practices to maintain its monopoly rents; furthermore, once a firm 
has achieved a monopolist position, a small degree of causative 
relationship between exclusionary practices and monopoly power 
might suffice to infer violation of § 2. 
Both the laws of abusive dominance and of monopolization are 
enforced in an objective manner, disregarding the intent to 
monopolize, but simply focusing of the abusive character of the 
conduct. Both § 2 and article 102 have structural elements, 
“monopoly power” and “dominant position”, and behavioral 
elements, the “abuse” in the EU and the “monopolization 
conduct” in the US. Neither text provides much guidance in 
distinguishing acceptable (lawful) conduct from unacceptable 
(unlawful) conduct. Section 2 simply states that firms “shall [not] 
monopolize.” Article 82 does not define abuse but recites a non-
exhaustive list of examples. 
Both the EC and the U.S. courts have formulated general 
definitions of “abuse” and “monopolize.” In Hoffmann La Roche, 
the European Court of Justice stated that an abuse is an objective 
concept –not requiring anticompetitive intent-, as a conduct 
resulting in the creation, extension or maintenance of dominance, 
and entailing “recourse to methods different from those which 
condition normal competition” that have the effect of hindering 
the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the 
market or the growth of that competition1089.  
The most frequently cited definition of actual monopolization is 
found in Grinnell: “the willful acquisition or maintenance of 
[monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development 
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident”1090.  
The European jurisprudential definition ascribes a normative 
claim to the concept of normality (“normal methods of 
                                                
1089 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461, para. 6.  
1090 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 1704, 16 L. 
Ed. 2d 778 (1966) 
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competition”)1091; abusive dominance is a conduct by a dominant 
firm that (1) hinders its competition and (2) does not reflect 
“normal competition”1092. Despite that, Courts have not provided a 
normative test to identify normal conducts, leaving the 
development of the notion of normal competition (or competition 
on the merits) to case law. 
The Grinnell definition is also based on a rather similar criterion, in 
that it ascribes a normative claim to the concept of exclusionary 
use of monopoly power as distinguished from growth and 
development. If, on the one hand this, definition sets more defined 
boundaries to identify the abuse, on the other hand it leaves the 
definition of “business acumen” and “superior product” open to 
the Court development. More specifically, the Grinnell Court 
failed to indicate whether the employment of “business acumen” 
or the development of a “superior product” is always a ground of 
exculpation. In other terms, there is always an element of 
willfulness in the business acumen or in the superior product that 
can be used to acquire or maintain a monopolistic position, which 
Courts have not addressed1093.  
As a matter of fact, often firms willfully acquire or maintain 
monopoly power precisely through business acumen or 
developing a superior product. It is highly unlikely that a firm 
really has a monopoly “thrust upon it”1094 without the aid of any 
                                                
1091 The normative relevance of the concept of “normal competition” resembles 
the American early enforcement of § 2. In Standard Oil, the Court noted that the 
defendant’s conduct gave rise “…to the prima facie presumption of intent and 
purpose to maintain the dominancy over the oil industry, not as a result of 
normal methods of industrial development [emphasis added], but by means of 
combination…with the purpose of excluding others from the trade”. Standard 
Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62, 31 S. Ct. 502, 516, 75 L. Ed. 
619 (1911) 
1092 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461, para. 3 
1093 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 1704, 16 L. 
Ed. 2d 778 (1966). Another emblematic example of the difficulty of discerning 
an anticompetitive use of a superior product can be found in Berkey Photo, Inc. 
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), the plaintiff alleged that 
Kodak had restricted competition by introducing a new film format that was 
only compatible with new pocket-size Kodak cameras, in order to drive Berkey 
off competition for amateur camera and photo-finishing equipment. The Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided against the plaintiff’s claim and 
countered that Kodak’s ability to introduce both the new film and the new 
camera without pre-disclosure was a function not of its monopoly power, but of 
its superior business skill, innovation, and integration. Compare Chapter I, 
para. 5 
1094 In the case law, there is a clear-cut distinction between the achievement of 
monopoly, on the one hand, and monopoly that has been ‘thrust upon it’, on 
the other hand, to which the Sherman Act does not apply. United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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willful conduct1095. In order to overcome the problems raised by 
the Grinnell test Courts and commentators have offered other 
formulations, leaning on the “anticompetitive or exclusionary” 
character of conduct1096. 
The problem remains open: neither the idea of anticompetitive 
conduct nor the idea of conduct hindering normal competition 
says much about how to distinguish vigorous competition 
resulting into the exclusion of a rival from a conscious conduct 
that excludes competition. This difficulty is reflected in the pre-
Grinnell structuralist approach in the enforcement of § 2: following 
Alcoa, Courts articulated the test concluding that a firm could be 
guilty of monopolization even if its conduct was “honestly 
industrial” and not “actuated solely by a desire to prevent 
competition”1097.  
 
10.1 The continuum between individualism and altruism  
That reflects the same crucial question: an honestly industrial 
conduct, or the use of business acumen, can also have 
anticompetitive effects, but “the extent to which particular words 
or categories are regarded as sufficiently “factual” to serve as the 
basis of formally realizable rules changes through time, is subject 
to dispute at any particular time, and is a matter of degree” 1098. 
The same idea of “competition” may appear to one lawyer to be 
likely to generate precise and predictable answers to particular 
questions of antitrust law, while another may regard it as no more 
than a non-manageable standard. 
Inevitably, the choice of applying § 2 against these arguably 
anticompetitive schemes will reflect two different rethorical and 
substantive modes that lawyers use in justifying particular rules of 
law, which can be has epitomized in altruism and individualism, 
                                                
1095 E. Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 260 
(2003) 
1096 In Aspen the Court borrowed the formulation of Professors Areeda and 
Turner, defining exclusionary the conduct that “(1) tends to impair the 
opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the 
merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way”. Aspen Skiing Co. v. 
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605, 105 S. Ct. 2847, 2859, 86 L. Ed. 
2d 467 (1985) 
1097 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813-814 (1946) quoting 
and “welcom[ing] this opportunity to endorse” these statements from United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.1945). Also compare 
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-07 (1948) holding that 
monopolization could be proven simply by the “existence of power ‘to exclude 
competition when it is desired to do so’... coupled with the purpose or intent to 
exercise that power”. 
1098 J.P. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1041, 1042 (1976) 
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as they have been outlined in the introduction to this chapter1099: 
the core of the individualistic paradigm is belief that a preference 
in conduct for one’s own interests is legitimate, but that one 
should be willing to respect the rules that make it possible to 
coexist with others similarly self-interested. The fundamental idea 
of the altruistic paradigm is the belief that one ought not to 
indulge a sharp preference for one’s own interest over those of 
others1100.  
An individualistic stance will tend to favor the application of clear 
rules and to guarantee the rights of market players through non-
intervention; moreover, it will tend to be defendant friendly by 
tolerating inequalities of bargaining power implied in monopoly, 
and more lenient towards profit-maximizing conduct that will 
have exclusionary effects by ignoring the existence of social duties. 
Conversely, an altruist attitude will tend to favor the application 
of standards of reasonable understanding, and censor the 
structural harm to competition, even when the monopolist’s 
conduct is honestly industrial.  
The altruistic attitude is particularly evident when it comes to 
enforcing the European standard of “normal” competition, or 
“competition on the merits”1101, in which the judge will filter 
political stakes that are already part of the acquis communautaire, 
such as the general –yet not categorical- protection of both 
consumers and SMEs, as weaker parties to transactions1102.  
The dichotomy of individualism-rule Vs altruism-standard is also 
manifest in the two opposite arguments about direct price 
regulation. The European abuse of excessive pricing is 
substantially justified in an altruistic fashion, namely as a function 
of the whole situation of the market1103. Conversely, the absence of 
a law of excessive pricing in the US system, save the limited reach 
of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, reflects the individualist 
faith in the idea of efficiency in the adjudication of a claim of 
monopolization, based on the normative claim that it is not up to 
the judge to establish a iustum pretium in a transaction, but such 
task is left to the free display of market forces.  
In general, American individualism seeks to freeze into the legal 
                                                
1099 D. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1685, 1714 (1976) 
1100 D. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1685, 1718 (1976) 
1101 See supra, paragraph 1. Introduction, the explanation of the dichotomy in 
adjudication. 
1102 M.W. Hesselink, SMEs in European contract law, background note for the 
European Parliament on the position of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 
a future Common Frame of Reference (CFR) and in the review of the consumer law 
acquis, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1030301 (2007) 
1103 See infra, note n. 166 on the definition of excessive price in relation to the  
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system the whole structure of laissez faire; it follows that antitrust 
law is only committed to free enterprise, on the one hand, and to 
the maximization of consumer welfare, on the other hand. Other 
policies filtered into the enforcement of § 2 cannot but be regarded 
as a “dangerous” form activism of Courts which, as it has been 
seen, stand as mere guarantors of individual freedoms. 
 
11. Exclusionary standards in light of the main doctrinal and 
judicial analytical tests: a syncretic approach 
In the narrowing of the relevant conducts of monopolization and 
abusive dominance, both models resort to open clauses such as 
“exclusionary conduct” 1104 , “anticompetitive conduct” 1105 , and 
impairment of “competition on the merits”1106. All these clauses 
have a major flaw, they do not provide guidance as to indicate the 
point after which a conduct is anticompetitive; the concept of 
exclusion is particularly ambiguous, because all competitive 
conducts that maximize profits and increase the firm’s market 
share also have exclusionary effects for the rivals; likewise, the 
placement on the market of a technologically superior product 
will exclude the obsolete products. Generally speaking, one of the 
needs for antitrust law is to administer the justifiable exclusion of 
rivals and to proscribe the unjustifiable ones. 
The legal argument has availed itself of numerous tests, mostly of 
economic origins, to fill the above open clauses with meaning, 
each reflecting a particular policy consideration that the both 
judicial and doctrinal formants have been attaching to the law of 
unilateral exclusionary conduct.  
Currently, the most discussed tests are consumer harm, profit 
sacrifice, no economic sense, and efficiency standards.  
                                                
1104 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223, 
113 S. Ct. 2578, 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 (U.S.N.C. 1993) 
1105 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605, 105 S. 
Ct. 2847, 2859, 86 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1985). Europemballage Corporation and Continental 
Can v. Commission of the European Communities, 21.02.1973, Case 6/72, [1973], 
ECR 215, para. 27 
1106 Compare Aspen, and Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan Et Vir, Dba Sorboturf 
Enterprises, 506 U.S. 447 (1993), 113 S.Ct. 884, 122 L.Ed.2d 247, with regard to 
the attempt of monopolizing. Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 14.10.2010, Case C-280/08 P, 2010, para. 192. The “competition on 
the merits” test was developed through the doctrinal formant (P. Areeda & D.F 
Turner, Antitrust Law: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Application, 
Little, Brown and Co., Boston, vol. 3 § 651 p. 78 (1978), but gained success even 
among the EU Competition authorities. Commissioner Mario Monti, in his 
press release after the conclusion of the Microsoft investigation and the 
imposition of a fine. “Dominant companies have a special responsibility to 
ensure that the way they do business doesn’t prevent competition on the merits 
and does not harm consumers and innovation”. Brussels 24 March 2004, 
Reference: IP/04/382 Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
04-382_en.htm 
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11.1  The consumer harm test 
Under the consumer harm test, the conduct is unlawful when the 
firm increases its market power and causes a net harm to 
consumer welfare; thus, there is an abuse only if challenged 
conduct has the effect of raising prices or restricting output, 
innovation, or quality1107.  
Resonance of the consumer harm test can be found in the previous 
Areeda & Turner formula to infer violation of § 2, pursuant to 
which exclusionary conduct “[C]omprehends at the most behavior 
that not only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but 
also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or does 
so in an unnecessarily restrictive way”. In 2007, Areeda and 
Hovenkamp reformulated the test, as acts that: (1) are reasonably 
capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by 
impairing the opportunities of rivals; and (2) that either (2a) do 
not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are unnecessary for the 
particular consumer benefits claimed for them, or (2c) produce 
harms disproportionate to any resulting benefits1108. 
Courts have articulated a balancing test under § 2 simply by 
readapting the rule of reason: in Microsoft –arguably the most 
famous modern monopolization case- the Court ruled that the 
plaintiff must demonstrate the anticompetitive effects of the 
monopolist’s conduct. Should he succeed in establishing a prima 
facie claim of monopolization, the defendant might proffer a 
procompetitive justification for its conduct. If the defendant’s 
justification stands unrebutted, then the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct 
outweighs the procompetitive benefit1109. However, the practical 
difficulty of balancing the efficiencies and inefficiencies brought 
the D.C. Circuit to find violation of § 2 merely on the absence of 
sufficient evidence of anticompetitive effects (inefficiencies) or of 
business justifications (efficiencies). The naked quashing of a new 
technology in a rapidly evolving market sufficed to establish a 
finding of monopolization, absent an actual balance of harms and 
benefits, and given the axiological preference for safeguarding 
technological value from the anticompetitive harm. 
                                                
1107 J. Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, Speech of the 31st Conference of the 
European Association of Research in Industrial Economics, Berlin, September 
3rd, 2004, available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/spe0304.pdf 
118 P. Areeda & D.F Turner, Antitrust Law: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles and 
their Application, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, vol. 3 § 651 p. 78 (1978). As for 
the new formulation of the test, compare P.E. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law – An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, Wolters 
Kluwer Law and Business, New York, § 3 p. 96 (2007).As regards the Aspen 
case, see note n. 211. 
1109 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 15-18 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
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An intriguing parallel can be found in the approach of the 
Commission in the European Microsoft case, in which the 
defendant was found to have contravened the second paragraph 
of article 102, by “limiting production, markets or technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers”. Interestingly enough, 
in applying a balancing test, the Commission did not rely on 
economic elements that would allow a real comparison between 
the gains and the losses of the conduct, but applied a rule of 
reason by simply weighing the anticompetitive nature of the tying 
operated by the defendant.  
 
11.2 The profit-sacrifice test 
The profit-sacrifice test implies that the firm is to deliberately 
forego some profits in the short run in order to induce exit from 
the market and to recoup the losses in the long term1110. The cost 
and benefits of the conduct are balanced, and conduct is unlawful 
if it is unprofitable for the dominant firm but for the exclusion of 
rivals and the post-exclusion supra-competitive recoupment. 
In both systems the most obvious example of profit-sacrifice 
conduct is predatory pricing. In has been seen that proof of the 
recoupment is more stringent in the US, where the strict 
recoupment is a prerequisite for a finding of predation, whereas in 
Europe the structural recoupment suffices. 
 
11.3 The no-economic sense test 
The no-economic sense test is closely related to the profit sacrifice 
one and focuses on the objective rationale of the conduct: there is 
an abuse when the conduct makes no economic sense but for the 
exclusion of competitors or the softening of competition1111. The no 
economic sense test avoids some of the criticisms that 
commentators have addressed to the profit-sacrifice test. If the 
dominant firm foregoes some profits in the short-run, under the 
no economic sense test it should be further assessed whether it is 
rational to make that sacrifice. Besides, under the test it is not 
necessary for a conduct to constitute a short-run profit sacrifice to 
be deemed unlawful, because the exclusionary impact of a 
conduct can be immediate and the anticompetitive gains from 
exclusionary conduct can be reaped straightaway, without any 
inquire of the resulting recoupment1112: when confronted with a 
                                                
1110  A.D. Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary 
Conduct—Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 Antitrust L.J. (2006); J. Ordover & R. 
Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 Yale 
Law Journal 8 (1981) 
1111 A.M. Mateus & T. Coelho Moreira, Competition Law and Economics – Advances 
in Competition Policy Enforcement in the EU and in North America, Edward Elgar 
Publishing (Inc.), Northampton, Massachusetts, (2010) p.190 
1112 G.J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2, 73 Antitrust 
L.J. 413 (2006) 
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short-run profit sacrifice, the court should merely evaluate 
whether it is an act of elimination of competition or it is an act 
directed to business growth. 
In the US system, precisely in the context of refusal to deal, 
evidence of sacrifice contributed to the Supreme Court’s finding of 
exclusion in Aspen, where the defendant’s termination of a 
presumably profitable course of dealing with its competitors was 
deemed to make no sense but for exclusion1113. Furthermore, the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
advocated a no economic sense test in an Amicus Curiae for Verizon 
v. Trinko: conduct is ‘exclusionary’ … if [it] would not make 
economic sense for the defendant but for its elimination or 
softening of competition.”1114. However, the absence of sacrifice 
contributed to reverse the plaintiff’s claim: absent an allegation 
that the defendant’s conduct implied financial sacrifice, and 
absent an actual sacrifice of short-term profits that makes sense 
only if it eliminates or impairs competition, the Supreme Court 
found that the plaintiff was under no obligation aid a competitor 
by sharing a facility pursuant to § 21115.  
All things considered, the paradigm of two cases shares some 
characteristics of both the profit-sacrifice and of the no-economic 
sense test, in that both Courts leaned on the idea of profit sacrifice 
with an anticompetitive slant. The bottom line is both the Trinko 
and the Aspen Court did emphasize the objective rationale of the 
monopolist, rather than the effects of the conduct: Aspen Ski’s 
termination of a voluntary course of dealing suggested “a 
distinctly anticompetitive bent”; Verizon had never voluntarily 
engaged in any such course of dealing so its prior conduct “sheds 
no light upon the motivation of its refusal to deal”1116. 
 
11.4 The equally efficient competitor test 
The measurement of the firm’s efficiency has been proposed by 
Judge Posner through the equally efficient competitor test, 
                                                
1113 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605, 105 S. 
Ct. 2847, 2859, 86 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1985) the monopolist ought to be “willing to 
sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived 
long-run impact on its smaller rival”. 
1114 Brief for the Government,Verizon Commc’ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, section n. 16 (2004) “A monopolist’s right to refuse 
cooperation with rivals is not wholly unqualified. If such a refusal involves a 
sacrifice of profits or business advantage that makes economic sense only 
because it eliminates or lessens competition, it is exclusionary and potentially 
unlawful”. 
1115 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 411, 124 S. Ct. 872, 880, 157 L. Ed. 2d 823 (2004). Whilst Aspen’s 
conduct “suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an 
anticompetitive end”, this factor was not present in the Verizon claim. 
1116 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 411, 124 S. Ct. 872, 880, 157 L. Ed. 2d 823 (2004) 
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pursuant to which there is monopolization every time an equally 
or more efficient competitor is excluded1117. In other terms, the test 
focuses on the effects of the conduct and disregards the objective 
rationale of it: when exclusionary effects caused by the conduct 
are offset by the efficiency produced in terms of consumer welfare 
the conduct will be lawful, because the exclusion of a less efficient 
firm is likely to generate a redistribution of welfare to consumers, 
in terms of a price reduction or a superior product. 
It has been seen that, even though the equally efficient test has its 
roots in the American scholarship, it has arguably had more 
resonance in the EU, since the Court admitted the test in AKZO, 
focusing on the foreclosure of competition for those rivals who 
were less efficient than the dominant firm1118.   
This test has also gained traction in a series of margin squeeze 
cases in the EU1119, such as Deutsche Telekom, where the assessment 
of the anticompetitive conduct was solely based on the 
measurement of the dominant firm’s cost, and not on the 
subjective intent of eliminating rivals. Furthermore, in TeliaSonera 
it was held that the economic justification for a price reduction 
capable of excluding a rival is to be made on the basis of all the 
circumstances of the case: dominant firm is to prove an increase in 
efficiency, whereby its low prices are necessary for all the firms in 
the market to be able to produce or distribute the product, and 
ultimately bring an advantage for the consumers1120.  
 
                                                
1117 R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
2001, p. 196 
1118 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 03.07.1991, Case 
62/86, 1991, ECR I-3359, para. 70.  
1119 Unlike the US, under EU competition law, the concept of margin squeeze 
has recently emerged into abusive-dominance litigation. Margin squeeze 
reflects a more general concern in competition law related to the issue of the 
profit sacrifice by vertically integrated companies enjoying market power, 
which prevent downstream companies from achieving competitive price-cost 
margins. A margin squeeze -or “price squeeze”- can occur when the firm 
charges a downstream price that is too low relative to the input price, with the 
result of driving out some or all downstream rivals, or at least significantly 
weakening their competitive positions (predation); or when the firm charges a 
wholesale price that is too high relative to the retail price, and however 
insufficient to allow for effective competition in the downstream market 
(vertical foreclosure-refusal to deal). In the last decade, margin squeeze 
allegations have come under scrutiny of both regulatory and competition 
authorities worldwide, in particular in those sectors that have transitioned from 
regulation to competition, such as telecommunications, gas, electricity or postal 
services. For a more detailed explanation of the phenomenon compare H. 
Auf’mkolk, From Regulatory Tool to Competition Law Rule: The Case of Margin 
Squeeze under EU Competition Law, Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 149-162, 2012 
1120 Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 17.02.2011, Case C 52-09, [2011] I-
527, para. 76 
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11.5 The balance between the gains and the harms of the 
unilateral conduct 
Post-Chicago scholars have criticized the under-inclusiveness of 
the equally efficient test and have based their analysis on the 
inquiry of the efficiency of the monopolist’s strategies. 
In particular, Professor Elhauge proposed a test yet based on 
efficiency, but not constructed on the balance between the gains 
and the harms of the unilateral conduct: if the dominant firm has 
improved its own efficiency in order to make a better or cheaper 
product, it should be free to sell that product at any above-cost 
price it wants, even though that may shrink rival market share to a 
size that leaves rivals less efficient, no balancing of harms being 
required. If the dominant firm has succeeded in furthering 
monopoly power by impairing rival efficiency, its conduct should 
be deemed unlawful1121.  
 
11.6 The “raising rivals’ costs (RRC)” test 
Professors Krattenmaker and Salop propose the “raising rivals’ 
costs (RRC)” test1122. In their seminal article on Raising Rivals’ 
Costs, Salop & Krattenmaker illustrate this basic paradigm with 
four types of behavior that could raise rivals’ costs: (1) a 
bottleneck; (2) “real foreclosure”; (3) the “cartel ringmaster”; and 
(4) the  “Frankenstein Monster” 1123  Aside from the two 
illustrations, which involve raising rivals’ costs by inducing 
collusive behavior among the suppliers, the first two behaviors are 
based on the notion of foreclosing supply of an input, thereby 
increasing its cost. In particular, a “real foreclosure” technique 
occurs when the dominant firm can use an exclusionary 
arrangement with the suppliers of an input in order to force rivals 
to pay more for the input and therefore raise the price of the 
downstream product above competitive level. This allows the 
excluding company likewise to raise downstream prices, 
capturing the price increase as a monopoly profit.  
Similarly, a purchaser can overbuy large amounts of the supply in 
order to drive up the market price for the rest of the supply of the 
input. Krattemaker and Salop have reconstructed part of the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Alcoa in terms of “real foreclosure”: 
by overbuying excessive amounts of raw materials necessary for 
the aluminum production, the defendant had raised the price for 
the remaining inputs, increasing the costs of production for its 
rivals. Similarly, by acquiring a naked exclusionary right over the 
                                                
1121 E. Elhauge, Defining better monopolization standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253, 263 
(2003) 
1122 T.G. Krattenmaker & S.G. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ 
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209, 236 (1986) 
1123 For a further explanation of the Krattemaker-Salop paradigm, compare 
Chapter I, para. 5 note n. 185 
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supply of electricity, it had raised its rivals’ prices for electricity1124. 
The RRC test is eclectic, in that it focuses on the effects of the 
conduct, which are measured in an objective manner, namely in 
terms of allocative efficiency, but the act of raising rivals’ cost is 
interpreted in a normative sense, as anticompetitive per se. This 
test suits the structuralist approach characterizing the enforcement 
of § 2 in the 1940s’ and 1950’.  
Furthermore, post-Chicago approach is informed to the 
identification of the strategies through which the monopolist 
would raise its rivals’ cost1125: in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
Technical Services (1992), the Supreme Court focused on the 
possibility of higher prices being charged to consumers of 
aftermarket parts because of the defendant’s decision to limit the 
availability to the plaintiff of replacement parts, and of the 
existence of significant information and switching costs that could 
create a less responsive connection between aftermarket prices 
and equipment sales. 
Similarly, the RRC test is not significantly divergent from the 
objective evaluation of the effects of a price squeeze on the 
downstream market in the European margin squeeze claims of 
Deutsche Telekom and TeliaSonera1126. 
 
11.7 The inescapable tension between consumer protection and 
outcome efficiency  
In conclusion, a unifying test does not exist and by no means has 
one test proved to prevail over the other in qualitative terms. The 
bottom line is a twofold consideration: one the one hand, all these 
tests reveal the inextricable interdependence between the law and 
economics when it comes to policing the phenomenon of 
monopolization-abusive dominance of a firm; on the other hand, 
the attempt to identify a fit-all principle to evaluate monopolizing-
abusive conducts will always result into an elusive effort, because 
each of these paradigms will reflect a more liberal or a more 
regulatory attitude towards the phenomenon. These competing or 
complementary tests differ in quantitative terms, and both Courts 
and competition authorities will continue to give axiological 
primacy to either consumer protection or outcome efficiency, 
based on different policy considerations and different 
assumptions.  
All things considered, the profit-sacrifice investigation, the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission focus on 
whether the conduct would not make business sense but for its 
exclusionary effect, Judge Posner’s focus on whether the conduct 
                                                
1124 Ibidem 
1125 A.I. Gavil, W.E.Kovacic & J.B. Baker, Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, 
Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy, p. 679 St Paul, Minnesota (2006) 
1126 See supra, para. 5.4 
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excludes an equally efficient rival, Professor Elhauge’s standard of 
conduct that impairs a rival’s efficiency without contributing to 
the monopolist’s efficiency, Microsoft’s rule of reason balancing the 
precompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the conduct; 
Krattenmaker-Salop’s raising rivals’ cost, are destined to become 
“old bottles for new wine” 1127 , none of which will capture 
completely the phenomena at stake.  
 
12. Main policy considerations characterizing the two systems 
The divergence between § 2 and article 102 is also grounded on 
different policy considerations. It has been seen that consumer 
welfare is the exclusive policy consideration under § 2; conversely, 
in article 102 the protection of consumer welfare is also qualified 
by both market integration and fairness considerations.  
Even if the European Commission has emphasized the prevalence 
of the consumer protection rationale over both fairness and 
market integration1128, it seems unlikely that the last two concerns 
will be eliminated completely from the political agenda of 
European competition law, because such objectives are enshrined 
in the fundamental principles of the EU Treaty1129. 
 
12.1 Fairness considerations 
With regard to the fairness consideration, its absence from 
American antitrust law enforcement has been partly due to the 
lack of predictable and administrable rules to identify an objective 
standard of fairness in the monopolist’s conduct, partly to the fear 
of excessively hampering the competitive and innovation process 
by means of protectionist principles. 
In contrast, fairness is expressed as a policy consideration in the 
prohibition of exploitative abuses, which implies the imposition 
“unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
                                                
1127 Misquoted Matthew 9:14-17 “Neither do men put new wine into old bottles 
[emphasis added]: else the bottles break, and the wine runneth out, and the 
bottles perish: but they put new wine into new bottles, and both are preserved”. 
King James Bible “Authorized Version”, Cambridge Edition, available at 
http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/Matthew-9-17/  
1128 Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, Speech on European Competition 
Day: Competition for Consumers’ Benefit (Oct. 22, 2004). “I said in my hearing 
before the European Parliament back in 1999, just before my term as 
Competition Commissioner began, that I would give “central importance to the 
consumers”, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/index_2004.html  
1129 Article 3 paragraph 3 of the Consolidated Treaty on European Union 
provides that “The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the 
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and 
price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement 
of the quality of the environment.  It shall promote scientific and technological 
advance”. 
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conditions” 1130 . Fairness is promoted to the benefit of both 
consumers’ and SMEs, as it appears from the German Ordoliberal 
origins of article 102, under which assumption big businesses 
should not hamper the activity of small ones.  
Aside from the normative origins of the article, there are other 
historical reasons underlying the condemnation of excessive 
pricing. Signatories of the Rome Treaty in 1957 may have seen 
price regulation as necessary or desirable to protect customers 
until competition developed more fully, together with the 
establishment of the Common Market1131. Chilling effects were 
disregarded, on the assumption that most dominant undertakings 
were state (or state-protected) monopolists whose market power 
would not diminish in the conceivable future. 
With regard to “excessive pricing”, the assessment of fairness is 
particularly controversial, and in all likelihood is the result of 
policy considerations exogenous to supply and demand 
conditions, given the impossibility of determining iustum pretium, 
namely a fair price imposed either by law or by the judge. As a 
matter of fact, in SACEM II the Court held that a useful indication 
to determine whether an exploitative abuse has been committed is 
the comparison between the dominant firm’s costs and operating 
expenses and those of its counterparts in other member states 
provides, implying that a dominant firm that is not as efficient as 
its counterparts in other markets would be abusing its dominant 
position1132. This approach has been criticized since it has as its 
consequence the ascertainment of an artificial efficiency based on 
exogenous elements rather than on the free display of market 
forces in that particular marketplace1133.  
At best, Courts can grant some relief on the mere ground of the 
economic lesion arising out of the anticompetitive conduct. In 
United Brands, the Court defined as “excessive” prices that have 
“no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product 
supplied,” by looking at the price charged for the product, its 
costs of production, and determining whether that price would be 
unfair in itself or when compared to competing products1134. Once 
again, judicial enforcement shows how the standard of 
                                                
1130 Article 102 paragraph (a) 
1131 M.S. Gal, Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offense in the U.S. and the EC: Two 
Systems of Belief about Monopoly?, 49 Antitrust Bull. 343 (2004) 
1132 Lucazeau et al. v. SACEM, 09.07.1989, Joined Cases 110, 241, 242/88, [1989] 
ECR 2811, para. 28 
1133 See T.E. Kauper, Whither Article 86? Observations on Excessive Prices and 
Refusals to Deal, in B.E. Hawk (ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy, 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute, p. 651 (1990).  
1134 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, para. 252. The ECJ 
charged the Commission with the burden of demonstrating the excessiveness of 
the price set by United Brands. 
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reasonableness is a vacuum that Courts can fill with opposite 
political stakes, ranging –for the sake of brevity- from 
individualism to altruism. In United Brands, the Court has shown 
an altruistic slant and the tendency to consider the dominant 
firm’s price as excessive because its anticompetitive impact on the 
market was a function of the whole situation, rather than a 
function of any general application of economic principles of 
supply and demand.  
At any rate, the appraisal of a “competitive price” can 
dangerously transfigure in a regulatory tool for the Common 
Market, and lead to paradoxical results of censoring conducts that 
are neither anticompetitive nor detrimental to consumers. The 
degeneration of this altruistic attitude of European law of 
exploitative abuses might consist of an excessive regulatory 
intervention of both the lawmakers and the judges, which might 
paralyze the economic private enterprise. 
The above referred risk implied in an extensive interpretation of 
article 102(a) has led to a narrow interpretation of excessive 
pricing abuses, which have been often found in markets 
characterized by high entry barriers (for instance technical 
standards), based on the assumption that the entry of new players 
in response to excessive prices would keep prices on a competitive 
level. Prices should not be regulated unless the excessiveness 
appreciably restricts competition, or there exists a public interest 
in lowering them to the benefit of consumers until competition is 
fully developed, or there is no expectation of new entry.  
Contrariwise, in the US the hostility to review exploitative pricing 
has traditionally characterized § 2’s enforcement, on the grounds 
of the complexity and non-administrability of the tests employed 
(price/cost comparisons, price comparison with competitive 
markets, etc).  Moreover, monopolists have the capacity of 
charging supra-competitive prices also through honestly 
industrial strategies or efficient means: by sanctioning excessive 
pricing, antitrust law would also chill the incentives to compete.  
As opposed to the European system, the American disregard for a 
law of excessive pricing reflects the individualistic adherence to 
the economic principles of supply and demand, on the one hand, 
and the laissez-faire praise for non-intervention in the regulation of 
the economic power, on the other hand. The degeneration of this 
attitude might consist of an excessive tolerance for the inequalities 
of market power among players in the name of a complete 
abstention from enforcing substantial values in particular cases. 
The imposition of “unfair trading conditions” is the second 
fairness consideration, whereby the dominant undertaking 
leverages on its market power to impose conditions that would 
not be otherwise imposed absent the market power itself. Here 
probably lays the most trenchant difference with the US system 
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because, by linking the abusiveness of the conduct to the firm’s 
size in such an objective manner, EU competition authorities 
appear to proscribe a course of conduct that in the US may be 
deemed efficient and advantageous for consumers, namely the 
application of trading conditions that competitors cannot sustain, 
because of their less efficient organizational structure. 
That shows how one of the policy considerations of article 102 is 
achievement of fairness, in other terms that firms with market 
power behave “as-if” the market were competitive. This view was 
reflected in the need for protection of small and medium 
enterprises, which were deemed as important to the consumers as 
the big businesses1135. Thus, some restrictions on the dominant 
firm’s conduct are deemed necessary to reassure fairness. 
 
12.2 Market Integration considerations 
The market integration is the second European policy 
consideration extraneous to the enforcement of § 2. In 1958, the 
Rome Treaty on the establishment of the European Economic 
Community integrated into a unified Common Market the 
separate markets of the sovereign states. Because article 102 (in its 
old formulation as article 82) has been drafted as a part of the 
Treaty of Rome, it has been developed within the broader context 
that Treaty creates; the law relating to competition is also molded 
by reference to the initial articles of the Treaty, which enshrine the 
Treaty’s basic principles.  
The integration goal has informed all the new treaties, including 
the 1992 Treaty establishing the European Union1136, and the 
following ones. Article 3(g) focuses on the “institution of a system 
ensuring that competition in the common market is not 
distorted”1137. Article 2 requires the European Union “to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development of 
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an 
increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of 
living and closer relations between the States belonging to it”1138.  
These articles have set forth the principles that ultimately must 
guide the EU authorities in the application of competition rules. 
Hence, even after the achievement of the Monetary Union and 
introduction elements of a political union (citizenship, common 
foreign and internal affairs policy), the consolidation of the 
Internal Market has never ceased, and the Union has seen the 
                                                
1135  D. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting 
Prometheus, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 92 
1136 Treaty on European Union - Maastricht Treaty (1992) 
1137  Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/C_2002325EN.003301.html  
1138 Ibidem  
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increase to twenty-seven member States from the original six1139.  
Conversely, at the time of the enactment of the Sherman Act, the 
United States was already a federation of states with an already 
integrated economy and an integrated internal market. 
The consolidation of the Internal Market has traditionally been 
informing the application of article 102, for instance in the 
prohibition of artificially discriminatory prices for equivalent 
transactions among member states that merely represent obstacles 
to the free movement of goods and a way to compartimentalize 
the market along national borders, as the United Brands case 
suggests1140, or the charging of different fees to domestic and 
international customers1141. 
Despite that, it is not clear whether the market integration will 
continue to inform the application of article 102, given that there is 
no mention of such policy concern in the Commission’s discussion 
papers1142. 
 
13. A possible explanation: the dichotomy between consumerist 
and ordoliberal policies, or the dichotomy between an efficient 
and an open market 
Broadly speaking, both U.S. and E.U. competition regimes resort 
to the economic principles of competition, and utilize the concept 
of efficiency as a primary reason to regulate against monopolies. 
Pricing is the ultimate test for an efficiency-based regime, and 
plays a significant role in understanding the consequences of 
transactions and economic practices1143: it has been highlighted 
                                                
1139 European Community, Article 3 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, (EC Treaty) 1992, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html further provides in 
part: 1. For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community 
shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable 
set out therein: (a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs 
duties and quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of 
all other measures having equivalent effect; (b) a common commercial policy; 
(c) an internal market characterized by the abolition, as between Member States, 
of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital; (d) 
measures concerning the entry and movement of persons as provided for in 
Title IV; . . Article 14 provides in part: 1. The Community shall adopt measures 
with the aim of progressively establishing the internal market over a period 
expiring on 31 December 1992 . . . . 2. The internal market shall comprise an 
area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 
1140 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, 14.02.1978, 27/76, 1978, ECR 207, paras. 4 and 232. 
1141 Aéroports de Paris v. Commission of the European Communities, 12.12.2000, Case 
C-82/01, [2002], ECR I-2613 
1142 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005 
1143 K. Abutbul, The US and EU approaches to Competition Law – Convergent or 
Divergent Paths?, 17 Colum. J. Eur. L. 101 114 (2010) 
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how deeply the two regimes resort to price analysis in the 
definition of monopolization and abusive dominance 
standards1144. 
The incorporation of the basic price-centered tenets of economics 
in competition law is to be confronted with the traditional 
conceptual divide between § 2 and article 102, namely a strikingly 
different idea of competition enlivening each provision. Section 2 
of the Sherman Act departs from a consumer welfarist 
perspective, which focuses on price and output, efficiency and 
safeguard of technological innovation. The anticompetitive 
unilateral behavior is reviewed primarily with respect to whether 
it will, over the long run, increase consumer welfare. Legal 
analysis is grounded on economics, with the primary emphasis on 
efficiency and consumer welfare maximization. Antitrust, in other 
terms, is about the effects of business behavior on consumers, and 
the relationship of the firm’s conduct with the consumers’ well 
being, because it is understood that the appraisal of impact of the 
firm’s conduct on consumers can be obtained only with basic 
economic theory. 
Conversely, the ordoliberal ideas of safeguard of economic 
freedom, market access and rival opportunities provided the 
major impetus for article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union is inspired by1145.  Thus, the conduct of the 
dominant firm is analyzed with regard to a broader range of 
concerns that are not only economic but also social and political, 
and include the establishment of a Common Market, the 
approximation of social and economic conditions of Member 
States, and the guarantee of equal access to the market regardless 
of the size of the firm. Thus, the Ordoliberal approach disregards 
welfare as an element of the competition inquiry or, in other 
words, the analysis of the distortion of competition is not subject 
to the inquiry of whether this conduct is economically efficient or 
welfare reducing 1146 . Unlike the US, in EU competition law 
economic theory is not utilized in a normative sense to determine 
the ontological contours of a distortion of competition, but rather 
is a tool supplementing the legal categorization of conducts.  
Thus framed, the EU competition law background idea shows 
bears little resemblance to the American notion of competition as a 
generator of efficiency, even though one must allow that the Court 
                                                
1144 Amongst other standards, the law of predation of both systems is based on 
the price analysis of the conduct. 
1145 For an extensive overview of the Ordoliberal background of European 
Competition Law, see D.J. Gerber, Law and Competition in the Twentieth Centruy 
Europe: Protecting Prometheus, Oxford University Press, p. 357 et seq. (1998) P 
1146 T. Eilmansberger, How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 
82 EC: In Search of Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anti-Competitive 
Abuses, 42 Common Market L. Rev. 129, 137 (2005). 
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and Commission interpretation of the law of abusive dominance 
appears to be more market-oriented than the treaty provision 
itself1147.   
Throughout this essay, it has been argued that the Chicago School 
of Law and Economics has put the most emphasis on consumer 
welfare, and has recollected this policy concern in the overarching 
antitrust goal of the promotion of efficiency1148. In the context of 
monopoly, a number of welfarist claims drive Chicago School 
antitrust analysis.  
First and foremost, economic efficiency, as expressed in terms of 
consumer welfare maximization, should be the paramount goal of 
antitrust laws. Consumer welfare is maximized when economic 
resources are allocated in a way that guarantees consumer 
prosperity is satisfied as fully as technological progress allows1149. 
Second, the focus on consumer welfare standard produces more 
administrable and objective rules, and is particularly manifest in 
the refusal of including exploitative abuses in the reach § 2; the 
“consumer welfare” stake has no ethical or redistribution 
implications, and antitrust law is not a process for establishing 
who is rich and who is poor. It only seeks to increase consumer 
welfare by requiring that in transactions the most favorable 
conditions for consumers be met.  In all, consumer welfare is only 
a synonym for the wealth of the nation. Contrary to that, the 
reviviscence of the concepts of “excessive pricing” or “unfair 
trading conditions” as under article 102(a) still characterizes the 
European role of the judge as a controller of the excessive 
producer surplus, and as an arbiter of the fairness of market 
                                                
1147  The Commission has called for a more economic approach in the 
enforcement of article 102, through its Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, 
who has argued his final speech at the end of his five-year mandate, A reformed 
competition policy: achievements and challenges for the future: “There is now a 
framework to allow the Commission to concentrate on proper enforcement 
priorities: Major changes such as the modernization of procedures, the 
introduction of an economic approach [emphasis added] and a careful priority 
setting have allowed the Commission to move from being an authority mainly 
processing notifications to an authority focused on prosecuting cross-border 
cartels and other antitrust infringements of major economic impact”. Centre for 
European Reform, Brussels, 28 October 2004, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2004_3_1.pdf. P. Jebsen & 
R. Stevens, Assumptions, Goals and Dominant Undertakings, the Regulation of 
Competition under Article 86 of the European Union, 64 Antitrust L.J. 443 (1996) 
1148 R.H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 Journal of L. 
and Econ. 7 (1966), R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, introduction ix, 2001; C.F. Rule & D.L. Meyer, An Antitrust 
Enforcement Policy to Maximize the Economic Wealth of All Consumers, 33 Antitrust 
Bull. 677, 679 (1988) “whether critics like it or not, consumer welfare is today 
the guiding principle of antitrust law and policy”. 
1149 R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books, Inc. 
Publishers, New York, p. 91 (1993) 
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conditions1150. 
Third, most markets are competitive regardless of the presence of 
a monopolistic firm1151.   
Fourth, every monopoly tends to its natural dissolution, since the 
monopolist’s charging of a supra-competitive price stimulates 
new entries into the monopolist’s market1152.  
Fifth, antitrust enforcement should only seek “to penalize conduct 
precisely to the point that it is inefficient, but to tolerate or 
encourage it when it is efficient”1153. The overall efficiency of the 
market determines the level of consumer welfare. 
Sixth, entry barriers become irrelevant in a consumer welfare 
perspective; moreover, some barriers are even desirable on the 
grounds that they shelter efficient economic activities that law 
falls short of protecting (i.e. the positive externalities generated by 
technological innovation)1154.  
Seventh, efficiency and consumer welfare are simply related to the 
relationship price-output on the demand curve: the discipline of 
the market would guarantee efficiency and, overall, maximize 
consumer welfare.    
Contrary to this approach, Post-Chicago School analysis 
underscores more dynamic economic models and a greater factual 
inquiry that may better account for market imperfections. Despite 
“post-Chicago” scholars have criticized the under-inclusiveness of 
the Chicago doctrines and advocated for a better inquiry of 
market imperfections and the facts of cases, they have never 
disregarded the economic analysis of antitrust claims1155. It has 
been seen above how Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 
Inc. has been perceived as a rejection of some of the more striving 
assertions of the Chicago School1156; however, even if the Court 
                                                
1150 See supra, the fairness policy concerns characterizing the article 102 
1151 H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 227 
(1985) 
1152 H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 227 
(1985) 
1153 H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 229 
(1985). Likewise, the statement echoes Posner’s equally efficient competitor test, 
whereby the monopolist’s conduct is lawful to the extent that it only drives less 
efficient competitors off the market, having consumer welfare as the paradigm 
for the measurement of efficiency see supra. 
1154 E.M. Fox & L.A. Sullivan, Antitrust Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are 
We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 936, 974 (1987)  H. 
Demsetz, ‘Barriers to Entry’, 72 American Economic Review 1 47 (1982). The 
author maintains that a barrier to entry is a mere endogenous response to 
consumers’ preferences. For instance, the number of brands may be restricted 
by the consumers’ ability to evaluate alternatives.  
1155 See supra, paras. 4.4, 11.5 and 11.6, on the influence of Post-Chicago School 
on § 2’s enforcement.  
1156 M.L. Popofsky & M.S. Popofsky, Vertical Restraints in the 1990s: Is There A 
“Thermidorian Reaction” to the Post-Sylvania Orthodoxy?, 62 Antitrust L.J. 729, 751 
(1994) 
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adopted a more nuanced approach, it nonetheless carefully 
explored issues as market power, pricing, and switching costs, 
thereby placing a great deal of emphasis on welfare economic 
theory, which continues to stand as a pervasive element of 
American antitrust jurisprudence. 
Unlike the US model, the EU approach appears to be 
characterized by a less seamless theory and by less substantive 
and broader concerns than the mere welfare maximization. In 
particular, the Chicago school philosophy has been downplayed 
on the grounds of the overriding market-integration stakes 
characterizing the EU competition law development. The Chicago 
approach needs not worry about market integration, which is still 
an ongoing process in the EU1157. Economic analysis and the 
achievement of efficiency are subsumed into broader goals that 
shape the contours of article 102, such as the protection the equal 
opportunities of the dominant firm’s rivals. It has been noticed 
that the ban of excessive prices as “unfair”, not as inefficient, 
together with the proscription for dissimilar conditions that place 
“other trading parties ... at a competitive disadvantage” imply 
from the outset that the protection of such other trading parties is 
an end in itself, unraveled from the fostering of competition1158.  
Moreover, the mindset of European Courts tends to find indicia of 
dominance in the presence of smaller shares, which suggests a 
certain predisposition with respect to the finding of the abuse. As 
a result, EU competition jurisprudence has developed a more 
unpredictable law of abusive dominance, with a view to 
safeguarding rivals’ opportunities, even to the detriment of 
efficiency and success in enhancing consumer welfare. 
Furthermore, the dominant firm’s market share figures have been 
interpreted relationally, in relation with those of its rivals 
dominant firm’s share with its competitors (Hoffmann-La Roche), 
particularly with the next largest. That shows a tendency of EU 
competition authorities to regard a factor, which the US model 
views as the sheer endeavor of a business to enhance its efficiency, 
as indicating dominance, in a way to consider the absence of 
potential competition as the probable “consequence of the 
existence of obstacles preventing new competitors from having 
access to the market”1159.  
In other terms, in the EU model is characterized by the belief –or, 
to put it better the presumption- that the absence of competition 
denotes a deficiency of the market structure impairing the equal 
access to the market for competitors, which justifies the 
                                                
1157 Sir L. Brittan, European Competition Policy: Keeping the Playing-Field Level, 
Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels, Belgium), p. 3 (1992) 
1158 See supra, the prohibition of exploitative abuses in article 102. 
1159 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
13.02.1979, Case-85/76, 1979, ECR 461, para. 48 
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application of competition law. The influence of ordoliberal 
thinking, according to which the role of the State is the creation of 
a legal environment suitable for the economy, the maintenance of 
a healthy level of competition through measures that adhere to 
market principles, and the preservation of the prerequisites of the 
competitive system is evident1160. 
Conversely, the US system is more grounded on welfare-based 
effect analysis: the absence of competition does not necessarily 
imply the existence of obstacles for competitors, but rather the 
probable higher efficiency of the dominant firm, which has 
acquired an advantage over its rivals through its technological 
lead, its highly developed sales force, or its business acumen; 
moreover, in reaching economic efficiency, the monopolist has 
also enhanced consumer welfare. The need for antitrust law is 
justified only when evidence shows that the monopolist’s conduct 
is a hindrance to rivals’ efficient operations.  
Other traces of the primacy of the market structure can be found 
in the very definition of abuse as a “special responsibility not to 
allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on 
the Common Market”1161, which echoes the ordoliberal idea that 
protecting the competitive structure is a goal in itself, and that the 
test for abusive conduct is structural, i.e. grounded on the inquiry 
of the harm to business and market rivalry. Market players 
(competitors and consumers) vie with competition as a policy 
goal, in a way that the relevant conducts under article 102 are also 
those that have a negative impact on the competitive process1162. 
The Ordoliberal influence can be inferred by the EU’s greater 
willingness to compel a firm to venture with its rivals, as it has 
been seen in the different approach to the essential facilities 
doctrine. This emphasis “on access and ‘open’ markets seems to 
trump the possible chilling effects on investment and 
efficiencies”1163. 
Concluding, it can be affirmed that the interpretation of § 2 has 
evolved in accordance with changes in economic thoughts, but 
welfare analysis has never ceased to lead the way of Courts, with 
the result of narrowing down the coverage of the provision, as 
opposed to article 102, which in comparison appears to be overly 
                                                
1160 J.M. Smits, The Draft-Common Frame of Reference, Methodological Nationalism 
and the Way Forward, European Review of Contract Law 3, (2008), D. Gerber, 
Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus, Oxford 
University Press, 1998, p. 92 
1161 See supra, Michelin I 
1162 E. Fox, Abuse of Dominance and Monopolisation: How to Protect Competition 
Without Protecting Competitors, in C.D. Ehlermann & I. Atanasiu (eds.), 2003 
European Competition Law Annual – What is an Abuse of a Dominant Position?, Hart 
Publishing, 2006, p. 69  
1163 B.E. Hawk, Article 82 and Section 2, in ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2 Issues 
in Competition Law and Policy, 875 (2008) 
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broad.  
In particular, strict recoupment is required for predatory pricing 
under § 2, whereas under Article 102 the structural recoupment 
suffices. Furthermore, American Courts tend to downplay claims 
based on allegations of unlawful leveraging on a lawfully 
acquired monopoly, owing to the lack of a unique standard and of 
administrable rules 1164 . Monopoly leverage claims are more 
benevolently received under EU law, where they are policed 
either under article 102(b), when they result into the exclusion of 
competitors from the related market, or under article 102(d), when 
they result into tying abuses1165. In addition, U.S. courts are more 
reluctant than those in the EC to mandate access by competitors to 
a dominant firm’s resources1166. 
The Commission has repeatedly stated that one of the goals of EC 
competition policy is the enhancement of consumer welfare1167. 
Even if it is fair to affirm that the EU and United States both 
endorse consumer welfare as a primary objective of competition 
law, on the one hand, the term “consumer welfare” masks 
profound differences, on the other hand. The United States and 
EC take different approaches even when alleging to embrace 
consumer welfare.  
Different historical contexts, policy considerations, and 
underlying assumptions (economic and juridical) explain the 
broader scope of Article 102. Differences will remain in light of the 
enduring fairness and market integration objectives of Article 102.  
However, the two models are not completely impermeable to one 
another, for at least two reasons. First, the EC’s increasing 
acceptance of welfare economics may approximate the normative 
understanding and the judicial enforcement of the two statutes. 
Second, the meaning of “competition” -as harm stemming from 
the diversion of trade to the respondent from its competitors- as 
understood in the Robinson-Patman Act, different from the 
traditional welfarist slant of American antitrust, which is 
traditionally indifferent to wealth redistributions among 
businesses, could result into the embedment of the protection of 
                                                
1164 See Chapter I, monopoly leveraging, note n. 48. Monopoly leverage claims 
are numerous, but the outcomes are oscillating 
1165  Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities, 
14.11.1996, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951 para. 27 
1166 J. Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, Speech of the 31st Conference of the 
European Association of Research in Industrial Economics, Berlin, September 
3rd, 2004, available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/spe0304.pdf  
1167 Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, Competition for Consumers’ Benefit 
(Speech delivered in Amsterdam, 22.10.2002), p. 6 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2004_016_en.pdf . “I have 
put consumer welfare at the top of the agenda of competition policy in 
Europe”.  
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small and medium enterprises into monopolization laws, in a way 
that is at all similar to the European enforcement of the law 
abusive dominance. 
 
13.1 Re-reading the claim: “We protect competition, you protect 
competitors” 
Following the above analysis, the writer agrees with the claim of 
an eminent American antitrust scholar, who rethought of the 
traditional difference between American and European antitrust 
law scopes, which can be epitomized with the saying: “We protect 
competition, you protect competitors”1168.  
The types of conduct that are actually detrimental to consumers 
are those implying an artificial output limitation aimed at raising 
the price for a product, on the one hand, and those seeking to 
degrade or undermine the market mechanism by blocking 
competition on the merits, on the other hand. The first hypothesis 
characterizes the rethoric of the American model, for which if a 
conduct is not output-limiting, then it is procompetitive: the law 
of monopolization is non-interventionist, unless the monopolist 
conduct is inefficient, in terms of artificial output limitation and 
price increase1169.  
The rethoric of the European model is more informed to the 
second hypothesis, for which the conduct of the dominant firm is 
anticompetitive when it forecloses competition on the merits1170: 
the law of abusive dominance prevents dominant firms from 
unfairly abusing their market power to create artificial obstacles to 
the non-dominant firms1171. However, both the output-limitation 
and the foreclosure of competition on the merits can be recollected 
in a rationale of protection of competition, not in the dichotomy 
competition-competitor, because the exclusionary conducts 
foreclosing competition on the merits can easily translate 
themselves into an output limitation and a price increase1172.  
Aside from that, antitrust can also embrace conducts that harm 
competitors directly, and look to the competitive process as 
unavoidably fair: it is the case of the antidiscrimination laws of 
both models1173, in which the meaning of harm to competition is 
                                                
1168  E.G. Fox, We protect competition, you protect competitors, 26 World 
Competition 2 149 (2003) 
1169 R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books, Inc. 
Publishers, New York, p. 123 (1993) 
1170  E.G. Fox, We protect competition, you protect competitors, 26 World 
Competition 2 152 (2003) 
1171  E.G. Fox, We protect competition, you protect competitors, 26 World 
Competition 2 159 (2003) 
1172  E.G. Fox, We protect competition, you protect competitors, 26 World 
Competition 2 167 (2003) 
1173 Compare Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 703 (1967) as 
regards the US model, and British Airways plc v. Commission of the European 
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essentially that of harm to competitors. No model a priori eschews 
the protection of competitors as an antitrust goal, in turn the EU 
prohibiting discriminatory abuses as under article 102(c), and the 
US prohibiting price discrimination as under §2(a) of the Robinson 
Patman Act. The American provision is even more far reaching, as 
it has been seen, even though is positions itself outside of the 
monopolization law. Both models regard this type of abuses as 
exceptional with respect to the output-limitation or to the 
exclusionary standards, for the very fact that antitrust 
enforcement against a conduct that merely harms competitors, 
may result into consumer harm, since it is very difficult to find a 
consumer enhancement rationale in the enforcement of 
antidiscrimination provisions.  
 
14. “Rhine” capitalism Vs “Anglo-American” capitalism 
The differences thus far outlined between the two statutes also 
display intriguing parallels between two different models of 
capitalism, the “Anglo-American” or model, on the one hand, and 
the “Rhine” model, on the other hand. The two definitions were 
coined by Albert Michel in his 1991 book “Capitalism versus 
Capitalism”1174.  
The “Anglo-American” model is based on laissaz faire capitalism, 
i.e. on the idea that free market is the most powerful driver of 
development, and that the government should abstain from 
regulating the economy. The main goals of this model are 
individual achievement and the pursuit of short-term profits. 
Therefore, the interests of stakeholders are subordinate to the 
interests of both shareholders and management, and the macro-
policy is focused on the short run business cycle. Elsewhere, it has 
been indicated as “stock market capitalism”1175. 
In the “Rhine” model, collective achievement, social solidarity and 
public consensus are intended as the keys to long-term success. 
Moreover, the building of consensus among stakeholders is the 
key element of the &action& in& pursuit & of& long‐term& economic& and 
social goals, with the least amount of government intervention 
possible.&Elsewhere, it has been indicated as “welfare 
capitalism”1176. 
The Rhine model implies a minimum regulation of the market in a 
                                                                                                                                                            
Communities, 15.03.2007, Case C 95-04 P, [2007] ECR I-2331, as regards the EU 
model. With regard to the European model, compare chapter II, para. 7.3, 
discriminatory abuses, and the difficulties of separating a pure discriminatory 
conduct from one that is also exploitative, on the one hand, and the difficulties 
of recollecting pure discrimination in a consumer welfare perspective. 
1174 M. Albert, Capitalism versus capitalism, London, Whurr, Business Economics, 
1993. In 1991, the book was firstly published in French, Capitalisme contre 
capitalisme, Paris, Editions du Seuil. 
1175 R.P. Dore, Stock Market Capitalism ‐ Welfare Capitalism, Oxford, 2000 
1176 R.P. Dore, Stock Market Capitalism ‐ Welfare Capitalism, Oxford, 2000 
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way to strike a balance between the rights of private capital and 
the long-term social needs of the economy. The model is inspired 
by the social welfare provisions distinctive of the German Social 
Market economy (Sozialmarktwirtschaft), which in turn derive from 
the two fundamental principles of the Freiburg School creed 
(Weltanschauung – “vision of the world”): 1) the dynamism of the 
economy is grounded on the dynamism of the market structure, 
not on the market outcome efficiency; thus, the swift functioning 
of the market is the main goal of state intervention, 2) The proper 
functioning of the market does not suffice in regulating the whole 
of social and economic life, but necessitates exogenous balancing 
elements.  
It follows that the State has the right to intervene in the economic 
and social issues only when the proper structural conditions of 
competition are distorted, on the one hand, or when social 
problems arise out of the economic organization, such as the need 
to improve the working conditions or “humanize” the production 
cycles, on the other hand (the German State of the 1949 Weimar 
Constitution professed to be a welfare state)1177.  
The “Anglo-American” model is characterized by a generalized 
lack of social protection (no welfare state). One of the tenets of the 
model is the abandonment of the Keynesian model, based on the 
stimulus of demand and on the budget deficit, put in place by 
President Reagan administration in favor of a policy based on 
supply-side economics and theorized by Milton Friedman, who 
argued in favor of a substantial tax reduction, of a central control 
of the money supply in the system, of deregulation, of 
privatization1178.  
The long-term view of the Rhine model is grounded on a sense of 
solidarity that is reflected not only in cooperative labor-
management relations but also in the proneness of the wealthier 
classes to be taxed more in order to contribute to a more generous 
system of social security. That implies a lesser economic rigor, a 
dichotomy between social needs and financial strength, which 
makes the model appear “vaguely amateur”1179. 
The Anglo-American model, in contrast, creates the possibility of 
rapid increases in wealth by individuals, is more rigorous and 
intransigent towards the less successful people. The Rhine model 
aspires to be “capitalism with a human face”1180, whereas the 
Anglo-American capitalism is the “law of the jungle”, with some 
                                                
1177 M. Albert, Capitalism versus capitalism, London, Whurr, Business Economics, 
p. 132, 1993 
1178 M. Albert, Capitalism versus capitalism, London, Whurr, Business Economics, 
p. 36, 1993.  
1179 M. Albert, Capitalism versus capitalism, London, Whurr, Business Economics, 
p. 222, 1993. 
1180 Ibidem 
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built-in antidotes for its own shortcomings: a meticulous legalism, 
a high sense of morality of religious descent, a high civic spirit and 
a high spirit of association1181.  
The declination of economic democracy brings to regulate the 
market with a view to the emancipation of individuals. In the 
Neo-American model, the overriding goal is the achievement of 
outcome efficiency, which calls for simple, unconditional 
protection of property rights. In the Rhine model, the 
emancipation of individuals is possible when markets are 
regulated and citizens share values regarding the idea of equality 
and solidarity. 
The two models of capitalism substantially diverge on the role of 
the market and, more specifically, on lays on the axiological 
priority assigned to goods market in the Anglo-American model, 
and of the priority of mixed goods market in the Rhine model. 
Both goods market and mixed goods market are subject to the 
rules of free market, but the latter is partly dependent on the State 
initiative. In this framework, the firm is considered as part of the 
goods market, as like as its products, in the Anglo-American 
model, whereas it falls within the mixed goods market in the 
Rhine model, more precisely it positions itself between a 
community and a commodity. Salaries are more and more 
dependent on the contingencies of the market in the Anglo-
American model; conversely, in the Rhine model, salaries are 
untied to the worker’s productivity, and related to other factors, 
such as education, length of service and collective bargaining.  
The difference is striking and sheds light on the idea of 
competition characterizing American law of monopolization, in 
which even the basic structure of the firm is subject to the laws of 
free market, in which antitrust intervention is minimal and 
plausible as long as there is harm to efficiency, as represented by 
an artificial limitation of output and raise in price. This is the only 
harm to consumers that make antitrust regulation acceptable as 
opposed to the free display of market forces. 
The consumerist dimension of European citizens conveys the idea 
of a citizen-stakeholder, whose public dimension, in the sense of 
the stakeholder theory itself 1182 , is better expressed by the 
representation of stakes than by the suffragist representation. This 
dimension is reflected in the treatment of the abuse of dominant 
position: as a stakeholder, the citizen has the power of influencing 
the outcome of the productive process. Therefore, harm to 
                                                
1181 Ibidem 
1182 The stakeholder theory was elaborated by R. Edward Freeman in the book 
Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, Boston: Pitman, (1984), who 
argued in a nutshell that aside from the shareholders, there are other 
“stakeholder” involved in the management and governance of a company, 
whose interests deserve regard.  
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competition includes harm to the competitive process, and the 
best way to protect consumers, along with the interests of 
producers, is to guarantee the openness of the market. 
The process of shaping and fostering of the Internal market, 
together with the creation of the European Union, has identified 
from the outset at Social Market Economy as a fundamental 
guiding principle1183. Social market economy is also enshrined in 
the first paragraph of article 3 of the Treaty on the European 
Union, which states: “The Union shall establish an internal market. 
It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on 
balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly 
competitive social market economy [emphasis added], aiming at full 
employment and social progress, and a high level of protection 
and improvement of the quality of the environment”1184. 
To quote the EU Commissioner responsible for Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion László Andor, the Freiburg School’s 
“social market economy” resembled the struggle “to find a 
halfway house (hybrid, cocktail etc.) between a laissez-faire 
market-based economy and one that was centrally planned and 
State-directed. was the compromise term selected…. The social 
market economy is based on two clearly distinct but 
complementary pillars: on the one hand, the enforcement of 
competition, and on the other, social policy measures to guarantee 
social justice by correcting negative outcomes and bolster social 
protection”1185. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1183 A. Somma, L’economia sociale di mercato / 1. Il fascino della terza via: torna di 
moda un passato mai passato, in XLIV “Biblioteca della Libertà”, 195, 2009, p. 44 
1184 Article 3 paragraph 3 of the Consolidated Treaty on European Union. 
1185 EU Commissioner responsible for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
László Andor, Building a social market economy in the European Union, Speech 
delivered in Manchester, 20 October 2011, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-695_en.htm  
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1. Introductory Remarks  
The following chapter has a twofold purpose. First and foremost, 
an attempt will be made to conceptualize the differences emerged 
in the descriptive and comparative part, and to re-collect the two 
legal models into a general framework for legal analysis, which 
has been elaborated by professor Neil Komesar in his seminal 
books “Imperfect Alternatives”1186, and the later “Law’s limits”1187, 
and is known as “comparative institutional analysis”. This 
approach entails making an “institutional choice”, namely 
identifying the process that can best reconcile the juxtaposition of 
various interests among those that participate in the molding of 
the laws of monopolization and of abusive dominance. Thus, the 
fundamental question of this section will be: is there an institution 
that best tackles the monopoly-abusive dominance phenomenon, 
by representing all the interests at stake? 
A caveat applies to institutional choice: the processes influencing 
the phenomena under investigation -the adjudicative, the market, 
and the political process- are “imperfect alternatives”, namely no 
institution can take account of the dynamics of all the available 
interests in a perfect manner, and no institution can in itself 
achieve the policy goals embedded in the legal question under 
investigation. Accordingly, the above question will be answered 
adversely, for there is no institution can operate independently of 
the others in the regulation of the issue. At any rate, the 
comparative institutional analysis will account for the various 
forces, the judge, the government and the market, which weigh on 
American antitrust and European competition regulations.  
Thus, despite the imperfections and the highly speculative nature 
of institutional choice, the purpose of this attempt will be to give 
an insight of the fact that the law in general, and the laws of 
                                                
1186 N.K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives – Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, 
and Public Policy, University of Chicago Press, (1994) 
1187 N.K. Komesar, Law’s Limits: Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of Rights, 
Cambridge University Press, (2001) 
MICHELE CERIMELE 
 
MONOPOLIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
362 
 
monopolization and of abusive dominance in particular, are the 
consequence of decisions, and the decision-making process is not 
the static product of an omniscient law-maker, or an omniscient 
court, but is a dynamic result stemming from a mass of conflicting 
stakes and diverging processes. 
The second broad scope of the chapter is to draw some brief 
speculative conclusions that will complete the essay by displaying 
the interrelation among the court’s activity, the political process 
and the market forces in the shaping of the discipline of monopoly, 
bearing in mind that the critical conclusions, those pertaining the 
comparison of the two model, can be found in the second part of 
chapter III. 
 
1.1 Comparative institutional analysis  
With regard to the first scope In the first sentence of his book 
“Law’s Limits”, professor Komesar cannot better describe the 
essence of law and his approach to a comparative institutional 
analysis: “ the essence of law does not lie in disembodied 
principles and abstract values. What law is, can be, or ought to be 
is determined by the character of those processes that make, 
interpret, and enforce law. The interaction of these processes 
molds the supply of and demand for law”1188. 
The molding of law depends on the positions of who decides; the 
essence of law making is the interaction between institutions. 
Institutions to Komesar are large-scale social decision-making 
processes. In broad categories, decision-making involves the 
market, the political process and the adjudicative process, i.e. the 
courts.  These institutions are alternative means through which 
societies determine their goals. Parallel to that is another postulate 
of comparative institutional analysis: when an institution 
functions properly and determines a legal rule for a question, its 
performance has normative validity. 
More specifically, the choices between markets, courts and 
political process pervade law and public policy at all level. 
According to Komesar, the decision of who decides is an 
“institutional choice”, meaning that the “decisions of who decides 
is actually a decision of what decides”1189. In law, the decision 
makers are not individuals, or groups of individuals (such as the 
political parties), but processes, such as the political process, the 
market process and the adjudicative process. Individuals play a 
role in the shaping of law through the filter of the “institutions”.  
Institutions tend to move together. When one institution is at its 
best or worst, the alternative institutions are often at their best or 
                                                
1188 N.K. Komesar, Law’s Limits: Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of Rights, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 3 (2001) 
1189 N.K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives – Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, 
and Public Policy, University of Chicago Press, (1994), p. 3 
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worst as well1190. To explain this movement, Komesar focuses on 
two factors: the number of relevant parties and the complexity of 
the decision. The market process and adjudicative process both 
function well when the number of parties affected by the relevant 
decision is small and the complexity of the decision is low. 
However, when numbers and/or complexity increase, the 
functions of both institutions deteriorate 1191 . Nonetheless, the 
question is not whether the market process or the adjudicative 
process performance improves or deteriorates with a certain 
numbers and complexity, but whether an institution works better 
or worse than the alternatives. It is unavoidable that in each case, 
the considerations of the court involve a choice between 
alternatives. 
 
1.1.1 The adjudicative process 
The functioning of the adjudicative process raises three 
institutional considerations: the competence, the scale, and the 
dynamics of litigation. By competence, Komesar means the ability 
of judges and juries as decision makers, to investigate, understand 
highly technical issues and make substantive decisions1192. By scale, 
the implications of increasing or decreasing the physical capacity 
of an institution are intended, namely the resources of budget 
available to the judiciary in relation with the expansion of the 
other institutions1193.  
The dynamics of litigation are the consequence of the distribution 
of stakes in the adjudicative process. Uniform low stakes mean 
both dispersed defendants and dispersed plaintiffs, which implies 
the probability of inaction1194. Uniform high stakes mean a small 
number of actors with high per capita stakes, which implies 
concentrated litigation 1195 . Skewed stakes mean concentrated 
potential defendant and dispersed potential plaintiffs, and the 
probability of action depends on the availability of a class action 
procedure1196.  These three considerations interact with each other 
and with factors such as numbers and complexity to determine the 
performance of the court.  
Compared to the market process, the adjudicative process exhibits 
three distinctive structural elements that define its function: 
higher threshold costs for participation, limited scale, and more 
independence of judges from the general population than their 
                                                
1190 Ibidem, p. 23 
1191 N.K. Komesar, Law’s Limits: Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of Rights, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 4 (2001) 
1192 N.K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives – Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, 
and Public Policy, University of Chicago Press, (1994), p. 138 
1193 Ibidem, p. 142 
1194 Ibidem, p. 128 
1195 Ibidem, p. 129 
1196 Ibidem, p. 132 
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market or political counterparts1197. The interaction between the 
elements of the institutions and the factors such as numbers and 
complexity suggest a predictable shift in the choice of institution 
as numbers and complexity increases1198. 
When numbers and complexity are low, the adjudicative process 
has the scale and competence to make judgments, sending more 
complex issues of balancing to the market. The adjudicative 
process should not balance the benefits and costs when the market 
process can accomplish the balance. As numbers and/or 
complexity increase, the market process will show systemic 
pressures and the dynamics of litigation will restrain the 
adjudicative process1199. Despite the fact that the functioning of the 
adjudicative process will also deteriorate, its judicial 
independence makes it a better determiner then the market 
process. As numbers and/or complexity continue to increase, the 
court suffers more supply constraints that limit its ability to meet 
the demand for law1200. 
It has been seen that theories of law and public policy underlying 
the two models focus on different social goals and values. With 
regard to the US system, the solely consistent policy goal is the 
increase of consumer welfare, or the increase of the nation’s 
wealth. The overriding social goals that appear to inspire the 
European model are the safeguard of fairness in transaction, the 
fostering of the internal market.   
 
1.1.2 The political process 
The analysis of the political process is the first step of comparative 
institutional analysis. The author proposes an alternative 
approach to understanding the political process, the two-force 
model of politics with majoritarian and minoritarian biases as 
twin sources of political malfunction, and the premise of cross-
institutional complexity, according to which increasing numbers 
and complexity similarly hamper all alternative institutional 
arrangements, greatly complicating institutional-choice decisions. 
The political process simply malfunctions because legislation is 
always biased in either in favor of majority or of minority. These 
shortcomings may be overcome by countervailing majoritarian 
and minoritarian influences in the political process: the majority 
has lower per capita stakes, but a greater number to dominate the 
political outcome, whereas the losing majority does not have the 
                                                
1197 Ibidem, p. 123 
1198 N.K. Komesar, Law’s Limits: Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of Rights, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 19 (2001) 
1199 Ibidem 
1200 Ibidem 
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incentives to recognize that it has been harmed 1201. Conversely, the 
minority has higher per capita stakes, and it is more likely that the 
members of the interest group understand better the issue at stake 
in the process1202. If the capital benefit exceeds the cost of political 
participation, the affected group will contribute to the process, 
unless the incentive to free ride will induce the latter to allow 
others to bear the costs of political participation1203. The smaller an 
interest group is, the higher the capita stakes and the less likely to 
face free-riding problems. 
Moreover, the degree and form participation in the political 
process for both small and big groups depends on the per capita 
benefits of political action, “including the mean, variance, and 
skewness of that distribution”1204, on the one hand, and the costs of 
political participation (costs of overcoming the free riding problem 
and information costs of identifying others who are in a similar 
position), on the other hand.  
In sum, the results of the political process can be traced to 
variation in the strength of the majoritarian and minoritarian 
influence, on the one hand, and to the distribution of stakes and 
the cost of information and organization. The voting system is the 
means to translate larger numbers into majoritarian influence1205. 
In democracy, majorities gain their influence over minorities 
simply by number, whereas minorities gain their influence over 
minorities where the distribution of stake-interests is uneven or 
skewed. Even if systems have in general majoritarian biases, the 
more concentrated the minorities’ interests are the more likely 
they will prevail over dispersed majoritarian interests. In fact, if 
the interest is skewed, a concentrated minority may prevail over a 
dispersed majority and seek rents on the functioning of politics. 
Rent seeking is a means to subject the political process to 
minoritarian biases1206. 
 
1.1.3 The market process 
The market process serves a function complementary to the 
political process, as a means parallel to the government action to 
achieve social goals. The market participation in the shaping of 
law takes place through transactions, by virtue of which society’s 
                                                
1201 N.K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives – Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, 
and Public Policy, University of Chicago Press, (1994), p. 65 
1202 Ibidem, p. 68 The author argues that the members of the losing majority –
often consumers and taxpayers- do not have the incentives to recognize that 
they have been harmed. Thus, legislation is sometimes protective with respect 
to them.  
1203 Ibidem, p. 69 
1204 Ibidem, p. 71 
1205 Ibidem, p. 74 
1206 N.K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives – Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, 
and Public Policy, University of Chicago Press, (1994), p. 116 
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scarce resources are allocated. In the market process the social 
results are setting market prices and output, whereby determining 
the distribution of wealth. The transactions are atomistic, but 
contribute to determine an aggregate result. The dynamics of 
market participation imply the evaluation of costs and benefits of 
participating in a transaction.  
The two constraints applying to the market process are the 
“market failures”, which demonstrate that the market is far from 
being perfect, on the one hand, and the costs of market 
participation (transaction costs), which play a significant role on 
how social income, welfare and opportunities are distributed, on 
the other hand1207.  
Market participation produces far less than ideal results in terms 
of social goals and resource allocation efficiency, on the accounts 
of a misinformed participation and higher transaction costs 
inherent in the bargaining. Thus, the government, or the political 
process in general, can also serve to impede the transacting costs 
and to foster the achievement of social goal associated to the 
market process, such as resource allocation efficiency1208. 
 
1.2 The participation-centered approach 
When it comes to identifying a method for the actual comparative 
institutional analysis, Komesar proposes participation-centered 
approach. One of the tenets of this approach is that the changes in 
the institutions will not occur if interested parties do not thrust 
upon them. Stakeholders can influence the political process by 
voting for those politicians who share their same interests, or by 
propaganda1209, buyers and sellers can foster market change by 
transacting in ways that achieve the change itself, or litigants can 
affect the adjudicative system by bringing cases to court. 
                                                
1207 Ibidem, p. 104. The analysis of the market process and of the role of 
transaction economics owes, by explicit admission of the author, a significant 
debt to the work of Ronald Coase, who used transaction costs to explore the 
source and the extent of externalities (R.H. Coase, The problem of Social Costs 3 
J.L. & Econ 1 (1960). Information costs are the primary externalities -they are 
not internalized in the process of transaction-, and have a significant economic 
impact on the market process. Komesar shares the heuristic value of the 
renowned Coase theorem, for which at zero transaction costs an efficient 
allocation of resources would occur whatever the initial assignment of property 
rights. The role of government in supporting market is to reduce transaction 
costs. Therefore, the state is an essential complement to the market. Unlike 
Coase, according to Komesar the analysis of the market process does not only 
depend on understanding its costs, but also on understanding its benefits. The 
market, for instance, can complement the adjudication process, when the latter 
cannot envisage any efficient solution for a dispute. 
1208 N.K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives – Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, 
and Public Policy, University of Chicago Press, (1994), p. 114 
1209 N.K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives – Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, 
and Public Policy, University of Chicago Press, (1994), p. 64 
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Participation in the institutions, however, will not occur if the 
benefits do not outweigh the costs of it. Thus, the nature of the 
participation depends on this interaction between benefits and 
costs of it. With regard to the benefits, the dynamics of each 
process depends on the average per capita stakes and on the 
differential of per capita stakes between the parties. The higher the 
stake of the party, the more change in that favored direction will 
benefit the party.  
With regard to the costs of participation, they entail transaction 
costs and litigation costs, in the adjudicative process, the costs of 
acquiring information about the current legal rule and the costs to 
change it, as well as the costs of organization in the political 
process1210.  
The characteristics of participation costs and benefits are the same 
for every institution. In general, the central determinants of the 
costs of participation include the number of parties and the 
complexity of the participation1211. The more diffuse an interest is 
among a group of people, the lower each person’s stake in the 
outcome, and the less incentive of parties to promote that interest. 
Parallel to that, a diffuse interest will be harder to identify, on the 
grounds of the information cost of identification of such interest 
and the free riding of non-participants1212.  
In addition to that, each institution creates its own costs that 
produce an aftermath on participation: the access costs to courts is 
significantly high regardless of the nature of the interest, but 
lower than the access cost to the political process (voting for the 
law-makers that share the same views). Access costs to the market 
process depend on the extent of transaction costs, and whether the 
latter do not exceed the benefits of market participation1213.  
In order to apply the participation-centered approach a three-
prong test should be deployed: first the social goals that the legal 
question intends to promote should be identified; second, the 
groups affected by a legal change should be identified; third, the 
cost of participating in each institution should be compared with 
the benefits of using the institution itself1214. The purpose of this 
analysis is the evaluation of how each institution performs with 
regard to a legal question compared to the others. 
Regardless of the comparison, each institution has also a vision of 
good performance.  
With respect to the political process, the Congress will perform 
poorly when it is subject to the over-representation of one group 
                                                
1210 Ibidem, p. 8 and 71 
1211 Ibidem 
1212 Ibidem, p. 69 
1213 Ibidem, p. 125 
1214 H.S. Herlanger & T.W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 Law 
and Soc. Inquiry 959 (1997) 
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and the under-representation of another group. Moreover, if the 
interest is skewed, a concentrated minority may prevail over a 
dispersed majority and seek rents in the functioning of politics. 
This way the process may be subject to a minoritarian bias1215. 
Such is the case of rent-seeking –mainly obtained through 
lobbying- of producers to obtain monopoly positions by excluding 
competition through tariffs, or monopoly regulation. The task of 
the analyst is to assess whether one group has disproportionate 
influence with respect to the social policy goal to pursue, and 
whether the group’s interest is conducive to a legal change that 
affords the group itself more benefits than are efficient for 
society1216.  
With respect to the market process, transaction costs are the 
externalities that most affect the performance. If transaction costs 
outweigh the benefits of contracting on the market, the market 
cannot provide indication as for the legal change1217. Under the 
participation-centered approach market functions when 
transactions reflect the bargaining by informed parties. As an 
example, transactions of consumers with very low per capita 
stakes and less information may be affected by the rent-seeking of 
smaller groups, such as the producers, often achieved by 
advertising1218.  
With respect to the court, the performance evaluation functions 
the same way as for the other institutions. Litigants adhere courts 
only if the expected benefits outweigh the access costs. If the cost-
benefit analysis suggests that the court is not the appropriate 
institution to give a legal rule to the question, either other 
institutions will operate the legal change, or the question will 
remain undecided, or it might be decided on the account of the 
one case that makes it to court. If the interest is diffuse and parties 
have a small per capita stake, they may ignore the rules resulting 
from the precedent. Owing to that, rent-seeking in the 
adjudicative process is more limited. 
All three processes rely on a cost-benefit analysis of participation. 
Moreover, each process has some constraints or peculiarities 
affecting the respective performance. 
 
1.3 Summary: comparative institutional analysis and 
participation-centered approach 
In sum, participation in the political process may either consist of 
voting or of lobbying, depending on the nature and variance of 
the interest. Participation in the market process means 
                                                
1215 N.K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives – Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, 
and Public Policy, University of Chicago Press, (1994), p. 116 
1216 Ibidem, p. 76 
1217 Ibidem, p.  111-112 
1218 Ibidem, p. 116 
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participating through transactions, bearing in mind that 
transaction costs best capture the dynamics of market 
participation and the benefits and costs of such participation. 
Participation in the adjudicative process means participating as 
litigants, considering the litigation costs caused by the dynamics 
of litigation.  
The participation-centered approach involves the identification of 
the different groups interested in a legal rule and the cost-benefits 
analysis concerning the participation in any of the three 
institutions. 
The comparative institutional analysis entails the identification of 
a social policy goal and the evaluation of the comparative abilities 
of each institution to achieve it, on the account of the level of 
participation of each stakeholder group. 
 
2. Comparative institutional analysis of monopolization laws 
In the following section an attempt will be made to apply the 
Komesar comparative institutional analysis to the two models 
previously described and compared, in order to evaluate the 
impact of the three institutions –market, politics, courts- on the 
legal question at issue. Thus, an attempt will be made to make an 
institutional choice on which of the processes above described can 
best pursue the social policy goals embedded in turn in the 
American law of monopolization and the European law of abusive 
dominance. 
Preliminarily, it should be reaffirmed that the preponderant role 
of the judicial formant in the treatment of the monopolization-
abusive dominance is familiar to the common law family, as it has 
been seen that the development of the principles and 
identification of abusive conducts has been largely left to the 
courts’ activity –or, in institutional choice jargon-, to the 
adjudicative process.  
Although article 102 singles out a list of proscribed conducts, the 
non-exhaustive nature of such list has allowed the ECJ and the 
Commission to develop a praetorian law of abusive dominance. In 
the US system, § 2 of the Sherman Act merely proscribes the act or 
the attempt of monopolizing an interstate market and defines a 
sanction for the unlawful conduct. The American provision is 
even less regulatory and has allowed courts to be a mouthpiece 
for the identification of monopolization conducts to a further 
extent than the European Courts and authorities.  
 
2.1 The policy goals of the two models 
In the previous chapter, it has been argued that the policy 
concerns of the two models are sensibly different: the US law of 
monopolization is exclusively a matter of protection of consumer 
welfare, whereas the EU law of abusive dominance is influenced 
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by fairness and market integration concerns. The American 
system seeks to enhance consumer welfare through a thorough 
adherence to the economic principles of supply and demand, on 
the one hand, and the laissez-faire praise for non-intervention in 
the regulation of the economic power, on the other hand. This 
policy goal is thus cast in terms of resource allocation efficiency.  
The European system seeks to promote fairness, in terms of 
protection of consumers and small businesses, on the one hand, 
and to consolidate the internal market, in terms of guaranteeing 
competition on the common market. The fairness concern is not 
expressed in normative terms, but emerges from the systemic 
interpretation of article 102, in accordance with its ordoliberal 
roots and with the acquis communautaire, which is in general 
focused on the establishment of equal market conditions for all 
market players1219. Conversely, the market integration concern is 
expressed normatively (Article 3(g) of the 1992 Treaty Establishing 
the European Union). 
Thus, the European judge applies the rules by looking at the 
results, and he will be driven by both fairness and market 
integration consideration, as essential parts of the enforcement of 
article 102. Conversely, the American judge regards legal certainty 
as a means to bar individuals from accomplishing antisocial ends, 
in particular when it looks at outcome efficiency as the only stance 
through which consumer welfare can be maximized.  
 
2.1.1 The impact of the adjudicative process on the question of 
monopolization 
In the context of monopolization, the interest groups are the 
monopolistic firm, the competitors, being either small or big 
businesses, and the consumers. The latter is largest interest group 
that is almost never directly represented in either the political or 
the adjudicative process, due to the dispersed character of their 
interest. Likewise, small businesses have also a dispersed interest, 
compared to big firms that are more affected by the monopolist’s 
conduct and can afford accessing the adjudicative process to 
vindicate their interests.  
Despite the deep influence of the judicial formant in the 
development of the law, it has been seen that in both models 
antitrust authorities are far from optimal decision-makers. The 
monopoly phenomenon is extremely complex and impacts a large 
number of people and business entities that are affected by the 
arrangements of the dominant firm. In both models, judges often 
lack technical expertise to police the issue of monopolization and 
to make decisions that are material with the policy goals 
                                                
1219 F.A. Schurr, What Role does Competition Law play in the Genesis of a Harmonised 
European Private Law, 14 Revue Juridique Polynésienne 14 (2008)  
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overriding the systems.  
In terms of dynamics of the litigation, in the US the possibility of 
private enforcement of antitrust law, on the one hand, and of 
awarding treble damages, on the other hand, makes court only 
virtually accessible to parties that have a dispersed interest, absent 
an efficient class action. The class action, as a matter of fact, 
implies a balance between the benefits of a single institutional 
response to the members of the class, and the reluctance of courts 
to open themselves to aggregate claims1220, also in light of the risk 
of awarding false positives. Thus, the exclusion of dispersed 
stakes and the absence of small claims are almost embedded in the 
dynamics of the adjudicative process. At any rate, compared to the 
European process the possibility of private standing remains a 
strong protective force for market players and consumers, which 
does not characterized the European model. 
In the EU model, the virtual absence of private enforcement of 
competition law virtually excludes the participation of dispersed 
interest to direct litigation, but the administrative powers of the 
Commission of inquiring into competition distortions1221 and of 
setting the enforcement priorities of article 102 may compensate 
this embedded exclusion with a view to achieving the policy goals 
of fairness and promotion of the internal market. Unlike other 
administrative agencies that are bent by the incentives from 
political sources that are one-sided, the Commission is part of the 
overall development of EU competition law developed and 
implemented a policy on the application of EU competition law in 
keeping with the treaties1222. Moreover, the independence of the 
Commission from the other political bodies of the EU makes it less 
permeable to the one-sided incentives from political sources, 
which often symbolize the lobbying activities of concentrated 
stakes.  
With regard to the protection of consumer welfare, it is doubtful 
on the account of the above said that the American judge would 
be able to perform a precise economic calculus to assess whether 
the monopolist’s conduct is detrimental to consumers. 
With regard to the consolidation of the internal market, the 
adjudicative process could be a valid mechanism to filter this 
normative goal into the regulation of abusive dominance. It is 
doubtful that courts could efficiently police the fairness of a 
transaction, on the account of the impossibility to judicially 
                                                
1220 N.K. Komesar, Law’s Limits: Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of Rights, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 51 (2001) 
1221 Pusuant to article 7(1)(2) of the Regulation /12003 the Commission has the 
competence to instruct an administrative procedure, empowering itself with 
powers of investigation and decision on an allegation of abuse brought by 
either Member States or by natural or legal persons 
1222 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html  
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determine a fair price, on the one hand, and the absence of a 
normative or political endorsement of fairness in competition law, 
on the other hand1223. The only claim that can be made to include 
fairness among the normative contours of EU competition law is 
by leaning on the argument that the establishment of equal market 
conditions for all market players is a traditional acquis goal: such 
objective can also be interpreted as the need to promote fairness. 
In terms of complexity and costs, it has been seen that the 
dynamics of litigation often imply very high costs and are often 
characterized by minoritarian biases, in that high stake players 
invest significant amount of money in litigation compared to the 
larger groups that have a more dispersed interest (consumers). In 
both systems, the complexity of the litigation hampers the ability 
of judges to make substantive decisions directed to the policy 
goals that the laws of monopoly and abusive dominance intend to 
achieve. 
 
2.1.2 The impact of the political process on the question of 
monopolization 
The political process could gather more technical information to 
discipline the legal question, on the one hand, but could be 
conditioned by biases or one-sided information coming from the 
powerful parts of the public that public officials are to 
acknowledge if they want to remain in office. In other terms, since 
political officials are often the expression of the majoritarian 
interest groups, they might be influenced by distorted views of 
public needs, especially if the distribution of the counter-interest is 
skewed and the participation costs for those who have a lesser 
impact on the political process is high, such as the interest of 
consumers in having a lower price, or the costs of lobbying for 
consumer associations, as opposed to the stronger impact of 
producers on the political process. 
Contrary to that, judges are more insulated from biased 
information and make decisions based on how litigants represent 
their positions in an adversarial framework, which guarantees –at 
least formally- that parties deliver information equally. Courts’ 
independence in adjudicating monopoly cases is the tradeoff for 
the integration of far less information in the process than the 
political institutions. As Komesar puts it, the tradeoff between 
evenhandedness and information is one of the most difficult 
issues in institutional choice1224. 
Consumers’ interest is dispersed and their per capita stakes are 
very low: as a result, it is unlikely that they have an incentive in 
participating in litigation in the form of a class action. Both 
                                                
1223 See supra, para 2.1 
1224 N.K. Komesar, Stranger in a Strange Land: An Outsider's View of Antitrust and 
the Courts, 41 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 443 446 (2010) 
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American and European Courts evaluate whether a conduct is 
pro-competitive or anticompetitive –or if the conduct is 
competition on the merits-, often bereft of the analytical tools and 
the information necessary to assess the impact of a conduct on 
consumers. The outcomes may represent a matter of politics rather 
than precision; however, it goes without saying that courts are 
barred from making political decisions, because of the chiasm 
between political sphere of any legal order, pertaining to the 
activity of the government (gubernaculum), in which decisions are 
made free in their ends, and the jurisdictional sphere pertaining to 
the courts’ activity, which filter the political objectives through the 
substantive and procedural legal rules (iurisdictio)1225. 
Moreover, the configuration of stakes (concentrated as regards the 
monopolist and the other businesses, skewed/dispersed as the 
regards the consumers) renders the high per capita stake actors 
influential in both the political and the market process. That 
shows how the question of monopolization-abusive dominance is 
deeply affected by minoritarian biases: the political influence of 
big businesses, by means of their lobbying activity, is likely to 
prevail over the losing majority of consumers, whose dispersed 
interest can also prevent them from influencing the voting 
procedures. 
From a European perspective, the political process is arguably 
more suitable than the adjudicative and the market process to 
favor the achievement of fairness and the consolidation of the 
internal market in Europe, as it has been seen how fairness can 
hardly be evaluated by a court in claims of abusive dominance, on 
the one hand, and the free display of a monopolized market can 
hardly produce a fair outcome.   
 
2.1.3 The impact of the market process on the question of 
monopolization 
With regard to the political process, it has been seen that the more 
concentrated the minorities’ interests are the more likely they will 
prevail over dispersed majoritarian interests. Because consumers 
and small businesses’ interest is skewed, there is a risk is that a 
concentrated minority represented by the monopoly-sized firms 
may prevail over a dispersed majority and seek rents to influence 
the political process1226.  
Likewise, if the legal question of monopoly were to be left to the 
free display of the market forces, that might provoke an excessive 
                                                
1225 The dichotomy between gubernaculum and iurisdictio was firstly drafted in 
the XIII century by Henry de Bracton in his De Legibus et Consuetudinibus 
Angliae, the second treatise on English laws and customs. Compare H. Brunner, 
The Sources of English Law, Little, Brown, and Company (1908) 
1226 N.K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives – Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, 
and Public Policy, University of Chicago Press, (1994), p. 116 
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tolerance for the inequalities of market power among players in 
the name of a complete abstention from regulating the issue. In 
the market context, the discrepancy between the high per capita 
stakes of big businesses and the low per capita stakes of 
consumers and SMEs might provoke an even less efficient 
allocation of resources. Producers might seek rents over the 
market in order to apply less favorable transaction conditions to 
the detriment of consumers, which would be bound by their 
rationality and the lack of information to accept them. With 
respect to smaller competitors, the market power of the 
monopolist-dominant firm might hamper the entry opportunities 
of the former, since their less efficient structure would not enable 
them to react to an anticompetitive conduct by means of a 
effectively opposing practice. 
Market failures are often associated with information asymmetries 
and monopolistic structures of demand. It has been seen that a 
monopolized market inescapably implies social costs (deadweight 
loss), which affect both competitors and consumers. Market 
failures often call for government interventions, a signal that 
under certain circumstances the market is incapable of self-
correcting. 
As regards the information asymmetries, in a monopolized market 
neither can consumers bear the cost of making an informed 
decision in a transaction, nor does their rationality enable them to 
evaluate the cost and the benefits of a transaction whose 
counterpart is often a big powerful business, holding the critical 
mass to impose its bargaining conditions unilaterally, by means of 
advertising campaigns or, worse, by eliminating competition. 
In all, the free interplay of market forces, absent any judicial or 
governmental intervention, does not prove as a persuasive tool to 
regulate the question of monopoly-abusive dominance with a 
view to encompassing all the interests at stake. The risks of market 
failure inherent in the asymmetry of information and in the 
market power difference among interest groups is a symptom of 
the need to approach the legal question of monopoly with a direct 
involvement of the political and adjudicative process.  
The market process can shed light on what is the efficient level of 
resource allocation, and, therefore, provide guidance as to how to 
measure the social costs of monopoly in terms of consumer 
welfare. This is especially relevant for the US system, whose sole 
policy goal is the achievement of allocative efficiency, based on 
the laws of supply and demand. The market process, on the other 
hand, is unsuitable for embedding the EU policy goals of fairness 
and market integration in the treatment of abusive dominance. 
Nor is it able to self-correct its distortions.  
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3. Conclusion 
A worthwhile conclusion to the above speculation would 
reaffirming the imperfect character of institutional choice, and 
acknowledging that comparative institutional analysis applied to 
the laws of the two systems does not provide a clear-cut answer to 
the question of whether the legal questions above referred should 
be left to solely the regulation of the courts, or of the government 
or of the market. 
The attractiveness of comparative institutional analysis rests on its 
nuanced character; more specifically, it conveys the idea that no 
institution can absolutely prevail over the others in the discipline 
of monopolization-abusive dominance. At the same time, 
institutional choice reflects the dialectic juxtaposition of the three 
processes that, to various extents, all participate in the regulation 
of the issue. Moreover, comparative institutional analysis reveals 
the fact that the law in general, and the laws of monopolization 
and of abusive dominance in particular, is not the result of a static 
procedure, but is the product of a dynamic mechanism, in which 
the interests of the various stakeholders can be defended by 
different institutions.  
In conclusion, and in non-technical terms, both the law of 
monopolization and abusive dominance are the result of the 
interaction of courts, politics and market. Understanding the 
interplay of this three forces means to enrich the analysis of a 
broader perspective, which can better capture the nature of 
monopoly, not as a mere economic phenomenon requiring 
regulation, but as a socio-political-economic incident in which the 
three institutions are at stake. 
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